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ABSTRACT
The Saudi securities market has been suffering from the lack of transparency and
disclosure credibility, which accounts for the market collapse in 2006 causing a loss of
50 per cent of the total market value and heavy losses for many investors. This disaster
has triggered an effect on a large proportion of the population, and in several cases,
death was recorded, and there were other instances where people became ill due to the
stress of the situation. However, such investors have not yet been compensated. One
main reason for this bad state of the market is the non-compliance with corporate
disclosures requirements set out by the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia)
(CML’03) and the regulations issued by the Capital Market Authority (CMA). This
collapse was caused by widespread defective corporate disclosures.
The aim of this thesis is to examine the civil liability regime for defective disclosures in
the Saudi securities market from the perspective of investor protection. An analytical
approach to the examination of the relevant legal rules and principles has been adopted
in undertaking the present thesis. The civil liability regime attracted by breaches of the
disclosure rules related to prospectus and post-prospectus disclosures (continuous and
periodic disclosures) has been examined. In this connection, to assess whether the Saudi
investors have sufficient protection, the relevant laws and principles from selected
developed countries (the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and
Canada), and the principles of securities market regulation set out by the International
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and case laws have been discussed as
a benchmark.

iii

This thesis also examines the remedy provisions for investors, defences available to the
accused (such as the issuers), and the judicial and administrative enforcement of these
provisions (including those related to the disclosure regime) of the Saudi securities laws
compared to the laws of the above mentioned jurisdictions. Finally, this study arrives at
the finding that Saudi Arabia lacks a strong disclosure, liability and remedy regime in
terms of both substantive provisions and their enforcement through the court of law and
the securities commission. There follows a number of suggestions to bring about legal
and regulatory reforms in the securities law of Saudi Arabia with particular reference to
the areas of concern under scrutiny in this study.
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CHAPTER 1:

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1. 1 Introduction
Investment is a driving force for any economy. In the age of the market economy, all
countries chiefly establish their stock markets for the purpose of accessing people’s
savings to finance business and investment activities at a lower cost and with fewer
financial risks compared to traditional bank financing. This is supported by academic
research that there is a positive correlation between stock market activities and stronger
economic growth.1 This is especially true for emerging markets.2
However, securities markets cannot prosper without effective regulation being in place.
Black asserts that regulation is essential for the creation of a strong securities market
which can consequently facilitate economic growth.3 La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and
Shleifer find that the growth of stock markets is strongly linked to extensive disclosure
requirements, liability standards and effective enforcement being in place.4 Hence,
investors feel protected through corporate laws that can remedy their loss or damage
resulting from the violation of the securities laws. Over the past few decades, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia)5 has become an attractive place for domestic

1

Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, 'Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth' (1996) 10 World
Bank Economic Review 323, 333; Philip Arestis, Panicos O Demetriades and Kul B Luintel, 'Financial
Development and Economic Growth: The Role of Stock Markets' (2001) 33 Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 16, 37.
2
A recent study of 80 developing countries from the period 1973 to 2002 found that the stock market has
a significant and positive impact on the economic growth of these developing countries. See Md Rabiul,
'Banks, Stock Markets and Economic Growth: Evidence from Selected Developing Countries' (2010)
37(3) Decision 5, 24.
3
Bernard S Black, 'The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets' (2000) 55 Business
Lawyer 1565, 1565.
4
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 'What Works in Securities Laws'
(2006) 61 Journal of Finance 1, 19.
5
The ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ is the international long official form of the country’s name. However,
the international short form ‘Saudi Arabia’ will be used throughout the thesis. The Official name in
Arabic is Al-Mamlaka al-Arabiya as-Saudiya.
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and international investment. Saudi Arabia’s economy has grown rapidly, leading to a
substantial increase in the investment in the stock market. The Capital Market Law
2003 (CML’03),6 and the Capital Market Authority (CMA) make a positive and notable
contribution to the development of the securities market in Saudi Arabia. As a result, an
increased number of companies going public has contributed to the growth of stock
market over the past decade. The number of listed companies has increased steadily as
has share volume and value. The number of shares traded in 1997 was 312.4 million
valued at USD59.4 billion. In 2011 this increased to 48.535 billion, valued at USD341
billion.7 During the past decade, the number of listed companies has doubled to reach
156 firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE) as at July 2012.8 This makes the
Saudi stock market the largest in the Middle East.9
Figure 1.1 Numbers of Saudi Listed Companies (2001–2012)10

6

Royal Decree No. (M/30) 2 Jumada al-Thani 1424 H [31 July 2003]. Prior to the adoption by the
Council of Ministers of the Capital Market Law, Saudi Arabia did not have a stock exchange and there
was no regulatory framework facilitating such trading or protecting the interest of investors. See Tim
Niblock and Monica Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (Routledge, 2007) 190.
7
Saudi
Stock
Exchange
(Tadawul),
'Annual
Statistical
Report'
(2011)
<http://www.tadawul.com.sa/static/pages/en/Publication/PDF/Annual_Report_2011_English.pdf> 38.
8
Chapter 2 will describe in more detail the development of the Saudi securities market.
9
The Saudi Stock Exchange is the largest exchange in the Middle East in terms of the number of IPOs,
by market capitalisation and by capital raised. See Saudi Stock Exchange, Tadawul (21 April 2013)
<http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c0/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3hLswCXUE8
TIwOLIGMTA08XCx_XQC8XIwMDc_3g1Dz9gmxHRQD5zumD/>.
10
See the Saudi Stock Exchange Official website for the new listed companies in the stock market.
<http://www.tadawul.com.sa>.
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Nevertheless, the development of the Saudi securities market is not satisfactory
compared with the economy of the country. Empirical research classifies the Saudi
stock market a ‘weak’ market.11 The lack of disclosure and transparency undermine the
efficiency of the market.12 As a result, investor confidence has been affected as they feel
that they are not protected. Proper protection has become a matter of priority for
investors in the Saudi securities market. This need is evident from the massive financial
crisis in 2006 when the market lost more than 50 per cent of its value.13 Because of this
collapse, more than 4 million investors suffered devastating financial losses.14
In order to outline the framework of the current study, this chapter is divided into 6
sections. Section 1 is an introduction to the chapter. Section 2 states the problems
prevailing in the securities market of Saudi Arabia. Section 3 describes the significance
and contribution of the study. Section 4 provides its aims and objectives. Section 5
presents its scope and limitation. Section 6 provides the research questions and subquestions. Section 7 explains the methodology utilised in this study and its associated
data collection. Section 8 presents a summary and conclusions.

11

Jasim Al-Ajmi and J H Kim, 'Are Gulf Stock Markets Efficient? Evidence from New Multiple Variance
Ratio Tests' (2012) 44 Applied Economics 1737, 1747.
12
Fama was the originator of the unique definition of market efficiency by providing that ‘A market in
which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information is called “efficient”.’ Eugene F Fama, 'Efficient
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work' (1970) 25 Journal of Finance 383.
13
The Saudi stock market witnessed six major collapses that resulted in significant depreciation of the
general price index during the years of 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2006, and 2008. This worst was in
2006.
14
Sami Al-Nwaisir, 'Saudi Stock Market Needs to be Reformed', Arab News (online), 11 January 2012
<http://www.eurasiareview.com/11012012-saudi-stock-market-needs-to-be-reformed-oped/>.
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1. 2 Statement of Problem
1.2.1

Lack of Regulation

It is generally accepted that central to the regulation of the financial market is
information and that its regulation is necessary because of the existence of informational
asymmetry between issuers and their potential investors.15 Loss contended that the
general problems of fraud and market manipulation make regulation imperative.16
Regarding investor protection in capital markets, he observed that ‘problems at which
modern securities regulation is directed are as old as the cupidity of sellers and the
gullibility of buyers’.17 One of the principal purposes of such regulation is investor
protection as is recognised by regulators worldwide, including the International
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).18 Several empirical and perhaps
most cited studies conducted by a group of researchers in the United States reveal that
the sustainable development of stock markets requires adequate protection of investors,
and a lack of such protection keeps the investing public away from the market.19 The
regulation of capital markets is regarded as a useful means of providing such protection,
which is sought to be achieved by, inter alia, imposing civil liability for defective
disclosures.

15

Razeen Sappideen, 'Securities Market Efficiency Reconsidered' (1988) 9 University of Tasmania Law
Review 132, 139.
16
Louis Loss, Trends in Corporate Governance and Investor Protection (Lagos University, 1981) 33.
17
Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (Little, Brown and Company, 2nd ed, 1988) 1.
18
International Organisation of Securities Commissions, 'Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation' (Report, IOSCO, June 2010) <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf>
3.
19
See Rafael La Porta et al, 'Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation' (2002) 57 Journal of Finance
1147; Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Wolfenzon, 'Investor Protection and Equity Markets' (2002) 66 Journal
of Financial Economics 3; Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, 'The Politics of Legal Reforms' (2002) 2
Economia 91; Rafael La Porta et al, 'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' (2000) 58 Journal of
Financial Economics 3; Rafael La Porta et al, 'Legal Determinants of External Finance' (1997) 52 Journal
of Finance 1131.
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The need for investor protection has led to the creation of laws and regulations in Saudi
Arabia in recent times, and to the appointment of the CMA, which is entrusted with the
responsibility of administering these laws. One of the important functions of the CMA
is thus to protect investors, inter alia, from defective disclosures by corporations to the
public. The regulator aims to provide this protection by preventing defective disclosures
from being included in prospectuses, periodic disclosures and continuous disclosure
documents.20
As part of enforcement measures to deal with the contraventions of disclosure
requirements, the CMA has established a committee known as the ‘Committee for the
Resolution of Securities Disputes’ (CRSD), which has jurisdiction over disputes falling
under the provisions of CML’03, including corporate disclosures.21 Finally, it should be
noted that in 2010, the CMA became an ordinary member of the International
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).22 The comprehensive protection of
investors has, however, not yet been accomplished in the Saudi securities market.
In effect, the Saudi civil liability provisions for defective disclosures are, principally, a
direct translation of the equivalent provisions of the US Securities Act 1933 (SA’33).23

20

CMA functions are broadly stipulated in chapter two of the Saudi Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi
Arabia). The full version of the Capital Market Law 2003 is available at
<http://www.cma.org.sa/En/AboutCMA/CMALaw/Pages/default.aspx>.
21
See article 25 of the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia): The Committee shall have all necessary
powers to investigate and settle complaints and suits, including the power to issue subpoenas, issue
decisions, impose sanctions and order the production of evidence and documents.
22
In fulfilling the criteria for membership, the applicants demonstrate their commitment to IOSCO’s
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation and that their regulatory regimes allow them to
become signatories to Appendix A of the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information. For details, see International
Organisation of Securities Commissions, 'IOSCO Expands its Global Membership to Include Iceland, the
Maldives, Saudi Arabia and Syria' (Media Release, IOSCO/MS/03/2010, 10 June 2010)
<http://www.cmvm.pt/CMVM/Cooperacao%20Internacional/Docs%20Iosco/Documents/IOSCOMS0310
.pdf> 7.
23
Abdulrahman Y Baamir, 'Issues of Transparency and Disclosure in the Saudi Stock Market' (2008) 22
Arab Law Quarterly 63, 78.
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In order for this importation to suit the Saudi securities market conditions, the current
securities laws and regulations need to be reviewed and improved to provide sufficient
protection for market investors. In terms of examples of how closely the legislation
correlates, Beach states that art 55 of the CML’03 closely mirrors the US provision on
liability for misrepresentations in a prospectus.24 In addition, art 56 of the CML’03 is a
direct translation of § 18(a) SA’33. It is submitted that ‘transplanting American-style
law into another country without taking into account the background culture and legal
structure of the country is not effective’.25
Furthermore, ineffective market regulation has a negative impact on the efficiency of
the stock market. Using the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) developed by Fama in
1965, a study on the Saudi stock market classifies the stock market as a ‘weak form’
market,26 which signifies the inefficiency of the stock market.27 Additionally, the same
study also confirms that the market lacks disclosure and transparency regulations for
listed companies.28 Hence, it can be said that the stock prices do not reflect the
(officially disclosed) information in the stock market as the market basically lacks
transparency and driven by rumours and false information. Nevertheless, the
government and securities regulator are not effectively working together in order to
24

Joseph W Beach, 'The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law in
Developing Markets' (2005) 41 Journal of International Law 307, 347. See Securities Act 1933 (US) §
11.
25
Stephen J Choi, 'Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets' (2002) 80
Texas Law Review 1657, 1726.
26
There are three types of market efficiency are generally distinguished:
i. The weak form: where a current price is considered to incorporate all the information contained in
past prices.
ii. The semi-strong form: where a current price incorporates all publicly known information,
including its own past prices.
iii. The strong form: where prices reflect all information that can possibly be known, including
privately known information.
For more details, see Fama, above n 12.
27
Ibrahim A Onour, 'Testing Weak-form Efficiency of Saudi Stock Exchange Market' (Ministry of
Economy and Planning, 2004) 3.
28
Ibid 5.

6

Chapter 1: General Introduction

carry out the necessary modification or to introduce any fundamental regulations in the
stock market which would foster the financial and monetary policies to encourage
people to enter the stock market again.
1.2.2

Inadequate Protection of Investors

The Saudi stock market is one of the largest emerging markets in the world,29 and has
been experiencing growing demands for investment in corporate securities. In recent
years, the demand for stock trading and investment portfolios has doubled and the
number of subscribers in some of the initial public offerings represents more than 60 per
cent of the population.30 The market witnessed the largest collapse in its history in 2006,
causing heavy losses of many investors, especially speculators. The price index lost
over 13,000 points (65 per cent of its maximum level).31 This sudden collapse was
caused by widespread defective corporate disclosures and rumour driven trading
practice by investors.32 Niblock and Malik say that ‘substantial responsibility also lay
with the character, imperfections and inadequate regulatory arrangement of the market
itself’.33 However, the investors have not yet been compensated. This collapse warrants
an in-depth investigation of its causes, implications and remedies from the perspective
of civil liability for defective disclosures.
With the increase in initial public offerings and a resultant increase in listed companies,
publication of defective disclosures are becoming a common phenomenon in the Saudi

29

Shawkat Hammoudeh and Huimin Li, 'Sudden Changes in Volatility in Emerging Markets: The Case of
Gulf Arab Stock Markets' (2008) 17 International Review of Financial Analysis 47, 49.
30
Khalid R Al-Rodhan, 'The Saudi and Gulf Stock Markets: Irrational Exuberance or Markets
Efficiency?'
(Center
for
Strategic
and
International
Studies,
2005)
<http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/051025_saudi_gulf_mrkts.pdf> 5.
31
Abdulrahman A Al-Twaijry, 'Saudi Stock Market Historical View and Crisis Effect: Graphical and
Statistical Analysis' (2007) 34 Journal of Human Sciences 1, 2.
32
Onour, 'Testing Weak-form Efficiency of Saudi Stock Exchange Market', above n 27, 6.
33
Niblock and Malik, above n 6, 218.
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capital market.34 This has raised the question of the efficacy of civil liability provisions
concerning corporate disclosures. As it stands, there are insufficient laws to cover all
breaches made by corporations, their directors and other persons involved in the
contraventions. In addition, a lack of transparency, poor corporate governance, broad
defences and weak enforcement practice, have made the issue of stock market
regulation difficult. A former legal advisor to the CMA claims that despite the fact that
disclosure rules are in place, they are not very functional in practice.35 Moreover, a 2009
empirical study revealed that corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is in its early stages
and is characterised by a lack of accountability, a weak legal framework and poor
protection of shareholders.36
One of the major problems with disclosure in the Saudi stock market is that some
people are able to know before others how and when a company will announce material
financial disclosures, such as the declaration of dividends.37 This means that the market
lacks integrity and transparency with respect to corporate disclosures. It is important to
make full, accurate and timely disclosure of material information to the market in order
to protect general investors.38 This weakness thus necessitates an investigation into the
causes contributing to the problem with a view to finding a viable solution. It may be
worth mentioning that despite these weaknesses persisting in the Saudi capital market

34

Many investors sustain losses because of defective disclosures in prospectuses. For example, see
Abdullah Bajubayr, 'Please Our Money..O Anti-Corruption Commission', Aleqtisadiah (online), 18 April
2012 <http://www.aleqt.com/2012/04/18/article_648289.html> [Arabic]. Unless otherwise stated, titles of
Arabic language texts are translated by the author of this thesis.
35
Ibrahim Al-Nasiri, 'Law and Transparency, O CMA', Alsharq (online), 11 April 2012
<http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2012/04/11/212941> [Arabic].
36
Khalid I Falgi, Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia: A Stakeholder Perspective (PhD Thesis,
University of Dundee, 2009) 295.
37
Mohammed Al Abbas, 'Information in the Stock Market Between Disclosure and the Black Market',
Aleqtisadiah (online), 10 November 2006 <http://www.aleqt.com/2006/11/10/article_6944.html>
[Arabic].
38
The term ‘material information’ will be discussed in chapter 4 and 5.
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for a long time, there has been no comprehensive research into civil liability for
defective disclosures by corporations in Saudi Arabia. In general, disclosure norms and
announcement practices in the Saudi securities market are poor.39 A recent study finds
that the lack of sufficient information amongst investors in the Saudi stock market leads
to a significant reduction in stock returns.40
The lack of investor protection has undermined the growth of the stock market in Saudi
Arabia. Investors have become unwilling to enter the market. On the other hand, victims
of violations of the law are reluctant to seek remedies due to the uncertainty of
indemnification of their damages and loss. Consequently, the current study is going to
address the problem of inoperative civil liability for defective corporate disclosures in
Saudi stock market from the perspective of investor protection. The weakness of civil
liability is necessarily linked to the weak requirements for information disclosure and
ineffective enforcement machinery.

1. 3 Significance and Benefits of the Study
Disclosure is a fundamental issue of securities laws, as it affects both the market and the
conduct of market participants. Disclosures aim to enable the public to make informed
investment decisions and are believed to be the ‘holy grail’ of securities markets. Hence
the development of an appropriate body of disclosure law is vital to the integrity of
securities law and ultimately to the market economy.41 False and misleading disclosures

39

Ahmed Alzahrani and Len Skerratt, 'How Markets React to Earnings Announcements in the Absence of
Analysts and Institutions: Evidence from the Saudi Market' (Working Paper No 09-40, Brunel University,
Department of Economics and Finance, 2009) <http://www.brunel.ac.uk/9379/efwps/0940.pdf> 6.
40
Noor Azlinna Azizan and Yahia Saad Mohamed, 'Predictability of the Saudi Arabian Market' (2010) 10
International Journal of Business Research 97, 108.
41
Jian Fu, Corporate Disclosure by Listed Companies in the People’s Republic of China and Australia:
Seeking an Appropriate Pathway for the Regulation of the Chinese Securities Market (PhD Thesis,
University of New South Wales, 2005) [Abstract].

9

Chapter 1: General Introduction

or omission of timely disclosure of material information may ruin investors, damage
public confidence, cause the collapse of a securities market and harm the national
economy for the long term. Liability is imposed to prevent that harm.
La Porta et al have found that countries with better legal protections for investors have
more developed financial markets.42 They analysed the securities laws of 49 countries
and found that disclosure rights and liability standards were positively correlated with
larger stock markets.
The Saudi stock market is associated with a lack of transparency, which was a major
reason for the market collapse in 2006. This massive financial catastrophe that hit the
Saudi stock market needs immediate investigation to ensure it does not happen again. In
order to do this, civil liability for the breach of the disclosure regime has to be reviewed
and strengthened as part of necessary legal reforms so that investors can be more
protected from disclosure violations.
Effective reforms are necessary for investor protection. However, in Saudi Arabia a
number of impediments to this exist, such as, an absence of academic literature in the
field of securities law in Saudi Arabia, weak investor confidence in the securities
market, lack of transparency and disclosure, weak civil liability, and ineffective judicial
enforcement and administrative enforcement of the disclosure regime. These
impediments would impact on the effective reform of the securities market in Saudi
Arabia. Hence, by addressing the above issues, the present study attempts to propose
legal reforms in order to strengthen the protection of investors, and improve the
integrity of the securities market as well as the economy of the country.

42

La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, above n 4, 27.
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Although the Saudi stock market is considered the largest market in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC),43 the Arab world and the Middle Eastern region, 44 the
market remains characterised by a lack of transparency. Therefore, improving the
accuracy of disclosures is essential for the investor protection as well as the
development of market.
Furthermore, the importance of this study derives from the strong correlation between
the stock market and the country’s economy. Having a developed stock market is
significant for the development of the private sector and the entire country as well. The
securities market must be attractive to investors so that the public can have confidence
and invest in the ‘initial public offering’ (IPO) and trade in the secondary market.
Hence, having appropriate education programs is essential for investors and
intermediaries in order for them to be able to assess financial information and make an
informed investment decision. This highlights the role of the securities regulator (CMA)
in the adoption of such programs and in issuing further rules in this regard as part of its
role as the supervisor of the market.
However, as alluded to earlier, the current legal and regulatory framework for corporate
disclosure in Saudi Arabia is weak and ineffective. Given the importance of full, fair
and timely disclosure of material or price sensitive information by corporations and
enforcement of those requirements for investors, markets and national economies alike
(as discussed above), the area of this study warrants an in-depth investigation of its

43

The GCC is a political and economic union of the Arab states bordering the Arab Gulf, namely
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
44
The Middle East region consists of Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates (UAE), West Bank and
Gaza, and Yemen. Sometimes the region is grouped with North African countries, together known as the
MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, and includes Algeria, Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania,
Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia.
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various aspects as identified in the discussion of the study’s objectives. Despite the
importance of this area, no comprehensive study — to the best of this researcher’s
knowledge — has been carried out to date addressing the concerns that this study
intends to address. This lack of investigation demonstrates the justification for and
significance of undertaking this study.
With the absence of academic literature in the field of securities laws in Saudi Arabia,
this study may fill the gap in this regard. The securities markets in Middle East
countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular may immensely benefit from the
outcomes of this study, which is intended to produce a set of reform proposals with a
view to intensifying investor protection and thereby developing robust securities
markets in the region. The current study identifies areas of further future research as a
continued effort to achieve vibrant capital markets in the countries of the Middle East.

1. 4 Aims and Objectives of the Study
The principal aim of this study is to improve the legal regime of investor protection in
the securities market in Saudi Arabia. In addition, it aims to increase local and foreign
portfolio investment in the country by generating and maintaining public confidence in
the securities market. Hence, formulating a legal and regulatory framework for
corporate civil liability is a major aim of this study.
In order to achieve these aims, this study has a number of objectives. The present study
intends to critically examine the current corporate disclosure provisions concerning
initial public offerings, periodic disclosures, and continuous disclosures in Saudi
Arabia. This study also makes an effort to identify and analyse what conduct constitutes
civil wrongs attracting civil liability under the current legal framework. Moreover, an
12
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examination of who can be held civilly liable for wrongdoings and an assessment of the
merits of the defences that are available to avoid such liability will be undertaken within
the objectives of the present study. Further discussion is presented in this study
regarding those who are entitled to seek civil remedies for contraventions of disclosure
requirements. For this reason, this study tries to identify the shortcomings and
weaknesses of laws governing the disclosure regime, civil liability for defective
disclosures, and the efficiency of the judicial enforcement. Furthermore, the current
study seeks to critically evaluate the role of the market regulator in protecting investors
and investigating the effectiveness of the judicial enforcement. Finally, the present
study intends to provide suggestions for further improvement of the relevant laws and
regulation in Saudi Arabia.

1. 5 Scope and Limitation of the Study
The present study is concerned with the current disclosure requirements for
prospectuses, and continuous and periodic disclosures in Saudi securities market.45 It
focuses on civil liability resulting from non-compliance with these requirements and the
enforcement machinery of the disclosure requirements and civil liability for the breach
of these requirements.
The first two substantive chapters, chapters 4 and 5, compare and evaluate the civil
liability provisions for breaches of the disclosure regime in Saudi Arabia and the
selected developed countries — the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK),
Australia and Canada. First, these two chapters discuss the disclosure requirements for a

45

Obligations and liability for prospectuses, periodic disclosures and continuous disclosures are found
and defined in the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia), Listing Rules 2004 (Saudi Arabia) and
Market Conduct Regulations 2004 (Saudi Arabia). However, this thesis will attempt an in-depth analysis
of the disclosure regime, the civil liability for the breaches of this regime and the enforcement machinery.
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prospectus, and for continuous disclosure and periodic disclosure in Saudi Arabia and
the selected countries. 46 Second, the Saudi civil liability provisions for breaches of the
disclosure requirements are evaluated in comparison with civil liability provisions in the
selected countries. The study considers the liability of the company as a separate entity,
and that of its directors, officers, underwriters and professionals involved in the
preparation and issuance of a prospectus.
The subsequent two chapters, chapters 6 and 7, continue to evaluate the civil liability
provisions in two main divisions. First, it provides and evaluates the remedies available
to investors for breaches of the disclosure regime, and second, it discusses the available
defences against civil liability for defective disclosures. In addition, evidence in
securities litigation is briefly discussed due to the importance of evidence in a claim for
civil liability and defences against such liability.
The final two chapters of this thesis (apart from the concluding chapter) are dedicated to
studying the enforcement machinery for securities laws and attempt to establish the
arguments that the judicial and administrative enforcement of the disclosure regime in
Saudi Arabia is not fully capable of providing protection for investors in the securities
market. Thus, the judicial enforcement chapter (Chapter 8) addresses the judicial
institutions for securities litigations in the terms of their composition, members and
performance. Likewise, the role played by the CMA in enforcing the disclosure regime
is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 9. The functions of the CMA in protecting investors
from defective disclosures have been addressed in the terms of pre-violation and postviolation of the disclosure regime.

46

Ibid.
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While this thesis is confined to studying investor protection through civil liability for
breach of the disclosure regime, it is difficult to address properly all the issues
concerned with investor protection in a single thesis. Therefore, further issues
encompassed by investor protection in securities market have been excluded from the
present thesis. These further issues include controlling misleading, manipulative or
fraudulent practices such as insider trading, ‘front running’ or trading ahead of
customers and the misuse of client assets, and so on.

1. 6 Research Questions and Sub-Questions
The main research questions for this study are:
i.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the civil liability regime for corporate
disclosures in Saudi Arabia in order to protect investors?

ii. How can the Saudi corporate disclosure regime be further improved to protect
investors?
The above research questions have been chosen based on the fact that the current Saudi
corporate disclosure provisions are flawed and ineffective in terms of civil liability and
their enforcement in practice. The following sub-questions need to be addressed in the
proposed study in search of answers to the main questions listed above.
Relevant Sub-Questions:
i.

What is the importance of investor protection in the Saudi securities market?

ii.

What are the objectives of disclosures in prospectuses, and periodic and
continuous disclosure documents under Saudi law?
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iii. Are the present requirements adequate to ensure full, fair and timely disclosure of
material information by corporations in Saudi Arabia?
iv. What is the scope of contravention of these requirements which would attract civil
liability?
v.

Who can be held liable for a disclosure containing untrue and misleading
information under Saudi law?

vi. What defences are available to escape liability, and how and when can these
defences be relied upon?
vii. What remedies are available for breaches of civil liability provisions for defective
disclosures?
viii. Are the present remedies adequate to compensate victims and to create deterrence
against contraventions?
ix. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial enforcement of the
disclosure requirements currently in place in Saudi Arabia?
x.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the administrative enforcement of these
requirements and how effective is the role of the market regulator in protecting
securities investors in Saudi Arabia?

xi. How can the enforcement regime be further strengthened in Saudi Arabia?

1. 7 Research Methodology and Data Collection
This thesis has been conducted based on archival primary and secondary materials
which have been collected from different libraries in Australia and Saudi Arabia, and
from the electronic sources available especially from the library of the University of
Wollongong. Interlibrary borrowing services have been used in collecting materials
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which are not available otherwise. A field-trip to Saudi Arabia was also completed in
order to collect materials related to the topic of the current research.
This research study is designed to cater for the need to conduct a comprehensive study
on the legal and regulatory framework for corporate disclosures in Saudi Arabia. The
legal system of Saudi Arabia is based on Islamic law (Shari’ah). Most of the legal
principles currently in force in the country are derived from the sources of Shari’ah.
When any rules or principles from different legal systems are adopted, they must be
able to conform or be consonant with Shari’ah. In such a case, there should not remain
any contradiction between Shari’ah and traditional laws. Any rule or principle is
Islamic unless it conflicts with Shari’ah.
It is, however, pertinent to mention that despite the fact that the country’s law largely
originates in Shari’ah, the body of commercial law is composed of both Shari’ah and
civil as well as common law principles. This implies that Saudi Arabia has the
flexibility to adopt useful provisions of corporate law from other jurisdictions in order
to improve its corporate regulation. Moreover, the securities laws of Saudi Arabia were
originally drafted by hired academics and scholars in line with similar laws of the US as
it will be shown in Chapter 3.47 Hence, the Saudi laws of securities regulation have been
reliant upon their equivalent in developed nations from their inception. Therefore, in
addition to the US jurisdictions, the major common law jurisdictions have been
examined as potential sources of suitable legislative provisions.
Having regard to this, the discussion in this thesis will use the civil liability provisions
for defective disclosures from selected developed countries, these being the US, the UK,

47

For more information, see below section 3.3.1.
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Australia and Canada. These jurisdictions are selected on the basis of the strength of
their improved securities regulatory regimes and the success of their markets. A
justification for this selection is that it is believed that the common law jurisdictions
appear to be much more active enforcers than civil law jurisdictions.48 A study of 49
countries demonstrated that common law countries had more extensive mandatory
disclosure requirements, and made it easier for investors to recover damages.49
Moreover, the civil liability provisions in the CML’03 are similar to their equivalents in
the SA’33.50 However, in this thesis, it will be demonstrated that in Saudi Arabia simply
copying laws from one jurisdiction to another without having an effective regulatory
body and enforcement mechanism is not successful, hence, it seems justifiable to
borrow further from common law countries in regard to these and other shortcomings.
This is particularly the case as capital flow is international in nature and greater
commonality and assurance would facilitate inflows to Saudi Arabia as well as
increased confidence in the domestic market.
In Australia and the UK, securities markets are centrally regulated, which is in contrast
to the situation in the US and Canada. In the US, there are two different regulations: one
is for the state level and the other is at the federal level. In respect of corporate
disclosure liability, the US federal securities laws will be used in this thesis. In regard to
Canada, where federal securities regulation does not exist, the regulatory regime of the
Province of Ontario will be used. This province has the nation’s largest capital market
and one of its most stringent and sophisticated securities regulatory regimes. In all other
developed countries mentioned above, the laws on national regulation of their securities
48

John C Coffee, 'Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement' (2007) 156(2) University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 229, 261.
49
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, above n 4, 17-28.
50
Beach, above n 24.
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markets have been taken into account in this thesis. Disclosure rules and regulations
issued by securities regulator of Saudi Arabia (the CMA) and those of other selected
countries will be examined in this thesis.51
The regulation of corporations is an area of law where commonality of principles in
many respects is desirable, regardless of the origins of the legal systems concerned. This
includes, for example, what conduct should be civilly prohibited, who should be held
liable for defective disclosures, what defences should be allowed to avoid liability or
what remedies should be made available to the victims, and so on.
Furthermore, the laws that govern the civil liability for defective disclosures in Saudi
Arabia will be examined from a comparative perspective. The principles and objectives
of the securities regulation set out by IOSCO and their current application in Saudi
Arabia will also be investigated. In recent years, IOSCO has demonstrated tremendous
success in raising the quality of securities market regulation and in strengthening
consultation and cooperation between regulators. This has been one of the
organisation’s key achievements.52 Saudi Arabia, as well as the other countries whose
jurisdictions are referred to in this thesis, are members of IOSCO.
As this study will be confined to the jurisdictions of the US, UK, Canada and Australia
in regard to the discussion of the questions listed earlier, it will adopt a moderate view
in selecting useful legal provisions from these selected developed jurisdictions in order
51

These securities regulators are:
i. Capital Market Authority (CMA), Saudi Arabia.
ii. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), United States.
iii. Australia Securities & Investment Commission (ASIC), Australia.
iv. Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), Canada.
v. Financial Services Authority (FSA), United Kingdom.
52
International Organisation of Securities Commissions, Final Communique of the XXXth Annual
Conference of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (Press Release, 7 April
2005) <http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS88-English.pdf> 1.
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to improve their equivalents in Saudi Arabia. However, adequate and appropriate
arguments will be provided in every case where the adoption of legal principles from
foreign jurisdictions is recommended for incorporation in Saudi law.
To achieve the objectives of the study, the following methods are employed:
i.

Collection of all primary relevant primary and secondary materials;

ii.

Review of the secondary literature on laws and regulations concerning investor
protection in the securities market;

iii.

Analysis of the relevant statutes and by-laws of Saudi Arabia and the selected
developed jurisdictions;

iv.

Discovery of suitable case law to be used when it is needed throughout the
analysis;

v.

Examination of media releases, newspaper articles, the opinions of
commentators and experts on the operation of the SSE and the legal and
regulatory framework of the securities market in Saudi Arabia;

vi.

Analysis of the available statistical data and public records issued by the
government, the CMA and the SSE.

It should be noted that the present study will assess the enforcement of civil liability and
the role of the securities regulator in Saudi Arabia without a full survey of the situation
in the above selected developed jurisdictions. This can be justified by the fact that,
unlike developed countries, judges and lawyers in Saudi Arabia are not well-trained and
not expert in securities. In addition, the CMA members lack legal education and
experience in the private sector as well as the well-trained staff to deal with, detect and
investigate violations of the disclosure rules. However, some useful standards and
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practices from the developed countries will be used carefully and selectively in order to
strengthen the enforcement regime of securities laws in Saudi Arabia.
As has been mentioned earlier, the literature on the topic of this thesis in Saudi Arabia is
extremely limited and in regard to some issues non-existent. The vast majority of
materials in this thesis are available in English. In instances where Arabic sources are
cited, the author of this thesis has translated the titles of Arabic sources into English and
indicated that in brackets [Arabic]. Due to the paucity of Saudi cases, mostly the case
law of the selected common law countries has been used.

1. 8 Summary and Conclusions
The existence of weak investor protection has been recognised as the principal problem
in the Saudi securities market. It has been submitted that the weak legal and regulatory
framework of the securities market produce weak protection for investors in the Saudi
securities market. In addition, it has been identified that investor protection is primarily
undermined by the ineffective disclosure requirements as well as the weak application
of civil liability provisions for breaches of these requirements.
Despite these weaknesses, the laws and regulations dealing with investor protection
have not been comprehensively examined. Hence, this study will be the first of its kind
which investigates investor protection and civil liability for defective disclosures in
prospectuses and in continuous and periodic disclosures in Saudi Arabia. The proposed
study intends to produce a set of reform proposals with a view to strengthening investor
protection and thereby facilitate the development of robust securities markets in Saudi
Arabia.
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This research provides specific suggestions and recommendations for the development
of the current legal and regulatory laws relating to investor protection. Hence, the
results of this study may encourage the governmental authorities to carry out additional
efforts to protect investors in the capital market. Additionally, academic research may
benefit from this attempt to improve the legal and the regulatory framework of the
Saudi securities market.
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CHAPTER 2:
INTRODUCTION TO SAUDI ARABIA, ITS
SECURITIES MARKET AND RELEVANT CONCEPTS
2. 1 Introduction
Following the general introduction which outlined the main concerns of this study, this
chapter aims to look at some introductory issues which are relevant to this research.
This chapter will provide a brief background to Saudi Arabia and its legal system and
the securities market from its inception53 and demonstrate the gradual development of
the market from 1935 to 2011. Moreover, attention will be drawn to the issues affecting
the development of the market and will be highlighted from both an economic and a
legal perspective. This chapter will look at some introductory conceptual and
terminology issues. It will identify the major terms and concepts relating to the concerns
of this thesis. Hence, this chapter is divided into a number of sections. An introduction
to the chapter is in section 1. Section 2 introduces Saudi Arabia as an independent
country and explains the legal system in Saudi Arabia. Section 3 introduces the
securities market in Saudi Arabia. Section 4 explains the inception of the Saudi
securities market in 1935 and its gradual development up until 2011 as well as
providing a comparison between the position of the Saudi securities market and its
regional and international counterparts. Section 5 discusses the major drawbacks
associated with the development of the Saudi securities market from an economic
prospective. Section 6 provides the reasons for weak investor protection on the
development of the Saudi securities market. Section 7 discusses the main terms and
concepts that are the concern of this thesis. Section 8 emphasises the importance of the
disclosure regime and the civil liability in relation to investor protection and the

53

The terms ‘securities market’, ‘stock market’ and ‘share market’ will be used interchangeably.

Chapter 2: Introduction to Saudi Arabia, Its Securities Market and Relevant Concepts

development of the market. Section 9 comprises a summary of the discussions and
conclusions.

2. 2 Background to Saudi Arabia
The history and development of the Arabian Peninsula and Saudi Arabia in particular
have been deeply influenced by Islam. In the 18th century, a religious scholar of the
central Najd,54 Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, joined forces with Muhammad bin
Saud, the ruler of the town of Diriyah, to bring the Najd and the rest of Arabia back to
what adherents believe is the original and undefiled form of Islam.55
The 23rd of September 1932 marks the foundation of the modern Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the heartland of Islam, the birthplace of its
history, the site of the two holy mosques (Al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca and Al-Masjid
al-Nabawi in Medina), which makes it the geographical focus of Islamic devotion and
prayer.56
The political system of Saudi Arabia is a monarchy.57 The King is the ruler of the
country, the prime minister of the government and the commander-in-chief of the
military. A legislative body called the majlis ash-shura (the Consultative Council)

54

Najd is the central region of Arabian Peninsula.
Anthony Shoult, 'People, History and Culture' in Anthony Shoult (ed), Doing Business with Saudi
Arabia (GMB Publishing, 3rd ed, 2006) 9, 13.
56
Anthony Shoult, 'Country Overview' in Anthony Shoult (ed), Doing Business with Saudi Arabia (GMB
Publishing, 3rd ed, 2006) 6. The Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca is, of course, one of the five pillars of Islam.
57
Basic Law of Governance 1992 (Saudi Arabia) art 5 declares that ‘Monarchy is the system of rule in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and rulers of the country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King
Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants.’
55
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advises the King.58 The Council proposes new laws and amends existing ones. It
consists of 150 members who are appointed by the King for a renewable four-year term.
The country is divided into 13 provinces, with a governor and deputy governor in each
one. Each province has its own council that advises the governor and deals with the
development of the province. The national language of Saudi Arabia is Arabic. The
country’s population is 27 million, including 8.4 million foreign residents (according to
the 2010 census).59 Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the Middle East and the
twelfth largest in the world in terms of geographic size.60
Figure 2.2 Map of Saudi Arabia61

58

Majlis ash-shura is a legislative body that advises the King on issues that are important to the State.
See Hamdallah M Hamdallah, Saudi Commercial Law (Khawarizm for Publications and Distribution, 2nd
ed, 2004) [Arabic] 21.
59
Central Department of Statistics and Information Saudi Arabia, Key Indicators (17 June 2012)
<http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/english/>.
60
Saudi Arabia is about 2.2 million square kilometres in area. Sajjad M Jasimuddin, 'Analyzing the
Competitive Advantages of Saudi Arabia with Porter’s Model' (2001) 16 Journal of Business and
Industrial Marketing 59, 59.
61
Map
of
Saudi
Arabia
(10
July
2012)
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/atlas_middle_east/saudi_arabia.jpg>.
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Saudi Arabia is a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), United
Nations, League of Arab States, Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); a member of many
international organisations, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO); and a signatory to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. Saudi Arabia is part of the world Group of Twenty Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors, which is also known as the ‘G20’. The G20
consists of 20 major economies: 19 countries plus the European Union.
Saudi Arabia has the largest economy in the entire Middle East with the largest banking
sector and capital market, and is the region’s largest exporter and importer of goods.62
In 2010, Saudi Arabia’s GDP was estimated to be USD622.5 billion, making it 23 rd in
the world.63 Saudi Arabia is the world’s leading oil producer, and exporter and the
owner of a quarter of all proven oil reserves. Oil accounts for more than 90 per cent of
the country’s exports and from 80 to 90 per cent of total export earnings, which
represents more than 75 per cent of the government’s annual budget. In fact, the Saudi
economy is commonly considered a small, open, oil-based economy.64
2.2.1

Saudi Arabia and Its Legal System

Islam, as the religion of the vast majority of the population, forms the foundation of the
legal and commercial systems in Saudi Arabia.65 Hence, the legal system of Saudi
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Shoult, ‘Country Overview’, above n 56, (Foreword).
Macgorine A Cassell and Rebecca J Black, 'Analysis of Hofstede’s 5-D Model: The Implications of
Conducting Business in Saudi Arabia' (2012) 16 International Journal of Management and Information
Systems 151, 152.
64
J W Wright and Muhktar M Ballool, 'Business Policy in an Era of New Prosperity: Strategic
Investment Planning from 1970 to 1985' in J W Wright (ed), Business and Development in Saudi Arabia
(Macmillan Press, 1996) 33, 33.
65
Janet K Mullin Marta et al, 'Some Important Factors Underlying Ethical Decisions of Middle-Eastern
Marketers' (2004) 21 International Marketing Review 53, 55.
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Arabia is based on Islamic law (Shari’ah). Shari’ah is considered the general law
(Common Law) in Saudi Arabia. In principle, Shari’ah applies to all actions, regardless
of the type of these actions, and all persons are subject to Shari’ah.66 The King is at the
apex of the legal system. He acts as the final court of appeal and can issue pardons.
There are essentially two legal systems in Saudi Arabia: ‘[o]ne is based on Shari'ah
Islami'iah (Islamic teachings) and the other is based on secularised (non-religious) laws,
known as nizam.’67
Saudi Arabia has no formal constitution. The functions of a constitution are served by
the Basic Law of Governance 1992 (Al-Nizam al-asasi) (BLG’92), which articulates the
system of government, rights of citizens, and powers and duties of the state.68 The
BLG’92 specifically states that the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad
(Peace be upon him) are the country’s constitution.69 The Holy Qur’an is the first source
of Shari’ah.70 It was collected very early in Islamic history. All Muslims accept the text
of Qur’an, which they believe to be the literal and final word of God, and as accurate
and beyond dispute.71 The Sunnah is the second most important text of Islamic law. It
refers to all the acts and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as well as
everything he approved.72 According to the BLG’92, art 48: ‘[t]he Courts shall apply
rules of the Islamic Shari’ah in cases that are brought before them, according to the

66

For more details, See Abdulhadi M Alghamdi and Bin Yunis Hussinie, The Commercial Law (King
Fahad National Library, 2005) [Arabic] 11.
67
Cassell and Black, above n 63.
68
Abdulaziz H Al-Fahad, 'Ornamental Constitutionalism: the Saudi Basic Law of Governance' (2005) 30
Yale Journal of International Law 375, 385.
69
See Basic Law of Governance 1992 (Saudi Arabia) art 1.
70
Islamic law is known as Shari’ah. Also, Shariah and Sharia are other spellings in common usage.
71
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and
International Law (Syracuse University Press, 1990) 19.
72
Jamila Hussain, Islam: Its Law and Society (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2011) 36.
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Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah, and according to laws which are decreed by the ruler in
agreement with the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah.’73
However, a study on the legal system of Saudi Arabia finds that a combination of
specific written laws has created the constitution of Saudi Arabia.74 In addition to the
BLG’92, these written laws are the Consultative Council Law 1992, the Law of Regions
1992, the Law of Council Ministers 1994 and the Law of the Judiciary 2007.75
Currently, Saudi Arabia has a dual judicial system comprised of the Shari’ah Courts
System (al-Mahakim al-Shariy'ah) and an independent administrative judiciary known
as the Board of Grievances (Diwan Al-Mazalem). In addition to the previous judicial
bodies, several Administrative Committees have jurisdiction to hear certain specified
cases. Moreover, the Law of Judiciary 2007 (LJ’07) permits the establishment of
specialised courts by ‘Royal Order on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial
Council’.76 There are two specialised courts within the Shari’ah Courts System: the
Courts of Guarantee and Marriages, which exercise jurisdiction over civil suits
regarding marriage and divorce, as well as child custody; and the Juvenile Court, which
hears juvenile delinquency cases. According to the LJ’07 and the BLG’92, Shari’ah
Courts have jurisdiction over all disputes and crimes except those exempted from their
jurisdiction by law. Shari’ah Courts hear cases related to personal status, family affairs,
civil disputes and most criminal cases. However, different laws and regulations have
granted jurisdiction over different claims and crimes to either the Board of Grievances
or to Administrative Committees.
73

Basic Law of Governance 1992 (Saudi Arabia) art 48. Also, see arts 1 and 7.
Abdulrahman A Bin Shalhoob, The Constitutional System in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Between
the Shariah and Comparative Law (Safir Press, 2nd ed, 2005) [Arabic] 403.
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Ibid.
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Abdullah F Ansary, A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System (July 2008) Hauser Global
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Figure 2.3: The Judicial System in Saudi Arabia
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There are several ‘Administrative Committees’ with judicial powers which have been
periodically created since the unification of Saudi Arabia in 1932. These Administrative
Committees have jurisdiction over civil, commercial, administrative and criminal cases
and disputes arising out of the implementation of several laws and provisions. The
jurisdiction of each committee is determined by the decree that created it.77
Over the past few years, the Saudi government has issued a number of laws and
regulations, including the Saudi Capital Market Law 2003 (CML’03),78 Code of Law
Practice 2001 (CLP’01),79 Law of Criminal Procedure 2001 (LCP’01),80 and Law of
Procedure before Shari’ah Courts 2000 (LPSC’00).81
Vogel states that Saudi Arabia is the most traditionalist Islamic legal system in the
world today.82 While this is partly true, Saudi law is more comprehensive than Shari’ah,
in the sense that Saudi law includes Islamic law and the codes and regulations adapted
from other laws within the sphere of the Shari’ah principles.

83

For example, the

Banking Control Law 1966 (BCL’66) shows the way in which Saudi legislators deal
with activities prohibited under Shari’ah.84
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Examples of current Saudi administrative committees are as follows:
x The Tax Committees;
x The Committees for Penalising Traffic Violations;
x The Mining Disputes Committee;
x The Fraud, Cheating and Speculation Committee;
x The Banking Disputes Settlement Committee; and,
x The Copyright Committee.
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The formation and operation of private companies are regulated by the Companies Law
1965 (CL’65),85 as amended in 1967 and 1982 by subsequent Royal Decrees.86 The
CL’65 does not regulate the participants in the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE) and their
activities. Only the Capital Market Law 2003 (CML’03) and the rules and regulation of
the Capital Market Authority (CMA) have jurisdiction over the primary and secondary
market parties and activities in Saudi Arabia.

2. 3 Introduction to the Securities Market
Financial markets may be divided into two parts, namely, the money market and the
capital market. ‘Money markets’ refer to markets that deal with short-term securities.87
The capital market is a long-term market and consists of securities having maturities
longer than one year.88 Hence, the securities market that this thesis is concerned with is
the capital market. It is also generally known as ‘stock market’ and ‘share market’.
These terms will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
A securities market is a market place where funds are raised for commercial and
investment enterprises and where securities in public companies are bought and sold.
There are essentially two types of securities markets: primary and the secondary
markets.

85

Issued under Royal Decree No. M/6 [22 July 1965]. According to this decree, a company is defined as
‘a contract pursuant to which each of two or more persons undertake to participate, in an enterprise
aiming at profit, by offering in specie or as work share, for sharing in the profits or losses resulting from
such enterprise’.
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Saudi Arabia: Business & Investment Opportunities Year Book (International Business Publications,
USA, 2005).
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Securities in money market are, for example, treasury bills, commercial paper sold by corporations to
finance their daily operations, or certificates of deposit with maturities of less than one year sold by
banks: Stanley B Block, Geoffrey A Hirt and Bartley R Danielson, Foundations of Financial
Management (McGraw-Hill Irwin, 13th ed, 2009) 15.
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Ibid 443.
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The primary market is a market where the initial fund raising is made by way of the sale
of new securities. Thus, securities are offered to the public for subscription for the
purpose of raising capital or funds. A securities issuer can be a corporation89 or other
entity that issues securities. A primary market transaction that is usually referred to as a
‘distribution’ takes effect where the issuer sells its own securities or sells them through
the services of an underwriter.
Issuers have two ways to sell their securities. The first is ‘private placement’, which is a
direct sale by the issuer to specific investors, generally institutional investors. Unlike
private placements that often target specific investors, the second method to sell issuers
securities does not, and is known as an ‘initial public offering’ (IPO). The IPO takes
place when an issuer offers securities to the public at large.
The secondary market refers to a market where securities are traded after being initially
issued in the primary market and listed on the stock exchange. Trading in this market is
called ‘secondary’ because ‘funds flow among investors, rather than to the
corporations’.90 It is also called ‘after-market trading activity’. The majority of trading
is done in the secondary market.
2.3.1

The Role and Function of Securities Markets

Securities markets perform two important functions. First, they are mechanisms which
facilitate the transfer of investible funds from economic agents in financial surplus to
those in financial deficit. This is undertaken by selling securities, shares or bonds to

89

The American term ‘corporation’ and the British term ‘company’ will be used interchangeably
throughout the thesis.
90
Block, Hirt and Danielson, above n 87, 451.
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those with surplus funds.91 As a result, companies have access to a larger pool of
capital. This is the so-called primary market where new issues of securities are arranged
in the form of an offer to investors. The second function of the securities market is
acting as a secondary market for securities which may have been issued at some time in
the past.92 This market allows securities holders to trade and assures them a degree of
liquidity. Indeed, the existence of a secondary market makes the primary market operate
more effectively. Investors will be more attracted to and be confidently involved in a
new issue because they will be able to turn their investment back into cash at any time.
In the past few decades, attention to the connection between financial development and
economic growth has considerably increased.93 This is because financial development
can increase the growth of the economy through various channels. Securities markets
are considered an effective channel for financial development. Recent studies have
identified a long-term relationship between growth in the securities market and financial
growth.94 They also revealed that stock market liquidity helps to improve the future
economy.95 Consequently, the securities market has a significant role to play in every
country’s economy as a whole.
In terms of current economic development in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi stock market can
play a vital role in the economic growth of the country. The creation and operation of a
sufficiently strong stock market is critical to any national economy.
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2.3.2

The Importance of the Securities Market in Saudi Arabia

There are numerous advantages of having a stock market at the national level. Firstly, it
gives the public an opportunity to invest their savings in government securities and to
finance the establishment of new corporations in different sectors and activities.96
Secondly, the expansion of the establishment of corporations in different sectors greatly
benefits the national economy by enriching both private and public sectors. It stimulates
the private sector and increases its growth rate, thus increasing the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) from non-petroleum products in Saudi Arabia.97 Thirdly, an increase in
the number of corporations could lead to the raising of production efficiency in the
private sector and thus enhance its performance as well as that of the stock market.98
Fourthly, investment in the share market can reduce inflation risks and also the erosion
of the value of the currency.99 Fifthly, one feature of the share market is that it offers the
possibility of converting shares into cash in times of need. Sixthly, the demand for
equity investment by the public leads to increased investor awareness and helps to
develop amongst the public the concept of saving and investment, as well as helping to
develop the concept of collective action in economic and investment activities.100
Hence, the smaller depositors can confidently put their money into the investment
market.
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Based on the above, it can be seen that a growing capital market ‘provides the necessary
mechanism to tap into the large domestic capital locked away in bank accounts’.101 It
will also support economic diversity, especially within a country that is heavily
dependent on its oil exports for revenue. A robust securities market encourages more
public offerings, which will finance small and medium-sized businesses and so facilitate
greater participation in the country’s economy.102 It also allows companies to effectively
carry out development projects and thereby support the national economy. 103 Thus, such
capital market growth helps recycle capital surpluses, especially those held by the
private sector,104 which creates a more resilient, complex and mature national economy.
The share investment environment in Saudi Arabia is promising due to the country’s
economic, political and social stability.

2. 4 The Development of the Securities Market in Saudi Arabia
The development of the securities market in Saudi Arabia has occurred in three major
stages. The first is the period from the inception of the stock market until the year 1984.
The second is the development of the stock market during the period 1984–2002. The
third is from 2003 until 2011. This section aims to describe the major development
during each of these three periods.
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2.4.1

The Inception and Development of the Saudi Securities Market 1935–1984

Trading in stocks and shares in Saudi Arabia began in 1935 with the establishment of
the Arab Automobile Company.105 Although such activities remained irregular from
1935 until the 1970s, this period is marked by two important events: the establishment
of Riyad Bank as the first company for banking services with its capital of SAR 50
million (USD 13.3 million) divided into 50,000 shares; and the emergence of mixed
companies, such as the Arab Petroleum Services Company (APSCO) in 1960 and the
Arabian Drilling Company in 1963.106 As a result, by 1964 the number of corporations
established had reached 17.107 Their establishment at that time was due to the necessity
of meeting the basic development needs of the country.108 Then, during the ten years
that followed, the focus on providing electricity services throughout the country led to
the establishment of a further 31 corporations. As a result, by 1974 the number of
corporations had grown to 54.109 The establishment of new corporations continued, and
by 1984 they numbered 61. There was a rapid increase in the country’s financial
resources during this period, which led to the development of substantial infrastructure
projects and helped support the growth of the private sector. As individuals and small
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The Arab Automobile Company was a ‘joint stock company’, which is a company in which the stock
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institutions could not finance projects such as these that required large capital
expenditure, the need to establish corporations continued to rise.
Furthermore, it can also be clearly seen from records of the time that the significant
increase in the number and size of corporations was largely due to government
contributions to the capital of leading corporations.110 Several leading corporations also
contributed to the establishment of additional corporations.111
The Saudi economy significantly increased during the period post-1974 due to the
considerable increase in financial resources.112 This period witnessed a significant
increase in the understanding and acceptance of the concept of investment amongst
Saudi people, a process that was assisted by the coming into existence of a number of
markets in neighbouring Arab countries.113 These events undoubtedly created a large
base of people interested in this type of investment. The country’s development needs
created a suitable environment for the expansion of all types of investment.
Share trading in Saudi Arabia remained sporadic from its inception until the
privatisation of several electricity companies in the second half of the 1970s. Therefore,
it can be said that informal stock market trading commenced in Saudi Arabia in 1975
when the merger of electricity companies in the eastern regions with those in the central
and southern regions resulted in additional shares being made available to shareholders
at no cost, and this in turn resulted in an increase in the number of shares available for
110

For instance, the government established the ‘Saudi Basic Industries Corporation’ (SABIC) and 30%
of the corporation’s shares were offered to public. Also, the government contributed 20% of the capital of
the ‘Agricultural Development Corporation’ and 40% of the capital of the ‘Saudi Fisheries Company’.
111
For example, ‘Saudi Public Transport Co’ owns a large share of the capital of Saudi Automotive
Services Co.
112
This increase itself was due to increased oil production and rising world prices in the 1970s.
113
Such as the Beirut Stock Exchange, which was founded in 1967; and the issuance of laws and
regulations in Kuwait, which was a preliminary stage to the establishment of the Kuwait Stock Exchange
in 1977. The Amman Stock Exchange opened in the 1978/79 financial year.
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trading in the market.114 As a result, several real estate agencies and other informal
offices, started to act as securities brokers, either on their own account or for a
customer’s brokerage account. This activity was limited and irregular, 115 but it is
commonly observed that the Saudi stock market dates from the second half of 1970s.
However, it was informal in both its inception and operation.
From 1975 until 1984, gradual development was the hallmark of the securities market in
Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government commenced the nationalisation of foreign banks
operating inside the country.116 As a result, the government offered shares in these
foreign banks for public subscription. This led to an increasing demand for shares until
1984. Several important factors contributed to this development. Felemban identifies
the following three factors:
i.

The increase in the savings of individuals during the years of economic revival;

ii.

The revival of the stock market due to company profits being distributed to
shareholders;

iii.

The stage of growth and expansion reached by many corporations established
before 1970.117

These factors strongly contributed to making investment in the securities market
attractive to the public, especially in terms of the initial subscription in the shares of
new corporations. On the other hand, the increase in initial public offerings led to a
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Abdullah M Al-Razeen, The Financial Market (LLM Thesis, Al-Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic
University, 2006) [Arabic] 51.
115
Felemban, above n 96, 100.
116
From 1975 to 1984, nine foreign banks were nationalised, with total capital funds of SAR 1750
million. The number of shares issued was 17.5 million, of which Saudi citizens own 60.6%.
117
Felemban, above n 96, 101.
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growth in the number and size of irregular brokerage firms and to competing
advertisements in the local press. 118
An additional development to that of the securities market in Saudi Arabia was the
adoption of a specific share allocation policy by the Ministry of Commerce. 119 This
policy encouraged an expansion in the number of investors, thus creating a broadening
of the scope of investment in the share market. Furthermore, mutual funds were first
introduced in the Saudi Market by the National Commercial Bank (NCB) through its
open-ended Al Ahli Short-Term Dollar Fund in 1979.120 The retail investor was the
target market of mutual funds that rapidly became a success due to the funds’ low
service charges, and ease of entry and redemption.121
The securities market also was marred by several illegal practices that influenced
market movement.122 These illegal practices were caused by a serious lack of awareness
and knowledge of securities investment among the majority of investors, as well as the
lack of experience of brokerage firms. As a result, these practices led to an unusual rise
in market share prices.
Since the early 1970s and up until the early 1980s, Saudi Arabia had an unofficial ‘over
the counter’ market for stocks.123 Thus, share prices were unreliable and varied from

118

This type of competitive advertising in the local press was headed ‘buy and sell shares’.
‘Share allocation’ means the act of spreading a small number of shares among a large number of
people who have applied for them. The allocation policy gives priority to small shareholders.
120
Aleqtisadiah, The History of the Mutual Funds: Its Goals, Features and Performance (16 May 2012)
<http://www.aleqt.com/2011/05/16/article_538586.html> [Arabic].
121
Ibid.
122
Examples of irregular practices include: phantom transactions in the sale of shares; selling with the
contract open; misleading the public by giving faulty and unrealistic pricing information to the press;
having a monopoly on influencing market prices; and broadcasting tendentious rumours to influence the
market level.
123
The ‘over the counter’ market is a market operated by security dealers for stocks not listed on the stock
exchange. See Nygh and Butt, above n 105, 358. In addition, in 1960s, the OTC market was a large,
important and heterogeneous securities market in the US due to the fact that the OTC market was
119
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one broker to another. Hence, a number of irregular secondary markets were created and
supported by unlawful practices conducted in the share market.
In summary, it can be clearly seen that during the period 1935–1984, the stock market
in Saudi Arabia had significant inadequacies and was characterised by the following:
i. A lack of awareness amongst investors and investment intermediaries;
ii. Viability of the market for illegal practices in the absence of a regulatory
framework of the securities market;
iii. The small size of the market in comparison to the volume of shares available for
trading between individuals;
iv. The expansion of informal brokerage firms;
v. The complexity of the emerging market compared to a small ‘leaf stalk-sized’
base of the informal brokerage firm, investors and speculators;
vi. The lack of a sense of social responsibility of business coupled with a trend
towards an acceptance of profitability by misleading means.
2.4.2

Growth and Development of the Saudi Securities Market 1985–2002

The need to re-evaluate the stock market trading system came as a result of the growing
appetite for equity investment, higher share prices and the irregular practices mentioned
earlier. In the early 1980s, the government launched a rapid development program,

exempted from securities regulations; see Allen Ferrell, 'Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns:
Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market' (2007) 36 Journal of Legal Studies 213, 219.
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including plans for establishing a formal Saudi stock market.124 A formal stock market
was imperative to protect investors, as well as to sustain the country’s economic growth.
To this end, in 1984, the Saudi government started to organise the market in a planned
way, enhancing its regulatory environment and facilitating registration. Accordingly, a
formal stock exchange mechanism was established. The function of stock brokerage
was restricted to commercial banks.125
In 1985, Saudi Share Registration Company (SSRC)126 was established; and, in 1990,
the Electronic Securities and Information System (ESIS),127 which is an automated
information system for stocks, was introduced. Participation in the stock market was
restricted to Saudi citizens and Saudi corporations until 1994 when citizens of the Gulf
Corporation Council countries (GCC) were allowed to access the market.128
In 1997, foreign participation was initially allowed only in the banks’ mutual funds,
with the first closed-ended Saudi Mutual Fund (SAIF) introduced by the Saudi
American Bank.129 In 1999, the stock market was opened to foreign investment through
a wider range of Saudi banks’ mutual funds.130 In 2001, the ESIS was replaced with the
launch of a new automated system for trading, clearing, and settlement called

124

In 1984, a Ministerial Committee composed of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the
Ministry of Commerce, and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was formed to regulate and
develop the market.
125
A brokerage monopoly was granted only to Saudi banks. Trading is ‘over the counter’ and is confined
to 12 banks.
126
Saudi Share Registration Company (SSRC) was a private limited liability company established to
provide central registration facilities for listed companies. It settles and clears all equity transactions. It
works as ‘Clearing House’.
127
Electronic Securities and Information System (ESIS) was an electronic floorless share trading and
settlement system operated and supervised by SAMA.
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Jean-Francois Seznec, 'The Gulf Capital Markets at a Crossroads' (1995) 30 Columbia Journal of
World Business 6, 13.
129
The Saudi Arabian Investment Fund (SAIF) established in 1997 by the Saudi-American Bank was the
first closed-end country mutual fund issued in the market to serve foreign investments in the Saudi stock
market. See Ramady, above n 104, 156.
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Ibid 157.
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Tadawul,131 which provides continuous order, drives the market and settles transactions
in the market. Trading through the internet also began in 2002. The establishment of the
Tadawul was the foundation of a new stock market index called the Tadawul All Share
Index (TASI), which is currently considered the official Saudi stock market index.
Hence, by virtue of its ease, transparency and speed in processing transactions, the
system fostered greater market liquidity and increased the volume of trade.
Another development in the stock market was the commencement of the bond market.
Government Development Bonds (GDBs) were first offered to domestic banks and
several special government agencies in June 1988.132 Since the government began
trading GDBs in the primary market, procedures governing the secondary market have
been established by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and primary dealers.
For instance, domestic banks play several important roles: as investors, as distribution
agents, as secondary market-makers, and as sub-custodians/paying agents.133
With respect to stock market growth, the period 1985–2002 experienced an enormous
increase in the number of listed companies and resultant market capitalisation. The
number of shares traded increased by more than 14,825 per cent during this period,
having increased by 151 per cent by the end of 2002 (compared with 2001).134 The
value of shares traded has risen by 9048 per cent during the same period, having
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The term tadawul is an Arabic word that means ‘exchange’. It is an entity still owned by the banks that
formed the brokers’ oligopoly, but is more heavily regulated by SAMA.
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Krishna R Akikina and Hamed Al-Hoshan, 'Independence of Monetary Policy under Fixed Exchange
Rates: The Case of Saudi Arabia' (2003) 35 Applied Economics 437, 439.
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Mohammad Al-Jarf, 'The Impact of Globalization on Saudi Capital Market' (Paper presented at the
International Conference of Islamic Scholars, Jakarta, 23–26 February 2004) 3.
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Stock
Exchange
(Tadawul),
'Annual
Report'
(2003)
<http://www.tadawul.com.sa/static/pages/ar/Publication/PDF/Annual_Report_2003_Arabic.pdf> [Arabic]
14; Al-Jarf, above n 133, 7.
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increased by 60 per cent by the end of 2002 (compared with 2001).135 The market
capitalisation of shares issued had risen by 290 per cent by the end of 2002 (compared
with 2001).136 The general share price index increased to 2311.4, and had increased by
3.62 per cent by the end of 2002 (compared with 2001).137
Development and growth have encompassed all areas of the Saudi economy, including
investment funds, which have recorded a great expansion in the value of their
investments and in the number of their subscribers (which grew by an annual rate of 20
per cent during the period from 1992 to the end of 2003). 138 The number of funds
floated rose from 52 to 151, and the value of their total investment assets increased from
SAR 12.4 billion to SAR 52.23 billion (approximately USD 13.928 billion) over the
same period.139 According to an official statement by the former governor of SAMA:
The stock market has experienced significant growth during the period (19902001). The number of shares traded increased 4000 per cent, and the value of
shares traded rose up to 1800 percent. The number of people invested in the stock
market had reached more than 1.6 million, which is more than about 10 per cent of
the citizens, (and the market value of shares issued by the end of the first half of
2002 about 308 billion riyals). At the same time, the mutual funds industry had
grown significantly and the average annual growth rate of the number of
participants 23 per cent during the period (1992-2001). The number of mutual
funds rose from 52 to 138 mutual funds with a rapid increase in the total assets
investment from 4.12 billion riyals to 50 billion riyals during that period.140

It can be said that despite its notable growth, the stock market remained as what could
best be described as a government-controlled banking consortium. This was as a result
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Saudi Stock Exchange, ‘Annual Report of 2003’, above n 134, 14; Al-Jarf, above 133, 8.
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Al-Jarf, above n 133, 8.
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From the year 1995 through to 2004, rapid growth had been witnessed by the Saudi share market. This
growth was supported by the 2001 consolidation of ESIS and the SSRC into the Tadawul. See Beach,
above n 24, 314.
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Muhammed Al-jasser, 'Financial Sector Development for Better Growth' (Working Paper, Symposium
on 'A Future Vision for the Saudi Economy until 2020', 19-23 October 2002) 13–14.
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of the absence of a securities exchange and independent market makers. It has also been
observed that the Saudi stock market was hindered by family business groupings and
attitudes, in spite of the attempts in the country to broaden the entrepreneurial class
base.141 In brief, it can be said that during the period 1985–2002, the stock markets were
inadequate for a number of reasons. The absence of comprehensive laws for securities
markets was a major obstacle for the development of the Saudi stock market. This,
combined with the absence of adequate stock market exchange, a lack of market
intermediation (that is, too few financial firms standing between the buyer and seller)
and, most importantly, the lack of transparency and disclosure creditability, had the
effect of hampering further development. Moreover, Akikina and Hoshan in their study
found that the lack of well-developed financial markets in the country had another
effect: it caused massive private capital outflows from the country.142 Consequently, it
can be clearly said that despite the development that the stock market had witnessed
during this period and in spite of the need for domestic investment, the local market was
considered to be far behind and the opportunities far fewer than in the overseas capital
markets, so there was a significant capital outflow.
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Jean-Francois Seznec, 'Stirrings in Saudi Arabia' (2002) 13 Journal of Democracy 33, 40; Seznec,
‘The Gulf Capital Markets at a Crossroads', above n 128, 14.
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Table 2.1: Saudi Stock Market Indicators 1985-2002
End of
Period

Number of
Listed
Companies

Number of
Shares Traded
(Million)

Face Value of
Shares Traded
(Million SAR)

Number of
Transactions
(Million)

General
Index
1985 = 1000

1985143

N/A

4

760

7,842

690.88

1986

46

5

831

10,833

646.03

1987

51

12

1,686

23,267

780.64

1988

52

15

2,037

41,960

892.00

1989

54

15

3,364

110,030

1,086.00

1990

57

17

4,403

85,298

979.80

1991

60

31

8,527

90,559

1,765.24

1992

60

35

13,699

272,075

1,888.65

1993

65

60

17,360

319,582

1,888.65

1994

68

152

24,871

357,180

1,282.90

1995

69

117

23,227

291,742

1,367.60

1996

70

138

25,397

283,759

1,531.00

1997

70

312

62,060

460,056

1,957.80

1998

74

293

51,510

376,617

1,413.10

1999

73

528

56,578

438,226

2,028.53

2000

75

555

65,292

498,135

2,258.29

2001

76

691

83,602

605,035

2,430.11

2002144

68

1,736

133,787

1,033,669

2,518.08

Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 39th Annual Report 2003–2010 - The Saudi Stock
Exchange (Tadawul) Annual Statistical Report, 2002–2011.
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The first year that data was available for the Saudi stock market.
The number of listed companies decreased as a result of a merger between the electricity companies
into a single company.
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Table 2.2: Market Capitalisation and Market Size of the Saudi Stock Market for
the Period 1985–2002
End of
Period

Market Capitalisation (MC)
(Billion Riyals)

Market Size (Depth) (%)
(1) ÷ (3)

1985

67.00

18

1993

197.90

41

1994

145.10

29

1995

153.39

29

1996

171.98

30

1997

222.70

37

1998

159.91

30

1999

228.59

38

2000

254.46

37

2001

274.53

40

2002

280.73

40

Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 39th Annual Report 2003–2010 - The Saudi Stock
Exchange (Tadawul) Annual Statistical Report, 2002–2011.

2.4.3

Saudi Securities Market Development 2003–2011

The ongoing growth of the Saudi stock market demanded additional reforms to be
adopted by the Saudi government in order to keep pace with the stock market
development. Therefore, the first securities law, the Capital Market Law (CML’03),
came into existence in 2003 and created the first securities regulatory body, the Capital
Market Authority (CMA), to oversee the stock market.

46

Chapter 2: Introduction to Saudi Arabia, Its Securities Market and Relevant Concepts

The new law established an independent financial market regulator, the CMA. It is the
sole regulator of the stock market in Saudi Arabia.145 The proclamation of the CML’03
in mid-2003 and the subsequent establishment of the CMA in mid-2004 as the primary
regulatory authority for the Saudi capital market and the operation of stock exchange
have been internationally recognised as positive measures by the market as a whole,
both by investors and by market intermediaries.146 In addition, the CML’03 established
the first national securities depository centre, which was later incorporated into the
Securities Exchange. The exchange will be a private sector company. 147 With the
purpose of being in line with global stock market operations, the Saudi Capital Market
Company (SCMC), with a capital of SAR 1.2 billion (USD 320 million), was
established by the Saudi government. The SCMC converted the Tadawul into a joint
stock company fully owned by the Public Investment Fund. The SCMC provides a
formal stock exchange.
With respect to the stock market growth, the year 2003 experienced a significant
increase comparing with the last year of the previous period from 1985 to 2002. The
number of shares traded increased by 221 per cent by the end of 2003 (compared with
2002).148 The value of shares traded increased by 346 per cent at the end of 2003

145

On 31 July 2003, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) was established pursuant to the Capital Market
Law 2003. The CMA represents the government apparatus which is mainly entrusted with the
management and organisation of the Saudi Capital Market, and which reports directly to the chairman of
the Council of Ministers. The CMA will be thoroughly discussed in the next chapter, ‘Legal and
Regulatory Framework of the Securities Market in Saudi Arabia’.
146
'Special Supplement: GCC - Saudi Arabia - Capital Markets Make an Impact - Besides Record Oil
Revenues, Saudi Arabia Has Made Significant Developments in Its Capital Markets, Especially In Its
Equity
Markets,'
The
Banker,
1
December
2005
<http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.uow.edu.au/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA134827712&v=2.1&u=uow&it=r
&p=AONE&sw=w>.
147
‘Securities Exchange’ will be described in the next chapter ‘Legal and Regulatory Framework of the
Securities Market in Saudi Arabia’.
148
Saudi Stock Exchange, ‘Annual Report of 2003’, above n 134; Al-Jarf, above n 133, 7.
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(compared with 2002).149 The market capitalisation of shares issued had risen by a
further 110.14 per cent by the end of 2003 (compared with 2002).150 The general share
price index increased to a further 76.23 per cent by the end of 2003 (compared with
2002).151 Over 1.6 million individuals had invested in the shares of Saudi joint-stock
companies by the end of 2003.152
In the past decade, the economy of Saudi Arabia has witnessed major reforms, the vast
majority of which were due to the government adoption of a privatisation policy. 153 In
November 2002, Saudi Arabia announced plans to privatise 20 major public
corporations or services. As a first step, Saudi Telecom has been partially privatised and
its initial public offering (IPO) was oversubscribed and those fortunate enough to buy
the shares made a large profit instantly if they chose to realise their investments.
In August 2008, for the purpose of adding depth for market participants, foreign
institutional investors were also allowed to participate in share trading under specific
rules put in place by the CMA.154 In March 2010, the CMA announced that it had
arranged the commencement of its first Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) and would allow
non-resident foreign investors to trade in it. Nevertheless, foreign portfolio investment
has not yet been permitted in the Saudi stock market.
149

Saudi Stock Exchange, ‘Annual Report of 2003’, above n 134; Al-Jarf, above n 133, 8.
Ibid.
151
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<http://www.tadawul.com.sa/static/pages/ar/Publication/PDF/Annual_Report_2002_Arabic.pdf> 9; Saudi
Stock Exchange, ‘Annual Report of 2003’, above n 134, 9.
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Al-Jarf, above n 133, 8.
153
Nimrod Raphaeli, 'Demands for Reforms in Saudi Arabia' (2010) 41 Middle Eastern Studies 517, 528;
Ibrahim Akoum, 'Privatization in Saudi Arabia: Is Slow Beautiful?' (2009) 51 Thunderbird International
Business Review 427, 440.
154
The CMA issued Circular No. 2-28-2008 on 18 August 2008 (08/17/1429) (the Circular), allowing
foreign investors to execute, under certain terms and conditions, equity swap agreements in respect of
listed Saudi Shares. The circular permits only CMA Authorised Persons to enter into Swap Agreements.
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(Press
Release,
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August
2008)
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On 23 January 2012, Saudi Arabia’s Capital Market Authority announced an
amendment to its listing regulations. The new rules allow a foreign issuer whose
securities are listed in another regulated exchange to apply for its securities to be
registered and admitted to listing on the Saudi Arabian exchange.
Article 14 of the CMA Listing Rules 2004 (LR’04) provides the conditions relating to
cross listing by stating that:
a. A foreign issuer whose securities are listed in another regulated exchange may
apply for its securities to be registered and admitted to listing on the Exchange. The
Authority may admit the securities to listing provided that, in the Authority’s
opinion, the listing rules applicable in the foreign issuer’s jurisdiction of listing are
at least equivalent to these Rules.

By December 2009, the number of listed companies had increased to 134, with a share
capital of SAR 596 billion (USD 158.9 billion). Meanwhile, the number of registered
joint stock companies had risen to 400 with SAR 470.2 billion (USD 125.4 billion)
share capital, and the number of limited liability and joint venture companies had
climbed to 16,908, with a combined SAR 155.6 billion (USD 41.5 billion) in share
capital.155 Consequently, it can be clearly seen that regardless of the higher number of
listed companies since 2002, a need persists for more listed companies to strengthen the
current stock market. Several Saudi stock market analysts claim that the slow pace of
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and listing is due to the Saudi listing requirements
imposed by the regulator being burdensome.156 For example, the CMA is planning to
impose further requirement and conditions on the new public offers in order to prevent
155

Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 'Forty-Fifth Annual Report' (31 August 2009)
<http://sama.gov.sa/ReportsStatistics/ReportsStatisticsLib/5600_R_Annual_Ar_45_2009_08_31.pdf>.
156
See Anthony H Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century (Praeger, 2003) 443; Henry Azzam,
The Arab World: Facing the Challenges of the New Millennium (IB Tauris, 2002) 75; Abdulaziz M AlDukheil, 'Saudi Stock Market' (Paper presented at the Future Vision of Saudi Economy Conference,
Riyadh, October 2002) 36.

49

Chapter 2: Introduction to Saudi Arabia, Its Securities Market and Relevant Concepts

weak companies from entering the stock market.157 However, this will generally delay
the IPO market development.
Furthermore, although the Saudi stock market is large compared to the markets of other
developing countries, recent studies have found that, like those of most developing
countries, it is not efficient when looking at the growing economy of the country and
the listed firms in the securities market.158 The number of companies listed in the Saudi
stock market is small when compared with the total number of the non-listed companies
able to go public. Research carried out in 2003 among the top 1000 Saudi non-listed
companies revealed that around 137 new companies could be listed in the Saudi
securities exchange based on the current requirements.159 Indeed, this would
substantially increase market capitalisation and therefore strengthen the market.
In today’s international economic market, the mutual fund sector has played a large and
important role in the financial and capital markets. In the Saudi Arabian market, stock
market growth was fostered by significant growth in the Saudi mutual fund segment,
which rose to a peak of SAR 137 billion (USD 36.5 billion) in 2005.160
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Table 2.3: Saudi Stock Market Indicators 2003–2011
End of
Period

Number of
Listed
Companies

Number of
Shares Traded
(Million)

Face Value of
Shares Traded
(Million SAR)

2003

70

5,566

596.51

3,763.40

4,437.58

2004

73

10,295

1,773.86

13,319.52

8,206.23

2005

77

12,281

4,138.70

46,607.95

16,712.64

2006

86

68,515161

5,261.85

96,095.92

7,933.29

2007

111

57,829

2,557.71

65,665.50

11,038.66

2008

127

58,727

1,962.95

52,135.93

4,802.99

2009

135

56,685

1,264.01

36,458.33

6,121.76

2010

146

33,007

759.18

19,536.14

6,620.75

2011

150

48,535

1,098.83

25,550.00

6,417.73

161

Number of
Transactions

General
Index
1985=1000

This large increase is due to the split nominal values of the company’s shares to 10 Riyals per share
instead of 50 Riyals.
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Table 3.4: Market Capitalisation and Market Size of the Saudi Stock Market
2003–2011
End of
Period

Market Capitalisation (MC)
(Billion Riyals)

Market Size (Depth) (%)
(1) ÷ (3)

2003

589.93

74

2004

1,148.60

124

2005

2,438.20

208

2006

1,225.86

93

2007

1,946.35

136

2008

924.53

52

2009

1,195.51

86

2010

1,325.39

81

2011

1,270.84

N/A

Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 39th Annual Report 2003–2010 - The Saudi Stock
Exchange (Tadawul) Annual Statistical Report, 2002–2011.162

2.4.3.1 The 2006 Historical Market Crash
The size of the Saudi stock market was expanding, with market capitalisation having
increased by 108 per cent when figures for 2003 and early 2006 are compared, and the
volume of traded shares risen by 988 per cent for the same period.163 However, the
boom in the stock market came to a crash in February 2006, causing a loss of 50 per
cent of the total market value.

162

Saudi Stock Exchange, Annual Statistical Report of 2011, above n 7.
Ibrahim A Onour, 'Testing Efficiency Performance of Saudi Stock Market' (2009) 23 Journal of King
Abdul Aziz University (JKAU) Economics and Administration 15, 16.
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Figure 2.4: Saudi Stock Market Crash and the Fall of the Share Index (TASI) in
2006164

In February 2006, the Saudi market index (TASI) lost over 13,000 points. It fell from
20,635 to about 6400 points (falling 65 per cent from its highest point). As a result, the
country lost SAR 2 trillion (USD 533 billion) of its national wealth. 165 The savings and
investments of Saudi citizens were devastated.
Consequently, thousands of stock market investors lost substantial amounts of their
personal wealth, and a large majority of them accumulated some degree of financial
debt. This disaster had an effect on a large proportion of the population, and in several
cases, deaths were recorded, and there were other instances where people became ill due
to the stress of the situation.166 It had been the first such crash in the history of Saudi
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stocks. As there was no sudden event leading to this heavy decline in the share prices,
studies are now warranted to investigate this issue more thoroughly.167
According to the CMA chairman, Abdulrahman A Al-Twaijry, the 2006 collapse was a
consequence of the huge increase on the demand side (buying), due in no small part to
ordinary people becoming increasingly aware of the opportunities offered by stock
market investments and entering the market to invest their savings, which led the share
prices to boom until they inevitably collapsed.168 He also claims that the responsibility
for the Saudi stock market crisis is shared by three parties: the government, which failed
to act in a timely manner and also failed to educate new investors; the media, whose illinformed commentators continued to encourage people to invest long after it was wise
not to do so; and the traders themselves, who were criticised for failing to research the
market, and invested on the advice of friends and families rather than from a considered
perspective, or without any expert advice.169
As the majority of market participants suffered a loss from their investments, this led to
questions being asked in relation to the integrity of the stock market and calls for
governmental intervention and better control of market dynamics. The investors’ main
concern was related to the ability of large investors and insiders to access private
information to gain unfair advantage.170 Weak transparency coupled with inadequate
disclosure requirements do undermine stock market development. Hence, it can be
suggested that the existence of a robust disclosure regime could be crucial to stock
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market integrity. In addition, it will provide protection for market participants, which
will consolidate confidence amongst investors.171
2.4.4

Comparative Position of the Saudi Securities Market amongst Its Regional
and International Counterparts

In 1996, the stock market in Saudi Arabia was ranked as the 13th largest developing
market and the largest in the GCC region,172 with market capitalisation of SAR 172
billion (USD 45.9 billion), 740 million shares issued and 1.67 million individual
shareholders.173 In 2000, its position had further improved: the Saudi market became the
largest in the region, ‘accounting for about 50% of the six GCC stock markets, making
up one third of the Arab countries’ stock markets, and being 11th among the emerging
markets’.174
According to a study on GCC stock markets carried out between 2002 and 2004, ‘Saudi
Arabia clearly dominates GCC stock market activities and constitutes the bulk of GCC
market capitalisation’.175 The same study states that:
[B]y far the largest stock market is Saudi Arabia, with a market capitalization of
USD 237.1 billion at the end of 2004. An average daily trading volume of USD
1.93 billion also makes Saudi Arabia the most active of the GCC stock markets.176

A recent empirical study of eight Arab Middle Eastern countries found that the stock
market of Saudi Arabia has shown a steady improvement in its efficiency since mid-
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2002.177 Moreover, a recent report released by the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) points
out that the total market value of Arab securities markets increased by 17.4 per cent to
about USD 903.4 billion by the end of the year 2009.178 Indeed, by the end of 2009 the
value of the Saudi stock market comprised 35.3 per cent of the total market value of
Arab stock markets, and the value of shares traded on the Saudi stock market was USD
337.1 billion, representing 51.6 per cent of the total value of shares traded on the
markets of Arab countries. During 2009, the Saudi stock market recorded the highest
indicators of all Arab stock markets; the market value of the Saudi stock market rose to
USD 318.8 billion.179
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Table 2.5: GCC and Arab Stock Markets Indicators at the End of 2010
Rank

Market

Market
Capitalisation
(USD millions)

Value of Shares
Traded (USD
millions)

Number of
Listed
Companies

1

Saudi Arabia

353,400.0

202,432.0

146

2

Qatar

123,641.0

18,453.0

43

3

Kuwait

113,883.0

43,777.0

214

4

Abu Dhabi

77,081.0

8,986.0

64

5

Morocco

69,386.0

13,881.0

75

6

Egypt

84,109.0

57,560.0

212

7

Dubai

54,692.0

16,075.0

65

8

Jordan

30,904.0

9,490.0

277

9

Oman

28,309.0

3,422.0

119

10

Bahrain

20,060.0

289.0

49

11

Lebanon

12,676.0

1,871.0

26

12

Tunisia

10,612.0

1,871.0

56

13

Sudan

2,446.0

1,018.0

53

14

Palestine

2,449.0

468.0

40

15

Algeria

106.0

161.5

2

Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 47th Annual Report.180

In 2010, a comparison of selected Arab share market indicators revealed that the Saudi
stock market recorded the highest indicators of all Arab stock markets. Market
capitalisation of the Saudi stock market stood at USD 353.4 billion, compared to an

180

Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 'Forty Seventh Annual Report: The Latest Economic Developments
1432H (2011G)' (Report, Research and Statistics Department, 27 October 2011)
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/ReportsStatistics/ReportsStatisticsLib/6500_R_Annual_En_47_20
11_10_27.pdf> 84.
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average of USD 65.6 billion for the Arab countries.181 Market capitalisation of the Saudi
stock market represented 35.9 per cent of total market capitalisation of Arab securities
markets by the end of 2010.182
Despite Saudi Arabia having one of the largest markets in the region, the number of
listed companies is relatively small in comparison with some of the emerging markets
elsewhere in the world. In terms of the number of listed companies, some of the
emerging markets — such as India, Korea and China — have many times the number of
companies listed in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, in 2003 the Saudi stock market became
the ninth largest emerging market in terms of the value of shares listed in the market. In
2005, the Saudi stock market, with a capitalisation of USD 518 billion, was ranked
second amongst the largest emerging markets and 12th largest worldwide.183 For
example, in 2004–2005, Saudi Arabia’s stock exchange had a market capitalisation
larger than that of South Korea.184
A study in 2006 showed the Saudi market to be the largest market in the region, with a
market capital of SAR 1.6 trillion (USD 418 billion), and the market remained the
largest amongst its regional counterparts until 2012, with a market capital of SAR 1.4
trillion (USD 373 billion).185 The study also showed that the average daily trading was
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more than SAR 15 billion (USD 4 billion), the average of which is 49 times the value of
the daily trading in 2001, which did not exceed SAR 304 million (USD 81 million). The
same study added that the Saudi stock market represents from 60 to 70 per cent of the
financial markets in the region in terms of market capitalisation and activity. In
addition, the development in the Saudi mutual fund sector has been remarkable, given
that ‘the Saudi mutual fund market has been impressive and today Saudi Arabia has the
largest mutual fund industry in the Arab world’.186
Based on the above, it can be clearly seen that since its inception, the Saudi stock
market has experienced significant growth in terms of stock market size, volume and
value of trade. However, it is argued that the supposed potential development of the
stock market is yet to be achieved. The following section will discuss shortcomings
associated with the development of the Saudi stock market.

2. 5 General Drawbacks of the Development of the Saudi Securities
Market
The relationship between stock market development and economic growth is
imbalanced in Saudi Arabia. Compared to the country’s economy, the stock market
does not reflect the real growth in the country. An empirical study found that welldeveloped stock markets can foster economic growth in the long run.187 While the Saudi
stock market has become the leader amongst Middle Eastern and Arab nations, the

Abraham Abraham, Fazal J Seyyed, Haider Madani, ‘The Price Discovery Process and Volatility
Linkages in A Resource-based Emerging Market: Evidence from the Saudi Stock Market’ (2012) 3(3)
International Journal of Accounting and Finance 223, 225
186
See Andreas G F Hoepner, Hussain G Rammal and Michael Rezec, 'Islamic Mutual Funds’ Financial
Performance and International Investment Style: Evidence from 20 Countries' (2011) 1 European Journal
of Finance 1, 6; See also Ramady, above n 104, 171.
187
Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Peter G A Howells and Alaa M Soliman, 'Stock Market Development and
Economic Growth: The Causal Linkage' (2004) 29 Journal of Economic Development 33, 47.
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market is still classified as an inefficient market.188 Based on Standard and Poor’s
Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB), the Saudi stock market remains as an emerging
market belonging to the Middle East and North Africa region.189 Several studies tested
the efficiency of the Saudi stock market. The majority of these studies have classified
the Saudi stock market as an inefficient market. A study carried out by Butler and
Malaikah found that the Saudi stock market was considered as an inefficient market.190
Al-Razeen examined the efficiency of the Saudi stock market for the period 1992–1995.
He found that the market has a low level of efficiency and classified it as a ‘weak form’
in terms of market efficiency.191
According to the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) quality of markets criteria of
2012, the Saudi stock market remains suffering from:192
i.

significant government ownership of listed companies,

ii.

relatively low institutional ownership,

iii.

limited number of brokerage firms publishing analysts recommendations and
none publishing analysis forecasts,

iv.

prohibition of short sales in all markets,

v.

unavailability of derivatives for trading in all markets, and

188
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190
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vi.

failure to match international standards although all markets have taken a
number of measures to improve the transparency, disclosure level and corporate
governance requirements.

In addition, the Saudi securities market still suffers from a high percentage of
individuals who are trading directly in the market without investing through institutional
investors. Individual investors account for more than 92 per cent of trading transactions
in Saudi Arabia and their investment decisions are not based on experience in securities
market.193 In fact, this may harm the market as well as the investors.
These drawbacks have had a negative impact on the development of the Saudi stock
market. Moreover, these and other factors inhibit the potential growth of the market.
These are: the small number of listed companies, the instability of the market, and the
absence of foreign portfolio investment.
2.5.1

The Small Number of Listed companies

The number of listed companies in Saudi Arabia is low by international or regional
standards. More importantly, the number of listed companies is low in relation to the
size of the Saudi economy, which has been a major shortcoming of the Saudi stock
market. In 2002, there were 68 listed companies with SAR 38 billion (USD 10.1 billion)
share capital, and 121 registered joint stock companies with SAR 81.3 billion (USD
21.2 billion) share capital.194 There were another 6000 limited liability Saudi companies
operating in the country and a further 1400 joint venture companies (national and
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foreign), with a combined share capital of SAR 85.5 billion (USD 22.8 billion). All
these companies remain outside the stock market.
Recently, a commentator pointed out that, ‘although the Saudi stock market is the
largest stock market in the Middle East, representing 41 per cent of the total
capitalisation of Arab stock exchanges, the number of listed stocks and the size of the
free float of shares is small’.195
Currently, Table 2.6 (below) shows that the number of joint stock companies by 2010
was 882 companies, 150 of which were listed in the Saudi stock market,196 which
implies that more than 75 per cent of the existing joint stock companies were not
included in the Saudi stock market. This shows that the Saudi authorities have a
challenging task ahead to attract new companies to be listed in the market.
Table 2.6: Companies by Type of Capital in Saudi Arabia 2010
Type of company

Number

Capital
(Million Riyals)

Joint stock companies

882

632,396.8

15,570

205,781.6

Joint liability partnerships

3,328

3,799.2

Mixed liability partnerships

1,345

8,889.5

Mixed liability partnerships
by shares

5

2.9

21,130

850,870.0

Limited liability partnerships

Total

Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 47th Annual Report 2011.197
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Furthermore, many listed firms are small compared to the top Saudi companies. For
instance, the top six Saudi listed firms (Saudi Basic Industries Corp, Saudi Telecom Co,
Saudi Electricity Co, Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corp, Saudi American Bank,
and Riyad Bank) represent about 71 per cent of total Saudi market capitalisation. The
government owns a large portion of companies traded. Family ownership is also evident
in many firms.
2.5.2

Instability of the Market

The performance of Saudi stock market is unstable. There are two issues which are
believed to be the major causes of the unsteady market. The first is the unprecedented
securities market crash in 2006 and its continuing effects on investors. The volatility
continues in stock prices and it has a negative impact on investor confidence in the
stock market. This issue was evident after the 2006 market collapse, which badly
affected investors in the market. Following this unprecedented crash, investors fled the
market and potential investors preferred not to invest in the exchange. As a result,
trading volume has significantly decreased and the market has been suffering from a
low inflow of funds into the exchange.
A number of Saudi economists recently announced that the crisis of investor confidence
in the stock market persists and that it has resulted in weaker market.198 They agreed
that market volatility is the major cause of reduced investor confidence.199 Another
commentator declared that ‘the Saudi stock market is suffering from a loss of
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confidence among investors which desperately needs to be restored’.200 A recent study
on the Middle Eastern capital markets found that the most influential factor in
investment decisions is confidence, which is necessary in order for an investor to put his
or her capital at risk.201 Thus, it can be said that the negative effects of the loss of
investor confidence have affected the development of the Saudi stock market.
The second factor is the correlation between the oil prices and the stock market in Saudi
Arabia. As the country’s economy fully relies on oil production, the stock market is
highly affected by oil prices.202 For that reason, there is a significant correlation
between oil prices and the stock market. A recent empirical study on the effect of oil
prices on the GCC countries found that there is a positive linkage between oil prices
changes and the stock markets in Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.203
The SAMA Annual Report of 2006 declared that the significant increase in oil prices
was one of the major factors that led to the strong performance of the Saudi stock
market from 2003 to 2005. Recent research undertaken by Alshogeathri affirms that ‘the
strongest influence on Saudi stock market returns variation was the price of oil’.204
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Indeed, improvements in the non-oil sector are essential to protect the stock market
from oil prices shocks. It was suggested that the high dependence on oil is considered as
a major challenge for the country’s economy.205 In addition, the significant relationship
between oil prices and stock markets may harm the actual performance and
development of the stock market in Saudi Arabia. A study carried out in 2011 by a
number of scholars found that the close relationship between oil prices and the stock
market would imply some degree of predictability in the stock markets and is a source
of volatility,206 which is unrelated to the underlying strength of the individual company
but reflecting anticipatory rises and falls according to oil price fluctuations In fact, the
country’s economy needs to lessen its dependence on oil production and find alternative
sources to strengthen the economy. This view is echoed by the current Petroleum
Minister, who has recently admitted that ‘it is inappropriate to rely on oil production as
a basis for national income’.207
2.5.3

The Absence of Foreign Portfolio Investment

Currently, foreign portfolio investment is not available in Saudi Arabia for both
institutions or individuals.208 The Saudi stock market is not yet fully open to foreign
portfolio investment. Foreign investors from outside the country must enter into swap
foreign investment agreements or hold mutual funds that are offered by commercial
banks. At present, non-resident foreign and resident foreign investment levels have been
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weak ever since the market was opened to them. For example, the Saudi stock exchange
(Tadawul) announced that at the end of 2011:
The percentage share of foreign residents in Saudi Arabia from the market trades
was 0.2% for selling and 0.2 % for buying. The percentage share of foreigners via
swap agreement from the market trades was 1.0% for selling and 0.7% for
buying.209

As a result, the correlation between the Saudi stock market and international markets is
weak.210 In addition, it may be the case that, as mentioned before, family ownership
constitutes 70 per cent of the volume of existing firms within the Saudi economy. Thus,
it was suggested that ‘some careful development, regulation enforcement and progress
are necessary to improve the current system in order to attract further foreign
investment to the country’.211 Omran and Bolbol, in their empirical research, admitted
that developing the stock market is not an easy task because it depends on regulatory
capacity, legal history, the existence of an investment culture and the ownership
structure of firms.212 Allowing foreign portfolio investment has become imperative in
order for the Saudi stock market to improve the national economy. Experts in Saudi
economics have recently called for allowing foreign funds to enter the Saudi market.213
They believe that it will improve the position of the Saudi stock market amongst its
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regional and international counterparts and contribute to the creation of a mature
market.214
To this end, the regulator should seriously consider the practical steps needed to allow
foreign portfolio investment. Foreign funds have become vital, especially, with low
trading volumes after local retail investors were hit first by the 2006 market correction,
and then by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008.
However, while the CMA has announced on several occasions that the market will be
opened to indirect foreign investment in the future, nevertheless, the it has not yet taken
practical steps to achieve this goal, such as issuing rules to regulate the foreign portfolio
investment.

2. 6 The Reasons for Weak Investor Protection and its Effects on the
Development of the Saudi Securities Market
Weak investor protection has inhibited the development of the Saudi securities market.
As discussed earlier, the 2006 market collapse shook public confidence in the securities
market. The economy ultimately suffers because the allocation of capital and corporate
financing has become inadequate to support growth. Investors in the Saudi securities
market are not protected from a lack of information disclosure and this is exacerbated
by the weak civil liability regime for breaches of the disclosure regime.
2.6.1 Lack of Transparency and Disclosure
Lack of transparency and failures in information disclosure have been a major problem
in the Saudi stock market. Hence, the efficiency of the market has been negatively
affected. In addition, investors have lost their confidence in the market. Alkholifey used
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a number of empirical tests, the results of which showed that the Saudi stock market is
not efficient with regard to information provided.215 Information efficiency is an
economic term, which means that the ‘market’s capacity to generate prices for its
products that incorporate all information available to the public’.216
Alajlan finds that although the Saudi stock market is one of the most rapidly developing
markets in the Middle East and Asia, it presently lacks sound frameworks for
regulation, transparency and the disclosure of financial information, all of which are
essential for the development of any securities market.217
A survey conducted amongst the investors in Asser Province (the southern region of
Saudi Arabia) found that the lack of transparency has led to the loss of confidence
amongst the ordinary investors in the market.218 As a result, investors have largely
abandoned investment in the market.219 Certainly, the standards of transparency and
governance are still far from ideal. A report by a Saudi analyst states that:
The Saudi market has the potential to be not only the largest in the region but also
the most liquid and mature. Hopefully, the progressive involvement of international
institutions will drive forward transparency and governance in the Kingdom. 220

For example, a recent empirical study found that capital markets in low disclosure
countries are more volatile than those in high disclosure countries.221
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As protecting investors is the main objective of securities regulation as set out by the
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the role of securities
regulators becomes more evident in creating such protection by issuing effective rules
and regulations to maintain transparency in the market. It is submitted that ‘regulations
should view the information efficiency of markets is a goal that they must strive to
achieve.’222 Therefore, a lack of transparency is one of the main drawbacks from which
the Saudi stock market suffers and reforms in this regard are imperative as will be
discussed in the following chapter.
2.6.2

Weak Civil Liability for Defective Disclosures and the Development of the
Securities Market in Saudi Arabia

The weak civil liability regime for defective disclosures in Saudi Arabia undermines the
investor protection which requires an effective and operative liability regime.
Adequate regulations will restore long-term confidence among investors. As shown in
the previous chapter, the function of civil liability is two-fold: first, to facilitate
compensation for investors who sustain loss or damage resulting from disclosure
violation; and second, to deter potential wrongdoers from violating the disclosure
regime. Accordingly, a strong civil liability regime will produce a transparent market,
compliant companies and investor confidence. This shows that civil liability for
defective disclosures has an important role in the development of the securities market.
Civil liability is an effective tool that provides investor protection so investors do not
abandon the stock market and invest in other sectors. Moreover, Fox suggests that the
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mandatory disclosure civil liability system should improve corporate governance,
enhance liquidity and create strong incentives to comply at all times.223
The securities regulatory body has a statutory duty to develop the market.224 The CMA,
as the sole regulatory body for the securities market in Saudi Arabia, must aim to
promote stability and liquidity in the market by introducing regulations that encourage
investment and reduce risks in the market.225 In addition, Principle 6 of the IOSCO
statement of Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation stipulates that ‘[t]he
regulator should have or contribute to a process to monitor, mitigate and manage
systemic risk, appropriate to its mandate.’226 A commentator criticised the inadequate
role played by the CMA in developing the market as he wrote that ‘the CMA has not
made a single modification or introduced any fundamental regulations in the stock
market which will foster the financial and monetary policies to encourage people to
enter the stock market again’.227
So far, the CMA remains ‘in denial’ and resists efforts for reform, not realising that they
are themselves preventing a stock market recovery to the level that existed before the
2006 debacle. In order to restore investor confidence, strengthening of investor
protection is essential. A recent study conducted on a number of African stock markets
suggests that stock market development should be encouraged through appropriate legal
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and regulatory policies to remove barriers to market operation and thus enhance their
efficiency. 228
Hence, a central concern of this thesis is to suggest the protection of investors by
strengthening the disclosure regime, enforcing securities laws and, most importantly,
facilitating civil liability for investors aggrieved because of a violation of the disclosure
regime.

2. 7 The Meaning of Concepts and Terms
2.7.1

Securities

In finance, a ‘security’ is a financial instrument that proves the ownership of an
investment and represents a financial value. So far, the term ‘security’ has not had a
precise and single legal definition. The definition of the term ‘security’ varies from one
jurisdiction to another. Generally, a security is a ‘financial asset’ issued by business
entities or governmental bodies for the purpose of raising funds for business or for
borrowing money for the government from the public.229 Arnett says, ‘a security is
simply a manifestation of a promise by an issuer to pay interest and return capital in the
case of bonds, or share in the ownership of a company in the case of stock’.230
Article 2 of the CML’03 provides a list of what the term ‘security’ includes:
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a. convertible and tradable shares of companies;
b. tradable debt instruments issued by companies, the government, public
institutions or public organisations;
c. investment units issued by investment funds;
d. any instruments representing profit participation rights, any rights in the
distribution of assets; or either or the foregoing

Article 3 of the CML’03 excludes several types of financial products from being
considered as securities. Commercial bills such as cheques, bills of exchange, order
notes, documentary credits, money transfers, and instruments that are exclusively traded
among banks, and insurance policies shall not be considered securities. The CMA has
the power to exempt any specific instrument by regulation if it believes the safety of the
market and the protection of investors do not require the instrument to be regulated as a
security.231 However, judicial interpretation of the term ‘security’ is absent from the
deliberations/findings of the courts in Saudi Arabia.
Securities are traditionally classified as equities, debts, hybrids and other instruments.
Both corporations and governments may issue securities; corporations alone always
issue equities. Equities are known as ‘ordinary shares’, and the most common form of
equity is ‘common stock’.232 Common stock is mostly offered in the IPO by a company
and then traded among investors on the secondary market. The buyers of common stock
share the ownership of a company and are referred to as shareholders. 233 Unlike in the
case of equities, both corporations and government may issue debt securities. Bonds are
debt instruments that have a fixed life.234
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A popular way for corporations to raise funds is a ‘hybrid security’, which involves
issuing a form of hybrid debt that has characteristics of debt and equity. 235 Hybrid
securities are complex capital instruments issued by companies to expand their financial
base and manage their cost of capital. Hybrid securities include: certain classes of
preferred stock, trust preferred securities, convertible debt securities and mandatorily
convertible instruments. The most common forms are convertible preference shares and
convertible notes. Other instruments such as mutual funds and unit trusts can be used in
investment in many kinds of securities.
In Saudi Arabia, companies can obtain the finance they need by offering securities in
two main forms, namely, stocks and bonds. Firstly, stocks represent equity ownership in
companies and such shares can be re-sold in the market either for cash or to modify
investment portfolios. Stocks are divided into ordinary shares (common shares) and
preferred stocks. Secondly, there are corporate bonds, which are debt instruments raised
by companies in the securities market as a major source of long-term funding. Bonds
differ among themselves in terms of the following properties: call ability, security
offered, convertibility and risk.
2.7.2

Securities Regulation

Securities regulation is known as the laws that govern the securities industry. Securities
regulation aims to ensure the smooth functioning of trading and clearing and settlement
mechanisms that will prevent market disruption and foster investor confidence. 236 Some
scholars define the regulation of securities as the ongoing attempt to draw a balance
between an efficient capital-raising process and the operation of an efficient securities
235
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market.237 However, securities regulation comprises the regulation of public issuers of
securities, the secondary markets, and market intermediaries. Loss was the first scholar
who called for securities regulation that would prevent the problems of fraud and
market manipulation.238
Regulation of the market is mostly justified in terms of protecting the general investors
from potential exploitation. Investor protection was a major concern for developing
securities regulation in developed countries.239 In this regard, it has been submitted that
the first objective of securities regulation is investor protection as stated by the
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO); the second objective is
ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and the third objective is the
reduction of systemic risk.240
In Saudi Arabia, the practice of securities regulation is relatively new. The CML’03,
which came into effect on 24 February 2004, establishes the basic framework for the
regulation of securities activities in Saudi Arabia. It is considered to be the first national
code to regulate both the primary and secondary securities markets in Saudi Arabia. The
CML’03 also established the CMA, a government organisation with financial, legal and
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administrative independence.241 Chapter 3 of this thesis provides a thorough discussion
of the legal and regulatory framework of the securities market in Saudi Arabia.
2.7.3

Investors

The term ‘investor’ is not a technical term with a precise legal meaning. The IOSCO has
defined the term ‘investor’ in a general way by saying that the term ‘is intended to
include customers or other consumers of financial services’.242 In terms of the course of
action, one scholar defines the role of ‘investor’ as ‘to invest’ and the term to ‘invest’ as
to spend money on something with an expectation of achieving financial returns.243
However, a specific and clear concept of the term ‘investor’ may be advisable in order
to determine the actual scope of the application of securities regulation.
In this study, investors can be referred to, for example, as shareholders, stockholders,
debenture holders, or bondholders. In addition, investors can be classified as ‘retail
investors’ and ‘institutional investors’. The term ‘retail investor’ can be used simply as
a way to differentiate individual investors from institutional investors. Thus, any
individual who owns stock by any means, direct or indirect, could be defined as a retail
investor. Investors have been classified as ‘sophisticated’ and ‘unsophisticated’
depending on their knowledge of investment. Institutional investors are generally
‘sophisticated’ and they invest considerable amount of money. On the other hand,
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investors who are unable to make a knowledgeable investment decision are known as an
‘ordinary’, ‘general’, or ‘unsophisticated’ investor.244
Furthermore, investors in the primary market can be classified according to their
holdings of shares. Based on this, investors may be categorised as equity investors, debt
investors, hybrids investors and other securities investors. Again, equity investors may
be generally a separated into two segments, namely, primary shareholders and
secondary shareholders. Investors in the secondary market can be classified into three
types in Saudi Arabia. They are: investors who enter the market for long-term
investment; traders for short-term investment; and speculators relying on quick profittaking expectations.245
The term ‘investors’ certainly includes those who invest in the IPOs. The subscription
process is when the issuing company has its first offering of stocks for sale, which is
known as the IPO. The IPO subscription is an offer from a buyer to purchase stocks
which are soon to be issued. They are basically termed ‘subscribers’.

2. 8 Investor Protection and the Development of the Securities Market
As was shown earlier, investor protection is the primary core objective of securities
regulation set out by IOSCO.246 The aim of investor protection is to develop the market
by facilitating fair transactions amongst market participants. The importance of investor
protection is derived from the stock market collapses that have taken place in different
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countries throughout history.247 These market crashes significantly contributed to the
need for (and an increased awareness of the need for) stronger laws for investor
protection.
In regard to the relationship between law and finance, La Porta et al demonstrate the
link between investor protection and capital market activity.248 A recent study on the
European markets shows that securities market with stronger regulation can produce
significant financial returns.249
In this study, the focus is the protection of investor rights in the securities market. This
protection can be obtained through the laws that protect investors’ rights, and the
effectiveness of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement. For this purpose,
the preferred form of investor protection with which this thesis is concerned is the
existence of a strong civil liability regime for breaches of the disclosure requirements.
However, without effective enforcement machinery, liability laws will be inoperative.
2.8.1

The Importance of Disclosure in Relation to the Investor Protection

Disclosure is an effective tool to reduce informational asymmetry and facilitate
informed decisions by investors. Mandatory disclosure of certain types of information is
considered to be of assistance to investors and investment advisors in helping them to
make an informed investment decision. According to a study carried out by Bushee and
Leuz, information asymmetry is reduced by improved disclosure requirements.250 The

247

Historical stock market crashes are, for example, in England in 1720, in the US in 1929 (and then
worldwide), and in major world markets in 1987 and 2008, and in Saudi Arabia in 2006.
248
Rafael La Porta et al, 'Legal Determinants of External Finance', above n 19, 1131.
249
Hans B Christensen, Luzi Hail and Christian Leuz, 'Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation:
The Role of Implementation and Enforcement' (Working Paper No 16737, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2011) 35.
250
Brian J Bushee and Christian Leuz, 'Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: Evidence
from the OTC Bulletin Board' (2005) 39 Journal of Accounting and Economics 233, 241.

77

Chapter 2: Introduction to Saudi Arabia, Its Securities Market and Relevant Concepts

same study finds that newly compliant companies with the disclosure requirements
show a significant increase in liquidity.251
Accurate information is necessary to ensure that investors make optimal decisions. In
this regard, the Technical Committee of IOSCO emphasises that:
Information should be disclosed on a timely basis, whether in connection with an
initial public offering or listing, continuously, currently or periodically, and in a
form or manner either prescribed by accounting standards, regulations, listing rules
or law, together with the information that is provided by the management under the
principles of fair presentation.252

The regulation of information disclosure is a significant aspect in maintaining the
integrity of the securities market. According to IOSCO, the fundamental purpose of
disclosure is to provide investors with the information necessary to make informed
investment decisions on an ongoing basis.253 Fox states that securities regulation should
protect investors from making damaging securities choices as a result of being poorly
informed.254 This shows the importance of mandating the disclosure of information.
Furthermore, a finding of the La Porta etc el is that ‘both extensive disclosure
requirements and standards of liability facilitating investor recovery of losses are
associated with larger stock markets’.255 Their results suggest that ‘the development of
stock markets is strongly associated with extensive disclosure requirements and a
relatively low burden of proof on investors seeking to recover damages resulting from

251

Ibid 240.
The Technical Committee of the IOSCO, 'Principles for Ongoing Disclosure and Material
Development Reporting by Listed Entities' (International Organisation of Securities Commissions,
October 2002) <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD132.pdf> 2.
253
International Organisation of Securities Commissions, 'Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation' (Report, IOSCO, May 2003) <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf>
5.
254
Merritt B Fox, 'Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom' (1997) 95
Michigan Law Review 2498, 2608.
255
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, above n 4, 28.
252

78

Chapter 2: Introduction to Saudi Arabia, Its Securities Market and Relevant Concepts

omissions of material information from the prospectus’.256 In addition, securities
regulators have found that the disclosure laws are a helpful means in their pursuit of
making corporations tell the public about all their activities.257
Easterbrook and Fischel assert that securities regulations have two components: a
prohibition of fraud, and requirements for disclosure when securities are issued and
periodically thereafter.258 DeFond and Hung found that countries with stronger investor
protection rights show evidence of more informative annual earnings announcements.259
Commentators state that the US securities laws are based on a philosophy of protecting
investors through mandatory disclosure. These laws focus on two principal settings in
which securities are bought and sold: issuer transactions (where securities are sold
directly by an issuer, such as in a public offering or a private placement) and trading
transactions (where securities are traded on secondary markets).260 The demand for
information disclosure was not only for the regional market but also included the
multinational corporations as ‘the development of information disclosure was taking
place in the wide range of participants at national, regional and international level’.261
In Saudi Arabia, flawed disclosure and the non-disclosure of material information is
unlawful.262 The materiality of information is a concept in which encompasses that
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information which would have an impact on the security’s value or influence a
reasonable investor in making an investment decision.263
2.8.2

Disclosure Methods of Protecting Investors in the IPO Market

The major systems of IPO disclosure regulation depend on two philosophies, that of
Merit-Based Regulation (MBR) and that of Disclosure-Based Regulation (DBR). MBR
relies on the supposition that ordinary investors are not able to make prudent investment
decisions even though companies disclose all material information. MDR requires
securities regulators to assess the merit of proposed public offerings. This approach is
generally associated with developing markets and may be of particular benefit where a
market lacks a group of analysts and advisers who could analyse information if it were
made publicly available. IOSCO considers MDR transitional and not necessary in a
fully developed market.264
On the other hand, DBR depends on ‘full, fair and true disclosure’ to the public. This
philosophy relies on compliance with the disclosure requirement and the presumption
that investors are able to assess the material information and make an informed
investment decision. Hence, in DBR, the regulator has less responsibility for the merit
of public offering. However, DBR is widely regarded as the optimal policy, especially
in developed securities markets.265
In Saudi Arabia, considering a hybrid approach combining MBR and DBR may be
suitable for the development of the securities market, a hybrid system of regulation may
be implemented by exempting some certain public offers from the regulatory merit
263

Discussion of the ‘concept of materiality’ will be provided in Chapters 4 & 5.
IOSCO, 'Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation-2003', above n 253, 24.
265
S M Solaiman, 'Disclosure Philosophy for Investor Protection in Securities Market: Does One Size Fit
All?' (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 135, 135.
264

80

Chapter 2: Introduction to Saudi Arabia, Its Securities Market and Relevant Concepts

assessment. Moreover, this hybrid system may be more elastic regarding the disclosure
requirement so investors will be responsible for making informed decisions.
2.8.3

The Meaning of the Disclosure Regime in this Study

A public company is required to make disclosure in three stages. The first is initial
disclosures in a prospectus which is made at the time of a company’s initial public
offering (IPO), that is, when a company first ‘goes public’. The second is continuous
disclosures which are made at any time during the time that of the company is listed as
required by events. The third is periodic disclosures which are made monthly, quarterly
and yearly depending on the laws of a particular jurisdiction. The term ‘disclosure
regime’ in this study will refer to the three types of disclosure mentioned above.
In regard to the content of the information disclosed by a public company, all material
information has to be disclosed publicly so that investors are able to evaluate whether
the information is important to his/her investment decision or not. Currently, disclosed
material information includes financial affairs, pollution activities, securities ownership
changes, payments to foreign governments, pending corporate takeovers, discoveries of
oil or minerals, or any key factor one would need to know to make an informed
decision.266 Because the disclosure arena is a contentious one, the law in this area is
evolving; items disclosed today were often not required to be disclosed 30 years ago.267
2.8.4

The Concept of Civil Liability

The stated objectives of securities laws are to protect investors and to deter the
misfeasance which is committed by individuals and institutions. In this sense, civil
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liability can be a meaningful tool to provide protection for investors in the securities
market. However, the concept of civil liability has been familiar to the major legal
systems in the world: civil law, common law and Shari’ah. 268 These three legal systems
have recognised and defined the meaning of civil liability.
In civil law jurisdictions, civil liability arises from an historic statement of law found at
art 1383 of the French Civil Code of 1804: ‘Everyone is liable for the damage he causes
not only by his acts, but also by his negligence or imprudence.’ 269 Similarly, the
German Civil Code of 1900 at § 823 described a person to be civilly liable as follows:
‘A person who, willfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health,
freedom, property or other right of another is bound to compensate him for any damage
arising therefrom.’270
In common law jurisdictions, the law of civil liability for wrongs is called the law of
torts. The law of torts defines the rights and obligations that arise when an individual
commits a wrong against or injures another. 271 Although the substantial part of tort law
is based on common law, statutory liabilities are in place in the common law countries.
In Shari’ah, civil liability exists to compel the person responsible for an injury to
compensate the injured party. It does not mean a form of deterrence as far as the
268
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meaning of reparation of the losses caused by the wrongdoer. Hence, any unlawful act
causing damage constitutes civil liability in Islamic law. Muslim jurists discuss civil
liability under the title ‘dhaman’ which is Arabic word meaning commitment or
responsibility to financial compensation for damages incurred by the injured party. 272 In
this respect, Sanhouri who is a well-known legal scholar refers the civil liability in
Shari’ah to dhaman, which is a civil compensation.273
2.8.4.1 The Meaning of Civil Liability in this Study
In this thesis, it can be generally said that the civil liability is the obligation for payment
of damages that have resulted from flouting a law. Hence, the term ‘civil liability’ refers
to compensation of investors or subscribers who may have sustained loss or damage
resulting from a breach of the disclosure regime. In another word, civil liability is used
here to describe the civil redress which is available to investors under the CML’03 and
which may be exercised directly by them as well as through the CMA.
If liability is established, the liable party has to indemnify the victim for the damage.
The meaning of indemnity is to make good the losses incurred by the victim. The
compensation should be a payment for the entirety of the damage and not exceed the
value of the damage done. It therefore does not entail any punitive damages.
In this thesis, the objectives of civil liability are to facilitate compensation for victims
and thus to deter potential violators from breaching the disclosure requirements. This is
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in line with Shulman who affirms this when he wrote: ‘Civil liability is imposed partly
for the purpose of compensating investors, partly, and probably more, for the purpose of
compelling compliance with the Act so as to avoid certain types of losses and the need
of compensation.’274 In addition, Golding asserts that civil liability performs two
functions. First, it provides compensation for those who have suffered loss; and second,
it acts as a means of deterrence.275 The term ‘deterrence’ refers to encouraging the
avoidance of particular actions or omissions through fear of the perceived
consequences. Deterrence encourages persons to modify behaviour in order to comply
with the law.
Recently, Fox drew attention to the importance of initiating a civil liability system for
the violations of corporate disclosures.276 Hence it is important to answer a number of
questions: Who should be civilly liable for damages when a disclosure violation occurs?
According to what standard? For what amount? To whom? The CML’03 provisions
regarding civil liability for defective disclosures will be the focus of this thesis. In
addition, disclosure requirements and the enforcement machinery, especially the role
played by the securities regulator, will be under examination.

2. 9 Summary and Conclusions
The discussion shows that securities markets are a fundamental engine for corporate
funding by the public. In addition, the preceding covers the most used terms and
concepts in this thesis. In this chapter, the important role played by the securities market
in strengthening economic growth has been demonstrated. It can be clearly said that the
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Saudi securities market has gradually grown since the establishment of the first stock
company in 1935. However, as with any emerging market, sustainable development is
imperative in order to be in line with modern securities markets.277 It has been seen that
despite the gradual development of the Saudi stock market since its inception,
drawbacks persist and reforms need to be made.
It has been demonstrated that a number of drawbacks have slowed the development of
the Saudi stock market. From an economic perspective, the Saudi stock market was
recently classified as of low quality according to the FTSE criteria for emerging markets
in the Middle East. In addition, as has been discussed, the market is mainly
characterised by the following: a small number of listed companies, market volatility
and the absence of foreign portfolio investment. Thus, potential investors prefer to
deposit funds in bank accounts or invest in sectors other than the securities market.
Most importantly, it has been shown that market development is not satisfactory due to
a lack of investor protection. The lack of transparency and disclosure coupled with an
ineffective civil liability regime has significantly undermined the growth of the
securities market in Saudi Arabia. It is submitted that adequate investor protection will
strengthen transparency, restore investor confidence, reduce instability and attract local
and foreign investment. Hence, the CMA is statutorily responsible for protecting
investors from unlawful market practices, strengthening the disclosure regime and
enforcing the securities laws.278
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Amr Daoud Marar, 'The Duality of the Saudi Legal System and Its Implications on Securitisations'
(2006) 20 Arab Law Quarterly 389, 392.
278
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 5(4).
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Adequate disclosure practice and transparency is crucial for the development of the
market and investor protection. A recent study on emerging markets has found that
‘[w]hen the informational efficiency in less developed markets is maximised, the market
will be more efficient, which will eventually increase investor confidence and contribute
to higher levels of economic activities’.279
Securities regulation primarily aims to ensure fair trading, prevent market malfeasance,
and foster investor confidence. All these ultimately relate to investor protection, which
is the most crucial concern of securities regulation. Investor protection is initially
provided by disclosure. The timeliness and accuracy of the disclosure of information is
significant for investors in terms of their ability to make an informed decision. It has
been shown that the disclosure regime in this study includes: prospectuses; and
continuous disclosure and periodic disclosure. Civil liability for contravention of
disclosure requirements is widely accepted to be an effective way of providing investor
protection. La Porta et al find that ‘both extensive disclosure requirements and standards
of liability facilitating investor recovery of losses are associated with larger stock
markets’.280
However, having a stock market is not enough. Developing such a market is important
for the economy of any country. The development of the stock market has to reflect the
wealth of the country. More importantly, effective regulations are required to be in
place for the development of the market.
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Asma Mobarek, A Sabur Mollah and Rafiqul Bhuyan, 'Market Efficiency in Emerging Stock Market:
Evidence from Bangladesh' (2008) 7 Journal of Emerging Market Finance 17, 39.
280
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, above n 4, 28.
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This study intends to strengthen the investor protection regime as the presence of
adequate investor protection in the Saudi securities market has yet to be achieved. It
appears that the current corporate regulations need to be more effective in order to
maintain market growth and foster confidence amongst investors. As the present study
is concerned with investor protection in regard to defective disclosures in the securities
market, the next chapter will introduce the current legal and regulatory framework of
the securities market in Saudi Arabia.
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CHAPTER 3:
LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
OF THE SECURITIES MARKET IN SAUDI ARABIA
3. 1 Introduction
This chapter aims to introduce the legal and regulatory frameworks of the securities
market in Saudi Arabia. It provides a historical background, and discusses the present
legal and regulatory framework. This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 1
serves as an introduction. Section 2 describes the historical background of the legal and
regulatory frameworks of the securities market in Saudi Arabia. Section 3 outlines the
current legal framework of the market. In section 4, details of the present regulatory
framework are provided. Section 5 shows the regulatory framework for disclosures.
Finally, section 6 presents a summary and conclusions.

3. 2 Historical Overview of the Legal and Regulatory Frameworks of
the Securities Market in Saudi Arabia
3.2.1

The Former Legal Framework of the Securities Market

Despite the establishment of corporations between 1935 and 1965, there were no laws
governing the securities market in Saudi Arabia. Company laws and regulations were
completely absent. Islamic law (Shari’ah) was the main and only source governing civil
and commercial transactions.281 Shari’ah did not differentiate between civil and
commercial transactions. In Saudi Arabia, wali al-amr282 (the King) has the power to set
rules and regulations to govern commercial activities as long as they do not breach
Shari’ah, and this was done (see below) — but not specifically in relation to the
securities market until much later, and as will be described further below, not to the
extent desirable.
281

Hamdallah, above n 58; Alghamdi and Hussinie, above n 66.
Wali al-amr is an Arabic word. It means that the ruler, one in charge, legal guardian and/or governor
of the state. See Al-Khudrawi, above n 272, 539. In Saudi Arabia, the King is the wali al-amr.
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In 1927, the first regulation for commercial activities in Saudi Arabia was the Nizam el
majlis el tijari (Commercial Council Law 1927).283 This law was drafted by the
Commercial Council in Jeddah and approved by the Majlis Ash-Shura (Consultative
Council).284 Based on the Commercial Council Law, Rules for Companies Registration
were issued and therefore a new branch of the Commercial Council was established,
called the ‘Registrar of Commercial Companies’. Thus, all commercial companies and
corporate bodies had to be registered with the Registrar of Commercial Companies.
In 1931, the Nizam al mahkamah al tijaria (Commercial Court Law 1931) was
established and was considered to be the first comprehensive commercial law in Saudi
Arabia.285 However, the Commercial Court Law did not survive because it was unable
to cater for all commercial developments and changes. Therefore, it was cancelled in
1954. Thus, it can be said the Rules for Companies Registration was the foundation for
the regulation of commercial issues in Saudi Arabia, including companies.
Nevertheless, there were no laws to govern the securities market.
However, the issuance of the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65) served as the foundation
for the development of the securities market; it was designed to establish clear and
specific rules for corporations and to foster confidence amongst investors.286 This basic
Saudi corporations law was put in place as the principal law regulating the primary
283

It is considered the first attempt to draft regulations concerning the commercial activities and litigation
in Saudi Arabia history.
284
Majlis ash-shura is a legislative body that advises the King on issues that are important to the State.
Hamdallah, above n 58.
285
The Commercial Court Law contains 633 Articles divided into four sections. The sections are:
Overland Trade; Maritime Trade; Procedural Commercial; and Output. The Commercial Court Law was
cancelled in 1954.
286
The Companies Law 1965 (Saudi Arabia) issued under Royal Decree No. M/6, dated 22/3/1385H and
amended several times under Royal Decrees. Examples of these amendments:
i.
M/5 on 12/2/1378H
ii.
M/23 on 28/6/1402H
iii.
M/46 on 04/7/1405H
iv.
M/60 on 03/7/1428H
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market.287 Seventeen corporations were in operation when this law came to existence,
and the primary securities market was the only market formally operating. These
companies were allowed to issue shares to the public. After the issuance of CL’65, more
companies started issuing securities in the primary share market, but the secondary
market activity was limited because of people’s lack of awareness about investment in
company securities. Owning stocks tended, therefore, to be reserved for businesspeople.
Apart from businesspeople, only those people who had had the opportunity to travel
abroad were able to realise the benefits of investment; they too had therefore invested in
securities. Nevertheless, the secondary market remained illiquid for a long time.
The CL’65 served as the only regulatory law of the Saudi stock market from its issue
until 2003.288 Although CL’65 provided a foundation for the development of the Saudi
share market until 2003, it was not adequate to the task of opening a formal stock
exchange or, more broadly, a functioning capital market. 289 Beach clearly observed that
there were several drawbacks with CL’65, as it was the only source of regulation for the
primary and secondary capital markets. These drawbacks were, namely, that the focus
of the regulation was on the primary offering; a prospectus was not required to contain
any useful information concerning the operation of the company; and issuer behaviour
and advertising during the offering were not subject to regulation. 290 It can be also

287

The ruler (wali al amr) issued a number of successive regulations in order to cover all commercial
activities. Of these regulations, for example:
i.
Law of Commercial Papers 1964
ii.
Banking Control Law 1966
iii.
Commercial Books Law 1989
iv.
Commercial Agencies Law 1963
v.
Law of Trade Names 2000
288
Joseph L Brand, 'Aspects of Saudi Arabian Law and Practice ' (1986) 9 Boston College International
and Comparative Review 1, 24; See also Hamdallah, above n 58.
289
Beach, above n 24, 317.
290
Ibid.
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added that regulations within CL’65 regarding the secondary market were significantly
incomplete.
Furthermore, the secondary market was mainly governed by the provisions of CL’65 as
well as rules issued by the Ministerial Committee for the share market. 291 In 1984, the
Committee formulated executive rules292 to regulate trading in shares through local
banks, which entitled only licensed Saudi banks to conduct services related to the
purchase and sale of shares in Saudi listed companies.293
Al-Twaijry agreed that the entire focus of these regulations was on banks, to the
exclusion of investors and other market participants.294 The provisions of CL’65 in
covering the secondary market suffered from several obvious omissions. Firstly, there
was no licensing or regulatory supervisory scheme for market intermediaries. Secondly,
there was no regulatory supervision of significant continuous disclosure to investors.
Thirdly, CL’65 did not address individual liability for wrongdoing and unlawful
practices. Finally, there were no provisions concerning anti-competitive behaviour, such
as market manipulation, insider trading, deceptive marketing, or most importantly,
material information disclosure requirements. As Abdul-Hadi observed, by that time
‘although the government provided some regulations in the form of decrees, the Saudi

291

In 1984, a Ministerial Committee composed of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy,
Ministry of Commerce and Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was formed to regulate and
develop the market.
292
The Executive Rules to Regulate dealing in Company Shares by Banks, issued under authority of
Royal Decree 1230-8 (1984) (Saudi Arabia).
293
For more details, see Ayman Shafiq Fayyad Abdul-Hadi, Stock Markets of the Arab World: Trends,
Problems and Prospects for Integration (Routledge, 1988) 50.
294
Al-Twaijry, 'Saudi Stock Market Historical View and Crisis Effect’, above n 31.
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stock market lacked … uniform stock quotations, company news and reporting
requirements’.295
Consequently, it can be said that CL’65 failed to set adequate disclosure requirements
for both the primary and secondary securities markets. Hence, a discussion of the CL’65
provisions for civil liability for defective disclosures will be largely unrelated to this
thesis. This is because the Capital Market Law 2003 (CML’03) was subsequently
implemented. This is supported by art 56 of the CML’03, which states: ‘This Law shall
repeal all provisions that are contrary hereto.’296
It is believed that ‘a weak legal system leads to significant market imperfections which
affect the growth of the real economy.’297 Until very recently, the securities market of
Saudi Arabia may have been characterised by the lack of a formal regulatory agency or
a specific legal structure to govern it. In 1984, Abdeen and Shook found that there was
no organised legal framework for the stock market in Saudi Arabia.298 Nevertheless, it
has always been known as a thriving market.299
3.2.2

The Former Regulatory Framework of the Securities Market

Since the inception of the securities market of Saudi Arabia in 1935 and until 1948,
there was no regulatory framework for the market. Instead, in 1986 the Ministry of
Commerce (MoC) was empowered to administer companies. The MoC was entrusted
with the organisation of domestic and foreign trade development. As mentioned in the
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Abdul-Hadi, above n 293, 49.
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 65.
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Yang Yao and Linda Yueh, 'Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China: An Introduction' (2009)
37 World Development 753, 758.
298
Adnan M Abdeen and Dale N Shook, The Saudi Financial System, in the Context of Western and
Islamic Finance (John Wiley & Sons, 1984) 145.
299
Shahid Ali Khan, 'Kingdom Instrumental in Fixing World Financial System', Saudi Gazette, 10 April
2011 <http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2010050471269>.
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previous chapter, the stock market had been managed by unofficial brokerage firms who
took advantage of the unregulated market. This situation led to share price volatility,
loss of market credibility, and investor protection loss. Therefore, in 1984, a royal
decree was issued by the King of Saudi Arabia to regulate the stock market. The decree
stated that a ministerial committee would be formed, which would be in charge of
overseeing all stock market activities. The committee consists of the representatives
from the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MoFNE), Ministry of Commerce
(MoC), and Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)300. Consequently, the committee
was given the power to issue rules and instructions for the stock market, but these rules
and instructions were insufficient to govern all of the stock market activities.
3.2.2.1 The Role of the Ministry of Commerce (MoC)
The MoC is directly responsible for the formation of companies, conversion of firms to
joint stock companies, and initial public offerings (IPOs). Thus, companies wishing to
go public are required to fulfil five conditions and submit four documents. These
conditions are that: net company assets are not less than SAR 50 million at the date of
change; there is a return of not less than 7 per cent on shareholder’s equity in any one
year of the three years preceding the change ; the company should have been established
for at least five years; it should place at least 40 per cent of the issued shares of the
company; and it should have an able administrative system and shall have efficient
internal controls to protect its net funds, and should have the ability to compete in the
market.301

300
301

SAMA is the central bank of Saudi Arabia.
Al-Dukheil, above n 156, 8.
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Documents to be submitted are: articles of incorporation of the company; approval of
company owners for the change of status; audited financial statements for the three
years preceding the request for change; and a feasibility study for the company goals
and future financial statements for the new company for the first three years, and a
determination of the price of shares in the company. 302
3.2.2.2 The Role of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MoFNE)
The function of the MoFNE is to manage all government finance, including the
budgeting and expenditure of all ministries and government agencies, and to control
national economic growth. The responsibilities of this ministry include the
administration of zakat, income tax and customs duties.303 The MoFNE is a body that
has a very strong influence on the financial system of the country through various
policy directives and controls that it exercises from time to time. It controls the central
bank of the country, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), which in turn
controls the stock market from an operational and functional point of view.
3.2.2.3 The role of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)
SAMA, the central bank, governs the Saudi Stock Market regarding management and
operations. Currently, only banking institutions that have been issued a licence under
the Banking Control Law 1966 are authorised to be members of the Saudi Stock
Market.304 These members use the Electronic Securities Information System (ESIS) to
effect trades between clients/investors and traders.
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Ibid.
‘Zakat’ is an Arabic term, which means a fixed proportion of a person’s wealth that must be
distributed on yearly basis for the benefit of the poor in the Muslim community: Al-Khudrawi, above n
272, 217.
304
Al-Dukheil, above n 156, 9.
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In effect, the stock market structure was dominated by SAMA and the MoC. It was
governed by rules and regulations issued and supervised by SAMA. However, demands
grew for a restructure of the capital market and the establishment of a formal stock
market with an independent regulator.305
Furthermore, Al-Dukheil made a call for a single regulator, pointing out that he felt that,
‘SAMA, as a central bank should not be directly involved in the day-to-day running of
the stock market.’306 He also states that ‘an independent regulatory authority comprising
professionals from the public and private sector can set the policy directions and also
establish a formal stock exchange on the lines of other developing and developed
economies.’307 Moreover, in terms of companies listed, the MoC can facilitate the
conversion conditions that allow commercial companies to be listed on the stock
market.
However, the stock market continued to be impeded due to the huge savings held by the
public (and not invested) and a small number of listed companies in which it would be
possible for them to invest if they so desired. In this regard, it is believed that a wellfunctioning stock market requires an adequate financial institution to hold public
savings.308 A professional body to observe the securities market was absent until the
establishment of the Capital Market Authority, as will be detailed in the following
section.
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Figure 3.5: The Old Saudi Regulatory Framework

3. 3 The Current Legal Framework of the Securities Market in Saudi
Arabia
The current legal framework governing companies includes CL’65 and CML’03, the
Listing Rules 3004 (LR’04) of the Capital Market Authority, and the Merger and
Acquisition Regulations 2007 (MAR’07) Offers of Securities Regulations 2008
(OSR’08). However, it should be noted that both LR’04 and MAR’07 apply to listed
companies only. The OSR’08 regulates public and private securities placement.
The legal framework of the securities market currently consists of CML’03 as well as
the rules and regulations issued by the Capital Market Authority (CMA). Generally,
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companies listed in Saudi Arabia are governed by CL’65 and CML’03, and LR’04 and
MAR’07 issued by the CMA. Although the formation and operation of all types of
companies are governed by CL’65, it does not apply to stock exchange activities. The
CML’03 is the sole statute that governs the work of the stock market.
3.3.1

The Major Saudi Securities Laws

In 1998, the legal department of SAMA commenced drafting the CML’03. Over the
next four years, enormous assistance was provided by Professor James D Cox309 and
Joseph W Beach310 to draft the rules necessary to implement this law and regulations to
govern the activities of the Saudi securities market. The final draft was submitted to the
Majlis Ash-Shura (Consultative Council) in December 2002.311 A Capital Market Law,
comprised of 67 articles, was finally passed by the Council of Ministers in June 2003,
with the law taking effect from November 2003 after publication in the Official
Gazette.312 The law was not really implemented until July 2004, which added some
ambiguity in the market. CML’03 has made a positive contribution to the development
of the Saudi capital markets.

309

James D Cox is a professor of Duke University, School of Law. Professor Cox earned his BS from
Arizona State University and law degrees at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law
(JD), and Harvard Law School (LL.M). In 1998, Professor Cox was retained by SAMA to draft the Saudi
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia).
310
Joseph W Beach is currently a Special Counsel in Cadwalader’s Charlotte office, USA. Beach
received his BA from Davidson College, cum laude, and his MA in international relations from Duke
University Graduate School. He received his JD, magna cum laude, and was a member of the Order of the
Coif from Duke University School of Law. He was previously an associate at Dechert LLP. In 1998,
Beach joined with Professor James D Cox to draft the Saudi Capital Market Law 2003.
311
‘Although many officials reviewed and commented on the draft law, the final version is remarkably
unchanged in substance from our original draft: See Beach, above n 24, 308.
312
In Saudi Arabia, the Council of Ministers undertakes the approval of drafts leading to the issuance of
laws and regulations. They become effective after promulgation in the Official Gazette. See Jean-Benoit
Zegers, 'The Legal Framework in Saudi Arabia' in Anthony Shoult (ed), Doing Business with Saudi
Arabia (GMB Publishing, 3rd ed, 2006) 87, 89.
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Many observers believe that ‘modernisation of the legal regime governing the Saudi
capital market is a key to the economic future of Saudi Arabia.’313 Beach asserts:
[T]he CML’03 will provide the legal underpinning necessary for growth and
development of the Saudi domestic capital market. In the long run, such
development should play a key role in advancing Saudi Arabia’s economic
modernisation.314

The majority of the articles of the new CML’03 have their basis in the securities statute
from the US.315 The passing of the CML’03 was a major indication that policy makers
in Saudi Arabia are serious about implementing reform strategies aimed at economic
liberalisation, competition, and market efficiency.316
The CML’03 consists of 10 chapters as listed below:
1) Definitions
2) The Capital Market Authority
3) The Stock Exchange
4) The Securities Deposit Centre
5) Brokers Regulations
6) Investment Funds and Collective Investment Schemes
7) Disclosure
8) Manipulation and Insider Trading
9) Regulation of Proxy Solicitations, Restricted Purchase and Restricted Offer for
Shares

313

See, eg, Salamander Davoudi, 'Liberalisation Process Produces Two Entrants: Saudi Arabia
Privatisation', Financial Times, 28 May 2003.
314
Beach, above n 24, 320.
315
Beach also claims that: ‘Although many officials reviewed and commented on the draft law, the final
version is remarkably unchanged in substance from our original draft.’ See Ibid 308.
316
Ramady, above n 104, 174.
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10) Sanctions and Penalties for Violations
Furthermore, the government issued a number or regulations that could further underpin
the purpose of investor protection in the securities market. These regulations are the
Foreign Capital Investment Law 2000,317 the Commercial Agencies Regulations 1962,
318

the Government Bids and Procurement Law 2006,319 the Common Customs Law of

the Gulf Cooperation Council States 2003,320 the Anti-Cover-Up Law 2004,321 the
Competition Law 2004,322 and the Anti-Money Laundering Law 2003.323 Processes of
change and reform in Saudi Arabia are always needed, due to the growing economy and
the need to attract foreign investment to the country, which require more effective laws
and institutions.324
3.3.2 Laws Governing Persons Involved in the Disclosure Regime
Companies in their initial procedures of going public — including company foundation,
registration, and initial subscriptions — are regulated by the CL’65. In addition, CL’65
has provisions regulating the appointment and functions of directors and auditors and
their liabilities to the company, shareholders and outsiders. Lawyers are governed by
The Code of Law Practice 2001.
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Foreign Capital Investment Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/1 dated 5 Muharram 1421 (10 April
2000).
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Commercial Agencies Regulation, issued by Royal Decree No. 11 dated 20 Safar 1382H (July 1962).
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Government Bids and Procurement Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/58 dated 4 Ramadan 1427H
(27 September 2006).
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67/2003 (January 2003).
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Competition Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/25 dated 4 Jumada al-Ula 1425H (22 June 2004).
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Anti-Money Laundering Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/39 dated 25 Jumada ath-Thani1424 (24
August 2003)
324
Hossein Esmaeili, 'On a Slow Boat toward the Rule of Law: The Nature of Law in the Saudi Arabian
Legal System' (2009) 26 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 1, 46.
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However, the focus of this thesis is the civil liabilities for contraventions of the
disclosures requirements set out in CML’03 and the CMA regulations. This is due to the
fact that CML’03 and the CMA regulations have legal application over all practices and
activities in the Saudi stock market. With the objective of improving the legal and
regulatory framework of the securities market in Saudi Arabia, this thesis will
demonstrate that the current regulatory regime has some shortcomings and that
provisions for civil liabilities for defective disclosures are not sufficient. Moreover,
defences and remedies for the civil liabilities for defective disclosures are inadequate.
This will be seen through an examination of the three types of disclosures: prospectuses,
periodical disclosures, and continuous disclosures. Discussion in the following chapters
will demonstrate the inadequacy of the civil liability provisions in the CML’03.

3. 4 The Existing Regulatory Framework
The issuance of the Capital Market Law 2003 (CML’03) was crucial in setting up an
independent regulatory framework for the securities market in Saudi Arabia.325 A single
Saudi Arabian securities regulator, the CMA, was established under CML’03.326 In
addition, a remarkable feature of the CML’03 was the establishment of a Securities
Exchange or bourse. The CML’03 also established the first national securities
depository centre. Thus, it can be said that the trend of Self-Regulatory Organisation
(SRO)327 has been adopted in Saudi Arabia when an authority is based on law or

325

Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) provides in art 4(a) that:
An Authority to be named “The Capital Market Authority” is hereby established in the Kingdom
and shall directly report to the President of the Council of Ministers. It shall have a legal personality
and financial and administrative autonomy. It shall be vested with all authorities as may be
necessary to discharge its responsibilities and functions under this law.
326
Ramady, above n 104, 149.
327
The International Council of Securities Associations (ICSA) defines the Self-Regulatory Organisation
(SRO) as ‘a private, nongovernmental organization that should be dedicated to the public interest
objectives of enhancing market integrity, investor protection, and market efficiency’: see The
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delegation of power by a statutory regulator. However, the SRO issue will be discussed
further later in this chapter.328
The CMA shall be vested with all authority as may be necessary to discharge its
responsibilities and functions under the CML’03.329 According to art 4(b) of CML’03:
‘The CMA shall not have the right to engage in any commercial activities, to have
special interest in any project intended for profit, to borrow or lend any funds, or to
acquire, own or issue any securities.’
3.4.1

Composition of the Capital Market Authority

According to the CML’03, the CMA is to have a board named the Board of Capital
Market Authority (BCMA). The BCMA is to be made up of five full-time members,
including the chairman.330 The membership period is five years, which can be renewed
only once. The CMA shall directly report to the President of the Council of Ministers.331
The CMA shall have a legal personality and financial and administrative autonomy. 332

International Council of Securities Associations, Best Practices for Self-Regulatory Organizations (8
December 2012) <http://www.icsa.bz/img/letter_pdf/ICSABestPracticesSRO.pdf>.
328
According to a recent working paper by John Carson, a full-fledged SRO performs three main
regulatory functions:
i.
Rule making: Establishing rules and regulations governing the conduct of member firms
and other regulated persons
ii. Supervision: Supervising members and markets to monitor for compliance with the rules
iii. Enforcement: Enforcing compliance with the rules by investigating potential violations and
disciplining individuals and firms that violate them.
For more details, see John Carson, 'Self-Regulation in Securities Markets' (Working Paper for World
Bank Financial Sector Policy Group, 2010) 10.
329
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 4(a).
330
The board members shall be appointed, and their salaries and financial benefits determined, by a Royal
Order. The Royal Order shall specify from the board members the chairman and deputy chairman who
will replace the chairman in his absence. Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 7(a).
331
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 4(a).
332
Ibid.
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Figure 3.6: Composition of the Capital Market Authority in Saudi Arabia

Source: Capital Market Authority333

3.4.2

Powers of the Board of the Capital Market Authority (BCMA)

According to the CML’03 (arts 7, 8, 9 and 10), the BCMA is assigned to perform the
following powers:
i.

The BCMA shall set forth the internal regulations of the CMA and the manner
in which the personnel, advisors, auditors, and any other experts shall be
appointed as may be necessary for carrying out the responsibilities and functions
entrusted to the CMA.

ii.

The BCMA shall exercise all authorities entrusted to the CMA in accordance
with the provisions of this law.

333

Capital
Market
Authority,
'Annual
Report
1432/1433'
(Report,
2011)
<http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Publicationsreports/Reports/CMA_Annual_Report_2011_EN.pdf> 19.
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iii.

The BCMA will specify how the CMA functions, and responsibilities and
operations will be organised among its divisions and departments. The Internal
Regulations of the CMA will set forth the requirements for the operation of
these departments and divisions.

iv.

With the exception of the powers conferred by the CML’03 exclusively upon the
BCMA, the Board may delegate any of its functions.

v.

The Board shall, however, at its discretion, retain the power to review the
actions and decisions made by those who had been delegated with such
powers.334

According to art 11 of the CML’03, the chairman of the Board shall be the CMA’s chief
executive officer, who shall implement the CMA’s policy and shall be responsible for
the management of its affairs, including the following:
i.

Implementing the decisions taken by the Board.

ii.

Signing, alone or jointly with others, reports, accounting statements, financial
statements, correspondence and the CMA’s documents.

iii.
3.4.3

The CMA’s administrative and financial affairs.
Powers and Functions of the Capital Market Authority

Article 6 of CML’03 has given the CMA a wide range of powers to effectively
supervise the market. These powers include the following:335

334

Such a review will be made at the CMA Board’s initiative, upon the request of one of its members or
upon the request of a party to a lawsuit arising under the provisions of this law and in compliance with the
rules issued by the CMA.
335
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 6. These powers are the most relevant to the subject of
this thesis. However, there are additional powers given to the CMA.
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i.

Set forth policies and plans, conduct studies, and issue necessary rules to achieve
the CMA’s objectives.

ii.

Issue and amend the implementing regulations as may be necessary to enforce the
provisions of this Law.

iii.

Approve the offering of securities.

iv.

Suspend the Exchange’s activities for a period of not more than one day;

v.

Approve, cancel, or suspend the listing of any Saudi Security traded on the
Exchange of any Saudi issuer on any stock exchange outside the Kingdom.

vi.

Prohibit any security or suspend the issuance or trading of any securities on the
Exchange as the CMA may deem necessary.

vii.

The CMA shall have the right to establish standards and conditions required for
the auditors who audit the books and records of the Exchange, the Depositary
Centre, brokerage companies, investment funds, and joint stock companies listed
on the Exchange.

viii.

Determine the contents of annual and periodical financial statements, reports, and
documents that should be submitted by issuers offering securities for public
subscription or the issuers whose securities are listed on the Exchange.

ix.

Approve the regulations, rules, and policies of the Exchange and the Depositary
Centre.

x.

Prepare the regulations and rules for the surveillance and supervision of entities
subject to the provisions of this Law.

xi.

Appoint a licensed auditor to audit the CMA’s financial statements and final
accounts.

xii.

In accordance with the provisions of the CML’03, the CMA is empowered with
the licensing of rating companies and agencies, and the conditions thereof.
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Article 5 of CML’03 states that the CMA is to be the only regulator of securities
markets in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the law states that, ‘the CMA shall be the agency
responsible for issuing regulations, rules and instructions, and for applying the
provisions of this Law’.336 This function is combined with the objective of protecting
investor interests, ensuring orderly and equitable dealing in securities, and promoting
and developing the capital markets. In order to carry out the regulatory role, art 5
provides that the CMA shall be responsible for:337
i.

Regulating and developing the stock exchange.

ii.

Regulating the issuance of securities, monitoring securities and dealing in
securities.

iii.

Regulating and monitoring the works and activities of parties subject to the
control and supervision of the CMA.

iv.

Protecting citizens and investors in securities from unfair and unsound practices
or practices involving fraud, deceit, cheating, or manipulation.

v.

Ensuring fairness and transparency in securities transactions.

vi.

Regulating and monitoring the full disclosure of information regarding securities
and their issuers.

vii.

Regulating proxy and purchase requests and public offers of shares.

viii.

The CMA may publish a draft of regulations and rules before issuing or
amending them.

ix.

For conducting all investigations, the CMA is empowered to subpoena
witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, or
other documents.

336
337

See Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 5(a).
Details of the CMA’s functions are stipulated in art 5: Ibid.
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x.

The CMA shall have the power to carry out inspections of the records or any
other materials.

3.4.4

The Saudi Stock Exchange

Law makers soon realised the need to establish a formal stock exchange in Saudi
Arabia. Article 20 of the CML’03 declares that a stock exchange with the legal status of
a company be created that is called the ‘Saudi Stock Exchange’ (SSE). The SSE is to be
the sole body with an authorisation to carry out trading in securities.
In accordance with the declaration given in the article above, the Saudi Stock Exchange
(SSE) company was formed in 2007 as a joint stock company. 338 A board of directors
governs the SSE. The board is made up of nine members, three representing various
government agencies, four representing the brokerages, and two representing the listed
companies.339 Moreover, for the purpose of ensuring fairness and the protection of
investors, the CML’03 allows the SSE to propose to the CMA the necessary regulations,
rules, and instructions for its operation. This includes conditions for the listing and
trading in securities and the minimum capital required for brokerage companies, as well
as the financial assurances required from such companies or their employees. Moreover,
the SSE is allowed by law to propose regulations and rules in relation to the immediate
and timely publication of information regarding transactions executed in securities
338

On 19 March 2007, the Saudi Council of Ministers approved the formation of the Saudi Capital
Market Company with a capital of SR 1.2 billion [USD 331 million], converting TADAWUL from an
automated trading system into a joint stock company fully owned by the public investment fund. For
more details, see Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), About Tadawul (2 October 2011)
<http://goo.gl/xzsq0>
339
According to the Capital Market Law of 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 22(b): The membership will be as
follows:
i.
A representative of the Ministry of Finance.
ii.
A representative of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
iii.
A representative of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency.
iv.
Four members representing licensed brokerage companies.
v.
Two members representing the joint stock companies listed on the Exchange.
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traded, and the obligations of issuers of securities, shareholders, and members to
disclose such information to the SSE as the SSE deems necessary. The SSE has two
main objectives: firstly, operating the market efficiently and delivering service
excellence; secondly, developing a leading financial exchange by supporting
competitive investment and financing channels. The objectives of the SSE are set out by
the Board of the SSE. They are as follows: 340
i.

Operate the market effectively and efficiently.

ii.

Ensure market integrity, quality and fairness.

iii.

Support investor education and awareness efforts.

iv.

Develop service excellence for customers (brokers, issuers, investors, vendors,
and so on).

v.

Develop the SSE’s capabilities and competencies.

vi.

Support efficient capital raising for companies.

vii.

Provide innovative, diversified, and integrated financial markets, products,
services, and instruments.

viii.

Attract national and international market participants.

ix.

Integrate and leverage offerings across our value chain.

x.

Provide superior financial returns and shareholder value.

On the basis of the above description, it has been established that a having sole entity to
exclusively carry out the function of securities trading will simplify the task of the
regulatory oversight and concentrate them in one entity. Moreover, it can be said that
the enabling nature of CML’03 has the flexibility to leave the SSE to develop itself.
Finally, Table 3.7 below recognises the parties that are under the CMA supervision.

340

Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), Objectives (2 October 2011) <http://goo.gl/nkQlB>.
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Table 3.7: Parties Subject to CMA Supervision
Party

Definition

i.

TADAWUL
Saudi
Stock
Exchange
(SSE)

Tadawul is the sole entity authorised to carry out trading in
Saudi Arabia in securities trading and is responsible for all
operations of the SSE.

ii.

Authorised
persons

Legal entities authorised to carry on securities business and
only persons holding a valid licence issued by CMA are
allowed to perform this function.

iii.

Listed
companies

Companies whose securities are traded in the SSE.

iv.

Traders

Entities representing the public who trade in securities in the
SSE.

Source: The 2009 Annual Report of the CMA341

Figure 3.7: Structure of the Present Regulatory Framework of the Securities
Market in Saudi Arabia

341

Capital
Market
Authority,
'Publication
and
Reports'
(Annual
Report,
<http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Publicationsreports/Reports/CMA_finalENGLISH.pdf> 22.
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3. 5 The Regulatory Role of the CMA in Regard to Disclosures
Having effective disclosure regulations has become a fundamental element of regulatory
improvement. By contrast, ineffective disclosure policy will lead to no advance in the
regulatory objectives.342 This section describes the current regulatory framework of the
disclosure regime in Saudi Arabia.
3.5.1

The Current Disclosure Regulatory Framework

Timely, accurate and adequate disclosures to investors are essential factors in ensuring
the efficiency and integrity of any capital market. According to art 5 of the CML’03, the
CMA regulates and monitors full disclosure of information associated with securities
and their issuers and the dealings of informed persons (insiders), major shareholders,
and investors.
Moreover, the CMA is empowered to define and make available the information that
participants in the market should provide and disclose to shareholders and the public.
Article 6 of the CML’03 grants the CMA the power to issue instructions and procedures
necessary for regulating and monitoring the disclosure process. Currently, the CMA has
regulatory powers to regulate and monitor two types of disclosure: IPOs and continuous
disclosure which includes periodic disclosure.
3.5.1.1 Initial Disclosure
This refers to disclosing preliminary relevant information about any company whose
shares are to be offered on the market for public subscription in accordance with the

342

David Weil et al, 'The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies' (2006) 25 Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management 155, 173.
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OSR’08 and LR’04. Such information shall be disclosed through a prospectus, which
must contain the following:
i.

An adequate description of the issuer, its business, and the individuals in charge
of its management, including members of the board of directors, executive
officers and senior officials, and major shareholders.

ii.

An adequate description of the securities to be issued or offered, in terms of their
volume, price, relevant rights, privileges, and priorities of the issuer’s other
securities, if any. The description must outline how the proceeds of the issue will
be disbursed and the commissions levied by those concerned with the issue.

iii.

A clear statement of the financial position of the issuer and any relevant financial
date, including audited balance sheet, profit and loss account, and cash flow
statement.

iv.

Any other relevant information as may be required by the CMA.343

3.5.1.2 Continuous Disclosures
The CMA treats any type of disclosure after the first sale of the security as a continuous
disclosure. Therefore, ‘continuous disclosures’ covers all disclosures by a company
subsequent to its IPO including periodic disclosures. The continuous disclosure refers to
disclosure of the following information and data concerning participants in the
secondary market:
i.

Annual financial statements and reports;

ii.

Quarterly interim financial statement;

343

During the year of 2011, the CMA reviewed and published nine prospectuses. Capital Market
Authority, ‘Annual Report of 2011’, above n 333, 69.
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iii.

Significant developments and events (material information) about listed
companies that can be of importance to investors and might affect the price of a
company’s securities;

iv.

Any developments or events related to capital increase or decrease;

v.

Any change in the details of members of the board of directors, senior executives,
and their relatives;

vi.

Any changes in the company’s articles of association, headquarters or auditor.344

The CMA also:
i.

Reviews the annual and quarterly financial statements of listed companies to
ensure their compliance with the disclosure requirements stated in the CML’3 and
the CMA regulations;

ii.

Monitors corporate investments in the shares of listed companies;

iii.

Reviews listed companies’ announcements of financial results, material
developments, or events to ensure their compliance with the CML’03 and the
CMA regulations, and all relevant instructions issued by the CMA;

iv.

Monitors notifications related to the substantial ownership of shares by major
shareholders, members of boards of directors and senior executives, to ensure
their compliance with the CML’03 and the CMA regulations;

v.

Monitors listed companies’ announcements of agreements and memoranda of
understanding signed with unlisted company/companies concerning share
acquisition or capital increase;

vi.

344

Monitors the lifting of share lock-ups on founders in listed companies;

Ibid 69–70.
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vii.

Makes supervisory visits to listed companies to ensure their compliance with the
CML’03 and the CML regulations.345

In addition, the CMA is empowered to review annual and quarterly financial
statements.346 The CMA reviews the detailed and condensed annual and quarterly
financial statements of listed companies, which are posted on the website of the SSE to
ensure that they meet all disclosure requirements according to the CML’03 and CML
regulations.

3. 6 Summary and Conclusions
Considering the short history of the CMA, it cannot be denied that there have been a
number of improvements. The CMA has been enjoying its statutory powers to oversee
the securities market in Saudi Arabia. As described earlier, since the inception of the
CMA, there have been several rules and regulation issued by the CMA.
The foregoing discussion in this chapter has explained the legal and regulatory
framework of the securities market in Saudi Arabia. It can be seen that CML’03 is
primarily an enabling law, and nominates various entities to govern the day-to-day
operations of the market. The CMA is created by the CML’03 to play the regulatory
role in the securities market in Saudi Arabia.
Furthermore, it has been seen that the CML’03 gives the CMA the power to regulate
and monitor disclosure (prospectus, periodic disclosures, and continuous disclosures) in
the SSE. The aim of this power is to provide investors with full, fair, and timely
disclosures, so that they can make informed investment decisions. In addition, one of

345
346

Ibid 70.
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 6(a)(10).

112

Chapter 3: Legal and Regulatory Framework

the main purposes of the CMA is to maintain the integrity of the market and ensure the
protection of investors. However, it has been found that the legal and regulatory
frameworks of the securities market require considerable improvements in order to
create and maintain effective protection of investors. There is a need for the issuing and
updating of rules and regulations in order to strengthen the disclosure regime. Thus, the
CMA is required to improve its function and make effective use of its statutory powers.
In brief, an adequate legal and regulatory framework of the stock market is essential for
successful investments as well as a strong economy. A significant point is that
investment always requires a healthy legal environment to sustain it. For that reason, it
is often said that ‘strong capital markets, fostered by strong investor protections, ought
to reduce a firm’s cost of capital and thereby encourage investment. Investment, in turn,
ought to pay off in faster growth.’347 Moreover, a recent study asserts that ‘the results
show that stronger securities regulation can have significant economic benefits.’348
Generally, regulation aims to provide protection for investors. Effective laws and a
proper regulatory framework can provide this protection. An empirical study of 49
countries across the world found that ‘countries with poorer investor protections,
measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have
smaller and narrower capital markets’.349 Thus, the legal and regulatory framework of
the Saudi securities market needs to improve the protection of the investor which thus,
in turn, will contribute to the further development of the market. A recent study asserts
that ‘much of securities regulation is oriented toward investor protection, bringing with

347

Bernard S Black, 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets' (2001) 48
UCLA Law Review 781, 835.
348
Christensen, Hail and Leuz, above n 249.
349
Rafael La Porta et al, 'Legal Determinants of External Finance', above n 19, 1131.
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it a set of investor rights, such as the right to certain disclosures.’350 On the other hand,
insufficient information about the market and its adherence to the international
standards will lead to an undermining and isolation of the securities market. A recent
report examining the compliance of Saudi Arabia with the Objectives and Principles of
Securities Regulation set out by IOSCO reveals that there is not enough information
publicly available to make an assessment of all relevant objectives and principles of the
securities regulations.351 Therefore, the following chapters will examine the
effectiveness of the present legal and regulatory framework in relation to civil liability
for defective prospectuses. It is believed that a legal framework that is based on
deterrence effectively protects investors in the securities market.352 Hence, the
provisions for civil liability for defective disclosures will be also examined in the
following chapters.

350

Ronald J Colombo, 'Trust and the Reform of Securities Regulation' (2010) 35 Delaware Journal of
Corporate Law 829, 851.
351
Financial Standards Foundation, 'Financial Standards Report: Saudi Arabia' (eStandardsForum, March
2010) 19.
352
S M Solaiman, Investor Protection in a Disclosure Regime [manuscript]: An International and
Comparative Perspective on Initial Public Offerings in the Bangladesh Securities Market (PhD Thesis,
University of Wollongong, 2003) 193; Golding, above n 275, 329.
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CHAPTER 4:
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE
DISCLOSURES IN A PROSPECTUS UNDER SAUDI
SECURITIES LAWS
4. 1 Introduction
Investor protection requires a combination of both rights written into laws and
regulations, and effectiveness in their enforcement.353 Shleifer and Wolfenzon found
that poor investor protection laws led to a decrease in public confidence in the securities
market, as well as having a significant effect on firms’ capital inflows from the
public.354 Having a strong civil liability regime can strengthen investor protection. Civil
liability for defective prospectuses provides incentives to comply with the requirements
and thereby foster investor confidence.
A securities market with a strong disclosure regime can evidently bring growth,
efficiency and integrity to the financial market. Disclosure of all material information is
essential for the protection of investors against deception, and for the efficient
functioning of financial markets.355 It is of the utmost importance for a successful
primary market. In efficient securities markets, information about a firm or company356
is incorporated quickly and accurately into stock prices.357
Companies that are willing to go public and are looking to raise funds are required to
inform the public about the actual state of the company and the nature of future
activities. A prospectus must have the information legally required in order to allow the

353

Rafael La Porta et al, 'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance', above n 19, 15; La Porta,
Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, above n 4, 3.
354
Shleifer and Wolfenzon, above n 19, 19.
355
Robert Repetto, 'Protecting Investors and the Environment through Financial Disclosures' (2005) 13
Utilities Policy 51, 54.
356
The terms ‘firm’, ‘company’ and ‘corporation’ will be used interchangeably in this thesis.
357
Fama, 'Efficient Capital Markets’, above n 12, 413; Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky, 'The
Essential Role of Securities Regulation' (2006) 55 Duke Law Journal 711, 721.
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potential participants to make an informed investment decision. The prospectus is
regarded as the most important document containing information about the Initial Public
Offering (IPO). It is asserted that ‘sufficient investment information is significant for
the prevention of “bad” IPOs in a disclosure regime’.358 Therefore, ‘full, fair and true
prospectuses’359 are essential to the integrity of the primary share market.360
Having effective disclosure regulation is widely regarded as an appropriate strategy for
adoption in developed securities markets.361 Thus, the imposition of civil liability for
non-compliance with the disclosure requirements for a prospectus is essential for the
protection of investors. In order to do this, the compensation of investors who suffer
loss or damage from defective disclosures is the core purpose of civil liability. The
preparation of the prospectus involves input from a number of sources, such as the
issuing company, its directors including the managing directors, the company secretary,
auditors, lawyers, issue managers and underwriters.
However, it is important to stress that an important aspect of regulation here is to make
certain that there is accuracy and adequacy of the ‘material information’ disclosed both
in relation to the issue and the issuer. Information is considered as material if it could be
expected to have an effect on the share value if it were publicly known or could be
expected to have influenced an investment decision by a reasonable investor had they

358

S M Solaiman, 'Investor Protection by Securities Regulators in the Primary Share Markets in Australia
and Bangladesh: A Comparison and Contrast' (2009) 16(4) Journal of Financial Crime 305, 322.
359
The term ‘full’ means ‘complete’. ‘Fair’ means just; equitable; equal; proper’. The term ‘plain’ is that
which is ‘clearly understandable’. See Md. Anowar Zahid and Andrew McGee, 'Prospectus Disclosure
and the Role of the Securities Commissions in Ontario and Bangladesh: A comparative Study' (2002) 4(2)
International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 163, 180.
360
In addition, the set of the adjectives ‘full, true and plain’ and ‘full, fair and timely’ are also used in
describing the type of disclosure contained in the prospectus. For details, see Condon, Anand and Sarra,
above n 237, 597.
361
Solaiman, ‘Disclosure Philosophy for Investor Protection in Securities Market’, above n 265.
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been aware of that information. The function of such information is to help the investors
assess the issuer’s business, assets and liabilities, financial positions and so on.362
The civil liability regime for defective prospectuses in Saudi Arabia is still unclear or
not broad enough as compared to that of developed countries. The lack of investor
confidence in the securities market is the result of numerous incidents of malpractice by
corporations and their professionals and intermediaries.
This chapter aims to examine the current civil liability provisions for a prospectus in
Saudi Arabia. In particular, the extent and the scope of these provisions will be
measured in terms of whether they provide satisfactory protection for investors in the
securities market. For this purpose, the chapter will be divided into nine sections:
Section 1 provides an introduction, and Section 2 identifies and evaluates the disclosure
requirements in a prospectus in Saudi Arabia. Section 3 focuses on the objectives of
civil liabilities for the prospectus. Section 4 identifies the scope of the defective
prospectus under the Saudi securities law. Section 5 explores the provisions of civil
liability for a prospectus in Saudi Arabia and outlines civil liability provisions for the
prospectus in selected developed countries. Section 6 gives an evaluation of the civil
liability provisions for disclosure in prospectuses in Saudi Arabia. Section 7 deals with
the arguments against the expansion of the civil liability to every person who
participated in preparation of the prospectus. Finally, Section 8 provides a summary and
conclusions. The concluding comments will demonstrate that the civil liability
provisions for prospectuses do not completely favour investor protection in the IPO or
primary market in Saudi Arabia.

362

Zahid and McGee, above n 359, 181.
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4. 2 Disclosure Requirements for a Prospectus
The obligation to entirely disclose information when advertising securities to the public
was developed in the late 19th century, when rapidly increasing commercial and
speculative activities permitted promoters to sell securities on an inadequate basis of
information and facts.363 As a result, the courts established precedents via rulings in
common law jurisdictions to ensure that persons who invite the public to buy securities
comply with strict rules that aim for accuracy. 364 Specifically targeted legislation,
legislative amendments, and the creation of regulations and their further amendment,
have progressively tightened disclosure requirements.
An issuer, who is going to offer securities for sale, is required to prepare a prospectus
that contains information about the company. The role of the law is to impose
requirements on the offeror to provide an accurate prospectus. The content of the
prospectus is important in relation to the market’s determination of the correct price of
the security. It has been pointed out that ‘the greater the informative content in the
prospectus, the better the pricing accuracy’.365 In the IPO market, it has been submitted
that ‘[e]very new issue had to be accompanied by a prospectus signed by the directors
and containing the information specified by schedules provided for in the Acts’.366

363

See Joanna Khoo, 'Civil Liability for Misstatements in Offer Documents: Striking the Right Balance'
(2010) 6 International Law and Management Review 49, 53.
364
For example, in response to such activities, the UK courts developed rules to ensure full and fair
disclosure by securities promoters. Securities promoters are ‘bound to state everything with strict and
scrupulous accuracy’ and with ‘the utmost candour and honesty’. See New Brunswick & Canada Ry Co v
Muggeridge (1860) 1 Dr & Sm 363, 381; Central Ry Co of Venezuela v Kisch (1867) LR 2 HL 99, 113.
365
Kathleen Weiss Hanley and Gerard Hoberg, 'The Information Content of IPO Prospectuses' (2010) 23
Review of Financial Studies 2821, 2823.
366
Elisabeth Keller and Gregory A Gehlmann, 'Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' (1988) 49 Ohio State Law Journal 329,
341.

118

Chapter 4: Civil Liability for Defective Prospectuses

Hence, it can be agreed that a prospectus is the document that business institutions
produce to describe the securities being offered to potential capital market participants
and subscribers. It serves as the investors’ source of material information about the
issuers and underlying securities in which they would like to invest.
With accurate information, investors can make responsible and informed investment
decisions. In this respect, finding laws that in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere govern the
prospectus and the requirements established by regulators can greatly assist an
examination of the adequacy of the prospectus liability regime in Saudi Arabia.
Prospectus laws and requirements will be investigated in the light of the jurisdictions of
the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and Canada. These
countries have more developed and better regulated securities markets.367 As the
obligation to disclose is essentially connected with liability for misstatements made in
the course of disclosure, this section will discuss the general requirements of prospectus
of the four selected jurisdictions, as well as of Saudi Arabia. A comparison is then made
in respect of the sufficiency of the prospectus requirements in Saudi Arabia.
4.2.1 Prospectus Requirements under Saudi Laws
In Saudi Arabia, a prospectus is governed by the Capital Market Law 2003 (CML’03)
and the Listing Rules 2004 (LR’04), which govern every aspect of the requirements for
prospectus documents. The issuer, or affiliates of an issuer or an underwriter, is required
to provide a prospectus to the Capital Market Authority (CMA).368 They are not allowed
to sell securities before a prospectus has been submitted and approved by the CMA.369

367

Justifications for the selections of these developed countries were stated in the methodology section of
this thesis. See Section 1.7.
368
See Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 40(b); Listing Rules 2004 (Saudi Arabia) art 11(b)(4).
369
See Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 40(c); Listing Rules 2004 (Saudi Arabia) art 13(a).
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The CML’03 prescribes the content of a prospectus, which must contain all information
required by the CMA.370 Article 12 of the LR’04 stipulates that:
The prospectus must contain all information which is necessary to enable an
investor to make an assessment of the activities, assets and liabilities, financial
position, management and prospects of the issuer and of its profits and losses
and must include information in relation to the obligations, rights, powers and
privileges attaching to the relevant securities.

The content of a prospectus must be compliant with listing rules issued by the CMA. In
addition to the general requirements of information content to be disclosed, LR’04
provides the minimum information that the issuer is required to provide. These specific
and minimum requirements are detailed in Annex 4 and 5 in the LR’04.371
Requirements for disclosure in a prospectus must contain both financial information and
non-financial information. Financial matters are those such as the breakdown of net
turnover of the issuer for the three financial years immediately preceding the date of
publication of the prospectus, the financial statement of issuer on a consolidated basis,
and a report by certified accountants that has been prepared in accordance with the
requirements.372 The non-financial information includes material such as details of the

370

This information is stated in Article 42 of the CML’03 as follows:

The prospectus must contain the following information and statements:
Information required by the Authority’s rules which give an adequate description of the issuer,
the nature of its business, the individuals in charge of its management such as members of the
board of directors, executive officers, senior staff and its major shareholders.
b. Information required by the Authority’s rules which give an adequate description of the
Securities to be issued, their number, price, and related rights, preferences or privileges of the
issuer’s other Securities, if any. The description will set forth how the issue proceeds will be
disbursed, and the commissions levied by persons connected with the issue.
c. A clear statement of the financial position of the issuer and any significant financial data
including the audited financial balance sheet, profit and loss account and cash flow statement as
the rules of the Authority may require.
d. Any other information required or authorized by the Authority in accordance with rules issued
by the Authority which it deems necessary to assist investors and their advisers in making
decisions about investing in the Securities to be issued.
371
Listing Rules 2004 (Saudi Arabia) art 12; Annex 4 sets the minimum information that must be
included in a prospectus for shares or debt instruments convertible into shares. Annex 5 sets the minimum
information that must be included in a prospectus for debt instruments.
372
Ibid Annex 4.
a.
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persons involved in the companies offer and preparation, an adequate description of the
issuer; the nature of its business; the individuals in charge. Materials required include
details of the securities to be issued; and a clear statement of the financial position of the
issuer and the audited financial balance sheet,373 profit and loss account374 and cash flow
statement375 as the rules of the Authority may require.376
The CML’03 grants the CMA the power to review the prospectus and make a decision
whether to approve or reject the prospectus. The CMA regulations and rules shall set
forth the information to be disclosed.377
4.2.2

Prospectus Requirements under Developed Countries’ Laws

The Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (CA’01) regulates the three types of
disclosure documents here relevant:378 the prospectus, profile statement, and offer
information statement. The CA’01 imposes the highest level of information disclosure
burden on offerers of securities that require a prospectus. 379 Therefore, information
required under s 710 of the CA’01 needs to be generated and made public. The section
contains requirements for a prospectus, including the general disclosure test requiring

373

‘Balance sheet’ is a statement of an accounting entity’s financial position, providing a summary of the
assets liabilities and owner’s equity of the entity at a given date. Nygh and Butt, above n 105, 56.
374
‘The profit and loss account’ is a financial statement providing a summary of an accounting entity’s
revenues, expenses, gains, losses and resulting net profit or loss, for a given period of time. Ibid, 389.
375
‘Cash flow’ is the earnings remaining after paying all expenses including wages, interest payments,
taxes and dividends. Ibid, 83.
376
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 42.
377
According to the art 45 of the Capital Market Law 2003, the Board of the Authority may reject a
prospectus in any of the following cases:
a. If the prospectus does not contain the information required by Article 42 of this Law.
b. If the prospectus contains incorrect information pertaining to material matters, false or
misleading statements or omits to state material information or statements that would, under the
circumstances, render the prospectus misleading or incorrect.
c. The prospectus issuance fees have not been paid in full to the Authority.
d. The issuer has failed to provide any of the reports stipulated in Article 45 of this Law.
378
For more details, see the definition of ‘disclosure document’ in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9.
379
Robert Baxt, Ashley Black and Pamela Hanrahan, Securities and Financial Services Law (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 7th ed, 2008) 164.
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the disclosure of ‘all the information that investors and their professional advisers
would reasonably require to make an informed assessment’ of the securities.380 The
specific information that must be included in the prospectus is prescribed in s 711. In
addition, the rules governing ‘disclosure operation of offers involving continuously
quoted securities’ are detailed in s 713. The procedure for offering securities is detailed
under s 717, which requires compliance by the person who intends to offer securities to
the public.
In accordance with s 718 of the CA’01, a prospectus must be lodged with the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). Section 739 of the Act gives ASIC the
power to suspend a securities offer before it is issued or transferred on the basis of
contraventions of prospectus requirements. ASIC has recently issued a ‘Regulatory
Guide 228: Prospectuses: Effective Disclosure for Retail Investors’ which offers
guidance to issuers and advisers on how to word and present prospectuses and other
documents in a ‘clear, concise and effective’ manner.381
In the UK, s 80 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA’00) establishes
the general duty of disclosure in listing particulars.382 Sections 84–87 of the FSMA’00
provide general guidelines on prospectus requirements. Most importantly, s 85 makes it
illegal to offer shares without an approved prospectus. Section 85(1) provides that:
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Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 710(1).
ASIC, Regulatory Guide 228 Prospectuses: Effective Disclosure for Retail Investors (November, 2011)
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg228-published-10-November-20111.pdf/$file/rg228-published-10-November-2011-1.pdf>.
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It is unlawful for transferable securities to which this subsection applies to be
offered to the public in the United Kingdom unless an approved prospectus has
been made available to the public before the offer is made.383

The prospectus is governed by the FSMA 2000, which delegates to the Financial
Service Authority (FSA) the power to make rules for a prospectus. The FSA has
implemented Prospectus Regulations 2005,384 which implemented the European
Union’s Prospectus Directive385 that came into force on 1 July 2005.
At present, the FSA implements three sourcebooks, which form a block known as the
‘Listing, Prospectus, and Disclosure and Transparency Rules’ (‘UK Prospectus
Rules’).386 These rules regulate the publication of information in relation to the issue of
securities. They provide details on the requirements relating to the content of the
prospectus. The UK Prospectus Rules incorporate detailed information requirements
including, for example: information about the issuer; financial information; information
regarding the investment objective, policy and restrictions; information regarding
managers, advisers, and other service providers; organisational structure/administration
and management details; and risk factors.387
In Canada, a company must prepare a prospectus when it offers securities to the
public.388 The Ontario Securities Act 1990 (OSA’90)389 and the National Instrument
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Ibid c 8, s 85(1).
Prospectus Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1433) amending the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
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385
Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the
Prospectus to be Published when Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and
amending Directive 2001/34/EC [2003] OJ L 345/64.
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See Lorenzo Sasso, 'Listing and Disclosure Rules in UK: Some Recent Changes' (2008) 2 Contratto e
impresa Europe 1, 1. The rules referred to are Listing Rules (LR), Prospectus Rules (PR) and Disclosure
and Transparency Rules (DTR).
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Financial Service Authority, UKLA Publications: Technical Note |Prospectus Rules (2 April 2012)
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/prospectus_rules.pdf>.
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In Canada, securities issuers subject to a prospectus requirement have four options: they can use a
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41:101 General Prospectus Requirements 2006 set out the requirements of a
prospectus. Section 53(1) of the OSA’90 requires a prospectus by saying that:
No person or company shall trade in a security on his, her or its own account or on
behalf of any other person or company if the trade would be a distribution of the
security, unless a preliminary prospectus and a final prospectus have been filed and
receipts have been issued for them by the Director.390

Also, s 56(1) of the OSA’90 prescribes that the prospectus must provide, ‘full, true and
plain disclosure of all material facts relating to the securities issued or proposed to be
distributed and shall comply with the requirements of Ontario securities law’. The
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) is the regulatory body responsible for overseeing
Ontario’s capital markets, which include the equity securities. It has the sole power to
approve prospectuses.
In the United States, the Securities Act 1933 (SA’33) is the principal statute that governs
the offer and sale of securities in the public market. In addition, the offer and sale of
securities in the United States is prohibited unless they are registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).391 As a part of the registration statements, a
prospectus is required to be filed with the SEC. Section 7 (15 USC § 77g) of the SA’33
and Schedule A392 describe the information required in the registration statement and
statutory prospectus. Section 10 (15 USC § 77j) deals with the required information by

is commonly referred to as an ‘Initial Public Offering’ (or IPO). For more details, see Ontario Securities
Commission, Prospectus Offerings (5 April 2012) <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Companies_prospectusofferings_index.htm>.
389
The Canadian Province of Ontario contains Canada’s largest capital market and has one of the most
stringent and sophisticated securities regulatory regimes in Canada. See Stephen Helperin, Caroline Wang
and Meenu Khindri, 'Securities Law in Canada' in Marcus Best and Jean-Luc Soulier (eds), International
Securities Law Handbook (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 113, 116.
390
Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) c S.5, s 53(1).
391
Securities Act 1933 (US) § 6. Note: Also codified at 15 USC § 77f (1933) [Registration of Securities
and Signing of Registration Statement].
392
The law sets forth 32 detailed items to be included in the registration statement. See Schedule A to the
Securities Act 1933 (US).
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the SA’33 to be contained in a prospectus. The SA’33 grants the SEC the power to
review, approve and adopt rules that are able to amend required information from a
prospectus. Moreover, under the legislation, the SEC promulgated Regulation S-K393
and Regulation S-X,394 requiring the issuer to disclose additional information when
offering securities to the public.
In brief, it can be said that there are twofold information disclosure requirements for the
prospectus: general disclosure and specific disclosure. General disclosure is to contain
all information legally required to enable the investors to make an investment decision.
The general disclosure is to include sufficient description of the nature of the securities
in question and the issuer. Usually the general disclosure requirements in a prospectus
are statutory requirements, with the specific requirements set out by the securities
regulatory body on the basis of a statutory power.
It has been seen in the earlier description, in Saudi Arabia, prospectus requirements can
be generally found in the CML’03 and with greater detail in the LR’04. 395 In relation to
the content of a prospectus, the issuer will be required to satisfy the minimum
information requirements — as set out in LR’04 — for the issue of the prospectus.396
However, the CMA can impose additional requirements on the issuer in regard to
information provided to ensure adequate disclosures in a prospectus.397
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Regulation S-K [17 CFR Part 229] Standard Instructions for Filing Forms under the Securities Act
1933, Securities Exchange Act 1934 and Energy Policy and Conservation Act 1975.
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Regulation S-X [17 CFR Part 210] Form and Content of and Requirements for Financial Statements,
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Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 42; Listing Rules 2004 (Saudi Arabia) art 12 and Annex 5
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Although there are both general and specific prospectus requirements in Saudi Arabia as
there are in those of developed countries, disclosures in prospectuses continue to be
inadequate under the current regime. The following evaluation of the prospectus
requirements under the current Saudi securities laws will demonstrate that the current
disclosure regime is unable to provide sufficient protection for the investors in the IPO
market.
4.2.3

Evaluation of the Prospectus Requirements under Saudi Laws

The preceding description of the prospectus requirements of selected developed
countries can be used to measure the adequacy of such requirements in Saudi Arabia.
Laws governing disclosures in prospectuses, competent authorities for issuing
prospectus requirements and information required to be disclosed will be examined. In
Saudi Arabia, as in the selected developed securities markets, there is similarly a
principal statute governing the prospectus. In addition, there are regulations that come
under the main statute in order to ensure the full and fair disclosure in prospectuses. All
jurisdictions require the company to publicise the prospectus when issuing new shares.
Thus, companies going public must meet the prospectus requirements of the CML’03 as
the principal statute in Saudi Arabia and the LR’04. However, since the issuance of the
CML’03, there have been no amendments regarding prospectus requirements
provisions. This may be due to the securities law in place in the country being so
comparatively recently enacted and therefore there being a lack of cases for
interpretation by courts, which could otherwise assist in the discernment of weaknesses
in the law.
All jurisdictions have a single body which is empowered by the statute to regulate IPOs
and issue rules regarding the prospectus. In Saudi Arabia, the CMA (as the competent
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authority) issues rules, instructions and procedures for the implementation of the
provisions of a prospectus. Similar to the equivalent bodies in the US, the UK and
Canada, the CMA has the power to review, approve and reject the prospectus. In
Australia, ASIC can also suspend a prospectus by issuing a stop order. However, the
CMA remains weak in exercising its regulatory and enforcement powers concerning
disclosures in a prospectus.398
It is worth mentioning that the above art 12 of the LR’04, which provides further
requirements for the prospectus, is copied verbatim from the European Union
Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC (Article 5(1)). The requirement of ‘all’ information
implies ‘true’ information. It can be noted that information must be comprehensible to
ordinary investors as the purpose of disclosure is to inform the investors of the issuer’s
financial and relevant non-financial matters (that is, all matters required by the
legislation, all material matters). In other words, the disclosure must be in a plain
language. Thus, the Saudi requirement may be interpreted as calling for ‘full, true and
plain’ information — a ‘catch-all’ requirement. In this way, the Saudi requirement is
similar to the Canadian (Ontario) requirement. The Canadian (Ontario) requirement is
‘full, true and plain’ information’.399 ‘Material information’ is information that the nondisclosure of which will impact on the market price of securities as it influences
investor decision making. Put simply, Canadian law, in effect, calls for all information
to be disclosed that would help investors make a sober investment decision. In the same
manner, the US, the UK and Australia call for ‘all’ information for informed assessment
of securities by reasonable investors and intermediaries. In the same way, Saudi law
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See Chapter 9 which examines the CMA’s role in regard to a disclosure regime.
For more discussion in regard to the meaning of full, true and plain disclosure, see Zahid and McGee,
above n 359, 180.
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requires the disclosure of financial and non-financial disclosure in prospectuses. For
example, the basic requirements of financial disclosure in a prospectus include the
disclosure of the audited annual report and accounts of the issuer for each of the three
financial years immediately preceding the application for the public offer. In addition,
the company is required to provide the interim financial statements issued since the date
of the last audited report and accounts.400 The published audited accounts covering at
least the last three financial years, must be prepared in accordance with the accounting
standards issued by the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants
(SOCPA).401
Indeed, having the basic requirements for financial and non-financial disclosures in a
prospectus are essential to ensure that disclosure is full. However, it can be suggested
that due to the complexity of the financial information to the ordinary investors,
prospectus has to be prepared in plain and easy language and to avoid technical and
complex terms from the prospectus. Hence, investors can be able to have a readable
understanding of the company and thus make an informed investment decision.
In Australia, ASIC has proposed more specific requirements to avoid too general
financial information provided in prospectus. The proposition is to require information
relating to key financial information and key financial ratios.402
It is submitted that adequate and improved prospectus requirements lead to better
protection of investors in the primary market. For that reason, developed countries have
400

Listing Rules 2004 (Saudi Arabia) art 11.
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an effective mechanism to ensure adequate disclosure in the prospectus. They have
ongoing development to enhance further these requirements. Hence, it is believed that
these countries have sufficient legal requirements governing disclosures in a prospectus.
However, for the sake of market integrity, the following discussion will show that
prospectuses require additional rules and regulation in Saudi Arabia.
In the UK, prospectus regulations have significantly improved in the past decade. There
have been additional rules and directives on the disclosures to be implemented in a
prospectus. In Australia, ASIC has a policy of continually improving the regulations
regarding disclosures in prospectuses. In addition to the prospectus requirements
stipulated in the CA’01, ASIC has implemented the Regulatory Guide 56 1996403 which
provides additional instruments for the prospectus requirements. In addition, ASIC has
recently published draft guidelines on prospectus disclosure in order to assist the
preparation and presentation of prospectuses in a clear, concise and effective manner as
required by s 715 (a) of the CA’01.404 In Canada, there has been considerable focus on
improving and updating the prospectus requirements by the Canadian Securities
Administrators (CSA).405 For example, in order to strengthen the disclosure regime in
the IPO market, the OSC has adopted several rules and instruments proposed by the
CSA, such as the National Instrument 41-101 General Prospectus Requirements and
Related Amendments 2006 and National Instrument 45-106 Prospectus and Registration
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Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide 56: Prospectuses: Chapter 7–
Securities (Part 7.12) (20 May 1996) (Updated 15 July 1996, 3 March 1997, 4 August 1997, 9 February
2000) (Regulatory Guide 56 (RG 56)).
404
See ASIC, ‘Prospectus Disclosure: Improving Disclosure for retail Investors’, above n 402.
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The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) is a voluntary umbrella organisation of Canada’s
provincial and territorial securities regulators whose objective is to improve, coordinate and harmonise
regulation of the Canadian capital markets. Canadian Securities Administrators, 'Introduction to Canadian
Securities
Administrators'
(2012)
<http://www.securitiesadministrators.ca/uploadedFiles/General/pdfs/CSAPresentation20120116VF.pdf> 5.
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Exemptions 2005.406 In the United States, the SEC has, as a part of its regulatory role,
also undertaken reforms and amendments regarding the prospectus requirements to
advance significantly the registration, communications, and offering processes under the
SA’33.407 For example, the SEC invited interested persons to suggest ‘reasonable
measures which might be taken to improve the readability and informativeness of
prospectuses’.408
Unlike in developed countries, the matters of issuing new rules for, or improving or
amending, prospectus requirements have not been prioritised in the Saudi Arabia.
Indeed, no new rule, or improvement to or amendment of requirements in respect of
prospectuses have been made since the CML’03 and LR’04 came into existence, despite
the CML’03 giving the CMA the power to amend, update and issue rules and
regulations in order to administer the stock market.409 However, it can be clearly seen
that the CMA has not been acting in a manner favourable to investors in terms of
ensuring proper disclosures in the IPO market. The CMA is required to utilise its
powers more effectively and in conformity with Principle 7 of the IOSCO Objectives
and Principles which states that the ‘regulator should have or contribute to a process to
review the perimeter of regulation regularly’.410
Given that the CMA is the sole regulator of securities market in Saudi Arabia, calls for
development of the prospectus regulatory framework continue to have a place amongst
the market investors and professionals. Companies that decide to go public are required
406

For more details, see Ontario Securities Commission, ‘Prospectus Offerings’, above n 388.
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to provide all required information and make full disclosures in their prospectuses.
Equally important, the CMA is required to adopt effective measures to check the
accuracy of the information provided in the prospectuses. For instance, incorrect
information provided in the prospectus of the Integrated Telecom Company (ITC)
misled investors and also resulted in subsequent defects in the financial reports,
consequently, trading in the ITC’s shares has been suspended.411 Investors in ITC blame
the CMA for not adopting effective verification of the content in the prospectus.412
Thus, a general test of disclosures in prospectuses is preferable to monitoring the
accuracy of information disclosed in the prospectus. The test of the information in the
prospectus is adopted by most developed countries. The test is known, for example, in
Australia as the ‘reasonable investor’ test. The test targets a requirement of disclosure of
information that investors and their professional advisers would ‘reasonably require’ in
a prospectus and it is the responsibility of the issuer to determine what information may
be required beyond the specific information.413 In the UK, the general test is aided by
the prescriptive requirements of Schedule 1 to the Public Offer of Securities Regulations
1995 (comprising 51 disclosure items to be addressed).414 In addition, in the United
States, there is a general test of disclosure of additional material information that
underpins the prospectus laws.415
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Unlike the selected countries above, in Saudi Arabia, there is no effective mechanism to
ensure that a prospectus has no misstatements or omissions. Adoption of such a
mechanism would assist investors to make an informed decision based on accurate
disclosure. Additionally, it would reduce the number of poor companies that enter the
securities market without strong economic fundamentals. It is recommended that, as in
developed countries, issuers be responsible for the determination of what information
may be required beyond the specific information.
Under the CML’03 and CMA rules, issuing companies are not required to undertake a
due diligence process during the preparation of a prospectus.416 Lawyers, auditors and
underwriters have a responsibility to ensure the accuracy of a prospectus during the
company’s process of going public. The emphasis on their role in regard to the
prospectus requirement is absent in the CML’03 and ignored by the CMA.
Indeed, in order to improve the accuracy and transparency of the information in
prospectuses, companies should undertake a process of verification prior to the
finalisation of any prospectus.417 Verification of a prospectus involves checking each
material statement of fact or opinion to ensure that it is accurate and complete. The due
diligence process is undertaken for reasons such as the following: to make reasonable
inquiries to ensure the prospectus is complete and accurate; and to enable the

416

‘Due diligence’ is a process by which stakeholders involved in the listing of a company find out and
confirm information they need to know in relation to the company, its business, assets and liabilities. See
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Listing A Company on the Australian Securities Exchange (24 April 2013)
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corporation’s directors and advisers to be able to avail themselves of the appropriate
defences allowed by law.418
It is believed that having a requirement that imposes upon companies an obligation to
undertake a due diligence process will not only benefit the accuracy of the prospectus,
but will afford the persons involved in the prospectus preparation with a defence in
relation to their potential liability for a defective prospectus. Moreover, effective
verification of all material information included in the prospectus will reduce the
likelihood of misleading statements and assist investors to make an informed investment
decision. A recent study of 16 new listed companies on the SSE found that the financial
performance of these companies declined after going public. 419 Hence, the market
administrator needs to investigate the decline in financial performance of newly listed
companies in order to put in place appropriate measures and rules for new listings.
Furthermore, it has been submitted that disclosure requirements for prospectuses should
be presented in a clear, concise and effective manner.420 However, a survey conducted
of the 500 largest private firms in Saudi Arabia revealed that ambiguity in regulations
that cover fundamental IPO issues is a major barrier to private firms contemplating
going public.421 This shows that the CMA has a key role in regulating and facilitating
the IPO market by improving the disclosure requirements for a prospectus.
Based on the above, it can be clearly concluded that the current disclosure regime
regarding the prospectus requirements is weak and, therefore, investors are lacking
418
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protection in the IPO market. Hence, proper protection of investors in the IPO market
requires a more effective regulator, improved rules, and an effective process of
verification prior the finalisation of any prospectus, and should also require that a
prospectus be presented in a clear, concise and effective manner.

4. 3 Objectives of Prospectus Civil Liability
The main object of imposing liability for a defective disclosure is to provide protection
for investors or speculators, whether they are investors in an IPO where a company is
going public (the primary market) or involved in later transactions, often between
investors (the secondary market).422 Deterrence is generally created by liabilities for
misconduct in every respect for the wrongdoers.423 In addition, a legal framework based
on deterrence effectively protects investors in the securities market.424
With respect to increasing the liquidity of shares of a company in the market, the civil
liabilities regime has twin objectives: firstly, to ease compensation for the victims of
defective continuous disclosure; and secondly, to deter persons who may potentially
otherwise become involved in breaching disclosure provisions and requirements.425 It is
thought that social utility is mostly gained by deterring corporate misconduct and,
therefore, imposing a strong civil liability regime can be the most efficient means of
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deterring corporate misconduct.426 A comprehensive civil liability regime for defective
disclosures in prospectuses is of vital importance in order to fully ensure a high level of
investor protection, which is the main objective of the disclosure philosophy. 427
In Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, it has been clarified that, ‘civil wrongs
comprise a person’s acts or omissions which bring liability to pay compensation to
someone who suffers loss caused by an act or omission’. It is also there stated that, ‘the
primary function of liability for civil wrong is provision of compensation commensurate
with the harm suffered’.428 Thus, it can be clearly asserted that civil liability for
defective disclosure in a prospectus works in favour of investor protection.

4. 4 Defectiveness of Prospectuses in Saudi Securities Law
4.4.1

Meaning and Scope of Term ‘Defective Prospectus’ in Relation to Saudi
Securities Law

The phrase ‘defective prospectus’ is broad and general. Hence, the defective prospectus
includes the ‘misstatement in prospectuses’, ‘misrepresentation in prospectuses’ and
‘untrue statement in prospectuses’, which phrases are commonly used to signify a
defective prospectus.429 Initially, the meaning of the term ‘defective’ is that, ‘if
something is defective, there is something is wrong with it and it does not work
properly’.430 Hence, a prospectus identified as being defective is a document
accompanying an offer of securities, which does not comply with the requirements
426

Lawrence Friedman, 'In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability' (2000) 23 Harvard Journal of Law
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either because it does not contain all the material required or because it contains a
misleading or deceptive statement.431
Secondly, the meaning of the term ‘misstatement’ refers to stating wrongly or
incorrectly or to the giving of false information. The term ‘untrue statement’ or
‘misstatement’ is used in the broader sense. As a result, an ‘untrue statement’ means a
statement which is in fact untrue, not a statement that, in the belief of the directors, is
untrue.432 It includes not only false statements but also statements that produce a wrong
impression of actual facts.433 The term ‘misrepresentation’ is also used to signify a
defective prospectus. Misrepresentation associated with contractual commitments
means ‘a false material statement of fact intended to induce another person to enter a
contract, and relied on by that person to their detriment’.434 The US Court of Appeal
that in SEC v Manor Nursing Centers Inc,435 held that a defective prospectus is
materially false and misleading, even when a prospectus in the correct form is duly
delivered, if that prospectus contains material inaccuracies in the information included.
Furthermore, disclosure of the information required to be stated in the prospectus is
essential to investors who intend to participate in the IPOs. Therefore, omissions from a
prospectus can mislead investors’, affecting their decisions (and even be to their
disadvantage). It is said that a successful plaintiff must demonstrate that, among other
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things, an omission is misleading.436 Hence, an omission in a prospectus is omitting to
state a material fact that is required to be stated in the prospectus.437
Arguably, it is stated that the prospectus must be taken as a whole. 438 It may be
misleading in that prospectus statements are correct but incomplete. This can create a
false impression. English law states that the omission must be of a fact, and is of
importance only when that omission renders other facts to be false. 439 In addition, under
US securities law, there is a duty to disclose special information not known to the
purchaser.440
It can be found under art 55(a) of the CML’03 in Saudi Arabia that a defective
prospectus refers to, ‘a prospectus [that] contained incorrect statements of material
matters or omitted material facts required to be stated in a prospectus’. Despite the
possibility that this definition might be satisfactory, it does not encompass that omission
of any necessary detail where such an omission would give a misleading impression of
other material in the prospectus. Similar to the English law’s definition of omission, the
Saudi definition of a defective prospectus finds that an incomplete prospectus could be
acceptable. Moreover, art 55(a) of the CML’03 does not stipulate that an incomplete
prospectus is misleading as suppression of material fact, but imposes civil liability for
defective prospectus if any damage occurs because of such an omission.
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Ibid. It was decided that ‘the misstatement contained in the prospectus must be material’. See
Greenwood v Leather Shod Wheel Co. (1900) 81 LT Rep 1 Ch 421.
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The basis of this statement is: ‘Lord McNaughton has precisely stated that the prospectus must be
taken as a whole for “everybody knows that half a truth is no better than a downright falsehood”.’ See
Dave, above n 433.
439
Ibid.
440
The Securities Act 1933 (US) § 11(a); 15 USC § 77(k)(a) (1933) imposes liability for the omission of
any material fact that should be have been included in the prospectus; or any necessary detail where such
omission would give a misleading impression of other material in the prospectus.
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4.4.2

The Materiality Requirement

With respect to investment in securities, the concept of material information can be
referred to information that would have affected a reasonable investor in making an
investment decision. The current preferred judicial standard441 for determining
materiality in securities litigation holds that an omitted fact is material where there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote or to purchase or sell stock.442
The UK Court of Appeal in Cackett v Keswick, 443 the judge states that information is
considered material if it induces or deters a reasonable investor in regard to an
investment decision. Moreover, omission from information that which would have an
impact on the investment decision is considered misleading.
The concept of materiality is important within the context of securities in the United
States because under s 15 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (US) (SEA’34), a
company can be held civilly or criminally liable for false, misleading, or omitted
statements of fact in documents, if the fact in question is found by the court to have
been material. In the US, information should be disclosed if there is a substantial
likelihood that a ‘reasonable investor would consider it important to an investment
decision.444

441

For judicial interpretation of materiality, TSC Industries v Northway, 426 US 438 (1976) and Basic
Inc. v Levinson, 485 US 224 (1988).
442
Shane Heitzman, Charles Wasley and Jerold Zimmerman, 'The Joint Effects of Materiality Thresholds
and Voluntary Disclosure Incentives on Firms’ Disclosure Decisions' (2010) 49 Journal of Accounting
and Economics 109, 128.
443
(1902) 2 CH 456 [2].
444
TSC Industries v Northway, 426 US 438 (1976), 445; Condon, Anand and Sarra, above n 237, 74.
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The present and most common statutory standard in Canadian is called a ‘market
impact’ test, that is, it involves information that should be disclosed is information that
would affect the price or value of the issuer’s securities.445 In Australia, a corporation
must disclose information to the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) in accordance
with the Listing Rules, where the information involved is that which a reasonable
person would expect to have a material effect on price or value. 446 According to ASX
Listing Rule 3.1, materiality must be assessed having regard to all the relevant
background information, including past announcements that have been made by the
Company, and other generally available information.447 In the UK, the court in Rex v
Kylsant held that the prospectus was misleading not because of what is stated but
because of what it concealed or omitted which was considered material information.448
The materiality of statements or omissions in a prospectus is required by art 55(a) of the
CML’03.449 Thus, a defectiveness of a prospectus must be associated with materiality.
Article 55(a) states that statements or omissions are to be considered material if it is
proven that the statement or the omission contained in the prospectus has affected the
investor’s purchase price.450 It can be seen that despite materiality being required with
respect to omissions and inclusions, a clear standard to determine what should be
considered material under the Saudi prospectus provisions is absent. This means that
445

Condon, Anand and Sarra, above n 237, 74.
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 674(2). See also the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission,
Disclosure
and
the
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of
ASX
and
ASIC
(7
April
2012)
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/disclosure-role-asxgibson.pdf/$file/disclosure-role-asx-gibson.pdf> 5.
447
ASX Listing Rule 3.1 lists the following examples of information which, if material, must be disclosed
to the ASX: forecasts; insolvency; transactions; dividends declared; dividend not declared; issue of
securities; and tracing beneficial ownership of shares.
448
(1932) 1 KB 442.
449
Article 55(a) of the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) defines the material fact in a prospectus:
‘a statement or omission shall be considered material for the purposes of this paragraph if it is proven to
the Committee that had the investor been aware of the truth when making such purchase it would have
affected the purchase price’.
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there is an imperative need for effective mechanism on the ground to determine what
information may be considered material. A recent comparative study confirmed that,
‘the materiality test can be an important element in examining misstatements even
though it is not generally required by the statute’.451 As per art 55(a), the court is
entitled to decide whether the inclusions or the omissions in the prospectus are material
or not. In Coleman v Myers,452 it was suggested that omissions or misstatement of
material facts must be information that investors would take into account in making
their decision. This contradicts the articulation of the materiality under Saudi law.
Article 55(a) of the CML’03 stipulates that misstatements or omissions of material facts
must to be information that, to investors, would affect the price of the purchase. In other
words, materiality is associated with the true value of a security that has been affected
by the inclusions or omissions of information. However, it may be better to state that
material information would have an impact when making investment decisions.
To sum up, the preceding discussion of what can be considered a defective prospectus
shows that art 55 of the CML’03 may not be adequate to successfully identify a
defective prospectus. Furthermore, the above discussion shows that despite there being
a requirement for materiality under the CML’03, this requirement remains insufficient
and requires further explanations. Therefore, persons that might otherwise be held liable
can escape liability because of the inadequacy of the Saudi prospectus law in respect of
materiality. In order to have a strong civil liability regime for defective prospectuses, it
is imperative to identify what constitutes a defective prospectus, including a proper
definition of the materiality. Consequently, protection of investors requires an adequate
prospectus requirement coupled with strong articulation by the regulator to create an
451
452

Khoo, above n 363, 60.
(1977) 2 NZLR 255.
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effective deterrent to potential wrongdoers. In this respect, it can be clearly said that art
55 of the CML’03 requires further improvements in order to achieve better protection
for investors. In addition, the responsibility of the CMA is to establish effective
methods to determine what information may be treated as material information.

4. 5 Civil Liability for a Defective Disclosure in a Prospectus
Persons involved in the preparation of a prospectus must comply with certain statutory
requirements and rules imposed by the securities regulatory body. Civil liabilities will
be imposed on those who are involved in the contraventions of prescribed prospectus
requirements under the CML’03 and the LR’04.
To this end, this section will describe the prospectus civil liability provisions in Saudi
Arabia and selected developed jurisdictions. Saudi securities law contains a number of
provisions stating the requirements for a prospectus. These can be found in the CML’03
and LR’04. These provisions require the issuer to produce a prospectus that contains all
information for prospective subscribers prior to the selling of the issuer’s securities.
Information is specified in the LR’04, and is divided into six categories: general
information; information about the conditions of issue of the shares for which
application is sought; information about the issuer and its group; financial information
about the issuer and its group; information about management; and information about
the documents available for inspection.
4.5.1

Civil Liability Provisions Dealing with Prospectus Liability in Saudi Arabia

Civil liability for defective disclosures in prospectuses is found in art 55 of the CML’03.
Investors who suffer damages resulting from a material misrepresentation in a
prospectus can sue to recover damages. Article 55(a) of the CML’03 states that:
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In case a prospectus, when approved by the Authority, contained incorrect
statements of material matters or omitted material facts required to be stated in the
prospectus, the person purchasing the Security that was the subject of such
prospectus shall be entitled to compensation for the damages incurred by him as a
result thereof. A statement or omission shall be considered material for the
purposes of this paragraph if it is proven to the Committee that had the investor
been aware of the truth when making such purchase it would have affected the
purchase price.

Liability is imposed on certain persons for any untrue statement included in the
prospectus. Article 55(b) of the CML’03 identifies a number of persons who may be
subject to civil liability for a defective prospectus. The following persons will become
liable for compensation of the subscribers to the prospectus:
i.

The issuer453

ii.

The senior officers of the issuer454

iii.

The directors of the issuer

iv.

The underwriters who have undertaken to offer, on behalf of the issuer, the
security for sale to the public455

v.

The accountant, engineer or appraiser and others identified in the prospectus,
who have consented in writing to be so identified, as having certified the
accuracy and truthfulness of the information stated in the prospectus

Civil liability is clearly imposed on the issuer, senior officer, director, underwriter,
accountant, engineer and appraiser. In addition, liability is imposed on any other person

453

Issuer: a person who is issuing or intending to issue securities. Capital Market Authority, Chapter One
Definitions
(9
December
2012)
<http://www.cma.org.sa/En/AboutCMA/CMALaw/Pages/CH1Article1.aspx>.
454
There is no definition for ‘senior officer’ under the CML’03 and CMA rules and regulations. However,
senior officers can be those who hold positions in the management of a company, and it may include
senior executive officers.
455
Underwriter: a person who buys securities from the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer for the purpose
of offering, placing and marketing such securities to the public, or a person who sells securities on behalf
of the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer for the purpose of making a public offering and placement of such
securities. Capital Market Authority, ‘Chapter One Definition’, above n 453.
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who accepts responsibility for any part of the prospectus in order to certify that all
information contained in a prospectus is accurate and true. However, it is unclear
whether or not the other persons involved in the preparation of the prospectus (such as
issue managers, promoters and lawyers) fall within the ambit of this liability.
The above provisions of the CML’03 have not been interpreted by the courts in Saudi
Arabia because of the serious dearth of cases involving allegations of the contravention
of these provisions. Thus, the liability of participants other than persons categorically
mentioned in the above law is yet to be determined under these provisions.
Civil liability, in this discussion, refers to the compensation of investors or subscribers
who may have sustained loss or damage by subscribing to an IPO. Civil liability for
defective prospectuses is found in the art 55(a) of the CML’03, which states that in the
case of a defective prospectus, investors are entitled to seek compensation. The
prospectus subject to civil liability, when approved by the authority, contains incorrect
statements of material or omitted material facts required to be stated in the prospectus.
For claims based on art 55(a), compensation for aggrieved investors comes as damages
that represent the difference between the purchase price of the security (not to exceed
the price at which it was offered to the public) and the price of the security when
bringing the legal action to the court.456
On the other hand, if the defendant proves that the investor’s loss was not due to the
defective prospectus in question, such loss shall be excluded from the damages for
which the defendant is responsible.457 The defendants are jointly liable for

456
457

Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 55(e).
Ibid.
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compensation. Thus, the amount of indemnification is to be subject to: the provisions of
the contract or agreement entered between the liable persons and the investor; or what
the court believes is equitable and does not harm the interest of investors or otherwise
contravene the spirit of the CML’03.458
Another issue is that of art 56 of the CML’03, which is described as the ‘anti fraud
provision’.459 It is unclear whether this provision may apply to disclosure violations in
the primary market. Article 56(a) states that:
Any person who makes, or is responsible for another making, orally or in writing
an untrue statement of material fact or omits to state that material fact, if it causes
another person to be misled in relation to the sale or the purchase of a Security,
shall be liable for compensation of the damages.

The articulation of art 56(a) is similar to that of § 18(a) of the SEA’34. Section 18(a)
provides civil liability for any false or misleading statement made in any document filed
with the SEC. Similarly, art 56 may be applied to both primary and secondary
markets.460 As mentioned above, art 56(a) is the anti-fraud provision against any
defective statement filed with the CMA. Keller and Gehlmann declared that ‘although
section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (US) parallels section 11 of the
Securities Act, it is less effective because, unlike sections 11 and 12, section 18(a)
requires the buyer to prove that he/she read the statement, and actually relied on the
material misrepresentation’.461

458

Ibid.
Beach, above n 24, 348.
460
Article 56 of the CML’03 and its applicability to the defective disclosures in the secondary market will
be thoroughly discussed in the Chapter 6: ‘Civil Liability for the Secondary Market Disclosures in Saudi
Arabia: Periodic Disclosure and Continuous Disclosure’.
461
Keller and Gehlmann, above n 366, 350. See also art 56 of the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi
Arabia).
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However, the discussion of prospectus civil liability will strictly focus on art 55 of the
CML’03. This is because that art 55 provides an express and clear civil liability for
defective disclosures made in prospectuses. Beach states that art 55 of the CML’03
closely mirrors the US provision on liability for misrepresentations in a prospectus.462
The following will outline the civil liability provisions dealing with prospectus in the
selected developed jurisdictions.
4.5.2

Civil Liability for Defective Disclosures in a Prospectus under the Laws of
Selected Developed Countries

The scope of civil liability and persons liable will be investigated in the light of the
statutes and judicial precedents of the US, the UK, Australia and Canada. Each of these
countries has developed a better regulated securities market.
In the US, §§ 11 and 12 of the SA’33 deal with the liability for disclosure in a
prospectus. Section 11 imposes civil liability for untrue disclosure or nondisclosure of
material facts on every person who signs the registration statement. 463 Additionally, this
section clearly states the liability of directors, experts,464 underwriters,465 and ‘any
person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him [or her], who has
with his [or her] consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement…’.466 Section 12 of the SA’33 imposes civil liability on any

462

See Securities Act 1933 (US) § 11; 15 USC § 77f (1933). See Beach, above n 24.
15 USC § 77a (1933) (US). A prospectus is a part of the registration statement required for an IPO to
be filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. In the US, the ‘registration Statement’ is a
prepared set of documents, including a prospectus, which is filed with the Securities Exchange
Commission prior to an Initial Public Offering.
464
‘Experts’ include accountants, engineers, or appraisers, or any person whose profession gives authority
to a statement made by him or her, who has with his or her consent been named as having prepared or
certified any part of the registration statement: Securities Act 1933 (US) § 11(a)(4); 15 USC § 77k(a)(4)
(1933).
465
‘Underwriters’ includes managing underwriters.
466
Securities Act 1933 (US) § 11(a)(4); 15 USC § 77k(a)(4) (1933).
463
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person who is involved in the preparation of a prospectus that contains untrue
statements or omits to state a material fact.
In Canada, s 130 of the OSA’90 imposes liability on the issuers, underwriters, directors
and every person who has signed the prospectus.467 The term ‘every person’ refers to
persons other than those who are already mentioned in the section by title. 468 As a
result, the OSA’90 exposes every person who has signed a prospectus to civil liability
for that prospectus.
In Australia, s 728 of the CA’01 states the liability for misleading or deceptive
statements or material omission in a prospectus. Section 729 imposes civil liability on
persons who are accountable to compensate investors who sustained consequential loss
or damage from their subscription to an IPO caused by the defective prospectus. The
persons liable under s 729 of the Act are: the person making the offer, directors,
underwriters, persons named in the ‘disclosure document’469 with their consent as
having made a statement, and a person who contravenes or is involved in the
contravention of the prohibitions against the inclusion of misleading or deceptive
statement or omission of material information from the disclosure document.
In the UK, s 90 of the FSMA’00 specifies those persons who can be held liable for a
defective prospectus. Persons will include the issuer and anyone who accepts
responsibility for or has authorised the prospectus. Thus, those persons are responsible

467

The Danier case was the first prospectus liability action under s 130 of the Securities Act 1990
(Ontario). See Kerr v Danier Leather Inc (2007) 3 SCR 331.
468
Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) s 130(e).
469
The term ‘disclosure document’ includes, among other things, a prospectus for the offer: Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth) s 9.
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for compensating anyone who has acquired securities and suffered loss as a result of an
untrue or misleading statement (including an omission) in a prospectus.
Furthermore, it imposes civil liability on any person who fails to comply with s 81. That
person is therefore liable for the payment of compensation to any person who has
acquired securities of the kind in question and suffered loss in respect of them as a
result of the failure to include the required information. However, civil liability under s
90 does not prevent other liabilities that may have arisen.470 Hence, parties liable for
information contained in prospectuses in the UK include:
i.

the issuers;

ii.

directors at the time when the prospectus is submitted;

iii.

each person who has authorised himself or herself to be named, and is named as
a director;

iv.

each person who accepts, and is stated in the prospectus as accepting
responsibility for the prospectus/listing particulars or part thereof;

v.

any other person who has authorised the contents, or any part of, the prospectus.

Section 90(8) of the FSMA’00 deals with the liability of promoters as follows:
No person shall, by reason of being a promoter of a company or otherwise, incur
any liability for failing to disclose information which he would not be required to
disclose in listing particulars in respect of a company’s securities — (a) if he were
responsible for those particulars; or (b) if he is responsible for them, which he is
entitled to omit by virtue of section 82.471

470
471

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c S.5, s 90(6).
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8, s 90(8).
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In addition, under s 51(1) of the Companies Act 2006 (UK) (CA’06) promoters are
responsible for pre-incorporation contract, deeds and obligations.472 However, in the
UK, liability of promoters was established both under the common law of torts and
under the liability provisions of company legislation.473 Promoters, lawyers and any
person who has a separate certification in the prospectus can be held liable under
English common law; the ratification or adoption, after the incorporation does not
discharge the promoter from liability of contract.
The above shows that a statutory liability is imposed by developed countries on the
issuers, promoters, directors, underwriters, issue managers and experts who can become
liable to compensate each investor who, having relied on the defective prospectus,
suffers loss or damage by investing in an IPO. In addition to statutory liabilities, those
persons are also liable under the common law of torts.474
However, the following will evaluate the Saudi civil liability for defective prospectuses
in light of its equivalents in the selected developed countries.

4. 6 Evaluation of Civil Liability Provisions for a Defective Prospectus
in Saudi Arabia
4.6.1

Drawbacks of the Civil Liability Provisions

The preceding description of the civil liability provisions for a defective prospectus
shows that the Saudi jurisdiction is in line with the selected developed countries. Both
Saudi Arabia and developed countries impose civil liability for a defective prospectus.

472

Section 51(1) of the Act provides that:
‘A contract which purports to be made by or on behalf of a company when the company has not been
formed has effect, subject to any agreement to the contrary, as one made with the person purporting to act
for the company or as agent for it, and he is personally liable on the contract accordingly’.
473
Benjamin v Wymond (1884) 10 VLR (Eq) 3 (the establishment of promoter’s liability).
474
More Discussions regarding remedies available for investors in common law are provided in Chapter
6: ‘Investors’ Remedies against Breaches of the Disclosure Regime under Saudi Securities Laws’.
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Therefore, persons who are responsible for a defective prospectus are liable for
compensation of investors who have sustained loss or damage as a result of defective
disclosures in a prospectus. Hence, identifying who can be civilly held liable is crucial
to the protection of investors.
The previous description of the civil liability regimes of the selected countries and
Saudi Arabia shows that the issuers, directors, underwriters and experts are liable in
these jurisdictions for defective prospectus. Moreover, the laws of these selected
developed jurisdictions clearly impose civil liability on parties other than those stated in
art 55 of the CML’03. For instance, promoters have been explicitly made liable in the
developed countries’ laws.475 It can be also seen that there is uncertainty about whether
the issue managers and lawyers fall within the ambit of this liability or not. Under Saudi
law, the vague expression, ‘any person who has been mentioned in the prospectus and
has certified any part of the prospectus will be exclusively liable for the part he/she
certified’ can be seen.476 None of the above selected laws of the developed markets
includes a similarly vague expression. They, instead, use a clearer expression than that
of the law in Saudi Arabia. For example, the US and Canada impose civil liability on
every person who signs the registration statement/prospectus; the UK clarifies that each
person who accepts the responsibility for the prospectus/listing particulars, or part
thereof, is civilly liable for a defective prospective in regards to the aggrieved investors.
The UK law further imposes civil liability on the persons who authorised the content or
475

Functions of promoters and rational for their civil liability will be carefully discussed later in this
chapter.
476
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 55(b)(5) states: ‘Others identified in the prospectus, who
have consented in writing to be so identified, as having certified the accuracy and truthfulness of the
information stated in the prospectus; however, such person’s liability shall not extend to information in
parts of the prospectus which are not so certified by him. That person shall be responsible for any part of
the prospectus understood to have been prepared according to his statement and approval in his capacity
defined under this paragraph.’ This is from the official translation from Arabic to English undertaken by
the CMA, Saudi Arabia.
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any part of the prospectus. The CA’01 imposes civil liability on persons named in the
‘disclosure document’477 with their consent as having made a statement, and any person
who contravenes or is involved in the contravention of s 728(1).478 Bringing those four
selected laws of developed countries together in the context of Saudi Arabia, art 55 of
the CML’03 is ambiguous and weaker in respect of the civil liability of promoters, issue
managers and lawyers. These drawbacks in the legal provisions produce weaker
protection of investors in the disclosure regime in Saudi Arabia. The disclosure
provisions contained in the CML’03 aim to develop the securities market, although, as
some scholars have affirmed, this development has been negatively affected by the
weaknesses of the protection of outside investors.479
The roles played by the promoters and issue managers are important. They provide
separate certification to the fact that they have examined the prospectus released to the
public.480 The publication of their certificates will be included in the pertinent
prospectus. Equally important, lawyers play a significant role in the corporate
fundraising process. Lawyers are subject to civil liability, due to their involvement in
the IPO process in other jurisdictions, as will be discussed later in this chapter. With
respect to a prospectus, discussion of the roles of promoters, issue managers and
lawyers and the rationale for their liability for a defective prospectus will be undertaken
below.

477

The term ‘disclosure document’ includes, among other things, a prospectus for the offer: Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth) s 9.
478
Section 728(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) prohibits the disclosure of misleading or deceptive
statements and non-disclosure of material fact in the prospectus.
479
Rafael La Porta et al, 'Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, Reform' (Working Paper No 7428,
National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1999) 32.
480
S M Solaiman, 'Investor Protection and Civil Liabilities for Defective Prospectus: Bangladeshi Laws
Compared with their Equivalents in India Malaysia' (2006) 25 Journal of Law and Commerce 509, 511517.
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4.6.2

Functions of Promoters and the Rationale for their Civil Liability for a
Prospectus

Promoters have an essential role in starting a company. 481 They are generally involved
in setting up the corporation and starting up the business of the corporation.482 They
have a fiduciary obligation and hence must act in good faith and avoid conflict of
interest when promoting a company, including during the period before the company is
registered. A company may have more than one promoter. Any person can be
considered a promoter even if he/she has taken only a small part in the promotion
proceedings.483 Despite a promoter being a founder of a company, he/she may or may
not be the director of the company.
Professional people, such as lawyers, engineers, accountants, and bankers are not
considered promoters while carrying out professional services through their
involvement during the formation of a company.484 They must act purely in a
professional capacity on behalf of a promoter.
In the Australian case of Tracy v Mandalay Pty Ltd,485 it was observed that the essential
factual involvement in the promotion of the company can occur before or after
incorporation. Chief functions associated with promoters include:
vi.

negotiating of preliminary agreements;

vii.

preparation of the company’s constitution;

viii.

identifying prospective directors and shareholders;

481

The word ‘promoter’ has not been defined or mentioned anywhere in the Capital Market Law 2003
(Saudi Arabia) nor by the CMA.
482
Jason Harris, Corporations Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2010) 35.
483
Ibid 36; See also, Susan Woodward, Helen Bird and Sally Sievers, Corporations Law in Principle
(Thomson Lawbook, 7th ed, 2005) 138.
484
Woodward, Bird and Sievers, above n 483.
485
(1953) 88 CLR 215, 242.
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ix.

preparation of the company’s fundraising documents (for example, a
prospectus);

x.

raising capital, either before or after incorporation.486

Functions similar to the above are found in the Companies Law 1965 (CL’65) of Saudi
Arabia.487 A promoter or company ‘founder’ is any person who starts the idea of
incorporation and participates in the process of establishment a company. 488 According
to art 53 of the CL’65, ‘a founder of a corporation shall be any person who has signed
its memorandum of association, or applied for an authorisation to incorporate it, or
offered a contribution in kind upon its organisation, or actually participated in its
organisation’.
The underlying principles for the promoter regarding civil liability are significant in
order to ensure the integrity of the prospectus. Moreover, fiduciary duties to the
company are the main obligation of a promoter. For instance, the New South Wales
Supreme Court in Aequitas v AEFC decided that promoters have the duty to make full
and complete disclosure to the company as well as to the initial shareholders.489 This
shows that the promoters are responsible for wrongdoings that are against the interests
of the shareholders. In addition, the fostering of investor protection against misconduct
by promoters has long been considered under the common law.490
The civil liability of promoters for defective prospectuses is found in the selected
developed jurisdictions. For instance, s 90(8) of the FSMA 2000 (UK), as stated above,
486

Jason Harris, Anil Hargovan and Michael Adams, Australian Corporate Law (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2009) 250.
487
Companies Law 1965 (Saudi Arabia) arts 53–65.
488
Alghamdi and Hussinie, above n 66, 219.
489
(2001) 14 NSWSC 442.
490
Lusina Ho and Pey-Woan Lee, 'A Director's Duty to Confess: A Matter of Good Faith?' (2007) 66
Cambridge Law Journal 348, 362.
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clearly deals with the civil liability of promoters. Moreover, the CA’06 provides
liability against promoters in the case of misstatement in the preparation of a
prospectus. In Australia, s 1006 of the CA’01 clearly imposes civil liability on the
promoter for false or misleading statement in, or omission from, a prospectus. In
addition, s 711(2) and (4) of CA’01 requires the disclosure of the interests of the
promoters of the company to be included in the prospectus. As a result, a promoter may
be liable under s 729 of the CA’01 which imposes liability on any person named in the
prospectus for failing to make the required disclosures.
In the US, liability extends to promoters who are required to sign the registration
statement before the security could be offered for sale.491 Section 11 of the Securities
Act imposes civil liability on every person who is a signatory to that statement.
All of the above demonstrates the importance of the liability of prospectus promoters,
an importance which is in line with the interests of investors. Civil liability of promoters
is significant for investor protection, especially, in the IPO market and the securities
market at large. Thus, the liability of promoters turns out to be more attractive for
recovery in the process of developing a prospectus civil liability regime in Saudi
Arabia. This can be due to the fact that, ‘the essence of a promoter’s obligation is
disclosure of matters relevant to investors’.492 Hence, the role of promoters is important
in relation to the full, true and plain disclosure of information to potential investors. The
absence of civil liability of promoters is a shortcoming of the prospectus civil liability
regime; an omission that results in greater ambiguity than already exists in the Saudi
disclosure regime. In comparison with the above selected developed countries, the

491
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Securities Act 1933 (US) § 7; 15 USC § 77g (1933).
Michael Quilter, The Company Law Notes (Lawbook, 3rd ed, 2008) 37.
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promoters can be held liable under the securities statute and under the common law of
torts. Investors can seek remedy through the rescission of their investment contract.
4.6.3

Functions of Lawyers and the Rationale for their Civil Liability for a
Prospectus

A securities lawyer plays an important role in assisting a public company to meet its
disclosure obligations.493 The lawyer’s central role is to verify and certify that full, fair
and timely disclosures have been made in the prospectus. Legally, the lawyer’s duty is
to ensure that the prospectus has been prepared in compliance with the relevant law. A
lawyer provides legal advice and opinions to the issuer throughout the making of the
prospectus. Therefore, lawyers (or the legal advisors of the company) guide the issuer
before the corporation goes public, both in the preparation of a prospectus and during
the IPO. In addition, lawyers have a duty to guide the issuer through various regulatory
obstacles. The integrity of a legal framework regarding the role of lawyers imposes
potential liability on them for providing incorrect legal advice to the issuer and
attaching false certification to the prospectus regarding legal compliance. As with other
experts involved in the prospectus, lawyers may not be held liable for sections of the
prospectus that were not prepared by them. It is stated that every expert, ‘such as
accountants, lawyers, appraisers or engineers, are best positioned to ensure the
correctness of their opinions. However, they have no influence on the content of the
parts of the disclosure not prepared by them’.494
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Arguably, it is said that lawyers are not generally regarded as experts in respect of the
IPOs.495 This is because lawyers are not supposed to be experts regarding the entire
content of the prospectus, but they are expected to have expertise on the legal aspects of
the prospectus. For instance, inappropriate legal opinion regarding the tax status of the
issuer may result in the lawyer being held liable for their specialist opinion in the
prospectus.496 The involvement or participation of lawyers in any part of the prospectus
should be enough for the imposition of civil liability on them. 497 Furthermore, the role
of the lawyer in the prospectus goes beyond advisory services to verify the fulfilment of
the legal requirements of the prospectus content. By virtue of their position as lawyers,
they have a duty to ensure compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements.
Because of their legal expertise, the later stage involvement by lawyers in the process of
preparation is much more than that of the auditor in attesting that the legal requirements
for the prospectus have been met.498 Therefore, weaknesses and certain requirements
regarding the prospectus have to be resolved by lawyers before it is released to potential
investors. In this regard, Daines asserts that, ‘lawyers are likely to be influential in the
firm’s incorporation decision, as they possess specialized legal knowledge and may
have more at stake in the decision than other advisors’.499
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On the other hand, it is claimed that lawyers may help the issuer to commit fraud,500
particularly if the defective disclosure has gone public with the lawyers’ consent. This
may be combined with the issuer’s desire to increase funds by ignoring their liability.
Hazen claims that ‘[l]awyers, like anyone else, can violate the securities laws.’501
However, lawyers have the right not to certify a defective prospectus. It is against their
ethical and professional obligations. The advisory function of the lawyers does not
require them to agree with client’s aims of maximising their economic interests. 502 In
addition, lawyers ‘exercise discretion in deciding’ on the content of prospectus
disclosure to the public.503 However, legal advisors can be primarily held liable for
defective disclosures in a prospectus.504 It can, therefore, be said that civil liability
should be imposed on lawyers too. On the basis of the above evidence, the imposition of
civil liability on lawyers is imperative for the protection of investors in the primary
market in Saudi Arabia.
4.6.4

Functions of Issue Managers and the Rationale for their Civil Liability for
Prospectus

The issue manager plays a significant role in the IPOs. The issue manager advises the
issuer on issue size and the timeliness of subscription management, as well as on all
administrative and legal procedures. The issue manager also takes responsibility for: the
preparation of the prospectus; the assurance of a clear prospectus; and marketing the
shares to the public. The issue manager is most responsible for assisting the issuer in
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drafting the prospectus.505 A ‘due diligence certificate’ is required to be provided by the
managers; this declares that the prospectus contents are accurately disclosed to the
public.506
The prospectus liability provisions of Saudi Arabia do not have a clear liability
imposition on the issue manager. Managers, as a minimum, ought to be liable for their
participation in the disclosures made in a prospectus. This is also because of the great
deal of performance of due diligence required from lead managers for the offering.507
There are a number of reasons that the civil liability should be imposed on managers.
For example, ‘managers should be liable for getting involved in the preparation of
prospectuses, providing confirmation of the fairness and adequacy of the disclosures,
controlling their issuers, as well as other participants in an IPO coalition’.508
The imposition of civil liability on the issue managers is clearly found in the Securities
Act 1933 of the United States.509 Section 12(2) of the Securities Act 1933 imposes
liability in general on any person who is involved in the defective disclosure. This
section is unlimited in relation to liability for the prospectus and has a broader extent of
application than that of § 11.510
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In the US court of appeals, it was held that a person is liable for omissions from or
misstatements in a prospectus if his/her involvement is significant in the IPO.511 Courts
have found issue managers liable in regard to their support and help in relation to the
violation of disclosure requirements when they intentionally and significantly aid the
violation.512 Moreover, investors may reasonably rely on the reputation of the issue
managers in making their investment decision.513 Thus, the issue managers become
civilly liable for the defective prospectus.
In view of the above reasons, it is evident that the issue manager has an important role
to play in the offering of securities for which civil liability has been imposed by the US
laws. In Saudi Arabia, calls have been recently made for a strong regulation to deal with
the considerable ambiguity that exists in relation to disclosures in a prospectus made by
issue managers.514 Issue managers are responsible for the lack of information during the
process of the IPOs, which can negatively influence the public investment decision.515
Consequently, it can be said that the Saudi disclosure regime needs to deal with the lead
managers’ civil liability arising from a defective disclosure. The absence of civil
liability for issue managers is certainly detrimental to the protection of the investor. To
this end, the imposition of civil liability on issue managers is imperative to protect the
IPOs participants.
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4. 7 Considering Arguments against the Extension of Civil Liability to
Every Person Who Participated in the Preparation of a
Prospectus
It may be argued that the imposition of civil liability on the promoters, lawyers and
issue managers will discourage their participation and accordingly decrease the number
of new offerings to the public.516 This argument may be correct in terms of high risk and
high technology industries that have a higher need for specialist knowledge and a higher
risk of adverse consequences. The ability to assess the risk associated with the IPOs
requires sophisticated investors. Furthermore, it is believed that the complexity of the
industry makes it hard for potential investors to make an informed decision based on
information provided in the prospectus. Thus, it is clear in the case of Klein v Computer
Devices Inc,517 in which the prospectus failed to disclose technical reasons for which the
main product of the issuer was considerably unprofitable. Mistakes in a prospectus,
which are difficult for a professional to identify, will be practically impossible for the
general investor to notice. Klinges states that, ‘a prospectus is difficult enough for the
average investors to understand’ and what is more, the ‘technical language about an
issuer’s industry may intensify this problem’.518 It can be suggested that avoidance of
investing in high risk IPOs is favourable, especially if the nature of risk is difficult to
establish.
In Saudi Arabia, the majority of share market investors lack the ability to assess whether
the prospectus of a company is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Generally, investors usually assume that
the company procedures of going public and its prospectus are done in accordance with
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law. However, the fact is that companies with weak economic fundamentals have been
found to be taking advantage of innocent investors and have raised enormous funds as a
result, but at great risk to the funds of those investors, is a concern. 519 These companies
have been struggling in the market because of their weak performance. 520 Such investor
experiences reduce their confidence and their willingness to participate in new
offerings. A random sample of 242 Canadian firms, taken from IPOs issued between
1987 and 1991 and the gathering of data directly from the IPO prospectuses found that
companies supplying accurate prospectus information would be more likely to endure
for a longer time in the market and be able to reissue equity in the market over the
longer term.521 Moreover, a recent empirical study found that, companies with greater
ambiguity in their offering prospectuses ‘experience higher underpricing at the IPO’.522
In 2006, the Saudi IPO market sharply declined and many companies failed to go public
because of the lack of investor confidence in the share market. 523 A recent report by the
SSE shows that in 2008, the market of IPOs witnessed a significant fall in number
issued of 50 per cent of the total number of IPOs in the previous year. 524 It represented a
huge decline in the proportion of IPOs subscribed since the CML’03 and CMA
519
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regulations came into effect. The fact is that the IPO market has become unattractive for
general investors because they feel unprotected in the market, even with the recent
regulation of the market.525 The Technical Committee of IOSCO believes that, in the
new economy, the preservation of investor confidence in the IPO process is of particular
importance for investors and market professionals.526
Therefore, it is thought that the fear that dominates the market and the poor protection
of investors have had a negative effect on participation in the ‘good offers’. However,
prospectuses with a high risk or technical terms will be more desirable to the average
investor once such prospectuses are coupled with a strong liability regime imposed on
the persons involved in formulating the content of the prospectus. For instance, Fox
declares that ‘the potential liabilities imposed upon an underwriter in connection with
the public offering of securities create a strong incentive for the underwriter to uncover
some of this information and disclose it to the market’.527
Indeed, inefficient protection of investors in the IPO market will lead to the weakening
of corporate fundraising of new companies with strong economic fundamentals, and the
local economy will be disadvantaged accordingly. Generally, investor protection is
imperative in order to have a sustainable and successful securities market. Thus, the
imposition of civil liability on all persons involved in the preparation of a prospectus
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will provide greater protection for the investors and create greater deterrence for
potential wrongdoers in Saudi Arabia.528

4. 8 Summary and Conclusions
One of the major objectives of the CML’03 and the CMA regulations is to ensure the
protection of investors in the securities market. Yet the disclosure regime is in need of
further improvements to be in line with that in the developed markets. The preceding
discussion reveals that the civil liability provisions dealing with defective prospectuses
in Saudi Arabia are ambiguous when compared with other equivalent provisions from
selected developed countries, such as the US, the UK, Australia and Canada. This flaw
has been measured in relation to the scope of civil liabilities. The discussion shows that
the civil liability of promoters, lawyers and issue managers for the prospectus is obscure
in the current CML’03 liability provisions. The combination of the serious dearth of
case law and absence of the interpretation by courts has considerably contributed to the
ambiguity of civil liability regarding a defective prospectus. The importance of the
imposition of civil liability on those professionals, and their significant roles in the
preparation of the prospectus, have been analysed earlier. The lack of clarity regarding
civil liability of those persons who are not specifically mentioned in the prospectus civil
liability provisions would generate uncertainty in relation to the law concerned.
Furthermore, the earlier discussion suggests that the requirements of the prospectus may
call for improvements in order to increase the transparency level in the market. It is
essential that the regulator take an effective role in improving the prospectus
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requirements in line with those of selected developed countries. An effective
verification process is imperative to determine what information may be material.
Having such a process in place will ensure accurate disclosures in the prospectus.
Consequently, it can be said that civil liability for defective prospectuses in Saudi
Arabia is inadequate. Thus, it can be confirmed that the investor protection in the IPO
market in Saudi Arabia is weaker than that in selected developed markets. It can be
suggested that the securities regulators must focus on the interest of investors rather
than remaining silent, which behaviour is contrary to their main function, namely to
protect investors from illegal and unfair practices in the market. Oakes and MacNeil
clearly stress that, ‘the main purpose of the Securities Act in connection with public
offerings is to provide investors with “full and fair disclosure”’.529
Moreover, remedies available to victims of defective prospectus and defences against
the civil liability will be discussed in the later stages of this thesis.530 However, prior to
a discussion on remedies and defences, the next chapter will investigate the legal
requirements that govern disclosure in the secondary market and the provisions of civil
liability resulting from the breach of the disclosure requirements. It will discuss the
contravention of disclosure requirements for the periodic disclosures and continuous
disclosures in Saudi Arabia.
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CHAPTER 5:
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE
DISCLOSURES IN THE SECONDARY MARKET
UNDER SAUDI SECURITIES LAWS: CONTINUOUS
DISCLOSURE AND PERIODIC DISCLOSURE
5. 1 Introduction
The secondary market is a place where investors can purchase a security from another
investor rather than the issuer.531 This market provides a trading facility for both equity
and the debt securities. Thus, the rights of investors need to be protected, and laws and
regulations are needed to foster public confidence, market integrity and economic
prosperity. In the secondary market, greater disclosure is vital to market sustainability.
Fox claims that greater disclosure will have three benefits, namely: ‘(1) the market will
be a fairer place in which to invest; (2) the market will be a less risky place to invest;
and (3) resources will be allocated more efficiently’. 532 However, greater disclosure
needs to be combined with an effective disclosure regulatory framework.533
The aim of this chapter is to examine investor protection in the Saudi secondary
securities market. Accordingly, an examination of the civil liability regime for the
secondary market will be conducted throughout this chapter which will discuss the legal
requirements that govern disclosure in the secondary market. Disclosure-based
regulation is generally regarded as the optimal policy, especially in the most developed
securities markets, such as the four selected in this thesis.534 The obligation to disclose
information is essentially connected with liability for defective disclosures. Hence, an
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analysis of the civil liability for defective disclosures in the secondary market will begin
with the requirement for disclosure. This chapter will look at the provisions dealing
with defective continuous and periodic disclosures, as they have different criteria and
functions. This will be in accordance with selected developed countries such as the US,
the UK, Australia and Canada.
As mentioned above, the requirement for information disclosure is closely associated
with the liability for misstatement liability made during the course of the disclosure.
Therefore, a description of the requirements for periodic and continuous disclosures is
essential to determining whether the Saudi securities market has sufficient requirements
concerning secondary market disclosure. Significantly, civil liability for defective
disclosure is governed by the Capital Market Law 2003 (CML’03) provisions.
Therefore, legal analysis will be carried out by the present writer to examine the
inadequacy of, and loopholes in, the current secondary market civil liability regime in
Saudi Arabia in regard to both periodic and continuous disclosure.
To this end, this chapter is divided into nine sections: Section 1 provides an introduction
and section 2 explores the objectives of disclosure in the secondary market. Section 3
provides the legal requirements related to continuous disclosure to the Saudi Stock
Exchange (SSE). Section 4 presents the legal requirements related to periodic disclosure
to the SSE. Section 5 focuses on the objectives of civil liability for defective disclosure
in the secondary market. Section 6 provides the provisions governing the civil liability
for defective disclosures in the Saudi secondary market. Section 7 discusses the civil
liability provisions contained in articles 56(a) of the CML’03 and 10(a)(c) of Market
Conduct Regulation 2004 (MCR’04) and their applicability to defective continuous
disclosures. Section 8 discusses articles 56(a) and 10(a)(c) and their applicability to
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defective periodic disclosures. Section 9 provides a summary and conclusions,
including that the civil liability regime for secondary market disclosure is contrary to
the disclosure philosophy of investor protection.

5. 2 The Objectives of Disclosure in the Secondary Market
Transparency is one of the essential principles to be promoted by regulations in the
secondary market.535 This is because transparency is one of the most efficient
mechanisms to protect the interests of investors in public companies.536 The main
objective of mandatory disclosure in the secondary market is to avoid information
misstatements, which mislead investors in their investment decision making. Investors
may thus suffer loss or damage because of false or misleading statements. As a result, in
order to maintain investor protection, companies have to publish both positive and
negative information. Publishing information is undertaken by listed entities through
continuous disclosure and periodic reports.
It is important for an efficient capital market that the market value reflects the true value
of the securities. An efficient market hypothesis (EMH), developed by Fama in the
1970s, claims that share prices at any time reflect available information. 537 A recent
study in secondary market disclosure finds that sources of information lead to an
adjustment of stock price towards its fundamental value.538 In addition, compliance with
mandatory continuous disclosure leads to more timely price discovery. 539 Another study
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confirms that mandatory continuous disclosure is significant in the deterrence of
secondary-market price distortions.540 Transparency in financial disclosures is crucial to
avoid unexpected market crashes.541 Greenspan, for instance, affirmed that
improvements in the disclosure regime would be significant in decreasing the risk of
future financial crises.542 Consequently, it can be said that investor protection is an
important objective of the disclosure in the secondary securities market.
5.2.1

The Importance of Disclosure in the Saudi Secondary Securities Market

Having full, true and timely disclosure in the secondary market is significant for the
integrity of the market and accordingly investor protection. The low level of disclosure
and transparency in the secondary securities market is the main reason that led to a loss
of confidence in the Saudi stock market. Therefore, the domestic securities market has
become extremely unattractive to investors instead of being a ‘honey pot’ or ‘magnet’
for the development of savings.
In Saudi Arabia as elsewhere, a high level of transparency can prevent the emergence of
speculation that is built on the basis firstly of unreliable information that prompts trades
intended for profit but that might not only mean individual loss due to the nature of the
information but contribute to a ‘boom-bust’ cycle and widespread market loss; or
secondly on the basis of information that is not available to others that is exploited by
those ‘in the know’ in order to have an immediate profit, contributing again to loss —
this tie by others but ultimately also a loss of confidence in the market and a further
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ultimately downward spiral due to loss of confidence in the market and an even more
profound unwillingness to invest, thus depriving the economy of necessary funds for
development.
By contrast, adequate disclosure in the secondary market will stop leakage of internal
information of companies, thereby achieving efficiency in performance in the market.
No investor can without transparency be assured that they received a fair price for the
buy and sell orders in the market. This generates a loss of trust in the market and an
unwillingness to invest. In the securities market, it can be clearly said that the stronger
transparency, the fewer the rumours and the less the information asymmetry in the
market — and the greater the possibility of trust and subsequent investment in the
market, the more rational the decision making process of the investor, and ultimately the
movement of the market as it reacts to actual rather than inaccurate information. This is
important for domestic and foreign investors alike, with obvious repercussions for
investment — and thus further and diversified development — in Saudi Arabia.
The above evidence shows the indisputable significance of disclosure in the secondary
market. True market value and investor confidence are significant objectives of
disclosure in the secondary market. Accordingly, it can be clearly seen that a
sufficiently robust disclosure regime for the secondary market is essential for the
purpose of investor protection.
To this end, the legal requirements for disclosures in the secondary market in the Saudi
Stock Exchange (SSE) will be discussed below. Firstly, the author will attempt to
discern the scope and definition of continuous disclosures and periodic disclosures.
Secondly, the legal requirements for both continuous and periodic disclosures will
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discussed in order to find out whether these requirements favour investor protection or
not.

5. 3 Continuous Disclosure Requirements in the Secondary Market
This section intends to define continuous disclosure in the secondary securities market
in general. Then, it will determine whether the Saudi laws recognise the concept or not.
In addition, this section will outline every legal requirement for continuous disclosure
under Saudi securities laws in order to analyse them by comparing them with their
equivalent securities regulations in selected developed countries.
5.3.1

The Scope of Continuous Disclosure

5.3.1.1 Meaning of Defective Continuous Disclosure
A listed company has an obligation to continuously disclose information which may
have an effect on its market price or value. Continuous disclosure is based on the EMH
that ‘all investors should have equal and timely access to information about a
company’.543
The necessity for securities markets to be fully informed at all times is undeniable. It is
essential to maintain the integrity of financial markets to protect the funding attained
through market exchange and on which companies are greatly reliant. As a result, a
company’s obligation to disclose material information is essential for fair share pricing
in financial markets.
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Keeping this in mind, it is often said that a strong and clear civil liability for disclosure
violations in secondary markets is essential for investor protection.544 Moreover, this
section intends to discover who can be held civilly liable for defective continuous
disclosure under CML’03 and the CMA regulations.
The main aim of this section is to examine the question of whether the civil liability
regime for defective continuous disclosure in Saudi Arabia is sufficient or not. In order
to respond to this question, several steps need to be considered. Firstly, it is necessary to
attempt to outline the differences between periodic disclosure and continuous
disclosure. Then, evidence of the importance of continuous disclosure is provided. After
that, a discussion is carried out to discover whether continuous disclosure obligations
exist in Saudi law or not. Finally, there is discussion about whether civil liability
provisions are present and, if so, whether they are sufficient. In addition, there is an
attempt to identify those persons who can be held liable for defective continuous
disclosures.
5.3.1.2 Difference between Periodic Disclosures and Continuous Disclosures
In a well-functioning securities market, continuous disclosure is imperative to ensure
that investors are accurately informed in a timely manner. Therefore, under the
‘continuous disclosure’ obligations, listed companies have an obligation to continually
provide to the market all material information that could affect investors in their
decision-making. Listed companies, therefore, are required to disclose to the public any
information that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the share
price or value. A disclosing entity is required to notify the market operator of
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Merritt B Fox, 'Rethinking Disclosure Liability in the Modern Era' (1997) 75 Washington University
Law Review 903, 904.

170

Chapter 5: Civil Liability for Defective Disclosures in the Secondary Market

information about specified events or matters as they arise so the market operator makes
that information available to investors.545 On the other hand, periodic disclosure is
structured financial information; for example, the quarterly, half-yearly or preliminary
final reports.
Issuers are responsible for ongoing market disclosure. This is due to the fact that, ‘the
primary idea behind continuous disclosure is to provide price-sensitive information to
the market as soon as it is known to the issuer of securities’.546 For that reason, it is
often said that ‘firm value is discovered by timely disclosure, particularly between
periodic reports’.547
In developed securities markets, trends toward continuous disclosure have become
evident. For example, the US adopted changes in disclosure regulations, requiring a
shift from periodic to continuous disclosure.548 It imposes a requirement on listed
companies to broadly disseminate certain information to the public on a continuous
basis rather than periodically. In the same context, in 2002, Canadian legislation
embodied a shift to additional monitoring disclosure standards.549 It enables the Ontario
Securities Commission and other regulators to devote more resources to continuous
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See Roman Tomasic, Stephen Bottomley and Rob McQueen, Corporations Law in Australia
(Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 145.
546
Roger Debreceny and Asheq Rahman, 'Firm-Specific Determinants of Continuous Corporate
Disclosures' (2005) 40 International Journal of Accounting 249, 251.
547
Mark Russell, above n 538, 1.
548
Jennifer E Bethel, 'Recent Changes in Disclosure Regulation: Description and Evidence' (2007) 13
Journal of Corporate Finance 335, 338.
549
Janis Sarra, 'Modernizing Disclosure in Canadian Securities Law: An Assessment of Recent
Developments in Canada and Selected Jurisdictions' (Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in
Canada, 29 May 2006) 74.
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market disclosure monitoring.550 In Australia, disclosure of price sensitive information
on a timely basis is required under the Continuous Disclosure Regulation (CDR).551
5.3.1.3 The Importance of Continuous Disclosure in Relation to Investor Protection
Continuous disclosure is important for the integrity of the securities market. This is due
to the fact that ‘continuous disclosure deals with the aggregate real and potential
financial impact upon a listed entity as it is likely to be reflected in its securities’.552 In
the EMH and the voluntary/mandatory disclosure debate, continuous disclosure has
always occupied a significant place. The EMH states that efficient securities markets
incorporate information into share prices immediately, rationally and without
prejudice.553 Share prices move in a ‘random walk’ according to the accessibility of new
information, and do not ‘stick to a pattern’.554
Furthermore, information becomes more valuable in market investment decisions.
Continuous disclosure aims to increase the level of information dissemination to all
investors and keep them ‘up to date’. Furthermore, mandatory continuous disclosure
contributes to the avoidance of unequal possession of information among investors.555
As a result, full, timely and accurate information is significant for the purpose of
protecting investors from unfair market practices. In robust securities markets it is
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Continuous disclosure requirements in the US, the UK, Canada and Australia will be mentioned and
discussed later in line with the equivalent legal requirements in Saudi Arabia.
551
The CDR is comprised of s 674 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and ASX Listing Rule 3.1.
552
Rouhshi Low, Mark Burdon and Paul von Nessen, 'Notification of Data Breaches under the
Continuous Disclosure Regime' (2010) 25 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 70, 99.
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Fama, 'Efficient Capital Markets’, above n 12.
554
Eugene F Fama, 'The Behaviour of Stock Market Prices' (1965) 38 Journal of Business 34, 87;
Andrew W Lo and A Craig MacKinlay, 'Stock Market Prices Do Not Follow Random Walks: Evidence
from a Simple Specification Test' (1988) 1 Review of Financial Studies 41, 56.
555
Mark Blair, 'The Debates over Mandatory Corporate Disclosure Rules' (1992) 15 UNSW Law Journal
177, 184.
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believed that companies maintaining a higher level of disclosure could improve investor
protection.556
A recent study finds that disclosure standards have a significant impact on the
information environment.557 Sarra points out that, ‘an issuer’s continuous disclosure
record allows regulators to make informed choices under risk assessment policies as to
where to direct their monitoring and enforcement resources most effectively in the
market.’558 Although continuous disclosure has a number of opponents, 559 research on
the securities market demonstrates that, ‘a mandatory environment of continuous
disclosure is necessary for the financial markets’.560 Fama has classified the ‘strong
form’ efficient market, implying that all information, whether public or private, is fully
reflected in the value or price of the share in the market. 561 Therefore, actual regulation
and its efficient enforcement play a crucial role in the process of any evaluation of the
adequacy of continuous disclosure.562
5.3.2

Requirements for Continuous Disclosure

The securities laws impose legal requirements for continuous disclosure on companies
listed on the stock market. Hence, the following section will highlight the legal
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Leora F Klapper and Inessa Love, 'Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Performance in
Emerging Markets' (2004) 10 Journal of Corporate Finance 703, 704.
557
Hui Tong, 'Disclosure Standards and Market Efficiency: Evidence from Analysts' Forecasts' (2007) 72
Journal of International Economics 222, 237.
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Sarra, above n 549, 74.
559
Some commentators argue that mandatory disclosure system has a number of costs: see Frank H
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, 'Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors' (1984) 70
Virginia Law Review 669, 705.
560
See Entcho Raykovski, 'Continuous Disclosure: Has Regulation Enhanced the Australian Securities
Market?' (2004) 30 Monash University Law Review 269, 270
561
Fama, 'Efficient Capital Markets’, above n 12, 415.
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Josephine Coffey, 'Enforcement of Continuous Disclosure in the Australian Stock Market' (2007) 20
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 301, 303.
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requirements for continuous disclosures in selected developed jurisdictions (the US, the
UK, Australia and Canada) and under the Saudi securities laws.
5.3.2.1 Requirements for Continuous Disclosure in Developed Countries
In the US, continuous disclosure obligations are set out in Form 6-K and Form 20-F
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (SEA’34). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002
(SOX’02)563 provides requirements for ongoing disclosures. Section 13 of the SEA’34
concerns periodical and other reports. This section was amended by § 409 of the
SOX’02 by adding a provision requiring ‘real time issuer disclosure’. The amendment
obliges the issuer to ‘disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such additional
information concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the
issuer’.564 Moreover, the New York Stock Exchange Manual (the NYSE Manual)
impose further obligation on the listed companies concerning continuous disclosure. For
example, s 202.06 of the NYSE Manual contains the immediate release policy provision
requiring certain important information to be immediately released to the public. In the
US securities’ fraud cases the Market Model based event study (MMBES) has been a
required module of any calculation of damages. The MMBES is commonly used in the
US case law in order to measure the actual loss in the stock value as a result of the
breach of the continuous disclosures requirements. In SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co, the
Court affirmed the principle of access to information for investors that ‘all investors
trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to information’.565

563

Also known as the 'Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act' and 'Corporate
and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act' and more commonly called Sarbanes-Oxley, Sarbox
or SOX. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat 745.
564
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (US) § 409.
565
401 F 2d 833 (1968), cert denied 394 US 976 (1969).
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In Australia, s 674 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (CA’01) imposes continuous
disclosure obligations on a company. In addition, Listing Rule 3.1 of the ASX is central
to the integrity of the financial market. It aims to ensure timely and equal access to
information by all investors.566 Listing Rule 3.1 requires listed entities to immediately
disclose to the ASX any information that can be reasonably expected to materially
affect the price or value of the entities’ securities upon the entities becoming aware of
the information (also referred to as ‘price-sensitive information’), subject to certain
exceptions. The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in James
Hardie Industries NV v ASIC, noted that ‘The continuous disclosure regime, contained
in s 674 and the Listing Rules, is designed to enhance the integrity and efficiency of
Australian capital markets by ensuring that the market is fully informed’.567
In Australia, the basic principle underlying the continuous disclosure framework is that:
Timely disclosure568 must be made of information which may affect security values
or influence investment decisions, and information in which security holders,
investors and ASX have a legitimate interest.569

The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate
Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) (‘CLERP 9’) focuses on transparency and open
communications; continuous disclosure and disclosure rules (sch 6 and 7); financial
reporting; audit reform (sch 1) and auditor independence and enforcement.570 CLERP 9

566

Grace Chia-Man Hsu, 'Impact of Earnings Performance on Price-sensitive Disclosures under the
Australian Continuous Disclosure Regime' (2009) 49 Accounting and Finance 317, 318.
567
(2010) 274 ALR 85, para 355.
568
‘Timely’ disclosure is disclosure that is neither premature nor late; see Introduction to the Listing
Manual (22 May 2011) <http://www.asxgroup.com.au/media/PDFs/introduction.pdf> 2.
569
Ibid.
570
Australian Government, 'Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate
Disclosure) Act, Amending the Corporations Act 2001, enacted July 2004' (30 June 2004)
<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004A01334>. An Act to amend the Corporations Act 2001 and
the Australian Securities and Investment Commissions Act 2001, and for related purposes. See also
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has brought enhancements to the CA’01 in relation to the civil liability for continuous
disclosure.571
In Canada, s 75 of the Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) (SA’90) requires the reporting
issuer to promptly disclose any material change that would have an effect on the
security purchaser or seller.572 In 2004, Canada’s securities regulators implemented a
new rule for continuous disclosure requirements as found in the National Instrument 51102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations (NI 51-102).573. The NI 51-102 defines material
change as ‘a change in the business, operations, or capital of the reporting issuer that
would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value
of any of the securities of the reporting issuer’.574
In the UK, s 118C(6) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) (FSMA’00)
deals with ongoing disclosure in the market. It provides that ‘information would be
likely to have a significant effect on price if it is information of a kind that a reasonable
investor would be likely to use as a part of the basis of his investment decisions’.575 In
addition, Rule 6 of the Disclosure and Transparency Rules 2006 (DTR’06)576 of the
Financial Services Authority (FSA) imposes continuing obligations on the issuer and
ASIC, Clerp 9: Corporate Reporting and Disclosure Laws (8 February 2010)
<http://www.asic.gov.au/clerp9>.
571
These enhancements were in the form of amendments that provide an extension to civil liability for
continuous disclosure and for proportionate liability, rather than joint and several liabilities in respect of
misleading or deceptive conduct. See Sarra, above n 549, 122.
572
In addition in Canada, s 85 of the Securities Act 1996 (British Columbia) requires the reporting issuer
to provide disclosure of a material change and other prescribed disclosure..
573
Ontario Securities Commission, 'National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations' (10
December 2012) <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/13342.htm> . It has been recently amended in late 2011
and 2012. See Ontario Securities Commission, 'National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure
Obligations'
(2
April
2004)
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/SecuritiesCategory5/rule_20040402_51-102-cont-disc-ob.pdf>.
574
National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations 2004 (Canada) s 1.1.
575
See Robert Falkner and Jon Gerty, 'Regulation of Market Misconduct in the United Kingdom' (2006) 6
Journal of Investment Compliance 35, 40; Also, see Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) s
118C(6).
576
The DTR was published by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 2006, and covers companies
admitted to the main market of the London Stock Exchange.
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relevant persons as defined by the Act577 to provide information to not only the FSA but
also shareholders.578
The above description of continuous disclosure requirements shows that the US, the
UK, Canada and Australia have robust securities markets coupled with well-developed
regulations, reflecting a recognition by these countries of the importance of continuous
disclosure requirements. It alludes to a positive signal of legislator responsiveness to
demands in the securities markets for greater transparency and accountability. Recent
updates in relevant legislation and regulation in regard to information disclosure and
related matters reflect the ongoing commitment to achieving the best outcomes for
shareholders in securities markets in terms of investor protection. In this section, an
overview of these regulations regarding continuous disclosure obligations will be useful
in order to determine the position of the continuous disclosure requirements in Saudi
Arabia.
5.3.2.2 Requirements for Continuous Disclosures under Saudi Laws
The Saudi securities laws impose continuous disclosure requirements on listed
companies. Listed companies are required to disclose material information continuously
to the public. Article 46 of the CML’03 states that:
A party who issues securities must inform the Authority in writing upon becoming
aware of any material developments which may affect the prices of the Securities
issued by such party. If such a party has a Security traded on the Exchange, the
Exchange must be informed of such developments in writing.
577

See, eg, DTR 6.3.1 which refers to the issuer or person who has ‘applied, without the issuer’s consent,
for the admission of its transferrable securities to trading on a regulated market’. The term ‘person’ here
refers to (in accordance with the Interpretation Act 1978 (UK)) any person, including a body of persons
corporate or unincorporated (that is, a natural person, a legal person and, for example, a partnership, but
not including a limited liability partnership): see Financial Service Authority, Glossary Definition (30
October 2012) <http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/glossary-html/handbook/Glossary/P?definition=G869>.
578
Financial Service Authority, DTR 6.3 Dissemination of Information of the Disclosure Rules and
Transparency Rules (30 October 2012) <http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/DTR/6/3>.
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As a result, listed companies have to inform the CMA and the public about any specific
events, matters and major developments that fall under the scope of the company
activities.579 ‘Continuing Obligations’ is the title of Part 6 of the Listing Rules 2004
(Saudi Arabia) (LR’04). Under this part, art 25 specifically requires the issuer to
disclose major developments. It obliges the issuer to notify the CMA and the public of
any major developments that are not public knowledge and may lead to substantial
movement in the price or significantly affect the issuer’s financial position.580
‘Major developments’, as mentioned in the LR’04, are those that may have an effect on
the company’s assets and liabilities or financial conditions or on the general course of
its business.581 In addition, these major developments may lead to substantial
movements in the price of the listed securities or, in the case of an issuer with debt
instruments listed, lead to substantial movement in the price of its listed securities, or
significantly affect its ability to meet its commitments.
Furthermore, art 7 of the MCR’04 provides a continuous disclosure obligation. The
Article’s title is ‘Prohibition of Untrue Statements’.
A person is prohibited from making an untrue statement of material fact verbally or
in writing or from failing to make a statement required to be made under the
Capital Market Law, the Implementing Regulations, or the rules of the Exchange or
the Depositary Centre, if the statement is made, or the person fails to make the
required statement, for the purpose of influencing the price or value of a security,
inducing another person to purchase or sell a security, or inducing him/her to
exercise or refrain from exercising rights under a security.

579

It states: ‘An issuer must notify the Authority and the public without delay of any major developments
in its sphere of activity which are not public knowledge and which may have an effect on the issuer’s
assets and liabilities or financial position or on the general course of its business and which may:
1) Lead to substantial movements in the price of the listed securities; or
2) In the case of an issuer with debt instruments listed, lead to substantial movement in the price of its
listed securities, or significantly affect its ability to meet its commitments.’
580
Baamir, ‘Issues of Transparency and Disclosure in the Saudi Stock Market', above n 23, 70.
581
Listing Rules 2004 (Saudi Arabia) art 25 (b).
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Article 7 falls under Part 4, which is titled, ‘Untrue Statements’. It is understood that
this Article deals with continuous disclosure. However, it can be said that it is unclear.
The term ‘person’ is general and ambiguous, as is discussed later in this section. Article
7 reflects the approach adopted by the Saudi securities legislator, that is, to prevent
market misconduct by prohibiting untrue statements.
However, Saudi law, similarly to that of the preceding developed countries, shows that
art 46 of the CML’03 and art 25 of the LR’04 have recognised the continuous disclosure
obligation; this is considered a healthy approach in regard to having legal requirements
governing continuous disclosure in the secondary market.
The materiality of information is the main concept of continuous disclosure. In
Australia, for instance, a company discharges these obligations by releasing information
to the ASX in the form of an ASX release or disclosure in other relevant documents.582
As a result, the market is kept fully apprised of information that may have a material
effect on the price or value of the company’s securities and correct any material mistake
or misinformation in the market. The Australian law empowers the ASX to enforce the
listing rules. For example, in TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Poseidon Limited (No 2), the
court confirmed the right of the right of the ASX to enforce the ‘spirit’ of the listing
rules by demanding greater disclosure.583
Regulatory provisions in Saudi Arabia make similar provisions, with selected
regulations developed in relation to the function and meaning of continuous disclosure.
The Saudi regulatory definition of ‘continuous disclosure’ is that the issuer has to notify
the CMA of any major developments that would have an effect on the market price or
582
583

See Baxt, Black and Hanrahan, above n 419, 227.
TNT Australia Pty Ltd v Poseidon Limited (No 2) (1989) 15 ACLR 80, 85.
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value of the issuers’ shares. These major developments involve all information that is
related to the company’s financial performance, operations and future expectations that
would have an effect on the value of share prices. Therefore, it can be seen that the
Saudi regulator has identified the need for continuous disclosure and required listed
companies to comply with such a requirement.
However, art 7 of the MCR’04 demonstrates a degree of ambiguity in regard to who is
responsible for continuous disclosure.584 The absence of clear specification of persons
who are lawfully obliged to comply with the ongoing disclosure requirements creates
confusion when determining who can be held liable. In contrast, the developed
countries cited above clearly specify that the issuer is the person responsible for
complying with the continuing disclosure obligations. The UK legislation, holds liable
— in addition to the issuer — persons including a natural or a legal person.585 The Saudi
provision in art 7 of MCR’04, arguably, excludes a company when the provision
‘him/her’ is used. Moreover, art 7 of the MCR’04 applies to all statements required to
be made under the CML’03 and other market regulations. As a result, it can be said that
the prohibition here presented applies to statements in periodic and continuous
disclosures. The duality and ambiguity of this Article could lead to misinterpretation of
the difference between periodic and continuous disclosure obligations by listed
companies in the SSE. However, it is to be hoped that requirements for continuous
disclosure are presented and differentiated from periodic disclosure requirements in the
Saudi disclosure regime. This trend is in favour of a strong disclosure regime.

584

Article 7 of the Market Conduct Regulations 2004 (Saudi Arabia) states that, ‘A person is prohibited
from making an untrue statement of material fact verbally or in writing or from failing to make a
statement required to be made under the Capital Market Law, the Implementing Regulations, or the rules
of the Exchange or the Depository Centre….’. For comprehensive information regarding the various rules
of the SSE, recourse can be made to the CMA website <http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Pages/home.aspx>.
585
A ‘body of persons corporate or unincorporated’: Interpretation Act 1978 (UK) c 30, s 5, sch 1.

180

Chapter 5: Civil Liability for Defective Disclosures in the Secondary Market

5. 4 Periodic Disclosure Requirements in the Secondary Market
The aim of this section is to define periodic disclosures in the Saudi secondary market.
After that, it will examine the current legal requirements for periodic disclosures under
the Saudi securities regulations and in selected developed countries. Then, an evaluation
of these requirements will be carried out in order to determine whether the disclosure
regime is adequate or not in respect of periodic financial reports in Saudi Arabia.
5.4.1

Scope and Meaning of Periodic Disclosures

Companies listed on the stock market are required to disclose periodical financial
statements/reports.586 Periodic disclosures are contained in quarterly, half-yearly and
annual reports. The purpose of these reports is to keep investors informed about the
company’s financial status and their investments in these companies’ securities. In fact,
disclosure of material information through periodic reports to groups of people or other
interested parties before such information is released to the public may undermine
investor confidence in the integrity of the securities market. Principle H of the
Principles for Periodic Disclosure of the International Organisation of Securities
Commissions Organisations (IOSCO) asserts that equal access to disclosure should be
provided to all investors at the same time.587
With this in mind, compliance with certain requirements must be imposed on listed
companies. Misstatement in, or omission from, a periodic disclosure document, that is, a
failure to meet the legislative or regulatory requirements, leads to defective periodic

586

See Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 45; Listing Rules 2004 (Saudi Arabia) arts 26, 27. In
this thesis, the terms ‘statement’ and ‘report’ are used frequently to describe the form of information that
the company produces to the public.
587
The Technical Committee of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions International
Organisation of Securities Commissions, 'Principles for Periodic Disclosure by Listed Entities' (Report,
February 2010) <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD317.pdf> 27.
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disclosures. As a result, investors may be affected by non-compliance with the legal
requirements and, therefore, sustain loss or damage.
5.4.2

Periodic Disclosure Requirements under Securities Laws in Selected
Developed Countries

Periodic disclosure requirements are investigated in the light of the legislation and
associated regulations in the US, the UK, Australia and Canada. The purpose is to come
to a decision about whether the Saudi securities market has a sufficiently robust periodic
disclosure regime.
In the US, § 13 of the SEA’34 provides the requirements for periodic reports.
Additional requirements for periodic financial disclosures were inserted in § 401 of the
SOX’02, which deals with disclosure in periodic reports. Issuers with publicly traded
shares are obliged, on an ongoing basis, to make periodic disclosures on Forms 10-K,
10-Q, and 8-K,588 as required by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).589
In the UK, Rules 4.1.12 and 4.2.10 of the DTR’06 provide obligations for periodic
disclosure.590 It is a regulatory responsibility imposed on the persons making statements
and compiling the annual and half-yearly reports. In Australia, Part 2M of the CA’01
provides obligations with which entities must comply in terms of financial and audit
reporting.591 In addition, Rule 4 of the ASX Listing Rules sets out the requirements that

588

Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K shall be used pursuant to § 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
1934 (US) and are required by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Form 10-K is an annual
report; Form 10-Q shall be used for quarterly reports; and Form 8-K is a document used to announce
certain significant changes in a public company, such as a merger or acquisition. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) (11 April 2012)
<http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf>.
589
Securities Exchange Act 1934 (US) §§ 13, 15(d).
590
Disclosure and Transparency Rules 2006 (UK).
591
Australia uses a co-regulatory model for company reporting and disclosure, with the Australian
Securities Exchange (ASX) and Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) as joint
regulators. This partnership is underpinned by a memorandum of understanding. See Australian Securities
and Investments Commission, Memorandum of Understanding Between Australian Securities and
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a listed company will have to satisfy in relation to each quarter, half yearly and end of
the year report.592
In Canada, the National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations 2002
provides periodic disclosure requirements.593 It recognises different types of disclosure,
particularly for annual and interim financial statements.
The legal requirements for periodic disclosures in Saudi Arabia will be investigated in
the light of the above developed jurisdictions. An examination of equivalent
requirements will be carried out in the subsequent discussion of Saudi laws.
5.4.3

Periodic Disclosure Requirements under Securities Laws in Saudi Arabia

Saudi laws impose certain requirements for periodic disclosure. Article 45 of the
CML’03 states that issuers with securities traded on the SSE must submit quarterly and
annual reports to the CMA.594 Hence, SSE listed companies are required to submit
quarterly financial statements within two weeks from the end of each quarter. Annual
financial statements that have been reviewed by auditors are to be submitted within 40
days of the end of the financial year. In general, art 45(a) of the CML’03 requires all
periodic reports to contain the following:
i. The balance sheet
ii. The profit and loss account

Investment Commission and Australian Stock Exchange Limited (28 October 2011)
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ASIC-ASX-mou.pdf/$file/ASIC-ASXmou.pdf>.
592
For details, see Chapter 4 of the Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rules, (13 July 2011)
<http://www.asxgroup.com.au/media/PDFs/Chapter04.pdf>.
593
Ontario Securities Commission, ‘National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations
published in 2004’, above n 573.
594
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 45(a); According to this article, it is understood that
periodic disclosures in Saudi Arabia are quarterly and annual reports.
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iii. The cash flow statement
iv. Any other information as required by the rules of the Authority.

In addition to the information required in paragraph (a) of art 45, paragraph (b) provides
that the annual report must contain the following:
i.

An adequate description of the company, the nature of its business and its
activities.

ii.

Information regarding the directors, executive officers, senior staff and major
investors or shareholders.

iii.

An evaluation of the company management of current and future developments.

iv.

Any other information as may be required by the CMA.595

The CMA requires annual reports to be audited in accordance with the accounting
standards issued by Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA).596
The CMA prohibits listed companies from disclosing any report’s information before it
has been properly lodged and disclosed to the public.597 In addition, the disclosure of
annual reports has additional requirements, which can be found in art 26 of the
LR’04.598 A listed company must provide the interim and annual accounts of a listed
company and must be approved by the board of directors and signed by a director

595

Ibid art 45(b).
SOCPA is a professional organisation established under Royal Decree No. M12 dated 1 Jumada alUla 1412H (19 November 1991G). It operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce in
order to promote the accounting and auditing profession and all matters that might lead to the
development of the profession and upgrading its status.
597
See Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 45(c): ‘All information and data described in
paragraphs (a – l, 2, 3) and (b.3) of this Article shall be deemed confidential. Before providing and
disclosing such information and data to the Authority, the issuing company shall be prohibited from
disclosing such information to parties not bound by a confidentiality obligation and an obligation to
protect such information.’
598
See Listing Rules 2004 (Saudi Arabia) art 26 – Disclosure of Financial Information.
596
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authorised by the board of directors and by the CEO599 and the CFO600 prior to their
issuance and circulation to shareholders and third parties. Immediately, the interim and
annual accounts and the director’s report must be filed with the CMA. The issuer must
provide to the CMA and announce to the shareholders its interim accounts (which must
be prepared and reviewed in accordance with the accounting standards issued by
SOCPA) within a period not exceeding 15 days after the end of the financial period to
which they relate. Then, the issuer must provide to the CMA and announce to the
shareholders its annual accounts as soon as they have been approved and within a
period not exceeding 40 days after the end of the annual financial period to which they
relate. The issuer must provide to the CMA and announce to the shareholders these
annual accounts not less than 25 days before the date of the issuer’s annual general
meeting.
Furthermore, the LR’04 requires the issuer to include the company board report with the
annual report. The board of directors’ report must contain a review of the operations of
the issuer during the last financial year and of all relevant factors affecting the issuer’s
business, which an investor requires to assess the assets, liabilities and financial position
of the issuer.
Another obligation stated in the MCR’04 is to:

599

According to Glossary of Defined Terms Used in the Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market
Authority 2004 (Saudi Arabia), the CEO refers to ‘the chief executive officer, being any individual who
heads the operations of any person and includes the managing director, the chief executive, the president
of the company or equivalent’. Another definition of the CEO is ‘chief executive officer, a director
appointed by the board of directors of a company’. The position is also known as ‘managing director’.
See Nygh and Butt, above n 105, 90 and 310.
600
‘CFO’ refers to any person who manages the financial affairs of another person, whether under the
name of chief financial officer or finance manager or equivalent. See Glossary of Defined Terms Used in
the Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market Authority 2004 (Saudi Arabia).
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prohibit any persons from giving oral or written statements in relation to material
facts … with the purpose to affect the security price or to induce another person to
purchase or sell a security, or to refrain investor from trading in securities.601

Another disclosure obligation is mentioned in arts 8 and 9 of the Corporate Governance
Regulations 2006 (CGR’06). They emphasise the policies and procedures related to
disclosures, especially disclosures in the board of directors’ reports.602
Indeed, it can be said that Saudi Arabia has adopted the same approaches that require
companies to disclose their financial reports for each quarter and annually. In addition,
examination reveals that the CMA has the regulatory and supervisory role in regard to
periodic disclosure that is in line with the approach that taken by developed countries.
The Saudi periodic disclosure regulation applying to listed companies includes the
statutory reporting requirements, the CMA periodic disclosure, LR’04 and CGR’06.
A major development has been that the CMA has recently become a member of the
International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO), which requires more
efficient and transparent disclosures in the secondary market.603 Moreover, similarly to
those of selected developed countries, Saudi securities regulations have recognised the
periodic disclosure requirements and given the regulatory role to one body — in this
instance the CMA — to govern, supervise and enhance periodic disclosure
requirements.

601

Market Conduct Regulations 2004 (Saudi Arabia) art 7.
Corporate Governance Regulations 2006 (Saudi Arabia) arts 8, 9.
603
In fulfilling the criteria for membership, the applicants demonstrated their commitment to IOSCO’s
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation and that their regulatory regimes allowed them to
become signatories to Appendix A of the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information. For details, see ‘IOSCO Expands its
Global Membership’, above n 22.
602
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Despite all listed companies having to submit quarterly and annual reports to the CMA,
only annual reports must be audited as required by the CML’03.604 In contrast, the ASX
Listing Rules require the quarterly, half-yearly and yearly reports to be audited and
given to the ASX prior to publication. In the UK, in addition to requiring an audited
annual report, Rule 4.2.9 of the DTR’06 declares that the half-yearly financial reports
must also be audited. Auditing all periodic financial reports which are to be disclosed to
the public is necessary to ensure the adequacy of the information contained in those
periodic reports. As a result, the Saudi securities regulator needs to insert a legal
requirement that requires listed companies to audit their quarterly financial report before
it is disclosed to the public. This will strengthen the fairness of the market and thus
increase the investor protection.
Another issue is that the compliance with periodic disclosure requirements by listed
companies in Saudi Arabia is yet to be improved. A recent report released by IOSCO
provides nine principles for periodic disclosures by listed entities. 605 The intention of
the report is to provide securities regulators with a framework for establishing or
reviewing the periodic disclosure regime for listed companies. For instance, the
‘disclosure criteria’ principle (Principle G) states:

604

Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 45(a); Listing Rules 2004 (Saudi Arabia) annex 6.
The Report identifies the following principles:
Periodic reports should contain relevant information:
1) Periodic reports in which financial statements are included should state that the financial
information provided in the report is fairly presented.
2) The issuer’s internal control over financial reporting should be assessed or reviewed.
3) Information should be available to the public on a timely basis.
4) Periodic reports should be filed with the relevant regulator.
5) The information should be stored to facilitate public access to the information.
6) Disclosure criteria.
7) Equal access to disclosure.
8) Equivalence of disclosure.
For details, see the Technical Committee of IOSCO, ‘Principles for Periodic Disclosure by Listed
Entities’ above n 587, 7.
605
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The information disclosed in periodic reports should be fairly presented, not be
misleading or deceptive and should not contain any material omission of
information. Moreover, information disclosed in a periodic report should be
presented in a clear and concise manner without reliance on boilerplate
[standardised format] language.606

It can be said that the application of this principle to the Saudi securities market is
inadequate. Compliance with the current periodic disclosure regime remains
unsatisfactory by the companies listed on the SSE. Thus, according to market observers,
there are widespread calls for full and fair disclosure of periodic financial reports by
listed companies.607 The current lack of compliance with the disclosure requirements,
especially in periodic financial reports, can badly affect the quality of advice given by
financial analysts, who rely on information contained in the periodic reports to issue
their analyses and advice to potential and current investors.608 It shows the possibility of
an unnecessarily high risk in regard to investment decisions and investments in the
market that are made in accordance with those financial reports that may inadequately
reflect the financial condition and position of the company. Such risk is inversely
proportionate to the quality of the documents: the higher the quality, the lower the risk
of poor decision making. Reliability of reporting also increases the overall degree of
investor confidence. Hence, ensuring the quality of such reports is highly important.609
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Ibid 24.
Mohammed Alanqeri, 'Disclosure and Transparency in the Balance', alphabeta (online), 11 January
2011 <http://alphabeta.argaam.com/?p=25374> [Arabic]. One of the purposes of disclosure is to fairly
present the company’s financial condition and results of operation, and for such disclosures to be made on
a timely basis as required by applicable laws. For details, see Kenneth Wiener, 'Civil Liability for
Secondary Market Disclosure and CEO/CFO Certification of Annual and Interim Filings' (Report
Presented at CCCA Annual Meeting, August 2003) <http://www.goodmans.ca/docs/CCCA__Civil_Liability.pdf> 44.
608
Alzahrani and Skerratt, above n 39.
609
In this context, the meaning of ‘quality’ of financial reports is to have full disclosure of all information
required by the law and the securities commission rules, to reflect the true financial situation of the listed
company and therefore allow investors to make an informed investment decision.
607
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The above evidence demonstrates the role that the CMA needs to take in order to foster
investor confidence as well as to maintain investor protection from misleading
periodical financial statements. As a result of this examination, it can be seen that
although the CMA is a member of IOSCO, it does not completely satisfy that
organisation’s principles.610 Finally, periodic disclosure requirements in Saudi Arabia
need to be frequently reviewed to provide full, fair and timely disclosure by listed
companies. In an empirical study undertaken during the period from 2001 to 2005,
Aljabr found that despite the fact that disclosure in terms of annual reports by listed
companies has improved since the establishment of the CMA, a delay persists in
presenting annual financial statements by struggling companies. 611 Most recently, three
listed companies breached the legal requirement to release their 2011 annual reports on
time.612 These companies are financially struggling and have an unstable performance in
the market. In practice, the delay in releasing annual financial reports combined with the
ineffective role of the CMA in terms of a willingness to strengthen the legal
requirements for the periodic disclosures will hinder investors from making
knowledgeable investment decisions. Strengthening the civil liability regime for
defective periodic disclosure will result in better compliance with the disclosure regime
and improve transparency in the secondary market. The following section will

610

See also IOSCO Principles for Auditor Oversight which sets forth general principles for the oversight
of audit firms and auditors that audit financial statements of companies whose securities are publicly
traded in the capital markets; International Organisation of Securities Commissions, 'Principles for
Auditor Oversight, Statement of the Technical Committee of IOSCO ' (Report, October 2002)
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD134.pdf> 3.
611
Yahya Ali Aljabr, 'The Timeliness of Saudi Financial Reports and Firm Characteristics' (Paper
presented at the The Role of Accounting Information to Revitalisating Securities, Riyadh, 2006) 28.
612
These companies are: Saudi Telecom Integrated Company, Allied Cooperative Insurance Group
(ACIG), and Buruj for Cooperative Insurance. Khaled Algharbi, 'Halt Trading Threatens Three
Companies',
Aleqtisadiah
(online),
30
March
2012
<http://www.aleqt.com/2012/03/30/article_641433.html?related> [Arabic].
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demonstrate that the protection of investors is the key objective of civil liability for noncompliance with the legal requirements for secondary market disclosures.

5. 5 The Objective of Civil Liability for Defective Disclosure in the
Secondary Market
Objectives for civil liability are twofold: the deterrence of wrongdoers and
compensation for investors who suffer loss or damage due to the wrongdoing. Thus, the
twofold contribution to protect investors is the ultimate objective of imposing civil
liability for defective disclosure in the secondary market. A recent study of civil liability
for defective disclosure in the secondary market asserts that ‘the availability of a civil
liability regime for secondary market disclosure enhances the public policy of investor
protection, as it creates civil remedies for misrepresentations’. 613 It allows investors,
individually or through approved class actions, to hold the issuer and its directors,
officers and any liable person accountable for their failure to meet statutory disclosure
requirements. Halperin and Goldman state that:
Civil liability for secondary market disclosure means that investors will more
easily be able to hold issuers and their individual representatives responsible for the
accuracy and completeness of information provided in documents, such as
financial statements and press releases that companies publish on an ongoing
basis.614

Shulman claims that the primary purpose of the imposition of civil liability provisions
in securities is to create compliance with the law rather than compensating investors.615
He argues, however, that civil liabilities, in turn, have a dual purpose: compensation of
613

Sarra, above n 549, 76.
Stephen Halperin and Paul Goldman, 'Canada Introduces Securities Disclosure Liability' (11 January
2006)
Euromony's Guide to the World’s Leading Capital Markets Lawyers
<http://www.goodmans.ca/pdfs/Article%20%20Canada%20Introduces%20Securities%20Disclosure%20Liability.pdf> 28, 28.
615
Shulman concludes his discussion by stating that, ‘Civil liability is imposed partly for the purpose of
compensating investors, partly, and probably more, for the purpose of compelling compliance with the
Act so as to avoid certain types of losses and the need of compensation’. For details, see Shulman, above
n 274.
614
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injured investors and prevention of conduct and transactions which would cause losses
and create a need for compensation.616 Nevertheless, compliance with the regulations by
market participants will ultimately serve the objective of investor protection. A study of
the Canadian securities law found that the absence of statutory civil liability for
continuous disclosure misrepresentations had (‘until very recently’) made the
shareholder’s exercise of a right of private enforcement (via ‘common law torts of
negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation’) difficult, as did legal costs based on ‘loser
pays’ and a reluctance to pursue a class action.617
Having efficient legal requirements coupled with an improved civil liability regime will
foster investor confidence in the capital markets. For that reason, it is believed that the
presence of secondary market liability increases market stability. La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer show that disclosure requirements and liability standards are more
strongly associated with financial development than other legal factors.618 To this end, it
is important to find out the civil liability provisions that deal with violations of the legal
requirements for secondary market disclosure in Saudi Arabia. The next section will
highlight the availability of civil liability provisions for defective disclosures in the
secondary market under the Saudi securities laws and associated regulations.

5. 6 Provisions Dealing with Civil Liability for Defective Disclosures in
the Secondary Market under the Saudi Securities Laws
Article 56(a) of the CML’03 is a statutory provision which imposes civil liability
enabling investors who sustain loss or damage due to violations of the secondary market
disclosure requirements, including defective disclosures in the secondary market, to
616

Ibid.
Christopher C Nicholls, 'Civil Enforcement in Canadian Securities Law' (2009) 9 Journal of
Corporate Law Studies 367, 384.
618
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, above n 4, 27–8.
617
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recover compensation. Paragraph (a) of art 56 of the CML’03 imposes civil liability for
misstatements in periodic disclosures. This provision states that:
Any person who makes, or is responsible for another making, orally or in
writing, an untrue statement of material fact or omits to state that material
fact, if it causes another person to be misled in relation to the sale or the
purchase of a Security, shall be liable for compensation of the damages.619

Additionally, art 10 of the MCR’04, which was issued for the purposes of the
application of art 56(a) of the CML’03, provides civil liability for defective disclosures
in secondary market. According to arts 10(a) and 10(c) of the MCR’04:
(a). A person shall be liable for damages to a claimant if he makes an untrue
statement of material fact and the statement is made: 1) for the purpose of profit or
commercial benefit; and 2) in relation to the purchase or sale of a security. 620
(c). A person shall be liable for damages to a claimant, if he is obliged under the
CML’03 and CMA regulations to make a statement and fails to do so provided
that: 1) the claim for damages is in relation to the purchase or sale of a security;
and 2) what has been omitted relates to a material fact.621

Although the above provisions are unclear as to whether they are applied to the
secondary market or not, a decision was issued based on art 56(a) by the Committee for
the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) to compensate a victim of untrue
statements.622 However, the above provisions will be examined to find whether they are
applicable to defective disclosures in the securities market. As it is shown above, the
first provision is contained in paragraph (a) of art 56 of the CML’03. It requires that any
person who is responsible for giving (orally or in writing) an untrue statement of
material fact, or omits a necessary statement of material fact, must compensate investors
who suffer loss or damage as a result of this act or omission. The second provision is

619

Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 56(a).
Market Conduct Regulations 2004 (Saudi Arabia) art 10(a).
621
Ibid art 10(c).
622
CRSD Decision No 508/L/D1/2009 of 1430 H issued 14 April 2009.
620
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found in paragraphs (a) and (c) of art 10 of the MCR’04, which bring civil liability for
defective statements in accordance with art 56 of the CML’03. Materiality is defined in
art 56 exactly as it was in art 55 which deals with defective prospectus.623
The above provisions can be applied to non-compliance with the continuous and
periodic disclosure requirements of the SSE.624 Beach describes art 56 of the CML’03
as ‘the CML’03’s anti fraud provision’.625 Thus, it can be assumed art 56 can be applied
to any misstatement in both the primary and secondary securities markets. 626 This is an
assumption made due to the serious dearth of case law and judicial interpretations in
Saudi Arabia which creates greater ambiguity regarding secondary market disclosure
liability.627 Moreover, it is said that this may be due to the ‘infant’ capital market law
which nevertheless has established a specialised court for securities market violations.
However, the following sections will examine the above civil liability provisions in
terms of their applicability to violations of the legal requirements for both continuous
and periodic disclosure in Saudi Arabia.

623

Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 55(a) states that ‘[a] statement or omission shall be
considered material for the purposes of this paragraph if it is proven to the Committee that had the
investor been aware of the truth when making such purchase it would have affected the purchase price’.
624
Ibid arts 45, 46. It is worthwhile to also mention that paras (a) and (c) of art 10 of the Market Conduct
Regulations 2004 (Saudi Arabia) are used for the purpose of the application of art 56 of the Capital
Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia).
625
Beach, above n 24, 348.
626
In fact, art 56 of the CML’03 is a direct translation of § 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934
(US). This provision could be applied to violations in both primary market and secondary market.
627
There is only one case law found imposing civil liability on a newspaper for an untrue statement which
caused loss for the investor. See CRSD Decision No 508/L/D1/2009 of 1430 H issued 14 April 2009.
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5. 7 Civil Liability Provisions and Their Applicability to the Defective
Continuous Disclosure
5.7.1

Civil Liability for Continuous Disclosure in Saudi Arabia

Article 56(a) of the CML’03 and arts 10(a) and 10(c) of the MCR’04 provide civil
liability for untrue statements of material fact.628 For the purpose of this liability, the
untrue statement has to have an effect on the investor decision to buy or sell, which
therefore affects the share price or value. This demonstrates the requirements of
causation to impose the civil liability. Hence, the violation of the continuous disclosure
should have an effect which leads to the loss or damage. Consequently, the above
provisions require a liable person to compensate investors who are aggrieved as a result
of untrue statements of material facts.
In respect of persons liable for defective continuous disclosure, art 56(a) of the CML’03
and arts 10(a) and 10(c) of the same Act declare that, ‘any person’, whether a natural or
legal person,629 can become a subject of civil liability for defective continuous
disclosures. These requirements are similar to those of paragraph (a) of art 10 of the
MCR’04, which imposes civil liability on ‘a person’ who makes untrue statements of
material fact. These civil liability provisions do not specify who can be held liable for
making defective ongoing disclosures that cause loss or damage for investors. The
dearth of legal suits and resultant lack of judicial interpretation have also contributed to
the absence of explicit specification of liable persons.

628

For the purpose of this Article, a statement or omission shall be considered related to an important
material fact in accordance with the standard provided for in para (a) of Article 55 of this law, ‘to the
Committee that had the investor been aware of the truth when making such purchase it would have
affected the purchase price’.
629
The term ‘person’ is defined as any natural or legal person recognised as such under the laws of the
Kingdom. See Glossary of Defined Terms Used in the Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market
Authority 2004 (Saudi Arabia).
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It should be noted that the CRSD interpreted art 56(a) of the CML’03. 630 The CRSD
imposed an obligation on a newspaper to compensate an investor the loss he suffered
because of the untrue statement regarding a listed company. The CRSD reasoned that:
[B]based on art 56(a) which states that any person will be held civilly liable if
he/she makes untrue statement and the statement that was published has affected
the share price, the newspaper is responsible to compensate the aggrieved investor
the amount he lost because of the untrue statement.

This decision shows that art 56(a) was applied to a party other than the issuer in respect
of the untrue material information that affected the value of the security and induced
investor to buy or sell. Nevertheless, there is need for a clear civil liability for the breach
of the legal requirements for continuous disclosures.
It has been seen that the civil liability provisions can be applied to all breaches of
primary and secondary market disclosure regimes. 631 An examination of the
applicability of these provisions to defective continuous disclosure is imperative to
determine whether the Saudi securities regulations are efficient or not in respect of
investor protection in the secondary market. Thus, in order to examine art 56 of the
CML’03, and arts 10(a) and 10(c) of the MCR’04, the following section will attempt to
track civil liability provisions for breaches of continuous disclosure requirements in the
selected countries. Based on this, an evaluation of the current civil liability provisions
for defective continuous disclosure in Saudi Arabia will be undertaken to determine the
weaknesses and suggest improvements.

630

CRSD Decision No 508/L/D1/2009 of 1430 H issued 14 April 2009.
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 56(a) and Market Conduct Regulations 2004 (Saudi
Arabia) art 10 (a)(c) were the only provisions that can be applied to defective periodic disclosures.
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5.7.2

Civil Liability for Defective Continuous Disclosure in Developed Countries

The liability for breaches of continuous disclosure provisions are investigated in the
light of the statutes and judicial precedents of the US, the UK, Australia and Canada.
All these countries have developed a civil liability regime for violations of continuous
disclosure requirements.
In the US, Rule 10b-5 of the SEA’34 is the principal provision for claiming defective
disclosures, which affects market trading once securities have been issued. In addition,
§ 18(a) of the SEA’34 also provides civil liability for defective statements made in
connection with purchase or sale in a security.632
In Canada, a statutory regime for secondary market civil liability was introduced in
2005. It allows those involved in secondary market to sue reporting issuers — officers,
directors, spokespersons, influential persons633 and others — for violation of specified
continuous and timely disclosure requirements. These amendments can be found in s
138 of the SA’90. The aim of s 138 is to impose civil liability for misrepresentations in
the secondary market. Liability is imposed on reporting issuers, officers, directors,
spokespersons

and

others

for

violation

of

specified

continuous

disclosure

requirements.634 Therefore, the section enables the secondary market purchasers to
recover loss or damage sustained from misrepresentation in public documents and in
public oral statements and for failure to make timely disclosure of material changes.

632

Securities Exchange Act 1934 (US) § 10b-5 will be discussed further in Chapter 6.
The term ‘influential person’ includes insiders, investment fund managers, promoters and control
persons; See Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) s 138.1.
634
See Part XXIII.1, s 138 of the Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) which came into force on 31 December
2005. Ontario is the first jurisdiction in Canada to introduce a statutory regime for secondary market civil
liability.
633
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Australia has a developed continuous disclosure regime. Civil liability for defective
continuous disclosure is available under the CA’01. A breach of s 674(2) can result in
an order for compensation for damage or loss suffered by a person. Persons who suffer
loss or damage as a result of a listed entity’s breach of s 674(2)219 may recover that
amount from the entity under s 1317HA. Section 1325 of the CA’01 provides that an
order may be made against a person engaging in the relevant contravention or against a
person who is involved in the contravention. The effect of this is to potentially extend
the civil liability consequences for a breach of the continuous disclosure provisions to
individuals associated with the relevant conduct. This section expanded the liability to
not only include the entity but also a person who is involved in a listed disclosing
entity’s contravention, with such person able to be held civilly liable.635
In the UK, s 90A of the FSMA’00 imposes civil liability for misstatements in all
information published by, or the availability of which is announced by, the issuer by
means of a recognised information service (RIS) or other means required or authorised
to be used when an RIS is unavailable. Therefore, announcements subject to this
liability can be made through documents, RIS and secondary sources. Section 90A
specifies a number of persons who can be held civilly liable for breaches of mandatory
ongoing disclosure. These persons are the company, directors and senior executives of
the issuer, that is, those having responsibilities in relation to the information in question
or its publication.636

635

See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 674(2A). For example, about the implementation of this section,
see: Kim Riley v Jubilee Mines NL (2006) WASC 199.
636
Senior Executives are the individuals who hold the highest of organisational management and have
day to day responsibilities of managing a company or corporation. However, a definition of the senior
executive of the issuer in the UK has not been found under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
(UK) and the Companies Act 2006 (UK).

197

Chapter 5: Civil Liability for Defective Disclosures in the Secondary Market

In the above developed jurisdictions, investors who suffer loss or damage as a result of
breaching continuous disclosure requirements are entitled to sue for compensation. The
company, directors, senior executives, officers, spokespersons, influential persons and
others are clearly liable for the breach of continuous disclosure requirements in the UK
and Canada. In Australia, it is clear that a claim of civil liability can be made against the
company or any person engaged or involved in violating the continuous disclosure
regime. In the US, civil liability is imposed on any person, directly or indirectly, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any securities.
5.7.3

The Imposition of Civil Liability Provisions for Defective Continuous
Disclosure in Saudi Arabia

There is no doubt that the ‘infant’ Saudi Arabian securities law and regulations issued
by the CMA have a positive impact on the investor protection and the market as a
whole. Moreover, these laws and regulations provide rules and impose requirements for
disclosure in the secondary market which must be complied with. However, a strong
civil liability regime will foster deterrence and will facilitate compensation for investors
who suffer loss or damage as a result of a breach of disclosure requirements. This
section aims to evaluate the adequacy of civil liability provisions for violations in
continuous disclosures. It can be said that the existing drawbacks related to civil
liabilities for continuous disclosure undermine investor protection. This is due to the
fact that the provisions concerning civil liability for continuous disclosure are not
sufficient. There are several reasons for this statement. The following discussions reveal
why art 56 of the CML’03 and art 10 of the MCR’04 are insufficient. In addition, the
preceding description of the civil liability provisions of different developed jurisdictions
can contribute to identifying the shortcomings of the Saudi continuous disclosure civil
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liability regime. Then, recommendations and suggestions can be drawn in order to
improve this regime.
In fact, confusion is apparent when reading the current civil liability provisions for
untrue statements. There is a clear absence of information about which market is
targeted by these provisions; that is, whether it is the primary or secondary market.
According to the articulation of these provisions, they can apply to any untrue
statements without mentioning which disclosure type these statements are. Moreover,
confusion results from the articulation of these provisions, which is in fact, general. The
absence of specific civil liability provisions that deal with every type of disclosure can
be considered a drawback of civil liabilities for continuous disclosure. For instance, in
Canada, Part XXIII.1 of the SA’90, titled ‘Civil Liability for Secondary Market
Disclosure’, indicates that civil liability is recognised in the secondary market. 637 In
addition, s 138.2 of the part clearly states that a prospectus does not fall under the
application of this part but it would fall under another part of the Act. This surely means
that that the two are distinguished but liability issues are covered for each. Furthermore,
civil liability for defective continuous disclosure is provided in the same part. Section
138.3(4) requires responsible issuers, who fail to make timely disclosure, to pay
compensation to affected investors. This section shows that the Canadian securities law
imposes civil liability for non-compliance with the requirements for continuous
disclosure. Similarly, s 674 of the CA’01 has a clear indication of the civil liability for
continuous disclosure violations in Australia. In the UK, s 90A of the FSMA’00 clearly
deals with civil liability for ongoing disclosure in the secondary market. In the UK,

637

For example, see s 85 of the Securities Act 1996 (British Columbia) clearly recognises civil liability
for defective continuous disclosures.
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failure or breach of compliance with the continuous disclosure obligations will result in
financial penalties being imposed by the FSA in relation to any such failure. As a result,
it can be seen that Canadian, Australian and the UK jurisdictions have a clear indication
of civil liability for instances of non-compliance with continuous disclosure that have
caused loss or damage to investors.
By contrast, the Saudi civil liability provisions are unclear in regard to breaches of
continuous disclosure. Civil liability, as stated in art 56, is ambiguous in terms of who
can be sued by affected investors who become victims of these violations. This is
coupled with the serious lack of case law and judicial interpretations in Saudi Arabia,
which result in more ambiguity regarding violations of continuous disclosure
provisions. As a result, it is more likely for wrongdoers to easily escape liability. This
will certainly lead to undermining investor protection in regard to the requirements for
ongoing disclosure and the secondary securities market at large. Finally, it can be said
that the need for the creation of a clear, strong and comprehensive civil liability regime
for continuous disclosure is imperative in Saudi Arabia.
5.7.3.1 Persons Who Can be Held Liable for Defective Continuous Disclosures under
Saudi Law
Securities laws always state that a public company as well as its officers and directors is
subject to liability every time a public company releases information containing
material information, misstatement or omission by the company, its officers and
directors.638 However, it is argued that the identification of those who can be held
civilly liable for defective continuous disclosure can strengthen investor protection.
638

Michael Klausner, 'Personal Liability of Officers in US Securities Class Action' (2009) 9 Journal of
Corporate Law Studies 349, 349; Paul Davies, 'Liability for Misstatements to the Market: Some
Reflections' (2009) 9(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 295, 304.

200

Chapter 5: Civil Liability for Defective Disclosures in the Secondary Market

Hence, aggrieved investors can easily identify who is liable and, therefore, sue them. In
addition, the identification of those civilly liable will create deterrence for potential
wrongdoers. For example, the UK jurisdiction clearly specifies the issuer, directors, and
senior executives, as civilly liable.639 Canada extends the scope of the civil liability to
include spokespersons and influential persons under the ambit of civil liability for
defective continuous disclosures. Australia and Canada both have a clear civil liability
imposition on the issuer and any other person who contravenes the continuous
disclosure obligations.640
On the other hand, in Saudi Arabia, in fact, there is no clear provision specifying who
can be held liable for defective continuous disclosures. The only provision that can be
considered to deal with liable persons is art 56(a) of the CML’03. However, the
elements of this provision resembles its US counterpart of § 18(a) of the SEA’34
The article does indicate the following:
x

the involvement of ‘any person’ that can be held liable for defective continuous
disclosure by saying that ‘any person who makes, or is responsible for another
making’ a defective disclosure;

x

causation between the wrongdoing and the loss or damage is required;

x

and it [the loss] has to be in relation to the sale or the purchase of a security.

However, contrary to art 56(a), the US provision adds that the degree of involvement
includes direct and indirect involvement.
Although the Article provides civil liability for untrue statements, it does not specify
who can be held liable. The term ‘any person’ in art 56 of the CML’03 is broad and it

639
640

Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8, s 90A.
Ibid c 8, s 90A; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 674(2) and s 1317HA.
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remains unclear in terms of who will fall under the ambit of the civil liability. It can be
considered an obstacle for investors who want to sue the liable person for the breach
that caused him or her to suffer loss or damage. Moreover, the absence of specifying
liable persons in art 56 can facilitate wrongdoers’ avoidance of responsibility. It
weakens the deterrence for which civil liability is established. Consequently, it can be
clearly said that provisions for persons liable for defective continuous disclosure in
Saudi Arabia is insufficient. The discussion above shows that art 56(a) of the CML’03
is contrary to the objectives of investor protection. It can create uncertainty amongst
affected investors in relation to whom they can sue for loss or damage for noncompliance with continuing disclosure obligations.
Consequently, it can be said that due to the ambiguity of civil liability provisions
concerning continuing disclosure violations, there can also be ambiguity in determining
who can be held liable. In addition, the lack of judicial interpretation of the CML’03
provisions makes the issue more difficult. Furthermore, it is believed that the liability of
participants in continuous disclosure is yet to be determined under these provisions.
The term ‘every person’ broadens the scope of the liability to be imposed on every
person who has caused loss or damage to investors, but it remains, nevertheless,
ambiguous. It is suggested that there is a need to clearly specify persons liable for
continuous disclosure contraventions. This is due to the fact that clear and specific civil
liability provisions concerning liable persons will most likely create deterrence as well
as protect investors by introducing a welcome degree of certainty in matters of civil
liability in this area. The next section will discuss the question of whether or not Saudi
Arabia has a civil liability regime for violation of requirements for periodic financial
disclosures.
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5. 8 Civil Liability Provisions and Their Applicability to Defective
Periodic Disclosures
5.8.1

Civil Liability Provisions for a Breach of Periodic Disclosure Requirements
in Saudi Arabia

Civil liability for defective periodic disclosures can be claimed under the paragraph (a)
of art 56 of the CML’03 which provides civil liability for a misstatement in, or omission
from, documents issued that are subject to disclosure requirements regarding material
information. In addition, paragraphs (a) and (c) of art 10 of the MCR’04 are civil
liability provisions for defective disclosures in relation to sale or purchase of securities.
These civil liability provisions are the same provisions which apply to breaches of
continuous disclosures. Hence, civil liability can be claimed if the untrue statement
causes another person to be misled in relation to the sale or the purchase of a security.641
Hence, liable persons are required to compensate the investors who sustained loss or
damage because of the untrue statement. Only listed companies in the SSE are usually
identified as being able to be held liable for defective periodic disclosures. However, it
can be said that there is a clear absence of a direct provision to practically indicate the
civil liability for breaching periodic disclosure requirements. Hence, it is reasonable to
claim that civil liability provisions for defective periodic disclosures are yet to be
determined.
It has been mentioned that paragraph (a) of art 56 of the CML’03 imposes civil liability
on ‘any person’642 who is responsible for defective oral or written statements. As a
result, it can be said that persons involved in stating false information containing untrue,
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Market Conduct Regulations 2004 (Saudi Arabia) art (10)(a)(c). see also Capital Market Law 2003
(Saudi Arabia) art 56(a).
642
The term ‘person’ is defined as any natural or legal person recognised as such under the laws of the
Kingdom; See Glossary of Defined Terms Used in the Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market
Authority 2004 (Saudi Arabia).
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misleading information or material omission, fall within the expression ‘any person’
and therefore are liable for making those untrue statements. Applying the same
approach, paragraphs (a) and (c) of the MCR’04 use the term ‘a person’ to refer to
anyone who can be held liable for making untrue statements that causes loss or damage
to another person. Unfortunately, these liability provisions for making untrue statements
have not been interpreted by the courts in Saudi Arabia. However, there is a need to
identify all persons who are responsible for the preparation and authorisation of
quarterly and annual financial statements.643 Specifying persons who can be held liable
will provide certainty and therefore foster investor protection. It will create more
deterrence, and assist aggrieved investors to become informed about whom they can sue
for their loss or damage incurred as a direct result of violations in periodic disclosures
by listed companies.
5.8.2

Civil Liability for Defective Periodic Disclosures under the Legislation of
Developed Countries

Providing civil liabilities and specifying persons liable for defective periodic disclosures
in securities markets will be investigated in light of the statutes and judicial precedents
of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada.
In the United States, civil liability for defective periodic disclosures is provided in §
18(a) of the SEA’34. The section imposes civil liability on any person who makes or
causes statements in any application, report, or document to be false or misleading. As a
result, persons become liable for damages caused by such reliance. A material

643

In this discussion and according to art 56 of the Capital Market Law 2003, the term ‘untrue statement’
refers to oral or written untrue statements.
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misstatement of the periodic filings is subject to liability under § 18(a) of the
SEA’34.644
In the UK, the liability is found in s 90A of FSMA 2000, which deals with untrue or
misleading statements in or omissions from periodic financial reports.645 It states that
issuers are liable to pay damages to investors who suffered a loss as a result of:
x

Any untrue or misleading statements in the relevant published information;

x

Omission of any matter required to be included therein.

The issuer can be held liable by a person who acquires, continues to hold or sells
securities, and in doing so, suffers loss in respect of those securities as a result of a
dishonest delay by the issuer in publishing the relevant information.646 Directors and
other persons beyond the issuer are not subject to civil liability by third parties;
however, this exclusion does not take away the liability in criminal law or for civil
penalties.647
In Canada, s 138.3 of the SA’90 clearly provides civil liability in Ontario for defective
disclosures in the secondary market in general. It states that any person or company that
acquires or disposes of the issuer’s security, during the period between the time when

644

Securities Exchange Act 1934 (US) § 18(a) states that ‘any person who shall make or cause to be made
any statement in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this title or any rule or regulation
thereunder…’ .
See also liability for misstatement at Commerce and Trade 2005 (US) 15 USC § 78r; Fox, ‘Civil Liability
and Mandatory Disclosure’ above n 223, 242.
645
Section 90A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) was extended in terms of the
issuers’ liability for public statements. The (Liability of Issuers) Regulations 2010 came into force on 1
October 2010.
646
See para 5 of the (Liability of Issuers) Regulations 2010, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
(UK).
647
‘Liability’ here means any civil remedy (not just damages) and includes liability in regards to the selfhelp remedies of rescission and repudiation. Paras 7(2) and (5) of the (Liability of Issuers) Regulations
2010, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK); See also, Paul Davies, 'Liability for Misstatements
to the Market' (2010) 5 Capital Markets Law Journal 443, 449.
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the document648 was released and the time when the misrepresentation contained in the
document was publicly corrected, has a right of action for damages. The section
identifies the following persons to be liable for damages: responsible issuer,649 directors,
officers and experts. Also, according to this section, a person who knowingly has an
influence on the issuer, directors and officer is also liable.
In Australia, s 344 of the CA’01 states that, ‘a director of a company, registered scheme
or disclosing entity contravenes this section650 if they fail to take all reasonable steps to
comply with, or to secure compliance with Parts 2M.2 of the Corporations Act 2001’.
For this purpose, ss 1041H and 1041I of the CA’01 combine to allow an injured
investor to bring a civil action against the liable person or any person involved to
recover losses or damages resulted from false or misleading statements.
The above provisions show that all selected developed countries impose civil liability
for the breach of periodic disclosures. However, the UK has the most recent and
sufficient civil liability provision for violating periodic disclosures. It allows the
securities seller, buyer and holder who have suffered loss or damage because of periodic
misstatements to directly sue the issuer. In addition, any action by the issuer against
other potential liable person would be left to the common law. As a result, having a
specified person liable favours investor protection. In this situation, aggrieved investors
can easily identify the party from whom they can seek compensation.

648

In this section, the term ‘document’ includes periodic reports, which are required to be filed with the
Ontario Commission; see Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) s 138.1.
649
A ‘responsible issuer’ is a reporting issuer; or other with a substantial connection to Ontario, any
securities of which are publicly traded. Ibid.
650
‘This section’ refers to a civil penalty provision provided in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317E.
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5.8.3

The Imposition of the Civil Liabilities for Defective Periodic Disclosures in
Saudi Arabia

The aforementioned description of the civil liability provisions of the US, the UK,
Australia and Canada shows that these jurisdictions provide civil liability for defective
periodic disclosures. On the contrary, Saudi securities laws do not have a clear and
direct civil liability for periodic reports. This is because Saudi law sets separate
requirements for the disclosure of periodic reports, while there is no distinction between
the civil liability for defective periodic disclosures and continuous disclosures. Article
56(a) of the CML’03 imposes civil liability for all misstatements in, or omissions from
disclosures requirements regarding material information. Unlike the laws of Saudi
Arabia and Canada, those of the US, the UK and Australia distinguish between the civil
liability for periodic and that for continuous disclosures. However, the laws of the above
developed markets clearly and directly impose the civil liability for defective periodic
disclosures.
Furthermore, specifying the liable persons varies between the laws of developed
jurisdictions and the CML’03. In Saudi law, art 56 imposes civil liability on ‘any
person’ who is responsible for defective disclosures. This Article resembles § 18(a) of
the SEA’34. The use of § 18(a) in the US has not been popular which is reflected in the
lack of lawsuits brought under that section.651 However, in Heit v Weitzen,652 it was held
that § 18(a) can be used as a concurrent claim of civil liability for any purchase or sale
made in reliance on false or misleading statements made in documents filed with the
SEC. Occhipinti points out that ‘[t]he target of any reinterpretation of section 18(a)
must be its two distinct, interrelated, requirements: (1) the false or misleading statement
651

John A Occhipinti, 'Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Putting the Bite Back into the
Toothless Tiger' (1978) 47 Fordham Law Review 115, 118.
652
402 F2d 909 (2nd Cir, 1968) 916.
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must be in a document filed with the SEC, and (2) the plaintiff must have actually relied
on the statement.’653 However, the SEC is rapidly shifting to a continuous disclosure
regime by supplementing periodic disclosure with ‘current disclosure’.
By contrast, the Canadian law identifies the liable persons for defective periodic
disclosures as the following: issuer, directors, officers, experts and any person who
knowingly has an influence on the issuer, directors and officers. Moreover, in the UK,
the new extension in the civil liability regime of issuers clearly names the issuer as the
liable person for defective periodic disclosures. Accordingly, FSMA 2000 (Liability of
Issuers) Regulations 2010654 identify the issuer as the liable person and explain when
the issuer becomes responsible for such liability.
Consequently, it can be said that CML’03 suffers from the absence of direct and clear
civil liability provisions for defective periodic disclosures. In addition, it includes the
expression ‘any person’ involved in creating defective periodic disclosures to impose
liability on those who are not specifically named in the relevant sections. Considering
all the four mentioned developed jurisdictions together in the context of Saudi Arabia,
art 56 is insufficient in relation to civil liabilities for misstatement in or omission from
periodic financial disclosures. Based on the above, it can be observed that there is a lack
of articulation of civil liability for defective periodic disclosures, coupled with the
absence of judicial interpretations of art 56(a) of the CML’03. The present researcher
could not find a lawsuit from the aggrieved investors against persons liable for defective
periodic financial reports in Saudi Arabia.
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Occhipinti, above n 651, 127: See also Francis J Higgins, 'Section 18 of the Exchange Act: A New
Defense Weapon in Securities Litigation' [1980](1) Detroit College of Law Review 761, 775.
654
See Part 2 of (Liability of Issuers) Regulations 2010, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK).
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On the other hand, the CMA fines listed companies for breaching the disclosure
requirements of annual financial reports.655 Article 59(b) of the CML’03 deals with
monetary fines for any breach of Saudi securities laws. The fine varies ranges from
SAR10,000 to SAR 100,000 (USD 2666–USD 26,666).656 In contrast, the US Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed a USD 1 million administrative penalty
against Pipeline Trading Systems LLC for misleading investors and providing defective
disclosure in connection with the sale of securities.657
It is evident therefore that even the administrative penalties are insufficient to deter
companies from violating the disclosures rule regarding periodical disclosures.
Recently, a commentator pointed out that the amount of the monetary fine is not
adequate to prevent violations of legal requirements in companies’ annual reports.658 It
is believed that these violations could directly adversely affect investors; hence
applicable deterrence should be stronger.
In fact, listed companies continue to violate the periodic disclosure regime. The weak
enforcement by the CMA does not provide sufficient incentive for potential wrongdoers
to comply with disclosures requirements. In different cases, the CMA imposed
administrative penalties on several companies that failed to disclose their annual
financial statements for 2007.659 These companies violated art 26(d) of the LR’04,

655

See 'Capital Market Authority: Four Companies Were Fined 250 Thousand Riyals for Breaching the
Securities Market Regulations', Al-Jazirah (online), 24 October 2011 <http://www.aljazirah.com.sa/20111024/ec3d.htm> [Arabic].
656
Chapter 9 will discuss the role of the CMA in enforcing the disclosure regime.
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Ramandeep Grewal, 'SEC Fines Dark Pool $1 Million for Misleading Customers,' (18 November
2011) Canadian Securities Law <http://www.canadiansecuritieslaw.com/2011/11/articles/securitiesdistribution-tradin/sec-fines-dark-pool-1-million-for-misleading-customers/>.
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Ghareeb Alafifi, 'The Capital Market Authority and Companies' Violations: Ambiguous Questions',
alphabeta (online), 24 October 2010 <http://alphabeta.argaam.com/?p=22250> [Arabic].
659
See Capital Market Authority, 'Announcement: Imposition of Penalties on Companies that Failed to
Disclose
their
Annual
Financial
Statements
for
2007',
21
May
2008
<http://www.cma.org.sa/en/News/Pages/CMA_N415.aspx >.
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which requires the issuer to provide financial statements to the CMA as well as the
public within a period not exceeding 40 days after the end of the annual financial
period.660 However, the civil remedy is insufficient to deter companies from violating
the disclosure rule regarding periodical disclosures.
These legal weaknesses result in weaker protection of investors. The present civil
liability provisions are clearly unable to create sufficient protection for market
participants in the periodic disclosure regime. Empirical research finds that the link
between investor protection and the quality of reporting is highly significant.661
Moreover, countries with poorer investor protections have smaller and narrower capital
markets.662

5. 9 Summary and Conclusions
A corporate disclosure regime has emerged in the developed markets to meet the needs
of investor protection. Disclosure continues to be the key tool for regulation within the

660

The CMA announces that the following companies:
· Emaar the Economic City.
· The Mediterranean & Gulf Insurance Company.
· Anaam International Holding Group Company.
· Malath Insurance Company.
· SANAD Insurance Company.
· Saudi Fransi Insurance Company.
· SABB Takaful Company.
· Ashargiyah Agriculture Company.
have failed to disclose their results for the year 2007, within the period specified in art 26(d) of the listing
rules, which states: ‘The company must provide the Authority and announce to the shareholders its annual
accounts (which must be prepared and audited in accordance with the accounting standards issued by
SOCPA) as soon as they have been approved and within a period not exceeding 40 days after the end of
the annual financial period to which they relate’. As such delay is considered as a violation to the Capital
Market Law, it is decided by the CMA Board to impose a penalty of SAR 10,000 on each of these
companies.’
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Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda and Peter D Wysocki, 'Earnings Management and Investor
Protection: An International Comparison' (2003) 69 Journal of Financial Economics 505, 526.
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Rafael La Porta et al, 'Legal Determinants of External Finance', above n 19, 1131.
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developed securities markets.663 Following the path of developed markets, Saudi Arabia
has adopted the civil liability regime but without appropriate amendments to the laws
pertinent to secondary market disclosure. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that
the civil liability provisions for defective continuous and periodic disclosures in Saudi
Arabia are insufficient and unclear when compared to those of other selected countries,
such as the US, and particularly the UK, Australia and Canada. This weakness has been
measured in terms of the extent of the scope of civil liability.664 The analysis shows that
the imposition of civil liabilities for defective periodic and continuous disclosure is
unclear in the current securities liability provisions in Saudi Arabia. In comparison, the
UK, Australia and Canada have developed a civil liability regime governing secondary
market disclosure.
In Saudi Arabia, the scope of civil liability concerning whether there are defective
periodic or continuous disclosures is ambiguous and unclear, and the current legislative
provisions have failed to specify persons who can be held liable for breaches of such
disclosures. The civil remedy is insufficient to deter companies from violating the
disclosure rule regarding continuous and periodical disclosures.
However, the preceding discussion also shows that the Saudi securities regulatory body
has adopted a positive approach, which is to distinguish between the periodic and
continuous disclosure requirements in the secondary market. However, they must be
different because of their nature. This trend is in line with the approach of the selected
developed countries, which apply different requirements for both periodic and
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Susanna Kim Ripken, 'The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation' (2006) 58 Baylor Law Review 139, 151.
664
The following chapters will discuss remedies available to investors and also discuss defences available
to escape civil liability for the violation of the disclosure regime.
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continuous disclosure. Nevertheless, unlike the selected developed countries, there is no
distinction between the provisions of civil liabilities of periodic and continuing
disclosures. Likewise, the ambit of civil liability for defective disclosures is currently
expanded to include all untrue statements. Thus, it can be said that the scope of the civil
liability for whether there are defective periodic or continuous disclosures, is unclear.
Moreover, the current provisions have failed to specify persons who can be held liable
for breaches of periodic or continuous disclosure provisions. Consequently, the current
civil liability provisions concerning disclosures in the Saudi secondary market are not
favourable for investor protection.
Furthermore, the significance of having sufficient civil liability provisions for secondary
market disclosure violation is derived from the importance of the secondary market
where the trading volume is larger than the trading volume in the primary market. In
addition, stock market crashes that occurred a number of times in several countries
revealed the necessity for investor protection and have prompted greater attention in
establishing a stronger regime.665 Therefore, investor protection is really needed in the
securities market. Strengthening of the secondary market civil liability regime against
defective periodic and continuous disclosures will certainly foster the protection of
investors. Therefore, regulators are required to continuously improve and develop
market regulations.
In addition, several negative issues persist that affect the quality of secondary market
disclosure in Saudi Arabia. For instance, the practice of continuous disclosures by listed
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Some historic tragedies in securities market were, for example, in England in 1720, in the US in 1929
and in Saudi Arabia in 2006. Except for Saudi Arabia, these market collapses significantly contributed to
legislation favouring investor protection.
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companies is still believed to be insufficient.666 Equally important, there is an enormous
need for full and fair disclosure in periodic financial reports by listed companies.667
A developed and clear civil liability regime for defective disclosure is imperative in
order to foster investor protection in the securities market in Saudi Arabia. This regime
needs to outline several main aspects, such as: ‘Who will be entitled to a right of
action?’ ‘Who can be held liable?’ ‘What defences will be available?’ ‘What remedies
are available?’ ‘How will damages be calculated?’ and ‘What are some of the
procedural rules?’
With this in mind, the following chapter will continue the attempt to broadly discuss the
current civil liability regime for defective disclosures. The adequacy of defences and
remedies for the civil liability incurred from defective disclosures in the prospectus and
continuous and periodic disclosures will be examined.
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Responsibility for listed companies to develop ways to facilitate the disclosure of the important
information, results and news of those companies in a more clear and understandable methods to the
public. See Mohammed Alanqeri, 'The Mystery of the Financial Market Weakness', alphabeta (online),
11 May 2011, Arabic <http://alphabeta.argaam.com/?p=30181> [Arabic].
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Alanqeri, ‘Disclosure and Transparency in the Balance’, above n 607. One of the purposes of
disclosure is to fairly present the company’s financial condition and results of operations, with such
disclosure to be made on a timely basis as required by the applicable legislation. For details, see Wiener,
above n 607, 44.
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CHAPTER 6:
INVESTORS’ REMEDIES AGAINST THE
BREACHES OF THE DISCLOSURE REGIME UNDER
SAUDI SECURITIES LAWS
6. 1 Introduction
An adequate civil liability regime is essential to provide protection for investors in the
securities market. Remedies available to injured investors in the securities market are
significant as a measure of the strength of a civil liability regime. Therefore, ‘good legal
rules’ are of vital importance in all robust securities markets.668 Equally important, an
adequate civil liability regime governing disclosure in the securities market is
imperative. It has been asserted that civil liability provides significant incentives for
entities to comply with the disclosure rules.669
This chapter will be evaluating the Saudi civil liability regime governing disclosure in
the market — as to whether it is clear or ambiguous or narrow — as compared to that
of the developed jurisdictions selected, namely the US, UK, Australia and Canada.
Hence, the central focus of this chapter is to analyse the provisions dealing with civil
liability in terms of investor remedies under the Capital Market Law of 2003 (CML’03).
It is important to recognise the causes of action available to the aggrieved investors who
sustain loss or damage as the result of a defective disclosure in either the prospectus or
secondary market disclosures (periodic disclosures and continuous disclosures). The
remedies available to investors will be discussed. The arguments regarding the relevant
provisions providing remedies will be examined and evaluation of these provisions be
conducted. This undertaking will reveal the inadequacy of the current civil liability
regime for defective disclosures in Saudi Arabia.
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Simon Johnson, 'Coase and the Reforms of Securities Markets' (2002) 16 International Economic
Journal 1, 2.
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Fox, ‘Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure’ above n 223, 273.
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With this in mind, this chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 1 provides an
introduction and section 2 presents the objective of the private enforcement of the civil
liability provisions for the breaches of the disclosure regime. Section 3 introduces
remedies in general and remedies available in the selected developed jurisdictions for
the breach of disclosure requirements. Section 4 explores the investor remedies
available for breaches of the disclosure regime in Saudi Arabia. Section 5 evaluates the
weaknesses of the remedies available under the Saudi securities laws. Section 6
discusses the claim of civil liability and the absence of securities class action lawsuits as
an effective remedy for the investors and strong deterrent to potential wrongdoers.
Lastly, section 7 presents a summary and conclusions. The closing remarks will make it
clear that the current civil liability regime is inadequate and to some extent contrary to
investor protection, which is the central objective of the disclosure philosophy.

6. 2 The Objective of Private Enforcement of the Civil Liability for
Breaches of Disclosure Regime
Effective civil remedies for investors encourage participants to comply with the
securities laws, and also enhance disclosure of information to the market. The findings
of La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer are that private enforcement mechanisms
(liability standards and disclosure requirements) are positively related to financial
development while public enforcement measures are not.670 In fact, facilitating the right
to bring civil lawsuits for investors is central for the development of securities
markets.671 Such a right will foster fairness and integrity amongst all market
participants. Veil points out that the implementation of a system of civil liability for
violations of market rules has two goals: to ensure compensation for suffering investors,

670
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La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, above n 4, 27.
Ibid.
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and to ensure that firms and directors act with due diligence regarding compliance with
regulations provided by the market administration.672
Private enforcement of securities laws (via shareholder lawsuits) is the cornerstone of
the investor protection in the securities market. Having civil liability provisions for
defective disclosure coupled with facilitating the use of these provisions can bring
stronger protection for investors. In the early 20th century, Pound drew attention to the
distinction between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’.673 The divergence between ‘law
on the books’ and enforcement, ‘law in action’, is becoming an important factor in the
discussion about investor protection in the financial markets worldwide. Coffee argues
that measuring only the laws ‘on the books’ is misleading without finding out the
strength of these laws ‘on the ground’.674
Enforcement of securities laws has strong advantages in regard to promoting
transparency in the capital market and financial development. 675 However, it is
generally believed that public enforcement is less effective than private enforcement.
Part of the difficulty is that the impacts of imposing large monetary fines by the
securities regulator on listed firms will extend to innocent investors rather than the
culpable corporate officers and gatekeepers.676 In terms of actions by private
individuals, the growth of the class action suit in the US and of contingency fee based
actions allows persons to aggregate their claims and so redress the imbalance created by
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Rüdiger Veil, 'Enforcement of Capital Markets Law in Europe – Observations from a Civil Law
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the size of the corporations that might otherwise discourage a civil suit by an individual.
Such approaches remain, however, largely peculiar to the US, although the approach is
gaining some traction in Australia, the UK and even Europe.677
The crash of the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE) in 2006 — when it lost 65 per cent of its
value in a few short months after a high in February of that year678 — raised questions
about the role of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in maintaining fair and efficient
capital markets. Moreover, the right of aggrieved investors to recover their loss and
damages was poorly expressed due to the insufficient civil liability provisions that
govern the disclosure regime (as discussed in the previous chapters). In addition, several
factors contributed to the weak private enforcement of the disclosure regime, namely: a
lack of legal awareness among investors, a lack of trained and specialised lawyers in the
securities literature and the weak judicial and administrative enforcement of securities
laws in Saudi Arabia.679
It has been submitted that the objective of the civil liability regime is to facilitate
compensation for the victims of defective disclosure, and to deter persons involved in
the preparation of prospectuses from infringing disclosure requirements. Consequently,
to have an efficient civil liability regime for defective disclosure, an adequate private
enforcement mechanism is required to be in operation rather than simply having laws
‘on the books’. For this purpose, it is important to analyse the remedies which can be
utilised based on the civil liability provisions provided in the previous chapters. Having
sufficient and adequate investor remedies for breaches of the disclosure regime will
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create strong incentives for market participants to comply with disclosure requirements
and therefore lead to better investor protection.

6. 3 Investor Remedies for Violations of the Disclosure Regime
6.3.1

Introduction to Remedies

In a legal sense, ‘remedy’ is ‘the means available at law or in equity by which a right is
enforced or the infringement of a right is prevented, redressed or compensated’.680
Therefore, civil remedies can be divided into two categories.681 The first category is that
of legal remedies,682 which are essentially a claim for monetary damages (that is, in
compensation for the plaintiff’s loss, the defendant pays money).683 The second
category of civil remedies is equitable remedies, which come as orders for the defendant
to engage in a particular act, or refrain from engaging in a particular act. Wright
observes that, ‘remedies are what clients want’.684 Moreover, it is very often said that
every genuine case involves a remedy. 685 In order to reach a conclusion regarding
whether the current remedies for breaches of disclosure requirements in the Saudi laws
are sufficient or not, the current regime for remedies is later discussed.
An efficient civil liability regime for defective disclosures requires adequate remedies to
be available for investors who sustain loss or damage due to violation of the disclosure
regime. It has been confirmed that securities regulations with adequate remedies
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available for investors will make a great contribution to the integrity of the securities
market.686 Hence, the variety of remedies available to aggrieved investors in the share
market will facilitate the claim of civil liability and thus strengthen investor protection.
In addition, a study of 49 countries that were grouped into their relevant legal families
— that is, English (common) law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian
law — concluded that common law countries had more extensive mandatory disclosure
requirements, and made it easier for investors to recover damages.687
That sufficient remedies being available to investors in the securities market is
beneficial for the concept of investor protection has been observed by Ben-Ishai, who
argues that ‘[u]nder common law, investors are able to bring an action against directors
for a breach of fiduciary duty and duty of care, as well as seek remedies in contract and
tort’.688
In contrast to the common law jurisdictions, which have civil remedies in legislation
and common law, investors in the Saudi capital market only have recourse to the
securities laws and regulations under which to seek civil remedies for breaches of the
disclosure regime. This is essentially a disadvantage of the Saudi legal regime.
6.3.2

Overview of the Remedies Available under the Selected Developed
Jurisdictions

The US, UK, Australia and Canada have remedies available in common law and under
statutory laws as well. In these common law jurisdictions, there are both damages and
equitable remedies available in a range of situations. Samuel classifies remedies by
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drawing a distinction between monetary and non-monetary remedies.689 He considers
this distinction as a useful one for the contract and tort lawyer in that a claim for
specific performance690 or injunction691 may bring into play different principles from
those attaching to a claim for compensation.692 Rescission is a remedy that can be an
equitable law remedy or one in common law, and is available in a number of
situations.693 A civil law remedy of damages and/or the rescission of the ‘contract,
disposition or other transaction procured by means of fraud’ may apply in a tort of
deceit.694 The torts of negligence, negligent misstatement,695 of fraudulent
misrepresentation, and torts of breach of fiduciary duty,696 and breach of contract697 all
give rise to remedies. These remedies include: rescission, and, in particular, damages, as
well as the two main equitable remedies for breach of contract, namely: specific
performance and injunctions.698
However, statutory remedies are available under the securities laws of the US, the UK,
Australia and Canada. In the UK, Davies stressed that only those acquiring securities
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could sue under the statutory regime699 and the ‘the statutory regime was the sole source
of remedy for investors in the area in which it applied’.700
In Australia, ss 737 and 738 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (CA’01) provide
investors with the right to withdraw and have money returned and refunded. In addition,
ss 1041E and 1041F provide remedies for prospectus misstatement. In Canada, ss 130
and 138.3 of the Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) (SA’90) provide the right of action for
damages against breaches in prospectus and secondary market disclosure requirements.
Also, investors in the secondary market have a limited right of action to seek
compensation for damages resulting from a misrepresentation in a public disclosure or a
failure to make disclosure of a material change.
In the US, § 11 of the Securities Act 1933 (SA’33) provides the damages remedy to
investors injured due to defective disclosure in a prospectus. Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act 1934 (SEA’34) is the principal provision relied on in suits
claiming defective disclosures, which affects market trading once securities have been
issued.
In the UK, s 90 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) provides
the remedy to investors who are aggrieved from misstatement in prospectuses. In
addition, s 463 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK) (CA’06) provides a remedy against
directors of all companies. This remedy makes the director only liable in repaying an
investor to compensate the company by the amount of loss suffered by the company.

699
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Section 90A of the FSMA 2000 allows investors who had acquired securities to sue for
breaches in the secondary market disclosures.
In fact, investors in the developed countries selected could seek civil remedies at the
statutory level and at common law. Such remedies include: rescission, the right to
withdraw and have money returned, and the right to return the securities and be
reimbursed the amount paid for those securities. The variety of remedies creates
stronger deterrence for potential wrongdoers and therefore greater compliance with
disclosure requirements. Giving the aggrieved investor the right to claim in a civil
action at common law for the loss or damages that resulted from the misstatement of
disclosure requirements in the stock market facilitates the claim of civil liability.
Moreover, the availability of judicial interpretations by the courts of the above
developed countries has led to a better understanding of the civil remedies in both the
statutory and common law. The following section will explore the civil remedies
currently available for violations of the disclosure regime under the Saudi Securities
laws.

6. 4 Remedies Available under the Saudi Securities Laws
6.4.1

Causes of Action to Claim Civil Remedies for Defective Disclosures under
Saudi Securities Laws

‘Cause of action’ is the legal ground or set of facts on the basis of which a party can file
a lawsuit to obtain remedy. 701 It is a corollary to the existence of a type of dispute where
one party is entitled to some kind of legal remedy. 702 Hence, before deciding to file any
lawsuit, it must first be determined whether a party has a legitimate cause of action.

701
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Nygh and Butt, above n 105, 84.
Peggy N Kerley, Joanne Banker Hames and Paul A Sukys, Civil Litigation (Delmar, 6th ed, 2011) 133.
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Also, the person who seeks remedy must have ‘locus standi’ which means the right to
bring action.
To this end, in relation to civil liability, investors in the Saudi securities market have
two causes of action under the CML’03. The first cause of action is that of the existence
of defects in prospectuses according to art 55 of the CML’03.703 Defective disclosures
in prospectuses constitute the legal ground for the private right to claim any damages or
loss resulting from such defects. Another cause of action, according to art 56 of the
CML’03, is the existence of defects in disclosure documents in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.704 These provisions entitle the investors aggrieved due to
defective disclosures to sue for damages or compensation on these bases.
Such cause of action is defined as the ‘right of recovery’ in the event that an individual
makes or is responsible for another making an untrue written or oral statement of
material facts, or a material omission, in connection with another’s purchase or sale of a
security (which results in loss or damage for that other person).705
Based on the above, it can be said that investors in the Saudi securities market can claim
civil remedy for their loss or damage resulting from defects in prospectuses and
disclosure documents in the secondary market.
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6.4.2

Remedies for Breaches of Prospectus Requirements

In respect of prospectus disclosures, the only relief available to injured investors is to
pursue damages suffered.706 The remedy is available to the injured party against every
person who certified the content of the prospectus, every director and senior officer,
every expert who certified part of the prospectus, and every underwriter.707
The CMA’s approval of a prospectus is considered the triggering event for the cause of
action in claiming remedy under civil liability.708 To claim civil liability, the omission
or misstatement of a required material fact must exist at the time that the prospectus is
approved by the CMA. The burden of proof is on the defendant and it can be expected
that establishing proof in these matters is difficult.709 However, this will be discussed
later in line with defences to civil liability.710
This remedy allows the recovery of a specific amount of money. The basic rule is that
the measure of damages is the difference between the price actually paid for the security
value and the price at the time of claiming civil liability. It should be noted that this
measurement of the damages is applied to the remedy of damages incurred by
subscribing in prospectuses or in a secondary market investment.711
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However, it is not clear whether the damages remedy is available or not for a person
who acquires shares in the secondary market following the issue of a defective
prospectus. It is understood that under art 55(a) of the CML’03 the only persons able to
seek a claim of damages for a prospectus breach are those subscribing under the
prospectus. As this issue has not been addressed in Saudi securities literature, the CMA
needs to make a clear policy position on the issue of liability in regards to the secondary
market purchaser.
6.4.3

Remedies for Breaches of Disclosure Requirements in the Secondary
Market

It has been seen that art 56(a) of the CML’03 provides the right to sue based on defects
in any disclosure documents in connection with sale or purchase of a security. Hence,
aggrieved investors may seek compensation for damages incurred. The articulation of
art 56(a) is similar to that of § 18(a) of the SEA’34 which provides purchasers an
express private right of action if they have been injured due to reliance on documents
required to be filed under that Act.712 Although § 18(a) of the SEA’34 parallels § 11 of
the SA’33, it is less effective because, unlike §§ 11 and 12, § 18(a) requires the buyer to

bringing the legal action or the price which such Security could have been disposed of on the
Exchange prior to filing the complaint with the Committee, provided that if the defendant proves that
any portion in the decline in value of the Security is due to causes which are not related to the
omission or the incorrect statement which is the substance of the suit, such portion shall be excluded
from the damages for which the defendant is responsible’.
Additionally, art 56(b) of the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) provides:
‘The damages recoverable under this Article from any defendant, and the rights of indemnity and
contribution among the persons responsible shall be as provided in paragraph (e) of art 55 of this Law.’
712
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (US) (similar to art 56 of the CML’03) expressly
creates a private remedy for false or misleading statements contained in any application, report or
document filed with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act in favour of any person, who in
reliance upon such statement, purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such
statement.
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prove that s/he read the statement, and actually relied on the material
misrepresentation.713
In regard to the secondary market, there is a need for straightforward provisions to
provide the remedy of damages. This is necessary for improved investor protection in
the secondary market. Legislative intervention in this issue could be better, by providing
a clear damages remedy for breaches of disclosure requirements in the secondary
market.
Based on art 56 of the CML’03, to claim this civil remedy for loss or damages resulting
from an ‘untrue misstatement’, the plaintiff must, first, prove that at the time of
purchase or sale s/he was unaware that the statement was defective; and, second, if in
possession of such knowledge would not have proceeded with the transaction at the then
prevailing price. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the person responsible for the
disclosure knew of its untruthfulness or that there was a ‘substantial likelihood that the
information disclosed omitted or misstated a material fact’.714 The defendant has the
burden of avoiding responsibility and proving that there was no causal link between the
misstatement and the damage sustained by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not required to
show privity or prove causation between the misleading statement and the loss in
situations where the price of the security is adversely affected. 715 Thus the difference is
that the plaintiff must show that the misstatement led to a decision to buy or sell as the
price then offered while it is up to the defendant to show that there is no causal link
between the misstatement and the damage sustained by the plaintiff.
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The remedy is available to the injured party against every person who makes, or is
responsible for another making, orally or in writing, an untrue statement of material fact
or omits to state that material fact.716 A recent judicial decision issued by the Committee
for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) is believed to be the only example of
the enforcement of the private right in the secondary market. 717 The cause of action was
the untrue statement which was considered material and led the plaintiff to buy or sell
the security in question.718 The measurement of the damages in secondary market
disclosure breaches are the same as that in the prospectus.719

6. 5 The Drawbacks of Remedies Available under the Saudi Securities
Laws
Investor remedies are inadequate under the Saudi securities laws and regulations. Based
on the above description of the remedies available to investors who become victims of
defective disclosures elsewhere, it can be said that the remedies available under the
Saudi securities laws are inadequate. Whilst the remedy of damages is accessible by
plaintiffs, it is, however, the only relief that an aggrieved investor can receive under the
CML’03. This section aims to evaluate the drawbacks of the current civil remedies for
breaches of the disclosure regime in Saudi Arabia. First, the remedy of damages in
Saudi Arabia and developed countries will be discussed. Second, discussion will focus
on the remedy of rescission as an important remedy to be available to investors in the
Saudi capital market and its possible application in Saudi Arabia.
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6.5.1

Weaknesses in Regard to the Remedy of Damages

In contrast to the above selected developed countries, in which jurisdictions it has been
seen that investors are able to remedy their loss incurred from breaches of the disclosure
regime in prospectuses and disclosure in the secondary market through the availability
of a variety of legal avenues, and where damages is just one (though a major one) of the
remedies available. In addition to the statutory remedies, aggrieved investors in the
securities markets of the US, UK, Australia and Canada have remedies available in the
common law. Hence, it can be argued that investors in these developed countries could
be better protected than the investors of Saudi Arabia.
In spite of the strong similarities between the damages remedy under the securities laws
of Saudi Arabia and the US, ambiguities persist in the current application of the remedy
of damages arising from defective disclosures in the prospectus. For example, an
examination of the application of the remedy of damages resulting from breaches of
disclosure in prospectuses under the CML’03 reveals that the purchasers do not have to
prove that they have relied on any misstatement in the prospectus 720 (while in regard to
‘any defective documents in the market’, a plaintiff is required to show that there was an
untrue statement or omission that was relied upon in the regard to a transaction).721 In
comparison, § 11 of the SA’33 includes a single requirement in regard to this, and that
is that reliance must be established where the issuer has generally distributed an
earnings statement covering a period of at least 12 months following the effective date
of the registration statement.722 Although the inclusion of such a requirement might
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appear to limit the use of this remedy, this requirement is missing under the damages
remedy provision in the CML’03. Hence, the process of claiming civil liability may be
easier for the investors in Saudi Arabia.
Another issue regarding the remedy of damages is whether the right to this remedy is
available only to the subscribers or whether it extends to any holder of the security that
is subject to misstatements or omission in the prospectus. For example, in the US, the
right could be available to the holder of any of the securities issued under the
registration statement, whether or not the plaintiff is the original subscriber or
purchaser, or a subsequent purchaser.723 Lopez affirms that that the correct reading of §
11(a), coupled with the decision by the US Supreme Court, entitles secondary
purchasers to seek damages through this right of action, which should not be just limited
to transactions in public offerings.724 Giving this right to subsequent purchasers is
consistent with the broadest possible protection for investors in the IPO and secondary
markets.725 In Australia, there is nothing in s 729 of the CA’01 that limits the
application of the remedy to persons that acquire securities under the relevant
prospectus. In the same way, art 55(a) of the CML’03 has not mentioned any limitation
to the application of the remedy. Certainly, with the absence of judicial interpretation by
the Saudi courts, the availability of a clear position regarding this issue is important for
secondary investors who are affected by defective prospectuses in the IPO market in
Saudi Arabia.
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However, it should be noted that there are disagreements regarding the extension of
liability in regard to the secondary purchaser of the shares. For example, Curnin and
Ford maintain that the accurate interpretation of the US legislation is that the ‘[o]nly
purchasers in the actual initial distribution of securities itself have standing to maintain
a claim under Section 11’.726 In the same way, the US Supreme Court held that § 12(2)
only applies to initial purchasers of securities.727
Despite the fact that the remedy of damages is found in art 56 of the CML’03, for the
sake of investor protection there remains a need for a clear remedy for the victims in the
secondary market. This is because of the value of investment in the secondary market,
the number of investors and the massive effect of this investment on the economy at
large. In this regard, it has been stated that the ‘private plaintiff plays a significant role
in promoting optimum enforcement of mandatory continuous disclosure regime’.728
However, there are strong similarities between art 56 of the CML’03 and § 12 of the
SA’33 and §18(a) of the SEA’34 where there are anti-fraud provisions as the US
regulator has improved the remedy of damages for secondary market disclosure
violations. Section 18(a) of the SEA’34 provides the remedy of damages for investors
who have sustained loss or damage as a result of breach of disclosure requirements
associated with any type of disclosure document.
Rule 10b-5 in the US regime provides one of the most significant remedies for
disclosure violations, even extending to secondary market trading. 729 Lawsuits may
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spring from defective material disclosure relied upon by investors, including in press
releases, financial reports and even analyst reports posted on an issuer’s website.730
Furthermore, civil damages under claims for defective prospectus and disclosure in the
secondary market are identically measured. The basic rule is that the measure of
damages is the difference between the price actually paid for the security and either the
value at time of the claim, or any price for the securities prior to filing the claim with
the CMA. Article 55(e) provides that the amount recoverable equals the difference
between the amount paid for the security and any of the two following amounts:
1. The value of the security at the time the suit was brought.
2. The price at which the security was disposed of in the market before the suit
was brought.
The above rules do not consider the changes in values of the security during the
litigation. Section 11(e) of the SA’33 has the same rules that of art 55(e). However, §
11(e) not only has similar measurement rules but also has the rule that protects the
plaintiff’s damages until the judgement. It provides the price at which the security was
disposed of after the suit but before judgement, if those damages are less than the
damages calculated on the basis of the first test above.731
Despite the fact that a remedy of damages is available under the CML’03, the need for
additional statutory remedies is significant for investor protection. It is important to
develop the current civil liability regime in accordance with other developed securities
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jurisdictions. For instance, in Australia under the CA’01, remedies include: the right to
withdraw and have money returned, and to return the securities and be refunded the
amount paid for the securities.732 In the US, in addition to the right to seek damages, the
plaintiff can obtain rescission, damages or equitable relief under § 12 of SA’33.
It can be argued that compared to some developed jurisdiction countries, the current
civil liability in respect of investor remedies is insufficient to provide adequate investor
protection in the Saudi Arabian securities market.
6.5.2

The Significance of Equitable Remedies as an Alternative to Damages

The second category of civil remedies is equitable remedies, which come as orders for
the defendant to engage in a particular act, or refrain from engaging in a particular act.
Wright observes that, ‘remedies are what clients want’.733 In the selected developed
countries (the US, UK, Australia and Canada), investors’ civil remedies under common
law could be greater than they would have been under their securities legislation.
Hence, in circumstances where there is no adequate remedy at law, an injured party can
seek the equitable remedies of rescission and restitution, specific performance, or
reformation.
For instance, Schwartz argues that specific performance should be generally available as
the remedy for breach.734 He suggests that specific performance does not present
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substantial difficulties for the parties in the context of contracts.735 In the same way,
Shavell concludes that if there is a substantial chance of underestimating the value of
damages, specific performance should be employed because, by definition, it guarantees
that the victim of a breach is ‘made whole’.736 An injunction is another equitable
remedy, which is sometimes available as an alternative to an award of monetary
damages as a means of enforcing a contract.737
The discussion in this chapter and the followings chapters will illustrate the observation
that investors in the Saudi capital market have essentially a single remedy which is
compensation because equitable remedies are not accessible and therefore investor
protection is weaker than that of developed countries. Even though the remedy of
damages is available for injured investors, weak judicial and administrative enforcement
make the issue difficult as will be demonstrated in a later stage of this thesis. However,
the following discussion will highlight the importance of the remedy of rescission and
its possible application in Saudi Arabia.
6.5.3

The Absence of the Remedy of Rescission

Rescission is a remedy available at common law and in equity. It allows the innocent
party to cancel the contract by rescinding or annulling it. Under common law, there are
several remedies for misrepresentation, with such remedies including rescission,
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation and damages for negligent misstatement.738
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Where the remedy of rescission is available, the court will order rescission of the
contract to subscribe for the shares and order restitution of the money paid under the
contract. Traditionally, the test of liability for prospectus misstatement has been based
on a ‘false or misleading’ statement or omission.739 The contract law remedy of
rescission requires proof of a ‘false’ statement. The rescission remedy for
misrepresentation in the prospectus is important to protect the purchaser of a new issue
from any misrepresentation in the prospectus. Hence, if a person is induced to enter into
a contract by false statements of fact made by the issuer, then there is a
misrepresentation, and the innocent party is entitled to rescind the contract.740 Amongst
developed countries, the US and the UK (for example), remedies of rescission and
damages are available. Under the SA’33, reliance is not required for rescission because
of the limitations of the remedy. However, in the US and the UK, the standard rules of
the law of contract apply to violations in the prospectus, which allows the defendants to
recover damages from the issuer for breach of contract. The civil remedy of rescission is
available under the SA’33. For example, in Gustafson v Alloyd Co, the Supreme Court
of the US held that ‘under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 buyers have an express
cause of action for rescission against sellers who make material misstatements or
omissions “by means of a prospectus”’.741 The purchaser can obtain damages if the

2.

Damages for fraudulent misrepresentation: damages are limited to the amount needed to right the
wrong done (i.e. the plaintiff cannot get damages for expected gains).
3. Damages for negligent misstatement: liability in tort may arise from a misrepresentation that is
carelessly made. There must be a duty of care owed and the maker of the statement must have
foreseen that the other party would rely on the statement.
For more details, see Lorraine Griffiths and Susan Woodward, Corporations Law Workbook (LBC
Information Services, 3rd ed, 1996) 367.
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securities have been disposed of.742 Moreover, in the US and the UK, in a prospectus
there is a general duty of full disclosure and an express duty of due diligence; and
express remedies of rescission and damages.743
In contrast, the application of contract rules in Saudi Arabia is obscure in relation to
investors aggrieved due to a defective prospectus. In the prospectus cases, the rescission
remedy is absent from the CML’03. Rescission is not available for the investors who
sustain loss or damage due to a defective prospectus. In fact, the serious dearth of cases
and lack of interpretations of civil liability for prospectus make the issue more difficult.
However, the remedy of rescission has elsewhere been in decline because of the
limitations imposed by the courts on its availability. 744 Greg Golding outlines the
instances where the right of rescission has been lost as follows:
i.

If the investor does anything with the right to reject the contract to subscribe for
shares after notice of misrepresentation is received by the investor;

ii.

If the parties cannot be restored to their original position; and

iii.

If the investor does not reject its shares within reasonable time of receiving
notice of misrepresentation.745

From the above, it can be seen that the right of rescission is available to investors who
subscribe to the shares and do not make a later purchase, or to persons who subscribe
through agents where they are an undisclosed principal. Although there has been a
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decrease in the demand for the right of rescission in developed jurisdictions, the lack of
clear statutory contract remedy in Saudi Arabia makes its presence essential.
Additionally, the absence of the right of rescission remedy in the CML’03 reveals the
need for a statutory rescission remedy, which is necessary in order to have adequate
investor protection in the IPOs.

6. 6 Persons Who are Entitled to Sue under the Civil Liability
Provisions in Saudi Arabia
6.6.1

The Claim of Civil Liability

Firstly, it is important to find out who can utilise the civil liability provisions for claims
in relation to a defective disclosure. Secondly, there is a need to clarify the difference
between the terms ‘complaint’ and ‘case’ according to the Regulating Procedures for
Resolution of Securities Disputes of 2011 (RPRSD’11). Thirdly, there is also a need to
recognise the procedure for bringing a complaint to the court.
Firstly, the injured investor has the right to seek compensation for the losses incurred
due to the violation of the disclosure provisions. Thus, a private right suit enables
investors to claim compensation for the losses that they have incurred as a result of the
violation of the relevant provisions. In Saudi Arabia, the target of the lawsuit is whoever
is proven to be guilty of violating those provisions regardless of their relationship with
the company. A purchaser can claim for compensation according to art 55 of the
CML’3, which states that in relation to a prospectus, the person who has purchased the
security, which was subject to loss or damage due to the defect in disclosure, is entitled
to seek compensation. Article 56 adds that a seller of a security can also seek
compensation for loss or damage by stating that any person who was misled in relation
to the sale or purchase of a security can seek compensation from the persons liable for
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the violation of disclosure provisions. It can, therefore, be seen that the acquirers of
securities — whether buyers or sellers — can sue for contravention of the disclosure
requirements in the Saudi stock market. This is in line with the UK statutory regime of
the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 (FSMA 2000), which now is extended
to include those acquiring interests in securities.746 For example, the Committee for the
Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) ordered a newspaper to compensate an
investor for the loss he suffered because of an untrue statement regarding a listed a
company.747
The defendant liability is joint and several.748 From the indemnitee’s perspective, joint
and several liability is optimal because it ensures, among other things, the investor right
to remedy for the loss or damage incurred because of the breach of the disclosure
regime.
Secondly, there is difference between a ‘complaint’ and a ‘case’. It should be noted that
the two words ( a ‘complaint’ or a ‘case’) — particularly in terms of the application of
these regulating procedures — are not used interchangeably in the Saudi securities laws,
but are defined as follows:749

746

Davies, ‘Liability for Misstatements to the Market’, above n 647, 451.
CRSD Decision No 508/L/D1/2009 of 1430 H issued 14 April 2009.
748
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Complaint: is the process of filing with CMA a grievance or a claim of right or
ceasing any invasion of right.
Case: is the complaint when registered with the committee, starting from
presenting such a written initiatory pleading, under these regulating procedures,
until the passing of the final and binding judgment.

In other words, the term ‘complaint’ means ‘submission of a grievance or seeking a
right or making a defence against an assertion of the right’; but when the complaint goes
from the CMA to the CRSD, it becomes a ‘case’. In general, any investor who realises
that he/she has been a victim can bring the issue to the court. However, the investor has
to go through the CMA first to lodge a complaint as this is the only way to ask for
compensation.
Hence, if any person intends to make a claim, he/she must first submit the complaint to
the Department for the Complaints of Investors within the CMA. Once such a claim is
made, two things will be considered, as follows:
i.

After a period of 90 days has elapsed from the date of submission of the
complaint, the claimant becomes eligible to apply directly to the CRSD.

ii.

The CMA notifies the claimant that he/she can advance the complaint to the
CRSD before the end of the period of 90 days, then the claimant can take the
complaint directly to the CRSD and then it becomes a lawsuit.
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Table 6.8: Numbers of Cases Filed with the CRSD in 2009, 2010 and 2011 by Type
of Case
Case Type

2009

2010

2011

Civil

118

93

81

Administrative

7

10

2

Penal

15

11

27

Total

140

114

110

Source: The Capital Market Authority. 750

In addition, art 2 of the RPRSD’11 gives details of the process of filing a case with the
CRSD.
To file a case with the committee, it is required to enclose a proof that the case is
filed first with CMA, and period of 90 days had elapsed since such filing.
However, a statement from CMA permitting filing with the committee before the
elapse of such a period may be enclosed. The case shall deal with the same subject
of the complaint filed with CMA.

It is clear from the above Article that a claimant is required to initiate the complaint
with the CMA before taking the action to the court. From a practical point of view, it
should make it easier for investors to sue companies for defective disclosures if a case
was able to be brought directly to the court instead of going through the CMA. This
procedure may delay the process of legal action against the alleged perpetrators.
However, the following will discuss the securities class action lawsuit and its possible
application in Saudi Arabia.
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Capital
Market
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'Annual
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1431/1432H'
(Report,
2010)
<http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Publicationsreports/Reports/Report2010.pdf> 137; Capital Market Authority,
'Annual Report 1432/1433' (Report, 2011), above n 333, 149.

239

Chapter 6: Investors’ Remedies

6.6.2

The Absence of the Securities Class Action Lawsuit

The securities class action lawsuit is considered a form of legal remedy.751 This form of
collective suit emanated from the US, which is a common law country. Class actions
were a result of the development of the law to provide protection for the individual.752
They are group or representative proceedings which allow individuals or businesses
with similar or substantially similar claims to combine together in one legal action
against the same person or organisation. Hence, the US is the original ‘home’ of class
actions generally, and securities class actions in particular. In addition, class action
lawsuits are used in the courts of other jurisdictions of common law legal origins, such
as the UK and Australia. Australian courts recognise that a class action is a radical form
of legal procedure developed by the US courts.753 Most recently, some 6000
shareholders participated in a class action against the Centro Group and have been
presented with a proposed settlement of AUD 200 million (USD 203.4 million) on
allegations that Centro and its former auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, engaged in
misleading and deceptive conduct and breached continuous disclosure laws.754

751

The class action can be defined as: ‘a legal procedure that enables the claims (or part of the claims) of
a number of persons against the same defendant to be determined in the one suit. In a class action, one or
more persons (reprehensive plaintiff) may sue on his or her own behalf and on behalf of a number of
other persons (the class) who have a claim to a remedy for the same or similar alleged wrong.’ For more
details see Rachael Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative
Perspective (Hart Publishing, 2004) 1.
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Mordecai Rosenfeld, 'The Impact of Class Actions on Corporate and Securities Law' (1972) 1972
Duke Law Journal 1167, 1190. It is noteworthy to mention that although Rosenfeld admits the
importance of the class action, he does suggest that not every class action is a worthy one.
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However, it is noteworthy that class actions are not exclusively a device for common
law legal systems.755 For example, Quebec in Canada, and Sweden and Brazil have
developed, within their civil law systems, a formal doctrine for class actions.
The class action regime has several common objectives. US jurisprudence has
particularly reiterated756 that class actions protect defendants from inconsistent
obligations that may be created by varying results in different courts, and, similarly, it
promotes the equitable principle that similarly situated plaintiffs should receive similar
recoveries.757
The major purpose of class action lawsuits is to maintain market efficiency and integrity
by deterring managerial misconduct in market affairs through the provision for
compensation of shareholders for losses.758 Moreover, Nicholls claims that securities
class actions are an effective civil enforcement remedy. 759 On the other hand, Coffee
and Fox assume that there might be a harmful result of punishing other equally innocent
investors in the same corporation when a civil action is raised by one group of
shareholders seeking damages arising from secondary market disclosure violations.760
Coffee and Fox declare that ‘[c]ivil actions brought by one group of shareholders
seeking damages arising from secondary market disclosure violations may have the
perverse effect of punishing other equally innocent shareholders of the same
corporation’.761 However, since the shareholder class action came into existence, it has
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been an effective remedy for investors and a successful deterrent to corporations in
regard to misleading shareholders.762 A recent study found that the private enforcement
in Canada is weaker than that of the US and largely attributed this to the slow
development of effective class action legislation in many Canadian provinces.763
Under the Saudi securities law, investor class action suit has not yet been identified as
possible. In practice, no legal action has been witnessed that has been brought by a
group of investors against persons liable for violation of the disclosure regime. The
introduction of a statutory securities class action would certainly benefit investor
protection. For example, since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act 1995 (US), which introduced the possibility of securities class actions, the
likelihood of companies to be sued still rose 23 per cent in the period 1995–2004.764 In
another example, Australian securities class actions have developed through legislative
change over the last two decades and have been strengthened through recent
developments in case law, which have helped clarify how and when they can be used.765
Furthermore, the objectives of the class action are enormous and evident. Class action
regimes might achieve economies of time, effort and expense, and promote uniformity
of decision. It is also a meaningful remedy for large numbers of plaintiffs. A class
action suit can reduce the cost for the courts and plaintiffs. In addition, there are noncommon objectives of the class action. They are: giving the case more importance,
providing deterrence against the potential wrongdoers, preventing the defendant from
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unjust enrichment, and requiring the wrongdoer to fully compensate the costs of their
illegal activity.766 As a result of the above objectives, securities class action lawsuits
have become more attractive to plaintiffs where such lawsuits are available.
On the basis of the above discussion, it can be said that the need for the availability of a
securities class action lawsuit in Saudi Arabia is obvious for the sake of investor
protection in the share market. As can be seen from the foregoing, the existing legal
remedies remain inadequate in Saudi securities law; and investor protection, therefore,
requires additional improvements and indeed reform.
6.6.3

Statute of Limitations

A statute of limitations sets forth the time within which an accrued cause of action must
be asserted in court.767 If the plaintiff brings a suit after the statute of limitations has
run, he/she has no legal remedy. A statute of limitations affects only a plaintiff’s ability
to seek a remedy; it does not affect a plaintiff’s underlying rights.768 In this regard, a
statute of limitations is distinguishable from a statute of repose, which extinguishes a
plaintiff’s rights or prevents them from arising once a fixed period of time has passed.769
However, limitation is considered a bar on a plaintiff’s right to sue.
A statute of limitations exists under the CML’03. In response to a claim for a breach or
violation of defective disclosure requirements, courts will not accept the case after the
elapse of one year. So defendants does not need to be worried about such case, as they
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can rely upon a limitation period specified in the Law, as follows:770 Article 58 of the
CML’03 stipulates a limitation period of one year, commencing from when the
complainant realised that he/she has become a victim of such a violation. This Article
also stipulates that in any event, suit of action is barred after five years from the
occurrence of the violation.771 Moreover, in Saudi Arabia, art 27 in the RPRSD’11772
clearly mentions one year as a limitation period, commencing from when the plaintiff
realised that he/she has become a victim of a violation. Thus, the victim is required by
law to submit a complaint against the wrongdoer within this twelve-month period,
otherwise his/her right to initiate the action becomes worthless. Furthermore, once five
years have passed since the said violation occurred, complaints will not be allowed to be
heard before the CRSD.
The statute of limitations period specified in the CML’03 differs from that applying in
the US and Australia (the provisions of which in this regard also vary from that of each
other in terms of their basis and the periods involved).773 The period limitation in
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (US) (SOX’02) is two years after the discovery of the
violation, with any action to be initiated no more than five years after such violation.
The CA’01, however, provides that proceedings must be instituted ‘within 6 years after
the day on which a cause of action arose’ (as the result of specific corporate
misconduct).774 Thus, the period of limitation in CML’03 is couched in the same terms
regarding its basis as the US legislation but varies in terms of the period involved (the
770
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US being two years from the time of discovery, Saudi Arabia, just twelve months from
the time of discovery; while the period for action from the date of the occurrence of the
violation is common, that is five years). The period applying in Saudi Arabia differs
from that provided not just in the US (as above)but also Australia (where action must be
launched within six years of the violation occurring). Saudi Arabian legislation specifies
just one year since the discovery of a violation (and within five years of the violation
itself) as the time limitation for initiating a suit. In contrast, the corresponding law in
Jordan requires that litigants must initiate suits within two years and the limitations
period commences from the date of the sale of the securities.775
The limitations statute for a cause of action for claims of defective disclosures
commences when the conduct occurs, unless the defendant has concealed it from the
plaintiff, in which case, in most jurisdictions, the statute of limitations is tolled until the
plaintiff either discovers the wrongful conduct or, through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered it. In this respect, Saudi Arabia and the US have
agreed that the validity of the period of limitations for a lawsuit starts from the
discovery of the violation.776 The Federal Court in the US held that ‘when the same
statute which creates a cause of action also contains a limitation period, the statute of
limitations not only bars the remedy but also destroys the liability. The plaintiff must
therefore plead and prove facts showing that he is within the statute of limitations.’777
According to the CML’03, the statute of limitation specifies a one-year limit in which
plaintiffs are able to bring a case to court after they have become aware of facts causing
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them to believe that they had been the victim of a violation of law. However, in other
jurisdictions, such as the US and Australia, two years are allowed for the action to be
brought. Whilst the short period for bringing actions under the CML’03 may benefit the
defendant, it is not in the best interest of investor protection.
In Saudi securities market, investors’ complaints have to be lodged with the CMA
within one year, commencing when the investor realises he/she has been a victim of a
violation. In addition, this complaint cannot be initiated after five years have elapsed
since the discovery of such a violation. These limitation periods are considered a
positive attribute of the Saudi securities regulatory system. Hence, the statute of
limitations in Saudi securities laws is quite compatible with that of the developed
securities laws of US and Australia. However, judicial decisions play a significant role
in the interpretation of laws in the developed countries. For instance, the US Court of
Appeals in Securities and Exchange Commission v Rind stated that enforcement claims
brought by SEC are not barred by the statute of limitations.778
Under the Saudi securities laws, the current limitation period of one year to bring an
action to the court is insufficient and contrary to investor protection. Taking into
consideration the fact that having any limitation on the plaintiff’s right to sue is a
disadvantage by itself, so having only one year to sue is not enough time for the injured
investor. Although the one-year period starts from the time that the investor realises that
he/she has been a victim of a violation of a law, it encourages wrongdoers to claim the
investor’s had knowledge earlier in the period since the transaction or even at the time
of the transaction, thus ruling out any claim (see further below). A claim for
778
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compensation might fail due to the defences that the defendants can uphold during the
litigation. The next chapter will discuss the evidence rules and the defences to civil
liability for violations of the disclosure requirements in Saudi Arabia.

6. 7 Summary and Conclusions
The earlier discussion confirms the fact that there are inadequate remedies available to
the investors to recover their damages or loss as a result of a breach of the disclosures
regime in Saudi Arabia. Although the remedy of damages could be available to
compensate the plaintiff’s loss resulting from violations of the disclosure regime in both
prospectus and secondary market, it remains the only relief available to investors. A
comparison with developed countries, such as the US, UK and Australia, demonstrates
that there are statutory remedies other than damages available for investors to recover
their losses in these jurisdictions, such as: rescission, the right to withdraw and have
money returned, and the right to return the securities and be reimbursed the amount paid
for those securities, thus offering higher protection for investors in those markets.
It has been found that the current civil liability regime in Saudi Arabia is insufficient to
provide investor protection. Considering the statutory absence of the right to the
rescission remedy and the lack of a securities class action lawsuit, this argument may be
plausible.
It has been demonstrated that the securities class action is an effective remedy for
aggrieved investors as well as a means of deterrence for potential violators.
Nevertheless, the provisions for a securities class action do not exist in Saudi Arabia.
Hence, shareholders who suffer minor loss or damage because of a breach of disclosure
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regime are reluctant to sue the wrongdoers. As a result, violators go unpunished and
victims sustain loss; and perpetrators may be encouraged to repeat their actions.
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that giving a limitation period of one-year to the
victim to sue is an obstacle to the plaintiff’s right to sue. It is recommended that the
limitation period to be extended to two years as it is in the US or to six years as it is in
Australia. Additional time will allow the plaintiff to bring the action to the court without
being under time constraints. Investor protection will be increased by their having extra
time to gain access to advice, martial their resources and necessary evidence sue where
a violation has occurred. Wrongdoers may then not as easily escape liability and
investor protection will further rise as the deterrent value of the legislation would
impact on potential actions or omissions that would be subject to such suits..
Based on the above, it can be clearly said that the civil liability regime for defective
disclosures is insufficient under the current CML’03. These legal lacunae result in
weaker investor protection of investors. The current disclosure regime is expected to
foster the development of the securities market, but — as stated by some commentators
— the weaknesses of the protection of public investment in the securities market have
negative consequences for this development.779 Therefore, it is suggested that additional
remedies should be available and accessible to aggrieved investors in the Saudi
securities market. A report by the Technical Committee of the IOSCO noted that:
Statutory civil remedies for investors who have suffered harm because they relied
on materially misleading, incomplete or incorrect information, are mechanisms
used in some jurisdictions to provide greater protection to investors and to
strengthen market discipline. Such remedies may make it easier for investors to
establish a claim for recovery.780
779
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With greater investor protection available in a strengthened civil liability regime, it
would then be essential to have adequate defences to avoid liability where this is
undeserved. It is the achievement of such a balance that will encourage greater
participation by investors in the country and the healthy development of corporations
and the economy. With this in mind, the next chapter will investigate the provisions of
defences and evidence in regard to civil liability for defective disclosures under the
securities laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia.

<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD295.pdf> 30; Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 'Corporate Governance in Turkey: A Pilot Study' (Report, 2006)
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/2/37550252.pdf>.

249

CHAPTER 7:
EVIDENCE AND DEFENCES WITH REGARD TO
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE DISCLOSURES
UNDER SAUDI SECURITIES LAWS
7. 1 Introduction
The preceding chapters have discussed the civil liability provisions for defective
disclosure in Saudi Arabia. It has been found that there are civil liability provisions for
defective disclosure made in prospectuses and in continuous and periodic disclosure. In
addition, the issue of investor remedies against breaches of the disclosure regime has
been discussed. These previous chapters demonstrate that the provisions dealing with
civil liability for defective disclosure are inadequate thus far.
A strong civil liability regime must provide sufficient remedies for aggrieved investors
and make defences available to those who are accused of a breach of the disclosure
regime. A ‘defence’ may be defined as the reason or justification for the defendant to
avoid the claim of liability against him/her.781 Another definition is that defences are the
means used by the defendant in the court to refute the plaintiff’s claim and so avoid
liability.782 The use of the defences made available under the law may allow a defendant
to achieve their goal.
To measure the strength of the civil liability regime, defences in regard to civil liability
for defective disclosures need to be discussed in detail. Therefore, this chapter will
focus on the defences that are available to defendants to allow them escape civil
liability. Then, arguments will be offered regarding the provisions that provide defences
regarding civil liability for the breach of the disclosure regime and an evaluation of
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them will be undertaken. The results demonstrate the inadequacy of the current civil
liability regime for defective disclosures in Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, a significant issue is the important role played by the law of evidence in
disputes arising from the securities market. As Islamic law (Shari’ah) is the main source
of laws in Saudi Arabia, there are no comprehensive and codified laws of evidence for
civil litigations. However, there are procedural rules governing evidence in securities
cases under the laws and regulations of the Capital Market Law 2003 (CML’03) and the
Capital Market Authority (CMA). It is said that the current rules of evidence are
inefficient and require improvement in order to strengthen civil liability regime for
defective disclosure in the Saudi securities market. Thus the beginning of this chapter
will demonstrate the inadequacy of the current rules of evidence concerning securities
cases. It will analyse the provisions dealing with civil liability in terms of rules of
evidence pertaining to securities litigation and the defences to civil liability that are
available under the CML’03.
It is important to indicate that the discussion will be limited to defences available under
the securities laws and regulation in Saudi Arabia. However, the experience of the
selected developed (the US, UK Australia and Canada) will be used selectively
throughout the text in order to improve their equivalents in Saudi Arabia.
To this end, the discussion is divided into six sections. Section 1 is introductory. Section
2 will look at the issues concerning evidence provisions in dealing with contravention of
the securities disclosure requirements. Section 3 will discuss the defences available in
civil liability for breaches of the prospectus requirements. Section 4 will then separately
focus on due diligence as a defence under the civil liability provisions in Saudi Arabia.
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Section 5 will explore the defences to civil liability for defective disclosure in the
secondary market. Section 6 will present a summary and conclusions.

7. 2 Evidence under the Securities Laws in Saudi Arabia
7.2.1

Provisions Regarding Evidence in Dealing with Contraventions of the
Securities Disclosure Requirements in Saudi Arabia

There is some coverage of the processes and use of evidence to be found in the Saudi
securities law. Paragraph (i) of art 25 of the CML03 states that, ‘evidence in Securities
cases shall be admissible in all forms including electronic or computer data, telephone
recordings, facsimile messages and electronic mail’. This provision considers the
technical nature of securities transactions, which involve prices and complicated
standards.
Although the above provision regarding evidence may conform to the nature of these
transactions, which are performed professionally and swiftly, it does not provide
sufficient detail regarding the substantive and procedural rules of evidence.783
Furthermore, art 18 of the Regulating Procedures for Resolution of Securities Disputes
2011 (RPRSD’11) deals with the forms of evidence similarly, reiterating the acceptable
forms of evidence to be presented. This Article states that evidence may be presented to
the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) in all forms and by
any means, ‘including electronic data or data extracted from computers, as well as
telephone call recordings, fax correspondences and e-mails’. This provision of evidence
allows the litigants in securities cases to utilise and present every form of evidence.
783
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However, a comprehensive law of evidence is absent from the Saudi Arabian legal
system generally and more particularly in regard to securities contraventions. Therefore,
it is submitted that investor protection will be undermined because of the significant
shortcomings in the evidence provisions of the Saudi securities laws. Laws of evidence
are a significant aspect of ensuring a fair trial for both the plaintiff and the defendant.
The following discussion will demonstrate the importance of a comprehensive law of
evidence for the application in securities litigation in Saudi Arabia and the need for its
introduction.
7.2.2

Arguments for the Importance of a Law of Evidence in Saudi Securities
Laws

Generally, having an adequate law to govern evidence during procedures contributes to
a fair, quick and satisfactory decision by the court. The need for such law becomes
imperative due to the nature of securities civil cases, where investors who have
sustained loss or damage are involved. At this point, it is worth defining and
recognising the concepts of the law of evidence, and its role in securities cases. Posner
commences his study by stating that, ‘the law of evidence is the body of rules that
determines what, and how, information may be provided to a legal tribunal that must
resolve a factual dispute’.784 Moreover, Waight and Williams define the law of evidence
as the law that ‘consists of the rules and principles which govern the proof of the facts
in issue at a trial. The “facts in issue” are those that the plaintiff or prosecutor, and the
defendant or accused, must prove in order to be successful’.785 Stone and Wells claim
that the ultimate objective of the law of evidence is to ‘ensure that the facts found, to
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Richard A Posner, 'An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence' (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review
1477, 1477.
785
P K Waight and C R Williams, Evidence: Commentary and Materials (LBC Information Services, 5th
ed, 1998) 1.
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which the court is to apply the rules of substantive law, are more likely to be true than
false’.786
In Saudi Arabia, the legal system is based on Shari’ah, which is the law applicable in
civil litigation. In Shari’ah, as is the case in common law, the law of evidence is of
great importance in any trial or legal adjudication.787 However, evidence in Shari’ah
means, ‘to make a plea in the court by the means set by Shari’ah’.788 In other words,
evidence is presented to convince the court that you ‘own’ the right that is the subject of
the dispute. A legal definition of evidence in Saudi Arabia’s laws has yet to be found.
Also absent are statutory evidence rules to be applied on securities cases. Generally, the
evidence rules in Saudi Arabia follow Shari’ah in applying the evidence system and the
burden of proof.789 There are no sufficient written rules, statutes or associated statutory
ordinances or so forth to govern evidence. The only provisions for evidence are to be
found in the Law of Procedure before Shari’ah Courts 2000 (‘Law of Procedure’ or
LPSC’00). This law, however, governs evidentiary procedures only and disregards the
substantive rules of evidence. In addition, judges have wider powers to determine the
applicable evidence in the proceedings on the basis of Shari’ah. However, it is unclear
whether the provisions of this Law of Procedure apply to cases involving securities or
not. Securities cases require proper and clear rules regarding the evidence and the
burden of proof, both of which are currently insufficient or lacking in the securities law
of Saudi Arabia. In contrast, most of the neighbouring Islamic countries have codified
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Julius Stone and W A N Wells, Evidence: Its History and Policies (Butterworths, 1991) 59.
Hussain, above n 72, 184.
788
See Mohammed M Alzhieli, Evidence Means in Shari'ah (Dar Al-Bayan Library, 1982) [Arabic] 23.
789
See Saad M A Ben Dhufair, Proceedings Rules in Shari’ah: Jurisprudence and System (Sammha
Press, 2001) [Arabic] 140.
787
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the application of evidence based on Shari’ah as statutory rules.790 Without such a
mechanism, the absence of a clear law of evidence in Saudi Arabia continues to
contribute to making the issue more difficult for both the litigants and the court in
securities cases.
7.2.3

The Burden of Proof791

Proof is a crucial issue when matters are being decided between the plaintiff and the
defendant as well as between the creditor and debtor, and where their various interests
are being weighed. Therefore, lawmakers are interested in developing general rules of
evidence with which all litigants must comply.792
Usually in civil cases, the onus of proof is on the plaintiff.793 Similarly, in securities
regulations, the plaintiff must prove a breach of the relevant securities laws. The
defendant can certainly rely on available defences and usually must prove the defence.
However, Condon, Anand and Sarra have noted that, ‘in the securities realm, the onus
of proof when a defence is invoked is not always clear.794 In some cases, it is clear that
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See for example, in Jordan, a neighbouring country of Saudi Arabia, there is the Law of Evidence of
1952; in Egypt the Law of Evidence in the Civil and Criminal Litigations 1968.
791
It is worth mentioning that evidence has to be presented in a clear, convincing and satisfactory manner.
‘“Burden of proof” means the obligation of a party to meet the requirements of a rule of law that the fact
be proved either by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence or beyond a
reasonable doubt’. See Rule 1(4) of the proposed uniform rules of evidence discussed by McBaine. For
more details, see James P McBaine, 'Burden of Proof: Presumptions' (1955) 2 UCLA Law Review 13, 13–
14.
792
In legal discussion the phrase ‘burden of proof’ is used in two ways:
1. To indicate the duty of bringing forward argument or evidence in support of a proposition, whether at
the beginning or later; 2. To mark that of establishing a proposition as against all counter-argument or
evidence: see James B Thayer, 'The Burden of Proof' (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 45, 48.
793
That is, the task of proving a case on the balance of probabilities lies with the person asserting the
law’s breach by another. The plaintiff must therefore present sufficient evidence to convince the court
that this is so.
794
Condon, Anand and Sarra, above n 237, 598.
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the defendant must prove that he, she, or it meets the requirements of the defence, but in
other cases, the onus of proof is ambiguous’.795
The common law accusatorial system defines the burden of proof as, ‘the duty of one
party (usually the party bringing the proceedings against another) to make out the case
against the other party and to prove to the court that the case has been established’.796
Another expression is ‘persuasive burden’, which is the burden of winning the mind of
the person or persons who are charged with establishing the facts and with decision
making, by the evidence, to those propositions of fact asserted by the party who will fail
if those propositions are not accepted.797
In the UK, in relation to prospectuses, the onus of proof is imposed on the persons who
accept responsibility for the prospectus. Davies points out that,
A statutory regime has been in place since the Directors’ Liability Act 1890, the
modern version of which is section 90 of FSMA. That regime imposes liability for
negligence (with the burden of proof reversed) on issuers and directors (and others
who have accepted responsibility for all or a part of the prospectus or listing
particulars) in favour of those who acquire the securities and suffer loss as a result
of the misstatement, whether or not they have relied on the prospectus.798

In another example, a US court dropped a case initiated by the SEC for an injunctive
action because the SEC failed to prove a breach of the securities law.799 This
demonstrates that the court imposed the burden of proof on the plaintiff.800 Likewise,
civil liability provisions in the CML’03 impose the burden of proof on the plaintiff. This
can be seen from reading the relevant articles regarding liability for the prospectus,
795

Ibid.
Nygh and Butt, above n 105, 73.
797
Graham Roberts, Evidence: Proof and Practice (LBC Information Services, 1998) 80.
798
Davies, ‘Liability for Misstatements to the Market’, above n 647, 443.
799
See SEC v First Fin Group of Texas, 645 F 2d 429 (5th Cir, 1981) 434.
800
In the SEC injunctive actions, courts sometimes conclude that the SEC failed to establish a violation of
the securities law. See Nicole A Baker, Kirkpatrick and Lockhart Nicholson Graham, The Securities
Manual: Tactics and Strategies (American Bar Association, 2nd ed, 2007) 314–15.
796
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where the injured investor has to prove that he/she was not aware of that prospectus was
defective when purchasing the security.801 However, it does not identify the party who
must prove that the disclosure was defective. It is not clear whether the plaintiff has to
prove the existence of a false or misleading statement or omission.
The imposition of the burden of proof on the plaintiff becomes more evident in
secondary securities market contraventions.802 The person who claims damage or loss
because of the defective disclosures must prove the relationship between the
wrongdoing and the damage or loss incurred.
As is the case in the common law, Shari’ah imposes the onus of proof on the plaintiff.
Where the plaintiff’s claim is accepted by the court, the defendant then has the
obligation to disprove to the claim.803 This is because the presumption of innocence
requires the plaintiff to prove that the wrongdoing is related to the defendant and this
wrongdoing in turn caused damage to the plaintiff.
By way of contrast, in contractual liability, any breach in the contract leads to the legal
assumption that makes the debtor a wrongdoer for merely not having implemented a
contractual obligation.804 On the other hand, common law misrepresentation actions in
corporate transactions generally require proof that the claimant reasonably or justifiably
relied on the defendant’s allegedly false statement.805
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See Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 55(a).
Ibid 56(a).
803
Hussain, above n 72, 186; Also see Al-Thanon, above n 273, 62.
804
Bernadette Richards, Karinne Ludlow and Andy Gibson, Tort Law in Principle (Thomson Reuters, 5th
ed, 2009) 13.
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Many contracts contain a ‘disclaimer-of-reliance’ provision that requires the buyer to agree that it did
not rely on any extra-contractual representations made by the seller. For more details, see Glenn D West
and W Benton Lewis, 'Contracting to Avoid Extra-Contractual Liability — Can Your Contractual Deal
Ever Really Be the “Entire” Deal?' (2009) 64 Business Lawyer 999, 1018.
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In fact, a low burden of proof on investors favours the development of the market.
There is a strong link between the development of securities market and a low burden of
proof on investors joined with adequate disclosure requirements. Jackson and Roe
observe that ‘[t]he development of stock markets is strongly associated with extensive
disclosure requirements and a relatively low burden of proof on investors seeking to
recover damages resulting from omissions of material information from the
prospectuses’.806 Similarly, La Porta et al find that,
the development of stock markets is strongly associated with measures of private
enforcement such as extensive disclosure requirements and a relatively low burden
of proof on investors seeking to recover damages resulting from omissions of
material information from the prospectus.807

Based on the preceding discussion, it can be seen that evidence plays a central role in
law. In the same way, evidence holds additional importance in securities disputes due to
the nature, size and the number of investors in the share markets. This requires efficient
regulations to be joined with an effective judicial system in order to conduct fair, rapid
and low cost securities trials and hearings of civil suits. The earlier discussion of the
provisions that govern evidence in civil liabilities for securities cases shows that these
provisions are inadequate. The absence of a written and comprehensive code of
evidence in the Saudi legal system has contributed to the creation of more ambiguity.
Consequently, while there is not a comprehensive law of evidence to be referred to
under the current CML’03, clear and sufficient wording of the substantive and
procedural rules of evidence are obvious. In fact, such laws will certainly strengthen the
civil liability regime for defective disclosures in Saudi Arabia. Improvements will be

806
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Jackson and Roe, above n 675, 234.
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, above n 4, 20.
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thereby achieved in relation to the protection of investors from non-compliance with
disclosure requirements in both primary and secondary share markets.

7. 3 Defences to Civil Liability for Defective Prospectuses in Saudi
Arabia
In order to succeed under some defences, the person claiming protection under a
defence must prove its applicability to him or her. The following discussion will
concentrate on defences available to avoid civil liability for defective disclosures in the
prospectus.
7.3.1

An Overview of Defences against Civil Liability for Defective Prospectuses
in Developed Countries

In the selected developed countries, some argue that it is much easier for liability to
attach, but this is balanced by the fact that it is also easier to establish a defence.
However, despite the fact that developed countries avail the defendant more defences,
their legal and regulatory framework and enforcement are stronger than that of Saudi
Arabia. Therefore, investor protection is higher in these developed countries. The
following will describe the defences to civil liability for defective prospectus in the
developed countries.
The US, UK, Australia and Canada have a number of defences available against civil
liability. However, a due diligence defence is available in these jurisdiction as defence
against civil liability for defective prospectus.808 In addition to the due diligence, there
are additional defences which are:

808

Securities Act 1933 (US) § 11(b)(3); Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8, s 90 ;
Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) s 130(4); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 731.
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i.

Lack of knowledge: if the defendant can prove that the document containing the
misrepresentation was filed without his/her knowledge or consent.809

ii.

Plaintiff’s knowledge of the misstatement or omission at the time stocks were
acquired or transaction made.810

iii.

Lack of causation: The defendant will not be liable if able to prove that the
decline in the security’s value was due to a general decline in the market and
was not a result of any untruths or omissions in the registration statement. 811

iv.

Withdrawal of consent: a defendant can avoid liability if he/she can approve the
withdrawal of consent before the issue of the prospectus.812

v.

Expert defence: this is defence for experts who believe that portion of the
prospectus (for which they were responsible) was accurate and fair.813

vi.

Reliance on an expert: if the misrepresentation is contained in a part of
prospectus made on the authority of an expert, the defendant must prove that
he/she had no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe that that there
had been a misrepresentation in the expert’s opinion.814

These defences are statutory defences, which are available in their securities
legislations. Although the above defences are available to defendants, requirements for
each defence limit their scope. This will be evident in the discussion of the due
diligence defence in the selected countries and Saudi Arabia.815 As a consequence,
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Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) s 130 (5)(a); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 732.
Securities Act 1933 (US) §11(a); Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) 130(2); Financial Services and Markets
Act 2000 (UK) c 8, s 90.
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Securities Act 1933 (US) § 11(e).
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Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) s 130(3)(b); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 733(3).
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Securities Act 1933 (US) § 11(b)(3). Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) s 130(3)(d). Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8, s 90.
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Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) s 130 (3)(c); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 733(1); Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 (UK) c 8, s 90.
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See Section 4 of this Chapter.
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investor protection is weaker in Saudi Arabia due to its unclear due diligence defence
which may permit wrongdoers to escape liability easily.
7.3.2

Defences Available under the Saudi Laws

There are a number of defences available to potential defendants in order to avoid civil
liability for a defective prospectus in Saudi Arabia. Similarly to what applies in
developed countries, the due diligence defence, lack of causation and plaintiff’s
knowledge of the alleged breach defence can be found in the art 55 of the CML’03
which deals with the civil liability for defective prospectuses. However, the above
description of defences available in selected developed jurisdictions shows that they
have more defences than that in Saudi Arabia. But as has been discussed in the previous
chapter, these developed countries have wider range of remedies than that in Saudi
Arabia. The following will describe the defences available under the civil liability
provisions for misstatement in or omission from the prospectus.
7.3.2.1 Due Diligence Defence
In Saudi Arabia, due diligence is available for potential defendants other than the issuer
in regard to civil liability for defective prospectuses.816 It is noteworthy that the due
diligence defence provisions in the CML’03 are equivalent to the US approach, but with
fewer details included in the legislation. Therefore, the function of the due diligence
defence in the CML’03 parallels the US approach to this topic. The issuer remains liable
to investors for defective disclosures in a prospectus even if innocently made.817 In a
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Potential defendants in regard to a defective prospectus include: issuers, directors, senior officers,
underwriters, accountants, engineers or appraisers and others identified in the prospectus, who have
consented in writing to be so identified, as having certified the accuracy and truthfulness of the
information stated in the prospectus. See art 55 of the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia).
817
Paul G Mahoney, 'The Development of Securities Law in the United States' (2009) 47 Journal of
Accounting Research 325, 331–2.
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number of other developed securities jurisdictions, the due diligence defence is
available, under Code or common law in the respective type of jurisdiction. The UK,
Australia and Canada provide the due diligence defence in their securities laws.818 The
due diligence defence will be discussed in depth in a separate section of this chapter.
7.3.2.2 The Lack of Causation Defence
This defence is expressly provided in art 55(e) of the CML’03. Here defendants can be
absolved from the liability for misstatement in a prospectus by proving that the
plaintiff’s damages did not result from the misstatements or omission. Thus, according
to art 55(e), a defendant can avoid or reduce the measure of damages by showing that
all or any portion of the decline in value of the security was not caused by the violation
in question.
In respect of the underwriter, art 55(b)(4) of the CML’03 provides that, in regard to a
security for sale to the public, ‘an underwriter shall not be liable for more than the total
price of the Securities underwritten or amount of Securities distributed by him
(whichever amount is greater)’. Similarly, under the SA’33, the liability of the
underwriter is limited to the total price at which the securities underwritten by him and
distributed were offered to the public. US law practitioner in securities litigation,
Howard Nations, states in this regard:
The defendant may assert that the lack of proximate causation — that the actions of
a third party are the sole proximate or independent intervening causes of the
818

Schedule 10 the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK); ss 731–733 of the Corporations Act
2001 (Cth); ss 130(3)–130(5) of the Securities Act 1990 (Ontario). In Australia, a person who is involved
in the listed company’s contravention is also exposed to the civil penalty, subject to a due diligence
defence. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 674(2A) Contravention by Individual Note 1: This subsection
is a civil penalty provision. Section 674(2B) Due diligence defence applies if the person proves that they
took all reasonable steps in the circumstances to ensure that the listed disclosing entity complied with its
obligations and, after doing so, believed on reasonable grounds that the listed disclosing entity was
complying with its obligations under s 674(2).
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plaintiff’s damages. However, if the defendant could have reasonably foreseen the
intervening cause, the chain of causation between the defendant’s negligence and
the alleged damages is not broken, and the defendant is not relieved of liability for
the plaintiff’s losses.819

Although the plaintiff is not required to prove loss causation in the complaint, he/she
must show that the purchase of the securities was made directly in the initial offering
not in the secondary market.
7.3.2.3 Plaintiff’s Actual Knowledge of the Alleged Breach
In regard to the prospectus, defendants820 (including the issuer) can escape civil liability
by proving that the plaintiff knew of the misstatement or omission at the time he or she
acquired the security. Despite this defence being available as actual knowledge is an
obvious concept, it is difficult to prove in reality because one cannot get into the mind
of the plaintiff.821
In the US, a Court of Appeal agreed and held that a plaintiff may not recover under § 11
if it knew [of] or had available ‘information that would have revealed the untruth or
omission contained in the registration statement.822
In Canada, the Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) (SA’90) and in Australia the Corporations
Act 2001 (CA’01) have expanded the scope of defences to include a withdrawal of
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Howard L Nations, Remedies for Wronged Investors (17 November 2001)
<http://www.howardnations.com/reading/wrongedinvestors.html> citing Restatement (Second) of Torts
§§ 448 (1965).
820
Potential defendants in prospectus include: issuers, directors, senior officers, underwriters,
accountants, engineers or appraisers and others identified in the prospectus, who have consented in
writing to be so identified, as having certified the accuracy and truthfulness of the information stated in
the prospectus. See art 55 of the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia).
821
Todd R David, Jessica P Corley and Ambreen A Delawalla, 'Heightened Pleading Requirements, Due
Diligence, Reliance, Loss Causation, and Truth- On-The-Market — Available Defenses to Claims under
Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933' (2010) 11 Tennessee Journal of Business Law 53, 77.
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APA Excelsior III LP v Premiere Tech Inc, 476 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir, 2007), 1277.
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consent823 and a lack of knowledge defence. Lack of knowledge as a defence provides
that if the person did not know that there was a misstatement in the disclosure
document, liability will not arise. The ‘withdrawal defence’ differs from the lack of
knowledge as the defendant is required to prove that he/she withdrew his/her consent to
the issue of the prospectus (or relevant part thereof). More specifically, the withdrawal
defence can be claimed in two stages. The first stage is the receptive director has to
prove that they withdrew their consent to be a director before the issue of the prospectus
and the prospectus was prepared and issued without their consent. In the second stage,
the defendant can prove that the issue of the prospectus in question was made without
their knowledge or consent and they immediately withdrew their consent and provided
public notice to that effect. For example, s 732 of the CA’01824 states that in order to
escape civil liability, the defendant needs to prove that they did not know that the
statement was misleading or deceptive, as did s 130(3)(a) of the SA’90 for those in that
Province’s jurisdiction.
In contrast, art 56(a) of the CML’56 only states that ‘the claimant should prove that he
was not aware that the statement was omitted or untrue’. The CML’03 does mention
lack of knowledge as a defence and the law has not provided the withdrawal defence. In
addition, the CML’03 needs to stipulate the withdrawal of consent as well as to what
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Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) ss 130(3)(a) and 130(3)(b); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 732, 733.
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 732 – Lack of knowledge defence for offer information statements and
profile statements. Not knowing statement misleading or deceptive:
(1) A person does not commit an offence against subsection 728(3), and is not liable under s 729 for a
contravention of subsection 728(1), because of a misleading or deceptive statement in an offer
information statement or profile statement if the person proves that they did not know that the
statement was misleading or deceptive.
Not knowing there was an omission:
(2) A person does not commit an offence against subsection 728(3), and is not liable under
section 729 for a contravention of subsection 728(1), because of an omission from an offer
information statement or profile statement in relation to a particular matter if the person proves that
they did not know that there was an omission from the statement in relation to that matter [emphasis
added].
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stage the defendant has to prove that he/she was not aware of the that prospectus in
question was defective. Further, withdrawal of consent should have been made public in
order to enable the investors to make an informed investment decision and to protect
potential investors from being misled. In fact, the current CML’03 provisions do not
require a notice to be given the public by the defendant, providing that the prospectus in
question was issued without his/her knowledge or consent. The purpose of such a
notification is investor protection and the integrity of the market.
Briefly, in the case of a defective prospectus, civil liability is subject to specific
defences under the Saudi laws. Defendants other than the issuer can also escape liability
by establishing the due diligence defence. In addition, defendants can avoid civil
liability by proving the lack of causation and/or the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the
defective nature of the prospectus. However, taking into account the importance of the
due diligence as a defence, the following section will be dedicated to discussing the due
diligence defence in more detail.

7. 4 Due Diligence as a Defence under the Saudi Securities Law
The expression ‘due diligence’ means ‘close examination … of a transaction and its
related documentation’.825 This expression is always used in the legal sense of a
transaction and its related documents. In Universal Telecasters (Qld) Ltd v Guthrie,826 it
was held that ‘due diligence’ refers to a standard of behaviour, which is then able to be
used to defend oneself against the breach of regulatory and supervisory provisions; that
is, the appropriate persons must ensure that the particular system was properly carried
out. Having an adequate system (policy and procedures) in place to prevent

825
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Nygh and Butt, above n 105, 170.
(1978) 18 ALR 531; 32 FLR 360.

265

Chapter 7: Evidence and Defences

contravention of relevant legislation or to ensure compliance with the prevailing
regulatory schemes can be crucial to a defence as can be the provision of adequate
supervision to ensure such a system is maintained or correctly utilised.827 Additionally,
a crucial issue with due diligence is that persons involved in a transaction or
documentation must exercise their powers and carry out their duties with appropriate
care and diligence. Failure at any of these points can lead to a failure of the defence.
However, the following discussion of the due diligence defence under the CML’03
demonstrates that the current situation in Saudi Arabia in respect of the application of
the due diligence defence remains ambiguous.
7.4.1

Due Diligence Defence and the Persons Involved in the Prospectus

7.4.1.1 Due Diligence Defence for Defective Prospectus Available to Persons Other
than Experts
Article 55 (c)(1)(2) of the CML provides a due diligence defence for those persons who
can be held liable for defective disclosures in a prospectus. 828 The defence can be used
to establish whether the section in question is certified by experts or not.
Firstly, for any section of the prospectus not certified by an expert, persons liable (that
is, one other than the expert but who was authorised or was responsible for the
document or portion thereof) may claim the due diligence defence by showing that
he/she: (1) conducted a reasonable investigation, and (2) had reasonable grounds to
believe or (3) actually believed that there was no material omission or misstatement.829
In other words, a showing of due diligence requires that such a person demonstrate that,

827

Ibid 363.
These persons are:
1. Senior officers of the issuing party of the security
2. Directors or persons performing similar functions
3. The underwriters.
829
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 55(c)(1).
828
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‘after reasonable investigation’, and on the basis of ‘reasonable grounds’, he/she was
convinced that there were no misstatement or omission of material facts in such portions
of the prospectus. Thus, these portions of the prospectus are referred to as ‘nonexpertised’ parts.
The requirement for ‘reasonable investigation’ regarding non-expertised portions
included in the prospectus is clearly established and required by the developed
jurisdictions, such as the US, UK and Australia. For example, § 11(3)(A)–(B) of the
SA’33 requires the defendants to perform reasonable investigation if they were to rely
on the defence of due diligence. In Australia, s 731(1)(2) of the CA’01 asserts the
requirement for ‘reasonable inquiries’830 and ‘reasonable belief’831 for the due diligence
defence in regard to prospectuses. In the pursuit of the due diligence defence, the person
‘must always conduct the due diligence investigation in person’.832
Secondly, there is the expertise defence. If the misleading statement or omission is in a
section certified by an expert, anyone other than the expert can use the due diligence by
showing only that he/she had no reasonable grounds to believe that there was a material
misstatement or omission.833 Hence, it can be clearly seen that a ‘reasonable
investigation’ standard applies to non-expertised portions and a ‘reasonable reliance’
standard applies to expertised portions.834

830

‘[A]ll inquiries (if any) that were reasonable in the circumstances’: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss
741(1)(a) (commission); 741(2)(a) (omission).
831
That is, in relation to statements then made being convinced they were correct or none omitted:
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 741(1)(b) (commission); 741(2)(b) (omission).
832
J R Lovejoy, 'Initial Public Offerings: The Due Diligence Process and Blue Sky Problems' (1981) 13
Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 369, 371.
833
Capital Market Law 2003(Saudi Arabia) art 55(c)(2).
834
This comes in with US court’s interpretation of § 11 of the Securities Act 1933 (US), which held that
the two portions of the prospectus cannot be treated the same for the purpose of the due diligence defence.
Escott v BarChris Construction Corp, 283 F Supp 643 (SDNY 1968) 683.
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7.4.1.2 Due Diligence Defence for Defective Prospectus Available to Experts
The due diligence defence is available to experts in respect of their opinions and reports.
Certifying experts and others specified in the prospectus will be excused from liability
for the section they certify if they can show that they conducted a reasonable
investigation and had reasonable grounds for their belief that there was no material
omission or misstatement in the section they certified.835 This standard is exactly the
same as that which applies to non-experts in non-expertised sections of the prospectus.
7.4.2 The Drawbacks in the Due Diligence Defence for Civil Liability under the
Capital Market Law 2003
Under the civil liability provisions in the CML’03, the due diligence defence is only
available in regard to the prospectus. It is not accessible to all defendants in the
secondary market. However, although the due diligence defence is available to
defendants other than the issuer in regard to avoiding civil liability for defective
disclosures in the prospectus, the application of this defence remains quite obscure
under the CML’03. Several items demonstrate the ambiguity of this defence in Saudi
Arabia. The first is the ambiguity of the standard of ‘reasonableness’ of due
diligence.836 Second, the standards of ‘reasonable reliance’ and ‘reasonable
investigation’837 have not yet been developed, especially by courts. The third is the
applicability of the due diligence to the ‘inside’ (executive) and ‘outside’ (non-

835

Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 55(b)(5).
Reasonableness in due diligence is an obligation defined as the action required of a ‘prudent man’ in
the management of his own property. This is known in the US Securities as the ‘Reasonableness
Standard’.
837
The term ‘reasonable investigation’ encompasses many modes of inquiry between obtaining comfort
letters from an auditor and doing little more, on one hand, and having to reaudit a company’s books on
the other. Farnk Fried, Shriver Harris and Jacobson LLP, 'The Due Diligence Process From the
Underwriter's
Perspective'
(March
2008)
<http://friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/D6F04F49731E93D48CF5885EB9DE205B.pdf> 24.
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executive) directors.838 In all of the above items, it should be mentioned that the dearth
of cases and lack of judicial interpretations of the due diligence defence have
contributed to making the issue more difficult in Saudi Arabia.
To begin with, similar to § 11(c) of the SA’33, art 55(d) of the CML’03 states that the
standard of reasonableness for due diligence shall be ‘that of the prudent man in the
management of his property’. The question of whether the standard is met or not may be
examined when determining the applicability of the due diligence defence. Therefore, it
is important to have a clear understanding of the standard of reasonableness.839 In
contrast to the US, this standard has not been developed by the CMA. In the US, the
standard of reasonableness has been further developed by the US Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC). In 1982, the SEC adopted Rule 176 under the SA’33 to identify
certain circumstances in relation to persons other than the issuer, which circumstances
could have an effect on the reasonableness of the investigation and thus allow a
defendant to avoid liability for a defective prospectus.840 In the US, Rule 176 clearly
delineates the circumstances that determine whether an inquiry is ‘reasonable’ and
provides ‘reasonable grounds for belief’ under § 11.841

838

A ‘director’ refers to every member of the board of directors. See Glossary of Defined Terms Used in
the Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market Authority 2004 (Saudi Arabia).
839
The Saudi securities regulator has exactly adopted § 11(c) of the Securities Act (US), which provides
that: ‘In determining what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for belief, the
standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in the management of his own
property.’
840
Circumstances Affecting the Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable Investigation and
Reasonable Grounds for Belief under Section 11 of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No 6335, 46
Fed Reg 42,015, at 42,015 (6 August 1981) (later codified at 17 CFR pt 230).
841
The Rule confirms that the degree of investigation is not the same for all § 11 persons. The availability
of the due diligence defence depends on the following factors:
1. type of issuer;
2. type of person;
3. type of security;
4. if the person is an officer, the office held;
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The above shows the importance of the role played by the regulator in clarifying the
law. While the Saudi law has adopted § 11 without change, it has not introduced
clarifying rules similar to those which exist in the US, from which jurisdiction it
adopted the initial section of the legislation. On the contrary, the standard of
reasonableness has not been amended or developed by the Saudi regulator. It has not
also interpreted by courts. Sjostrom has analysed several US court cases regarding the
standard of reasonableness.842 He finds that the reasonable investigation standard
applicable to underwriters is lower than the standard applicable to inside
directors/management.843 Hence, the more direct a role a party plays, the more stringent
the standard of liability.844 This sliding scale approach comports with the US Supreme
Court’s statement in Herman & McLean v. Huddleston that §11 ‘was designed to assure
compliance with the disclosure provisions of the [Securities] Act by imposing a
stringent standard of liability on the parties who play a direct role in a registered
offering’.845 Another example, the US court in Monroe v Hughes, states that even
though accountants have to comply with the strictures of the accounting profession, the
reasonable investigation standard is applicable to accountants.846

5.

if the person is a director or proposed director, the presence (or absence) of another relationship
to the issuer;
6. reasonable reliance on officers, employees and others whose duties should have given them
knowledge of the particular facts (in light of the functions and responsibilities of the person with
respect to the issuer and the filing);
7. if the person is an underwriter, the type of underwriting arrangement, the role of the person as an
underwriter and the availability of information concerning the registration;
8. whether the person had any responsibility for a fact or document incorporated by reference at the
time of the filing from which it was incorporated.
842
William K Sjostrom, 'The Due Diligence Defence under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933'
(2005) 44 Brandeis Law Journal 549, 599.
843
Ibid.
844
Ibid.
845
459 US 375, 381-82 (1983).
846
31 F3d 772 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Therefore, in the face of this insufficiency in regulatory and court interpretation under
Saudi law, it would be opportune to adopt clear criteria for a ‘reasonableness’ standard
in respect of what constitutes ‘reasonable’ investigation and ‘reasonable’ ground. Such
improvements would strengthen the due diligence defence and contribute to the
execution of justice.
Under the provisions of the CML’03, the due diligence defence is insufficient because
of the vague position of non-executive (‘outside’) directors with respect to the due
diligence defence.847 Generally, a company has executive and may also have nonexecutive directors. In Saudi Arabia, a company may have executive and/or nonexecutive directors. According to art 55(b)(3) of the CML’03, there is no distinction
between the executive and non-executive directors with respect to prospectus liability
defences.
It has been stated that the directors are required to meet the standard of reasonable
investigation in order to accept the due diligence defence. Hence, expert defence that is
available to executive directors in relation to material approved by executive directors
for inclusion in reports is not enough to establish a due diligence defence. For instance,
a due diligence defence was refused by an Australian court, saying that the ‘blind
acceptance’ of assurances concerning disclosures in a prospectus given by the executive
directors, amongst others, would not be acceptable.848 Another court in the same
jurisdiction admitted this defence when the non-executive directors are just required to

847

‘Executive director’ is a director engaged by a company under a contract of employment to perform
functions additional to those involved in being a member of the board of directors. ‘Non-executive
director’ or ‘outside director’ is a director who does not take part in the day to day management of the
company. For more details, see Nygh and Butt, above n 105, 195 and 341.
848
J P Coats v Crossland (1904) 20 TLR 800, 806.
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have ‘a reasonable ground’ to believe that the director of the issuer has carried out a
reasonable investigation.849
In Adams v Thrift,850 a leading English case, the court held that ‘blind reliance’ on a
report or opinion by experts for prospectus statements was not a reasonable ground to
establish the due diligence defence. Accordingly, directors must take positive steps in
regards to the statements embodied in the prospectus in order to ascertain their
reliability before approving their inclusion.
On the other hand, in regard to victims, a Canadian academic, Christopher C Nicholls
(commenting on the legislation applicable to the Province of Ontario), supports the
removal of the requirement that they prove a reliance upon the material pivotal to the
dispute. He commends a statutory civil liability remedy, which eliminates the
requirement for aggrieved investors to prove reliance on the alleged misrepresentation
and would represent a powerful protective tool for Ontario investors.851
Furthermore, it is generally known that executive directors are associated with the
affairs of the company more than the non-executive directors. Thus, the executive
directors are generally elsewhere ascribed to bear a greater due diligence obligation than
the non-executive directors, as is apparent in the US case of Escott v BarChris
Construction Corp (BarChris Case), a leading case on the due diligence defence in that
jurisdiction.852 The main lesson learned from the BarChris case is that, in most

849

Stevens v Hoare (1904) 20 TLR 407, 409.
(1915) 1 Ch 557, 565–71.
851
Nicholls, above n 617, 393. Note: He refers only to Ontario investors as this legislation is limited to
the Province of Ontario, Canada, and is not national legislation.
852
In this case it was held that: ‘What constitutes “reasonable investigation” and “reasonable ground to
believe” will vary with the degree of involvement of the individual, his expertise, and his access to the
pertinent information and data. What is reasonable for one director may not be reasonable for another by
850

272

Chapter 7: Evidence and Defences

circumstances, a reasonable investigation cannot end with the questioning of company
officials but must include independent verification of their answers.853
As well as noting the ‘need to retain some system of issuer liability under Section 11 —
with a strong emphasis on insider [executive officer and executive director]
responsibility’, US academic Donald C Langevoort adds that an ‘internal due diligence
requirement for insiders makes a great deal of sense to [him]’.854 The inherent
obligations of non-involved executives in this respect can also exert a social pressure for
all to conform as their own liability would make them less likely to ignore lapses of
others if they detect them. In terms of non-executive directors (‘outside directors’),
Langevoort again calls to retain outside directors liability directly under §11 of the
SA’33 when scienter can be established.855 Most recently, the Australian High Court in
the James Hardie case held that non-executive, as well as executive directors, are
responsible for the release of information concerning company decisions to the share
market, employees, creditors and the public.856
In fact, the position of the non-executive directors is important in relation to the
management of the corporation. In respect of the causes of corporate scandals and
malfunctions generally, DeMott argues that the main one of these causes is the

virtue of their differing positions’: Escott v BarChris Construction Corp, 283 F Supp 643 (SDNY 1968)
706.
853
'Escott v Barchris: ''Reasonable Investigation" and Prospectus Liability under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933' (1969) 82 Harvard Law Review 908, 910.
854
Langevoort, ‘Deconstructing Section 11’, above n 540, 64.
855
Ibid 65. Langevoort notes that the 1995 reforms the eliminated of joint and several liability and
balanced due diligence responsibilities in §11 liability as such persons were ignorant of any fraud.
856
To fail to do so as required is to fail in their duties to the company and breach their legal obligations
under the Corporations Act. Matters concerned related to the adequacy of asbestos compensation funding,
company planning and share arrangements. See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v
Hellicar (2012) HCA 17; Shafron v ASIC (2012) HCA 18; Australian Securities and Investments
Commission, Decision in ASIC’s Appeals in James Hardie Matter (16 May 2012)
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/1285MR+Decision+in+ASIC’s+appeals+in+James+Hardie+matter?openDocument>.
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malfunctions resulting from inadequate performance of non-executive directors in
relationship to the corporation’s senior management.857 However, the following
discussion aims to show the need for clear and developed provisions regarding this
defence.
In the UK, under the Companies Act 2006 (CA’06), the law clearly applies to all
directors, whether executive or non-executive, full or part-time, and that a director can
be liable for the actions of his/her fellow directors.858 Accordingly, a director must
ensure that he/she is regularly provided with sufficient information to satisfy
himself/herself that he/she and his fellow directors are fulfilling their obligations.859
However, it can be said that the exercise of reasonable inquiry is crucial in order to
confidently approve the accuracy of some portions of the prospectus. It is, however,
suggested that regardless of the degree of involvement of directors, they could not be
free from defective prospectus liability on the basis of due diligence without at least
exercising reasonable care. The blind acceptance of others’ statements will not be
adequate to establish this defence. From the above, it has been shown that in developed
jurisdictions generally the ‘reasonable investigation’ standard varies according to the
type of defendant. The more direct a role a party plays, the more stringent the standard
of liability.860

857

Deborah A DeMott, 'Inside the Corporate Veil: The Character and Consequences of Executives’
Duties' (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 251, 251.
858
Companies Act 2006 (UK) ss 171–177 – the general duties and on directors both fiduciary and nonfiduciary.
859
Charles Russell, Directors Responsibilities: Understanding Relationships (4 June 2012)
<http://www.charlesrussell.co.uk/UserFiles/file/pdf/Mergers%20&%20Acquisitions/Directors_Responsib
ilities.pdf>
860
Sjostrom, above n 842, 572.
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In Saudi Arabia, however, as there is no distinction between the executive directors and
non-executive directors, the application of due diligence remains ambiguous. In
addition, other jurisdictions have made the burden on the executive directors far more
onerous than that on the non-executive directors in establishing the due diligence
defence, as is evident from the above. Consequently, the drawbacks associated with the
lack of clarity regarding the due diligence defence and a lack of cases to illustrate its
operation will certainly lead to weakening of the regime of civil liability and actually
undermine the concept of investor protection in the IPO market.

7. 5 Defences to Liability for Defective Disclosure in the Secondary
Market
The failure to make timely disclosure regarding periodic statements or continuous
disclosures of new matters and developments related to the company may lead to loss or
damage to investors in the share market. Persons responsible for such failure will be
held civilly liable for defective disclosures. According to art 56 of the CML’03,
Any person who makes, or is responsible for another making, orally or in writing
an untrue statement of material fact or omits to state that material fact, if it causes
another person to be misled in relation to the sale or the purchase of a Security,
shall be liable for compensation of the damages.

7.5.1

Lack of Causation as a Defence for Secondary Market Liability

It is clear from the above provision that the failure in making correct disclosure must be
the cause that leads the potential plaintiff to sustain loss or damage. Thus, the result of
loss or damages must be linked to the wrongful act. Thus, as in prospectus liability,
defendants can avoid their liability by showing the lack of causation in regard to second
market liability. The defendant can use the lack of causation in this regard to defeat a
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claim by showing that the loss sustained by the plaintiff was not the result of the alleged
misstatements or omissions.
However, the burden of proof is shifting from the defendant to the plaintiff. It puts more
pressure on the plaintiffs to prove that their loss or damage is linked to a specified
person who is assumed to be a potential violator of the disclosure requirements. Article
56 of the CML’03 states that when establishing responsibility for damages, the claimant
should prove:
i.

That he/she was not aware that the statement was omitted or untrue.

ii.

That either he/she would not have purchased or sold the security in question had
he known that information was omitted or untrue, or that he would not have
purchased or sold such a security at the price at which such a security was
purchased or sold.

iii.

That the person responsible for the disclosure of the statements, or the giving of
such incorrect information, knew of the said untruthfulness or was aware that
there was a substantial likelihood that the information disclosed, omitted or
misstated a material fact.

These provisions do not require the plaintiff to show any causal connection between the
misrepresentation and his damage. Under art 56, the burden of proof is placed on the
plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff has to prove the damage and then courts determine its
amount.
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Under the US Securities Exchange Act 1934 (SEA’34), a substantial burden of proof is
placed on the plaintiff to prove that a defendant acted scienter (‘with knowledge’).861
Like the CML’03, it imposes the burden of proof for the damage on the injured investor
(plaintiff) whilst the defendant has the burden of defence.
In Canada, s 138.4(2) of the SA’90 is similar in content to art 56, which states that a
plaintiff has the burden of proof in relation to the failure of making timely disclosures.
Nevertheless, the defendants have a number of defences in relation to the failure of
timely disclosures if that person or company proves that the plaintiff acquired or
disposed of the issuer’s security with knowledge of the defective or material change. 862
In addition, the defendant can escape liability for defective secondary market
disclosures by establishing the due diligence defence.863
In the same way, art 10 of the Market Conduct Regulations 2004 (MCR’04) (Saudi
Arabia) confirms that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the case.864 Hence, art 56

861

David, Corley and Delawalla, above n 821, 60; See Tellabs Inc v Makor Issues & Rights Ltd, 551 US
308 (2007) 313.
862
Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) s 138.4 (5)(6).
863
Ibid s 138.4 (6)(b).
864
See Market Conduct Regulations 2004 (Saudi Arabia) where arts 10(c) and 20 provide defences to
civil liability for a defective disclosure.
In art 10(c) for the purposes of application of art 56 of the Capital Market Law 2003 and the provisions of
this part: provide as follows:
Article 10(c).
A person shall be liable for damages to a claimant, if he is obliged under the Capital Market Law, the
Implementing Regulations, or the rules of the Exchange or the Depositary Centre, to make a statement
and fails to do so provided that:
1) The claim for damages is in relation to the purchase or sale of a security; and
2) What has been omitted relates to a material fact.
d. A claimant for damages under paragraph (c) of this Article must establish that:
1) He was not aware of the failure to make the statement; and
2) He would not have purchased or sold the security in question had he known in advance that the
statement was omitted, or that he would not have purchased or sold the security at the price at which
such security was purchased or sold.
Article 20:
Where a person is found to have violated the provisions of the Capital Market Law or the
implementing regulations on market manipulation, insider trading or untrue statements while acting
on behalf of another person and at the direction of the person on whose behalf the relevant act is
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of CML’03 provides that the plaintiff has to prove that they were not aware that the
statement in question was omitted or untrue.865 In this situation, the plaintiff carries the
burden of proof. In Canada, s 138.4 of SA’90 presents a clear and direct provision
regarding the liability. It provides a due diligence defence for the defendant to avoid
civil liability. On the other hand, the plaintiff is required to prove that the failure to
make timely disclosure by the person or company was done with their knowledge, or
misconduct in regard to their knowledge of a material change that may affect the
security’s value.
In Canada, amendments to the SA’90 that came into effect in 2005 allow secondary
market purchasers to sue reporting issuers, officers, directors, spokespersons and others
for violation of specified continuous and timely disclosure requirements.866 According
to the above recent amendments, the amount of damages that can be claimed is limited
unless the plaintiff can establish the defendant’s prior knowledge of either the
misrepresentation or the failure to make disclosure of material change. 867 For example,

carried out, that other person is liable and is subject to any sanctions to which the person carrying out
the relevant acts is subject unless the person on whose behalf the act is carried out:
1) Took reasonable steps to prevent the violation of the provisions of the Capital
Market Law and its implementing regulations; and
2) Did not authorise the acts in question.
865
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 56(a)
The claimant should prove:
1. That he was not aware that the statement was omitted or untrue.
2. That either he would not have purchased or sold the Security in question had he known that
information was omitted or untrue, or that he would not have purchased or sold such Security at the
price at which such Security was purchased or sold.
3. That the person responsible for the disclosure of the statements or the giving of such incorrect
information knew of the said untruthfulness or was aware that there was a substantial likelihood that
the information disclosed omitted or misstated a material fact.
866
Alan D'Silva, Jeffrey Singer and Samaneh Hosseini, 'Canada's New Regime Tested' (2006) 25
International Financial Law Review 56, 56.
867
The new amendments to the Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) limit the amount of damages that can be
claimed. To explain, ‘[i]f the defendant is a responsible issuer, its liability is limited to the greater of 5%
of the responsible issuer's market capitalisation and $1 million. If the defendant is a director or officer of
a responsible issuer, liability is limited to the greater of $25,000 and 50% of the previous 12 months'
compensation received from the responsible issuer or its affiliates’. Ibid 57.
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in the IMAX claims in Canada,868 the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants had
prior knowledge of the misrepresentations and have therefore claimed damages of CAD
500 million and CAD 200 million in damages, alleging that the limits on damages do
not apply to the defendants. Therefore, in many cases the extent of damages recovered
will depend on whether prior knowledge can be established.
In the US, under the SEA’34, the lack of prior knowledge defence is clearly found in §
18. According to this section, civil liability for misleading statements is imposed on the
wrongdoers, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no
prior knowledge that such statement was false or misleading.
However, according to art 56(a) of CML’03, the defence of lack of knowledge is
unclear in respect of who can rely upon this defence to escape civil liability.
Additionally, the application of this defence has not been interpreted by courts, which
makes the issue difficult for the claim of civil liability for defective disclosures.
Following the path of the recent amendments of the SA’90, the defence of ‘lack of
knowledge’ is required to be improved and presented in efficient way.
7.5.2

Lack of Authorisation Defence

There are some measures available to defend liability, such as the ‘lack of
authorisation’. Although this defence can be used as a defence against liability in
general, it can be in addition used to avoid liability for defective disclosures. In fact, as
with the lack of causation defence, this defence can be used to defend any defective
disclosure whether it has occurred in the primary or secondary markets.

868

Ibid.
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According to art 20(2) of the MCR’04, the defendants can avoid civil liability by
proving that they did not authorise the person who acted on their behalf to carry out the
action in question. This provides that when acting on behalf of another person and at the
direction of the person on whose behalf the relevant act is undertaken, that person
becomes liable and is subject to any sanctions to which the person carrying out the
relevant acts is subject, unless the person on whose behalf the act is carried out proves
that he has taken reasonable steps to prevent the violation of the law; or did not
authorise the acts in question.869
The lack of authorisation defence that allows the defendant to avoid liability is
ambiguously presented. The defendant ought to prove both that he/she, firstly, has taken
reasonable steps to prevent any violation of the law, and, secondly, did not authorise or
give authorisation to that person who claims to have acted on behalf them in regard to
the act in question. Although this defence is provided by the MCR’04, it is broad and
obscure. This is because it is not stated whether the defendant needs to prove the above
two requirements of the defence jointly or separately, or whether just one of them alone
is enough. Equally importantly, this defence lacks interpretation in terms of the conduct
in question and also in terms of who acts on behalf the defendant. It does not identify
the legal frame entitling this person to act on behalf of the other person. Further, the
ambit of this authorisation is ambiguous.870

869

Market Conduct Regulations 2004 (Saudi Arabia) art 20(2).
In this respect, it would be more convenient if the Saudi securities regulator specifies who is the
person who has authorisation to act on behalf the others who give him/her this authorisation or permission
to do so such as ‘issuer agent, financial advisor, accountant, lawyer, auditor…’ and so on; it also does not
specify that kind of permission or authorisation (comprehensive, partly or for a specific matter).

870
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7. 6 Summary and Conclusions
The main prerequisite for a sufficient and developed market is to have adequate laws.
The law interferes in the securities market to provide protection to investors from unfair
practices.871 The CML’03 was established with the objective of protecting investor
interests, ensuring orderly and equitable dealing in securities, and promoting and
developing the capital markets.872 The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the civil
liability regime for defective disclosure in Saudi Arabia is ambiguous, lacks clarity and
is narrow when compared to that of other selected developed countries, such as the US,
the UK and Australia. The inadequacy has been measured in terms of the evidence in
civil liability litigation and the defences to civil liability for defective disclosures.
The discussion of the evidence in civil liability litigation shows that there is no
comprehensive written code of evidence under the Saudi legal system. In addition,
although the current provisions dealing with the evidence under the CML’03 have
procedural rules regarding that evidence, the Saudi system lacks the substantive rules
that are imperative for the law of evidence and the concept of a fair trial.
Unlike other developed countries, the due diligence defence is only available for
defendants in contravention of prospectus requirements. Thus, defendants are not able
to uphold the due diligence defence against civil liability for defective disclosures in the
secondary market.873 Moreover, there is a significant lack of interpretations regarding
the ‘reasonableness’ standard, that is, what constitutes ‘reasonable investigation’ and
871

For example, in the US, ‘the main purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is to protect financial markets
investors by requiring disclosure in public offerings of securities.’ See Roberta Romano, 'Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation' (1998) 107 Yale Law Journal 2359, 2367; Lopez,
above n 724, 655.
872
Ramady, above n 104, 158.
873
Disclosures in the secondary market are: periodic disclosures and continuous disclosures.
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‘reasonable grounds’. This is coupled with the issue of missing criteria, namely what
constitutes a reasonable investigation and reasonable grounds in respect of the defence
of due diligence. In addition, non-executive director liability is not found under the
current regime and therefore it is not clear whether the non-executive directors are able
to use the due diligence defence or not. Thus, the definition of ‘reasonable inquiries’ is
yet to be determined in respect of the non-executive directors. This is due to the fact that
the current articulation of art 55 of the CML’03 does not have a clear distinction
between the executive and non-executive directors in respect of the defences against
prospectus liability.
It has been found that, under the CML’03, the defences for civil liability for a defective
prospectus is equal to that of § 11 of the SA’33 In the case of a defective prospectus, a
defendant other than the issuer can use the due diligence defence. In addition,
defendants can escape liability by proving that the plaintiff knew of the misstatement or
omission at the time he/she acquired the security, or proving that the plaintiff's damages
did not result from the misstatements or omission. Although the due diligence defence
is clearly similar to § 11 of the SA’33, its application in Saudi Arabia remains poor.
Another drawback in the defences regime is that the due diligence defence is not
available to defeat claims made under civil liability for defective disclosures other than
in the prospectus. Under the current civil liability provisions, defendants are only able to
establish the due diligence defence in the defective disclosures in a prospectus.
Conversely, in Canada for instance, s 138.4 (6)(b) of the SA’90 provides the due
diligence defence to all defendants regarding a failure to make timely disclosure.
Further, in the system of continuous disclosures, due diligence provisions do not detail
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who in particular can rely on the defence.874 Section 674(2B) of the Australian CA’01
contains a clear indication of due diligence defence that can be relied upon by
defendants in regard to continuous disclosures violations.
In Saudi Arabia, defendants may escape civil liability for breaches of secondary market
disclosures. This is evident from the articulation of the civil liability provisions under
the CML’03. Article 56 of the CML’03 provides the defendant with the defence of lack
causation. What is more, it is unclear whether one can assume that implied defences are
available for defendants due to the lack of interpretation of this Article by the regulatory
and judicial bodies.
Furthermore, according to art 56 of the CML’03, the onus of proof is imposed on the
plaintiff. Although the investor totally carries the burden of proof, he/she is not required
to show any elements of causation in defective disclosures made in the secondary
market. This is a supportive approach for investors and strengthens their right to be
compensated for their affected investments. Nevertheless, art 56 does provide the
defendant with the defence of the lack of causation to escape liability.
Based on the above, it can be clearly seen that these legal lacunae result in a weaker
civil liability regime and are contrary to the concept of protecting investors. The
previous discussion demonstrates that the provisions regarding defences are not clear.
Taking into account the insufficient remedies available for aggrieved investors,
wrongdoers may escape liabilities and investors remain uncompensated. With this in
mind, the need for interpretations by the regulator and judicial bodies is evident in the
development of the civil liability regime. The absence of judicial opinions regarding the
874

See Angie Zandstra, Jason Harris and Anil Hargovan, 'Widening the Net: Accessorial Liability for
Continuous Disclosure Contraventions' (2008) 22 Australian Journal for Corporate Law 51, 80.
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defences available to civil liability for defective disclosures has contributed to making
the issue considerably more difficult for investors who believe themselves victims to
receive redress and, on the other hand, easier for defendants to avoid liability.
Indeed, fewer defences are recommended to allow investors to recover their loss. On the
other hand, more defences will undoubtedly go against investor protection. In sum,
despite the fact that defences are available under the current civil liability provisions in
Saudi Arabia, the weak legal and regulatory framework and the ineffective enforcement
mechanism make the issue difficult for injured investors to seek compensation for the
loss or damage they sustain due to a violation of the disclosure regime. The Saudi
securities market has a serious lack of experienced and well trained judges and lawyers.
Hence, defendants can benefit from the weak regulations and enforcement machinery in
the Saudi securities market and escape liability.
The absence of court decisions and judicial interpretation makes the issue difficult under
the Saudi securities legislation. In contrast, it has been seen that the selected developed
countries have a long history of dealing with securities cases and of judicial
interpretation. Clear and improved civil liability provisions for defective disclosures are
essential for the right to fair trial. However, drawbacks in judicial enforcement will
demonstrate further weaknesses of the law relating to the disclosure. With this end in
mind, the next chapter will investigate the provisions of judicial enforcement of the
disclosure regime and civil liability resulting from the breach of disclosure
requirements.
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CHAPTER 8:
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE
SECURITIES LAWS AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF THE
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE SAUDI
SECURITIES MARKET
8. 1 Introduction
The law is made to be enforced. Law enforcement represents the execution of the
purposes contained in a given law. The judicial enforcement of law stands for the
execution of those purposes through the government’s judiciary. There are two benefits
of any law. The first benefit of any law relies on voluntary compliance with it. The
second benefit of a specific law becomes more evident in its compulsory enforcement
by the competent authorities. Lopez-de-Silanes notes that ‘[l]aws that stay on the books
and are not enforced are tantamount to not having regulation at all.’875 A large
international study found that a strong level of enforcement of shareholders’ legal rights
is essential in order to have effective corporate governance in emerging markets.876
Thus, the effectiveness of legal institutions is much more important than the quality of
the law in the books.877
In respect of the securities market, the enforcement of corporate laws is crucial to the
maintenance of market integrity and sustainability. A study of 49 countries selected
from different legal systems found that the primary market has been considerably
improved by effective law enforcement.878 Closing remarks in this survey confirm that
countries with a low level of law enforcement lack development of their securities
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Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, 'A Survey of Securities Laws and Enforcement' (Working Paper No
3405, World Bank, 2004) 28–9.
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Michael S Gibson, 'Is Corporate Governance Ineffective in Emerging Markets?' (2003) 38(1) Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 231, 231.
877
Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser and Stanislaw Gelfer, 'Law and Finance in Transition Economics'
(2000) 8 Economics of Transition 325, 356.
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Rafael La Porta et al, 'Legal Determinants of External Finance', above n 19, 1143-1146; La Porta,
Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, above n 4, 28.
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markets.879 In addition, Johnson affirms that ‘[l]egal institutions are strongly correlated
with financial development’ of a country’s economy.880 A report from the World Bank
asserts that ‘[e]ffective institutions can make the difference in the success of market
reforms’.881 Strong judicial institutions that enforce contracts will create an attractive
environment for funds and deter those who would wish to engage in risky or dubious
business activities.882
More importantly, the adequacy of the judicial enforcement is significant in terms of the
protection of investors. Effective judicial enforcement is the cornerstone of public
confidence in the judiciary. Klapper and Love state that ‘[f]irm-level protection of
minority rights is less likely to be effective if legal enforcement and judicial efficiency
is weak’.883
In effect, corporations alone cannot provide a safe investment environment for their
shareholders. While the separation between the corporate shareholders and management
of corporations gives corporations an advantage over the structures, it raises significant
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. The conflict arises because
managers of corporations are more concerned about increasing their own personal
salaries, or job security rather than in the interests of investors who wish the value of
their corporation to increase and the share price (and return on their investment) to rise.
Thus, both issuers and shareholders rely on an efficient legal system to protect their

879

Rafael La Porta et al, 'Legal Determinants of External Finance', above n 19, 1149; La Porta, Lopez-DeSilanes and Shleifer, above n 4, 28.
880
Johnson, above n 668.
881
World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets (Oxford University
Press, 2002) iii (Foreword).
882
Ibid.
883
Klapper and Love, above n 556, 717.
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interests. A weak environment of enforcement will not only undermine the corporate
governance mechanisms, but also the general financial development of corporations.884
As the aim of the disclosure regime is to provide protection for investors, corporations
are responsible for their compliance with disclosure requirements in the prospectus,
periodic disclosures and continuous disclosures. A breach of disclosure requirements
may result in damage or loss for the investors. Victims of such breaches may seek
judicial enforcement in order to remedy their loss or damage. Accordingly, a speedy and
cost-effective delivery of judgments is expected to provide justice to all litigants.
In Saudi Arabia, securities market participants increasingly demand judicial reforms. It
is argued that the judicial enforcement of corporate laws is inadequate in Saudi Arabia.
Evidence will be presented to demonstrate that currently the judicial dealings with
securities market disputes are weak and reasons for this situation will be presented.
There are calls to enhance the role of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in bringing
civil suits on behalf of the investors. In addition, the articulation of the securities court’s
remedial powers or sanctions is not clearly provided in the Capital Market Law 2003
(CML’03).885 Moreover, the securities courts in Saudi Arabia lack not only efficient
judges, but also experienced lawyers, who are essential for the maintenance of effective
securities regulation. Additionally, despite the fact that there are special courts for the
adjudication of securities disputes, the independence of these courts and judges is
questionable. For that reason, a number of commentators confirm that ‘[t]he

884

Erik Berglöf and Stijn Claessens, 'Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing
Countries and Transition Economies' (2006) 21 World Bank Research Observer 123, 124.
885
The terms ‘sanction’ and ‘remedy’ will be interchangeably used to indicate the court’s potential
decisions as specified under art 59 of the Capital Market Law of 2003 (Saudi Arabia).
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combination of judicial independence and efficiency seems to be essential for judicial
reforms to have a positive effect on economic development.’886
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the shortcomings of the judiciary when
dealing with securities cases from the perspective of investor protection. The discussion
in this chapter will be divided into seven sections. Section 1 provides an introduction.
Section 2 outlines the objectives of the judicial enforcement of the securities laws.
Section 3 describes the judicial system for securities litigation in Saudi Arabia. Section
4 provides an evaluation of the judiciary dealing with the securities litigation. Section 5
provides an evaluation of the current performance of the securities courts in Saudi
Arabia. Section 6 discusses and evaluates the drawbacks associated with the powers of
the securities courts. Section 7 presents a summary and conclusions, which demonstrate
that the current judicial enforcement of the disclosure regime is ineffective in protecting
investors in the Saudi securities market, and reforms in this respect are of vital
importance.

8. 2 Objectives of the Judicial Enforcement of the Securities Laws
The fundamental goal of the enforcement of law is to maintain order in a country. This
is also true in relation to securities markets, which require more than just having law ‘on
the books’ in order to ensure the effective functioning for such markets. Precise
enforcement of law provides deterrence for potential violators. The quality of law
enforcement refers to the effectiveness of the judicial system in redressing the violation
of law.
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Juan Carlos Botero et al, 'Judicial Reform' (2003) 18(1) World Bank Research Observer 61, 80.
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There are different views regarding the goals of the enforcement of securities laws.
Some of the prominent goals that have been adopted by the Canadian Securities
Administrators (CSA)887 state that the purpose of enforcement of securities laws is to
‘deter wrongdoing, protect investors, and foster fair and efficient capital markets in
which investors have confidence’.888 In Australia, an empirical study found that the
central approach amongst judges regarding the goal of the enforcement of corporate law
is to ensure honesty and the compliance with standards of morality and proper conduct
in corporate activities.889 The majority of judges agreed that the primary goal of
enforcement of securities laws is the protection of the investing public. 890 Moreover,
legal practitioners consider the enforcement of securities laws ‘as a means of creating
market confidence and ensuring that business operates smoothly’.891 Furthermore,
Stigler states that ‘the goal of enforcement is to achieve that degree of compliance with
the rule of prescribed (or proscribed) behaviour that the society believes it can
afford’.892 Law and finance theory emphasises that the efficiency of the enforcement of
the law has a great influence on the development in terms of the breadth and depth of
the capital market, the efficiency of investment allocation, the nature of corporate

887

‘The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) ‘is a voluntary umbrella organization of Canada’s
provincial and territorial securities regulators whose objective is to improve, coordinate and harmonize
regulation of the Canadian capital markets’: Canadian Securities Administrators, 'Introduction to
Canadian Securities Administrators', above n 405.
888
Canadian Securities Administrators, 'Report on Enforcement Activities from April 1, 2007 to
September 30, 2007' (Report, 2007) <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/Enforcement_Report_AprSept2007_Eng.pdf> 3.
889
Roman Tomasic, 'Corporations Law Enforcement Strategies in Australia: The Influence of
Professional, Corporate and Bureaucratic Cultures' (1993) 3 Australian Journal for Corporate Law 192,
200.
890
Ibid 200–1.
891
Ibid 202.
892
George J Stigler, 'The Optimum Enforcement of Laws' in Gary S Becker and William M Landes (eds),
Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment (UMI, 1974) 55, 56.
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structures and so on.893 These, in turn, largely hinge on public confidence in the
securities market, which is again underpinned by effective enforcement.894
The above collected views suggest that the protection of investors is the main goal of
the enforcement of securities laws. This protection relies heavily on the judiciary.
Therefore, effective judicial enforcement of securities laws requires efficiency and
expertise within the judiciary system in order to produce effective protection of
investors.
In Saudi Arabia, a special judiciary has jurisdiction over all securities disputes. The
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) was established by the
CML’03 to have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes and courses of action arising under
the CML’03 and its appurtenant rules and regulations. The law grants the CRSD a broad
range of authorities and powers in order to effectively enforce the law and maintain
fairness amongst securities market participants. However, there are claims that the
judiciary is ineffective in regard to securities litigation. It is argued that an independent
and experienced judiciary for the settlement of securities disputes is of paramount
importance for judicial effectiveness. A successful legal system requires efficient and
experienced judges to promote the judicial enforcement of the law. Equally, a proper
judicial enforcement program can encourage greater adherence to the law and also boost
public confidence in the enforcement machinery.895

893

Rafael La Porta et al, 'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance', above n 19, 7.
Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine, 'Legal Institutions and Financial Development' (Working Paper
10417, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2004) 6.
895
Joan R Salzman, 'Ethics Enforcement: The New York City Experience' in Yassin El-Ayouty, Kevin J
Ford and Mark Davies (eds), Government Ethics and Law Enforcement: Towards Global Guidelines
(Praeger Publishers, 2000) 123, 136.
894

290

Chapter 8: Judicial Enforcement

8. 3 The Judicial Institutions for Securities Litigation
The CML’03 initiated special committees896 to deal with breaches of its provisions and
the rules of the CMA. These committees are quasi-judicial bodies; their decisions are
regarded as judicial rather than administrative. Their final decisions cannot be appealed
to any other judicial body.897 The independence of this judicial system for securities
litigation is regarded as the collective or institutional independence of these quasijudicial committees from the judicial branch of the government.898 Thus, these
committees have different judicial procedures from those applicable to other judicial
bodies in the country. Due to their role being essentially judicial in nature, the term
‘court’ will be used (below) in relation to them.899 The CRSD functions as the court of
first instance (or first degree court) and the Appeal Committee for the Resolution of
Securities Conflicts (ACRSC) as the appellate (or second degree) court.900 The
following will provide a description of the judicial system that governs securities
litigations.

896

The term ‘committee’ is used by the CML’03 and the CMA. In this thesis, and because of the
similarity between the roles of these committees and courts, the term ‘court’ will be used instead of
‘committee’.
897
In Saudi Arabia, there are a considerable number of quasi-judicial committees. Some of these
committees have their decisions as final, and other committees’ decisions can be appealed to another
judicial body. The reason for establishing these judicial committees is explained by Al-Ghadyan in his
study of the legal system of Saudi Arabia:
There are several administrative committees with judicial powers. These committees were established
as a result of the Shari’a Courts judges’ unwillingness to apply Government regulations, fearing that
they may contain provisions that are not in strict compliance with the Shari’a Law. Therefore,
wherever a new regulation is issued as a response to the requirement of the country’s social and
economical development, it provides for the establishment of a committee whose task is to implement
its provisions.
See Ahmed A Al-Ghadyan, 'The Judiciary in Saudi Arabia' (1998) 13 Arab Law Quarterly 235, 246–7.
898
The concept of judicial independence has two important elements: the individual independence of
judges and the collective or institutional independence of the judiciary. John Ferejohn, 'Independent
Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence' (1999) 72 Southern California Law
Review 353, 355.
899
In general, the term ‘securities courts’ will be also used to indicate the committees dealing with
disputes arising from securities market in Saudi Arabia.
900
Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts, About ACRSC (4 January 2012)
<http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Conflict/Pages/ACRSC.aspx>.
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8.3.1

Composition of the Courts Dealing with Securities Litigations

Two bodies have jurisdiction over securities disputes in Saudi Arabia. Pursuant to art 25
of the CML’03, these are the CRSD and the ACRSC. The CRSD and ACRSC are fully
independent in the discharge of their duties. Thus, pursuant to the provisions of the law,
the CRSD and ACRSC became the competent bodies for litigation related to the
resolution of cases between parties in disputes arising among investors and broker
companies as well as the regulating and executing bodies of the Exchange Market.901
8.3.1.1 Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD)
The first CRSD began operating in 2004. Article 25(a) of the CML’03 enables the CMA
to establish a committee known as the CRSD. The CRSD is a court of first instance,
composed of members who are appointed under a CMA board resolution for a
renewable three-year term.902 The law does not stipulate a particular number of CRSD
members. However, the members of these committees will be discussed separately after
highlighting the jurisdictions and powers of the CRSD.
8.3.1.1.1

Jurisdictions of the CRSD

The CRSD has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes and causes of action arising under
the CML’03 and its associated rules and regulations.903 It considers hearing all cases

901

Committees for the Resolution of Securities Disputes, Q & A (11 December 2012)
<http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Pages/QA.aspx>.
902
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 25(a)( b). CRSD first undertook its functions on 07 Dhu
al-Qa’da1425 H (19 December 2004 G.), when CMA Board decision No 2-31-2004 dated 07 Dhu alQa’da1425 H (19 December 2004 G.) was issued to appoint CRSD members for their first term. Three
were assigned as CRSD members: one is a chairman, and two are members. The assignment of all firstterm members was renewed for a second term of three years, as per decision No 1/2/2008 dated 06
Muharram 1429 H (14 January 2008 G. The assignment of all current members of the CRSD was
renewed for a further period of three years, as per CMA Board decision No 6/31/2010 dated 24 Dhu alHijja1431 H (30 November 2010 G).
903
Specifically, the CRSD ‘shall have jurisdiction over the disputes falling under the provisions of this
Law, its Implementing Regulations, and the regulations, rules, and instructions issued by the Authority
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involving the securities deposit centre,904 private causes of action under the CML’03,905
and enforcement and criminal actions brought by the CMA.
Since the CML’03 stipulates rules for various cases, the CRSD carries out its
jurisdictions to review suits in accordance with such rules. The subject matter of CRSD
jurisdictions can be summarised as follows:

i.

Review claims against decisions taken and procedures adopted by the CMA or
the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE) — such a suit is known as an ‘Administrative
Suit’;906

ii.

Review complaints arising between investors relating to the CML’03 and its
implementing regulations, as well as CMA and the SSE regulations, rules and
instructions in terms of public (filed against violators of the CML’03 and its
implementing rules as well as of CMA regulations, instructions and directives)
and private actions (filed by investors against authorised persons) — such a suit
is known as a ‘Civil Suit’;907

iii.

Consider suits brought by the CMA (as a general prosecutor) against violators of
the CML’03 and its implementing regulations — such a suit is known as a
‘Penal Suit’.908

and the Exchange, with respect to the public and private actions.’ Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi
Arabia) art 25(a).
904
Ibid art 26: The Securities Depositary Centre is the sole entity in the Kingdom authorised to practise
the operations of deposit, transfer, settlement, clearing and registering ownership of Saudi Securities
traded on the Exchange.
905
See also in ibid: Liability for material misrepresentation in a prospectus: art 55; Liability for material
misrepresentation in purchase or sale of a security: art 56; Liability for market manipulation: art 57;
Unlicensed brokers: art 60; General jurisdiction of the CRSD: art 62;
906
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes, CRSD Jurisdictions and Authorities (16 May
2012) <http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Dispute/Pages/authority.aspx>.
907
Ibid. For material defining private and public actions, see also the Committee for the Resolution of
Securities Disputes, ‘Q & A’, above n 901.
908
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes, ‘CRSD Jurisdictions and Authorities’, above n
906.
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These subject matter jurisdictions are currently exercised at a broad geographical level,
covering all the cities and governorates of Saudi Arabia,909 with the CRSD acquiring
jurisdictional competence with regard to these authorities.
8.3.1.1.2

Powers of the CRSD

The CML’03 gave the CRSD broad jurisdiction, enabling it to maximise the
performance of this jurisdiction and comprehensively review and resolve disputes.
Article 25(a) of the CML’03 states: ‘The Committee shall have all necessary powers to
investigate and settle complaints and suits, including the power to issue subpoenas,
issue decisions, impose sanctions and order the production of evidence and documents’.
The powers granted to the CRSD are as follows:910
i.

to investigate and settle complaints and suits,

ii.

to issue subpoenas,

iii.

to make and issue necessary decisions to resolve the suit,

iv.

to impose sanctions,

v.

to order the presentation of evidence and documents,

vi.

to issue a decision awarding damages, and

vii.

to request a reversion to the original status, or issue another decision as
appropriate that would guarantee the rights of the aggrieved.

909

Ibid. The geographical jurisdiction is not mentioned in the CML’03. However, art 25 of the CML’03
empowers the CRSD to have jurisdiction over all claims arising from dealings in the Saudi securities
market.
910
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes, ‘CRSD Jurisdictions and Authorities’, above n
906; Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 25.
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8.3.1.2 Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts (ACRSC)
Paragraphs (g) and (f) of art 25 of the CML’03 provide for the formation of an appeal
panel (the ‘Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts’ (ACRSC)) to
respond to requests for appeals against decisions issued by the CRSD and submitted
within 30 days from the date of notification of the decision to be appealed.
The ACRSC is formed by a resolution of a Council of Ministers and is comprised of
three members, each with a three-year renewable term, who represent the Ministry of
Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Bureau of Experts at the
Council of Ministers.911 The inaugural ACRSC commenced in 2005, when a Council of
Ministers’ resolution stipulated the membership of the ACRSC for its first term.912
The creation of the ACRSC came as an extension in order to ensure the right of litigants
involved in securities disputes to obtain a number of guarantees. Such guarantees may
include the right of appeal. Thus, the party who is unconvinced of the decision issued by
the CRSD (court of first instance) may appeal such a decision before the ACRSC
(appellate court), which consists of members different from those of the court of first
instance.
8.3.1.2.1

Jurisdictions of the ACRSC

The ACRSC is considered an extension to the subject matter jurisdiction that the CRSD
holds and as is set forth in art 25(a) of the CML’03. Thus, the ACRSC has geographical
jurisdiction, where it proceeds with a spatial jurisdiction that includes all parts of Saudi

911

Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts, ‘About ACRSC’, above n 900.
Members comprised three persons, namely a chairman and two other members: Res No 222 dated 22
Sha’ban 1426 H (26 September 2005 G). The tenure of two of the three first-term members was extended
to a second term via resolution No 328 dated 05 Dhu al-Qa’da1429 H (3 November 2008 G).

912
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Arabia.913 The ACRSC has a subject matter jurisdiction over requests for appeals of
decisions issued by the CRSD regarding complaints that arise between investors relating
to the CML’03 and its implementing regulations, as well as the CMA and the Exchange
Market regulations, rules and instructions in terms of public and private actions — such
an action is known as a ‘Civil Suit’.914 The ACRSC also considers requests for appeals
of decisions issued by the CRSD brought by the CMA against violators of the CML’03
and its implementing regulations — such an action is known as a ‘Penal Suit’.
Additionally, the ACRSC reviews requests for appeals of decisions issued by the CRSD
in terms of complaints and grievances resulting from decisions and procedures issued
by the CMA or the Exchange Market — such an action is known as an ‘Administrative
Suit’.915
8.3.1.2.2

Decisions of the ACRSC

Requests for appeal on decisions issued by CRSD are made to the ACRSC.916 Under
paragraph (g) of art 25 of the CML’03, the ACRSC may, at its discretion, choose to
(i) refuse to review a CRSD decision;
(ii) affirm the original decision; or
(iii) undertake a review (based on the record of the first instance hearing) and issue
an ‘appropriate decision’.917
The nature of the decisions of the ACRSC shall be final and cannot be appealed.918

913

Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts, Jurisdiction, Authority and Nature of
ACRSC
Decisions
(11
June
2012)
<http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Conflict/Pages/J,AandNACRSCDecisions.aspx>.
914
Ibid.
915
Ibid.
916
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 25(f).
917
Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts, ‘Jurisdiction, Authority and Nature of
ACRSC Decisions’, above n 913.
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8.3.2

Members of the CRSD and ACRSC

The above description of judicial institutions for securities litigations in Saudi Arabia
notes that there are two courts: the CRSD and the ACRSC. There are some differences
in regards to the requirements for membership of the two bodies and the processes
involved for appointment.
First, the members of the CRSD (the number members of which is unspecified) are
appointed by a decision of the CMA Board. Article 25(b) of the CML’03 defines the
requirements to become a member of the CRSD.919 Hence, the member shall be:
i.

a legal advisor who specialised in the area of securities markets;

ii.

an expert in commercial and financial matters and securities;

iii.

appointed for a three-year term;

iv.

must not have direct or indirect financial or commercial interest with the parties
to the complaint or the suit brought before the CRSD;

v.

must not have a family relationship up to the fourth degree with the parties to the
complaint or the suit brought before the CRSD.

Secondly, and in contrast with the CRSD, the CML’03 stipulates that the three members
of the ACRSC are appointed by a decision of the Council of Ministers. 920 The CML’03
does not define the specific requirements for the members of the ACRSC (other than
their representative status of particular Ministries and the Bureau of Experts). Article
25(g) states that:
i.

the ACRSC is to consist of three members;

918

Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 25(g).
Ibid art 25(b).
920
Ibid art 25(g).
919
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ii.

the three members are the representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the Bureau
of Experts and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

iii.

the members are to be appointed for a renewable three-year term.

8. 4 Evaluation of the Judiciary for the Adjudication of Securities
Litigations in Saudi Arabia
The preceding description shows that the judicial institutions having jurisdiction to deal
with securities litigations are independent of the government. The CML’03, as the sole
securities legislation, has created the securities courts and defined the jurisdictions of
those courts. The courts have both civil and criminal jurisdictions. These courts are
empowered by the CML’03 to set down appropriate compensation and penalties in all
cases brought before them, as stipulated in the pertinent laws. Moreover, these
specialised courts have absolute jurisdiction over securities cases.
However, the effectiveness of each court’s operation is important in order for it to be
able to dispense justice and maintain confidence amongst market participants. Many
have argued that the quality of justice is measured by the quality of judges. 921 It is not
just a matter of what penalties are available, but of the willingness of the judiciary to
impose them. It is also a matter of the training received for the extensive responsibilities
(outlined above) that they bear. The members of the securities courts in Saudi Arabia
have broad powers ranging from imposing monetary penalties to imprisonment.922

921

Penny J White, 'Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial Performance
Evaluations' (2002) 29 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1053, 1064.
922
In 2009, the CRSD issued a final decision of a three-month term of imprisonment against the chairman
of the board of directors of Bishah Company. The imprisonment was as result of a securities violation
(insider trading) and was the first such instance of jailing a violator of stock market rules. See Capital
Market Authority, 'Announcement Regarding Bishah Agricultural Development Corporation' (Media
Release, 13 January 2007) <http://www.cma.org.sa/Ar/News/Pages/CMA_N276.aspx> [Arabic]. He was
also fined SAR 52,690 and banned from working with any listed firm for 5 years: Reuters Staff, 'Saudi
Court Gives First Jail Term for Stock Market Violation', Reuters (online), 18 August 2009
<http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2009/08/18/saudi-court-gives-first-jail-term-for-
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Therefore, the members of the securities courts in Saudi Arabia have extensive powers
given to them by the CML’03.
Any evaluation of the efficiency of the securities courts requires an analysis of the
adequacy of the judges who administer the justice, in terms of their numbers as well as
training. In Saudi Arabia, although the CML’03 established specialised courts to have
exclusive jurisdiction over breaches of the CML’03 and the regulations and rules issued
by the CMA, shortcomings persist. Thus, the sufficiency and efficiency of the judiciary
with respect to securities cases will be investigated in order to demonstrate that the
securities courts in Saudi Arabia are both insufficient and inefficient.
8.4.1

Insufficient Number of Courts Dealing with Securities Cases

The earlier description shows that there are special courts in place to deal with securities
cases. Decisions of these courts are final and cannot be appealed in any other judicial
body. Both the first-instance court (the CRSD) and, the appellate court (the ACRSC)
presently consist of three members. Despite the growing securities market and
burgeoning economy, there is only one first-instance court located in Riyadh (the capital
city of Saudi Arabia), as well as a single appellate court also located in that same city.923
That there are no other such courts in the other cities of the country can be considered to
be a significant obstacle for those market victims who cannot afford the travel costs to
make a claim for their loss or damage.924 Providing equal access to justice, regardless of

stock-market-violation/>. In another decision, the CRSD required an accused person to pay to the CMA’s
account the gains that resulted from violations, amounting to SAR 16,837,224 (USD 4,489,387). See
CRSD Decision No 43/L/D1/2006 of 1427 H issued 1 September 2006 G.
923
In 2010, the population of Riyadh region reached 6.8 million, which represented 25% of the total
population of the country: Central Department of Statistics and Information Saudi Arabia, above n 59.
924
Any person who is directly involved in the case or has an interest in it, may file it to CRSD in person
at any given stage from filing and pleading before the court up to the handing over of decision. He may
appoint others to file the case on his behalf during any of the case stages. See Committee for the
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geographical location, is significant in order to achieve a quality justice system.925
Without such access, victims may become reluctant to lodge their claim or may not be
able to claim for their loss or damages, and wrongdoers thus escape their liabilities.
Having just one bench of three members to deal with all securities allegations arising
from the market can impair the effectiveness of judicial enforcement of securities laws
in general, and of the disclosure regime in particular.926 A former general legal advisor
of the CMA commented that as the CMA is responsible for the establishment and
formation of courts for securities disputes and provides the financial support for these
courts, there should be securities courts in all regions of the country rather than there
being just one court located in Riyadh.927 He suggested that having extra securities
courts in different regions would foster investor confidence and increase investment in
the market.928
For instance, in Australia, securities cases can be heard in the State courts and the
Federal and family courts under the general cross-vesting legislation at Federal level
that is complemented by legislation in every state and the Northern Territory. 929 The
original rationale for the cross-vesting scheme is still relevant: it provides ‘a beneficial
facility … for the efficient use of hard-pressed resources and the reduction of

Resolution of Securities Disputes, Manual: Litigation in Securities Disputes (11 June 2012)
<http://www.crsd.org.sa/Documents/Manual-Litigation%20in%20Securities%20Disputes.pdf> 4.
925
Larry R Spain, 'The Opportunities and Challenges of Providing Equal Access to Justice in Rural
Communities' (2001) 28 William Mitchell Law Review 367, 367.
926
The following Section 8.5 demonstrates the poor performance of the securities courts in Saudi Arabia.
927
Abdullah Albsalei, 'Legal Excesses by the CMA Lead to Investors Fleeing', Aleqtisadiah (online), 26
November 2011 <http://www.aleqt.com/2011/11/26/article_601506.html> [Arabic].
928
Ibid.
929
This was upheld in a series of cases including Gould v Brown (1998) 15 ACLC 316, 346; although the
constitutionality of a number of elements was later challenged in other cases, including Wakim and
Hughes, where the authors cite Re Hakim (1999) 17 ACLC 1055 and R v Hughes (2000) 18 ACLC 394:
This led to further legislative change as detailed in Tomasic, Bottomley and McQueen, above n 545, 27–
8.
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inconvenience, delay and cost to litigants’.930 It is particularly applicable in the Saudi
Arabian legal context as the country lacks physical infrastructure and enjoys perhaps the
advantage of not having the additional complexities provided by a federal system.
Accessibility of courts is vital to ensure legal redress for victims of violations of
securities laws.
It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia has recognised the problem, with its legal system
having been recently improved in respect to the laws governing the judiciary. The Law
of Judiciary 2007931 (LJ’07) was implemented to foster the fair demographical
distribution of judges and courts across all provinces in order to satisfy an essential
element of judicial effectiveness.932 In terms of securities related matters, however,
despite the CML’03 establishing special courts for such cases, an insufficient number of
courts and judges continues to persist, as is evidenced by the description and
composition of these courts as provided in art 25 of the CML’03.
Although the CML’03 does not fix a specified number of CRSD members, there is just
one court of three members, who administer justice in relation to securities cases.
Considering the high importance of the first-instance court, the need for a sufficient
number of judges (and courts) to ensure the effective delivery of justice is evident.933
Hence, it is argued that successful judicial enforcement requires sufficient numbers of

930

Gould v Brown (1998) 15 ACLC 316, 377 (Kirby, J); Tomasic, Bottomley and McQueen, above n
545, 76.
931
The Law of Judiciary 2007 (Saudi Arabia) Royal Decree No. M/78 (19 Ramadan 1428 H, 1 October
2007) OG Umm al-Qura No 4170 (30 Ramadan 1428 H, 12 October 2007). The Law of Judiciary
contains several sections covering various aspects of the judicial system, such as provisions securing the
independence and impartiality of the courts, the types of courts and their jurisdiction, the judges, their
appointment and promotions, the role of the Ministry of Justice, etc. For more details, see Ansary, above
n 76.
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judges and courts to deal with cases arising from the daily operation of the market. In
2010, the then Chief Justice of California (in the US) pointed to ‘the lack of available
courtrooms and judges was attributable to the Legislature’s failure to provide a number
of judges and courtrooms sufficient to meet the rapidly growing population’ in a
particular area of that state.934 This failure had led to problems with the administration
of justice as a number of criminal cases had to be dismissed on the basis that the
defendants had not enjoyed their constitutional right to a speedy trial. 935 Moreover,
providing ‘justice for all’ is more important than the cost of operating more courts. A
comparative study of efficient judicial administration has considered that the number of
judges is an important element in such efficiency. 936 The number of judges must be
consistent with the number required to process the cases.
Furthermore, it can be said that having a sufficient number of judges has become
imperative in a fast-growing market such as the SSE in order to handle the number of
disputes arising from the market’s day-to-day operations.937 In addition, facilitating
access to the courts is a significant factor in measuring the effectiveness of the judiciary
system. Hence, ensuring the effectiveness of the enforcement of securities laws is one of
the important principles of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions
(‘IOSCO’). For this reason, IOSCO confirms that access to courts, or other mechanisms
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of disputes resolution, has to be available for investors who become victims of breaches
of securities laws.938
In addition, it has been observed that the CML’03 contains statutory requirements that
apply to the potential members of the CRSD. In contrast, and despite the fact that the
ACRSC is a higher court, there are no specific statutory qualifications required to be
held by the members of this appellate court. To provide equal access to securities and
facilitate claims of civil liabilities for victims of defective disclosures, it would be
suggested that the number of courts and judges be increased.
8.4.2 Shortcomings in the Judicial Independence of the Securities Courts
The independence of the judiciary is the foundation of justice. It means that judges
should be free to make impartial decisions based solely on fact and law without such
judges being subject to any interference or influence. The delivery of justice may
become difficult if judges lack independence. Handsley declares that ‘[j]udicial
independence serves the rule of law by protecting judicial processes from improper
influence’.939 With this in mind, it can be argued that the members of the securities
courts in Saudi Arabia are not independent in their administration of law. This argument
can be accurately based on the absence of specific provisions in the CML’03 in regard
to the independence of judges of the securities courts. Although these courts are
considered to have finality in their decisions and thus to be immune to any review by
any judicial authority, the Saudi Arabian Basic Law of Governance 1992 (BLG’92),
which declares independence of the Judiciary, does not apply to these securities
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committees.940 In fact, the BLG’92 does not identify these courts as part of the judicial
authority.941 These securities committees are established by the CML’03 which gives
them the jurisdiction over all disputes arising from the securities dealings.
Equally important, judicial accountability is significant in maintaining judges’
awareness of their administration of law. ‘Accountability’ refers to the obligation of
public officials to explain, justify and legitimise the use of power in discharging public
duties.942 Akkas notes that the accountability of judges may be ensured in a number of
ways: public exposure of judicial functions (including public reporting of decisions);
reasons being supplied for judicial decisions; appellate process; discipline of judges;
and scrutiny by lawyers.943 There are no such provisions in the CML’03 that relate to
the members of the securities courts in Saudi Arabia. Judicial accountability has a
considerable impact on the balance between judicial independence and impartial justice.
In this respect, Shetreet strongly argues that ‘[j]udicial independence cannot be
maintained without judicial accountability for failure, errors or misconduct’.944
Moreover, White points out that ‘[a] judge remains accountable to the fair application of
the law regardless of the judge's endorsement of or belief in the law’. 945 However, it is
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss possible ways of ensuring judicial
accountability that can be applied to the members of securities courts in Saudi Arabia.
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On the other hand, the LJ’07 aims to provide judicial independence and to ensure
protection for the judges in general courts.946 In contrast to the requirements that exist
for judicial independence in the general courts, the requirements for members of
securities courts do not require the members be independent, nor to not take any other
jobs in the government or in the private sector.947 In fact, the current situation is that the
members of the securities courts in Saudi Arabia hold the position of judge, as well as
engaging in other employment and activities in both the government and private sector.
This situation clearly is at odds with perceptions of judicial independence from
government or private interest. The concept of judicial independence requires that
judges should not be subject to control by the political branches of government and that
they should enjoy protection from any threats, interference, or manipulation which may
affect them to unjustly favour party against another.948 Nor should there be any possible
perception of that they might be subject to such control or influence. This can also be
said in regard to any relation to the private sector (for example, acting as an advisor or
engaging in any employment).
The principles of judicial ethics require that a judge be a full-time salaried position and
not to receive money from any other form of employment. 949 Moreover, a study on
judicial ethics affirmed the principle of judge’s independence by stating that ‘unlike the
legal practitioner, the judge must be independent of governments, institutions and
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individuals and must be impartial in the discharge of his or her adjudicative
responsibilities’.950
A further issue is that although LJ’07 sets down the requirements for the appointment of
judges at all court levels, these requirements do not apply to the members of the
securities courts in Saudi Arabia. More importantly, there is no statutory protection for
the members of courts in their administration of law in the CML’03, which works
against the principle of judicial independence.951 The necessary protection should be
given to the members of the securities courts, as these protections are already afforded
to judges of the general courts in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the negative impact on
judges of not having sufficient protection can be also reflected on litigants who are
looking for a fair and quick trial. For that reason, Williams declared that ‘[adequate]
constitutional protection must be afforded judicial office and adequate remuneration, as
[t]hese protections allow judges to deal with all cases that come before them without
having to worry about the security of their office, or having their pay reduced, if
decisions unfavourable to the government are made’.952
In contrast, the judiciary in Saudi Arabia aims for judicial independence, providing
sufficient guarantees for the judges and their functions, which allow judges (other than
those in the securities court) to carry out justice ‘without fear or favour’, that is, without
the threat of outside intervention or influence or the offer of inducements. As Ferejohn
points out, ‘[I]nstitutional judicial independence is, however, a complex value in that it
really cannot be seen as something valuable in itself; … [r]ather, it is instrumental to the
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pursuit of other values, such as the rule of law or constitutional values’.953 Therefore,
the LJ’07 provides a number of judicial protections for judges, such as: protection from
dismissal,954 protection from administrative controls and bias,955 and judicial
immunity.956 In all cases, the Supreme Judicial Council has complete power over the
protections afforded to judges.957 This is a marked advance on the previous provisions,
yet these provisions still do not apply to members of the CRSD or the ACRSC.
Consequently, it can be clearly said that the current judicial system for the settlement of
securities disputes has shortcomings in relation to the independence and effectiveness of
the judges and courts in Saudi Arabia. The above discussion has clearly shown that
despite the need for members of the CRSD and ACRSC to be independent in their
administration of justice, no provision has been made in law that would match the
provisions for judges in other courts.
8.4.3

Need for Efficient Judges in the Securities Courts

Having independent and sufficient courts is not enough for proper judicial enforcement.
In fact, providing justice under any law requires a clear understanding of that law. In
respect of the securities literature, which is highly complex and technical, advanced
knowledge of law and proper training are imperative.958 Therefore, adequate training,
experience and knowledge is essential for proper adjudication of contraventions of
securities laws.

953

Ferejohn, above n 898, 353.
The Law of Judiciary 2007 (Saudi Arabia) arts 2 and 3.
955
Ibid art 57.
956
Ibid art 4.
957
The Supreme Judicial Council is the highest authority in the current judicial system in Saudi Arabia.
For more details about the composition, jurisdictions and powers of the Supreme Judicial Council, see
arts 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Law of Judiciary 2007 (Saudi Arabia); Ansary, above n 76.
958
James H Lorie, Peter Dodd and Mary Hamilton Kimpton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence
(Dow Jones-Irwin, 2nd ed, 1985) viii (Foreword).
954

307

Chapter 8: Judicial Enforcement

The earlier description of the members of the securities courts shows that the court of
first instance, the CRSD, will consist of ‘legal advisors specialised in the doctrine of
transactions and capital markets, and experts in commercial and financial affairs and
Securities’.959 On the other hand, the ACRSC (the appellate securities court, which is
the highest securities court) does not specify either specific requirements or
qualifications for its members.960 This is despite the fact that the ACRSC is empowered
to affirm or refute the lower court’s finding, or refuse to review the case (based on the
record at the hearing before the CRSD), and to issue a decision that is considered
final.961
In a democracy, the judiciary has the responsibility to uphold the legislation and, where
it may appear unclear (perhaps in a new or different situation), interpret it by
determining the intention of the legislator. Interpretation is required to ensure whether
the act in question constitutes a violation of the law in question. The judiciary has a duty
to deliver justice to the litigants in terms of the legislation before it and may call upon
precedents to assist in the decision-making.962 Efficient courts are required to provide
the correct interpretation of the law and a fair trial for the litigants.
Weak judicial enforcement can be a considerable obstacle to the functioning of
securities laws and ‘can hobble the enforcement of corporate law in emerging
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markets’.963 For that reason, it is said that ‘[i]f a judge lacks adequate knowledge,
efficiency, integrity and honesty, it may result in miscarriage of justice’. 964 It can also
result in parties not being treated fairly in accordance with the law and the handing
down of decisions which are not of relevance to the matters before the court.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the lack of experienced and well-trained judges may
undermine the enforcement of securities laws. For instance, a judge may be mistaken in
his interpretation of the law, which in turn may lead to unclear rulings that vaguely
identify the persons who are liable for the contravention in question. Such a vague case
law decision can advantage the defendants. Moreover, an unclear understanding of a
law may lead to a wrong judgment or the inappropriate imposition of the lowest or
maximum penalty allowed by the law. In addition, an inefficient judge may cause a
delay in the delivery of justice as he struggles with the complexity of the law and the
matter before him.
Taking into the consideration the above implications of ineffective judges in the fair
administration of justice, it can be said that well-trained, efficient judges are needed for
a successful investor protection regime in the securities market.
The nature of securities disputes requires a professional and specialised body which
performs efficiently and expeditiously. It is always argued that a specialised court is
ideal for the enforcement of securities law because experienced and trained judges are
important for the purpose of effective judicial enforcement.965
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Fair administration of justice is the key to a successful judiciary. Education and training
are two requirements that are essential for achieving efficiency in any profession. In
addition, potential judges who have prior legal practice experience can be more efficient
than those who have not. In Saudi Arabia, holding a formal legal qualification is not
compulsory for a person willing to be appointed as a member of the higher securities
court (the ACRSC) yet this body has the power to impose a penalty of imprisonment for
up to five years.966
Not only do members of the ACRSC lack a law degree, neither are they required to
have the proper training for and experience of being a judge. It is agreed that
professional background is an important element in the appointment of judges. A recent
US study found that 64 per cent of all justices appointed to the Supreme Court of the
United States had a variety of prior experiences, such as, as attorneys in private practice
and as judges in lower courts.967 Moreover, the study showed that experience in private
practice, judicial experience and educational backgrounds are viewed as significant in
terms of requirements for those to be appointed judges of the Supreme Court.968
Another study found out that ‘a quality education and extensive prior legal and judicial
experience are reasonable indicators of likely judicial expertise and potential for quality
judicial work’.969
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Judges who have a legal background coupled with sufficient experience are also more
able to avoid delay in the delivery of justice. Shleifer points out that ‘[i]n some areas,
even with expert advice, it might take a judge an enormous effort to understand liability
and damages’.970 Tomasic concludes with the view that the judges need to be
experienced in the adjudication of complex securities cases in a timely way. 971 This
reveals the necessity for sophisticated judges to deal with cases of securities issues.
Thus, the presence of qualified judges is imperative in ensuring the effectiveness of the
enforcement of securities laws. In this regard, Black calls for ‘[a] judicial system that:
(a) is honest; (b) is sophisticated enough to understand complex self-dealing
transactions; (c) can intervene quickly when needed to prevent asset stripping; and (d)
produces decisions without intolerable delay’.972 This shows the importance of having
qualified judges to deal with the difficulty and complexity of securities laws.
Based on the above, it can be said that efficient judges for adjudication of securities
litigations are of paramount importance if there is going to be a successful judicial
enforcement of securities laws. Judges with training for and experience on the bench,
coupled with relevant legal education and prior legal practice, are needed to ensure
proper and fair judgements in securities disputes. In Saudi Arabia, the inadequate
performance of the securities court implies that the judges lack practical experience in
dealing with cases involving disclosure allegations.973 Additionally, the appointment of
members needs to be in accordance with certain designated criteria. The absence of such
criteria becomes more evident in the case of the appellate court. However, the judiciary
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in Saudi Arabia is not only short of efficient judges but also the experienced lawyers
necessary for the efficient enforcement of securities laws.
8.4.4

Lack of Lawyers Skilled in Dealing with Securities Litigation

Lawyers have an essential role to play in the judicial system. Efficient lawyers are an
important part of the enforcement process of securities laws.974 Thus, there is a need for
experienced and trained lawyers as they are important for successful judicial
enforcement. In Saudi Arabia, the lack of case law regarding defective disclosures
reveals that the enforcement of securities laws and related court and legal practice is a
relatively new or unusual phenomenon for the courts and, therefore, for lawyers. As a
result, it is to be expected that lawyers in Saudi Arabia would be lacking in critical
knowledge regarding securities laws. Currently, no universities in Saudi Arabia offer a
formal degree or diploma program in the field of securities regulation. Neither do any
law schools in the country provide teaching or training in securities law to any
appreciable extent. The business and economics colleges merely teach securities
markets as a part of a subject in their curricula, but they teach it from business and
economics perspectives.
Law schools in Saudi Arabia teach the subject ‘Company Law’ without any particular
focus on its significance in respect to the securities markets. Besides, despite its being
taught as a single subject as part of a law degree majoring in commercial law, the
subject does not deal with the securities laws or instruct students in regard to the
provisions of the CML’03. In addition, the subject as taught does not deal in particular
with civil liabilities arising from the violation of the disclosure requirements. Therefore,
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law graduates have a serious lack of knowledge about securities markets and their
regulation. The lack of a degree with particular focus on securities laws and relevant
knowledge may be discouraging those who would otherwise consider undertaking
higher degree programs in the field of securities regulation. Accordingly, carrying out
in-depth research in securities laws may be impeded. The lack of such training is also an
impediment to the development of the market and the protection of investors as those
lawyers who be called upon to act as legal advisors to companies may not be equipped
with the requisite knowledge to best undertake their role in relation to the issuance of a
prospectus, periodic reports and the like, or to be able to guide company directors and
executive officers and others in their responsibilities regarding disclosures (which have
been touched upon earlier).
In Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that the Code of Law Practice 2001 (CLP’01)975 exists
to govern the profession of legal practice and representation, there is no bar council for
legal practitioners. In fact, there is no single statutory body for the regulation of the
legal profession in the country. The Ministry of Justice administers the legal profession,
which is contrary to the fostering of independence of the profession.
As of August 2011, there are 1611 lawyers registered in the records of practising
lawyers in the Ministry of Justice.976 This number of lawyers is relatively small
compared to the country’s population of 27 million.977 The lack of lawyers, together
with the absence of an independent bar council, may have a negative impact on the legal
975
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profession in Saudi Arabia. Several experts in the legal profession in Saudi Arabia
confirm that the lack of lawyers may delay the delivery of justice, as well as impair
plaintiff’s rights.978
In light of the current situation in Saudi Arabia, there are several factors undermining
legal practice in the country. Some of the most important of them are mentioned below:
i.

Law schools are not attractive to students, which has led to a shortage of lawyers
and law degree holders;

ii.

Bar associations are absent;

iii.

No proper protections are provided to lawyers, neither by the law maker or the
government;

iv.

There is an absence of legal training programs to ensure lawyers are qualified to
practise law efficiently;

v.

A low fee structure in comparison with neighbouring countries acts as a
disincentive.979

Furthermore, the need for a constructive role for lawyers becomes more evident in
relation to the interpretation of laws. Because of the complexity of court operations and
securities cases, courts may rely on the exploration of laws by lawyers who could be
paid for discharging their professional responsibilities in such a manner, especially in
light of the lack of formal training and experience being required of judges in securities
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matters, especially in the appellate court. In this regard, Shleifer points out that ‘[w]hen
issues are complex, courts rely on experts to interpret contracts and testify as to
appropriate precautions, remedies, and damages.’980 It is submitted that appropriately
trained and experienced lawyers could fulfil that role. In this respect the universities
might reconsider their course structure and content to ensure an even better class of
graduate, and offer improved post-graduate training to better fit them for tasks they may
encounter as corporate lawyers in the commercial sector or in the court sector itself,
particularly in relation to the CRSD and ACRSC. Lawyers need to be experienced and
trained to deal with complicated cases and to seek judicial favour (in terms of outcomes
for clients or as associates to judges) not simply enlightenment.981
Lawyers are actively involved in the judicial system and judges are in need of efficient
lawyers to assist them in their administration of justice. Hence, it can be reiterated that
experienced and trained lawyers can play an important role in the enforcement of
securities laws.
In Saudi Arabia, the above discussion shows that drawbacks continue to persist in
respect of the legal profession and legal practice. In particular, the lack of experienced
and trained lawyers is unfavourable in regard to the effective judicial enforcement of
securities laws.
Consequently, it can be said that the lack of laws governing the securities courts and
their members is undermining the fair judicial enforcement of securities laws in Saudi
Arabia. Hence, arguably these weaknesses have an adverse impact on investor
protection.
980
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8. 5 Evaluation of the Current Performance of the Securities Courts in
Saudi Arabia
Successful enforcement requires an efficient judiciary to deal with contraventions of
securities laws. In fact, courts perform important public functions and therefore the
quality of their work is fundamental for the delivery of justice. Thus, it is necessary to
evaluate the effectiveness of the current securities courts in Saudi Arabia. The
measurement of the performance of the securities courts is crucial to finding out
whether the current courts are operating efficiently or not.
Although there are special courts for securities market disputes in Saudi Arabia, there is
a need for judicial reforms in order to have effective enforcement of the securities laws.
This recommendation is based on the weak performance of the securities courts in Saudi
Arabia. Despite the need that the first instance court has to be more effective in dealing
with cases and in delivering justice within a reasonable time, the performance of the
CRSD is weak in practice.
Article 25(b) the CML’03 states that ‘[t]he Committee must start considering the
complaint or the suit within a period not to exceed fourteen days from the date of filing
of the complaint or the suit with the Committee’. Nevertheless, the CRSD takes far
longer than the time stipulated to make a judgment on a case. From the CRSD’s
commencement in December 2004 until 2011, its performance has been criticised.
According the chart below, in 2005 and 2006, the level of functioning of the court was
reasonably high; however, the function of the CRSD decreased significantly thereafter.
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Figure 8.8: Number of Cases Filed with the CRSD and Finalised in the Year they
were Lodged.

Source: Capital Market Authority982
According to the annual reports released by the CMA, there were just 38 civil suits
finalised out of the 211 civil suits filed during 2009 and 2010. These figures
demonstrate the weak performance of the CRSD. In addition, the performance of the
ACRSC is no better than that of the CRSD. For example, there were 75 decisions issued
out of 187 appealed cases in 2009.983
Accordingly, it can be reasonably argued that although the law stipulates a fixed
period984 for the disposal of a case commenced before the CRSD, the number of
resolved cases is very low when compared with the number of cases lodged within the
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same period. These facts lead to questions about the efficiency of the CRSD, which is
the court of first instance and supposed to be active and effective in dispensing
decisions in regard to securities disputes. In addition, this may reflect that the case
management by a judge may be poor in respect of both prioritising and resolving the
cases. Moreover, it is not clear if although there are only three judges, whether they sit
individually and not as a panel.
The delay in the disposal of cases has a negative impact on the litigants as well as on
public confidence in the judiciary. The wrongdoers may also double their gains from the
violation that they committed in the interim; while, on the other hand, the plaintiff may
become ever more desperate to obtain compensation for their loss or damage resulting
from the violation. In addition, public confidence in the judiciary decreases, as is
evident from the lack of people’s desire to bring an action to the court.
As noted above, the judiciary dealing with securities cases requires improvements in
order to provide justice to all litigants. It is important that the delivery of judgments be
both speedy and cost-effective — these are two important elements of an efficient
judiciary. Thus, the blame substantially rests with the courts, which have the
responsibility to apply the applicable laws, and involve matters such as court funding,
provision of adequate training of personnel and so forth. For that reason, Pistor
comments that the effectiveness of any good law depends mainly on the efficacy of its
enforcement institutions.985
With this in mind, it can be said that the current judiciary for the adjudication of
securities cases requires significant improvements to deal effectively with the cases
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lodged and avoid delay in delivering judgments. This can be done by increasing the
number of judges and by imparting appropriate training to them. Having one firstinstance court with just three judges to deal with all cases arising from the securities
market is regarded as a big obstacle to the effectiveness of judicial enforcement. On the
other hand, judges also need to be properly trained in order to improve their efficiency.
The existence of rules, criteria and methodology for ascertaining the quality and
performance of judges is crucial to bringing about improvement in the judiciary in
whole.986 In Saudi Arabia, assessments of the current securities courts and judges are
yet to be determined. The lack of sufficient and accurate information on the
performance of the securities courts can make the assessment issue difficult. But it is
crucial, for — as a comparative study on the efficiency in judicial administration
concludes — ‘information on the court performance can assist in promoting greater
confidence in the rule of law as well as the economy’.987
Similarly, Jackson and Roe state that ‘[i]t would, moreover, be useful to collect
information on the actual enforcement activities undertaken in each jurisdiction: how
many cases prosecuted per year; how many sanctions imposed and with what level of
monetary penalty’.988
In addition, the public have no knowledge with respect to the criteria that is used to
select the members of the securities courts, nor on what basis or qualifications they have
been chosen. Mahony pointed out that in order to maintain accountability of the
986

Penny J White, above n 921, 1068. In the US, in addition to the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges of 1973, there is Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Performance adopted in 1985 in order
to enhance judicial performance. For more details, see United States Courts, 'Code of Conduct for United
States
Judges'
(2
June
2011)
<http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf>.
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Dakolias, above n 936.
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Jackson and Roe, above n 675, 237.
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judiciary, the public must be involved in evaluating judicial performance.989 Hence,
public scrutiny is recommended to enhance judicial enforcement.990
On the basis of the above, it can be clearly said that the judicial enforcement of
securities laws in Saudi Arabia is weak. It has been demonstrated that the performance
and effectiveness of the securities courts in Saudi Arabia is poor. Thus, the current state
of the enforcement of securities laws is unfavourable to investor protection in the Saudi
securities market.

8. 6 Suits Brought by the Securities Regulators on Behalf of Investors
The CMA is entitled to lodge civil suits on behalf of investors who have suffered loss or
damage as a result of the violation of the provisions of the CML’03 and the rules of the
CMA and the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE).991 The CMA has expanded its powers to
seek recoveries on behalf of investors. In this regard, art 59(a) of the CML’03 provides
that:
If it appears to the Authority that any person has engaged, is engaging, or is about
to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provisions of this Law,
or the regulations or rules issued by the Authority, or the regulations of the
Exchange, the Authority shall have the right to bring a legal action before the
Committee to seek an order for the appropriate sanction. The sanctions include the
following:
1. Warning the person concerned.
2. Obliging the person concerned to cease or refrain from carrying out the act
which is the subject of the suit.
3. Obliging the person concerned to take the necessary steps to avert the violation,
or to take such necessary corrective steps to address the results of the violation.

989

Anne Rankin Mahoney, 'Citizen Evaluation of Judicial Performance: The Colorado Experience' (1989)
72 Judicature 211, 216.
990
Stephen J Choi, Mitu Gulati and Eric A Posner, 'Judicial Evaluations and Information Forcing:
Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges' (2009) 58 Duke Law Journal 1313, 1317.
991
These provisions certainly include disclosure requirements and rules provided under the Capital
Market Law of 2003 (Saudi Arabia) and the Capital Market Authority regulations and rules.
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4. Indemnifying the persons who have suffered damages as a consequence of a
violation that has occurred, or obliging the violator to pay to the Authority’s
account the gains realized as a consequence of such violation.
5. Suspending the trading in the Security.
6. Barring the violating person from acting as a broker, portfolio manager or
investment adviser for such period of time as is necessary for the safety of the
market and the protection of investors.
7. Seizing and executing on property.
8. Travel ban.
9. Barring from working with companies whose Securities are traded on the
Exchange.

Article 59 of the CML’03 resembles § 21(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934
(US) (SEA’34) , but with less specificity.992 In this situation, the CMA may seek a court
order against the violator. The CMA carries the burden of proof in every case on behalf
the public. The CRSD is empowered to impose a wide variety of sanctions/remedies.993
Moreover, art 59(b) of the CML’03 states that, upon a request from the CMA, the
CRSD has the power to impose a fine against any person responsible for knowingly
violating the law or any rule.994 It should be noted that s 128 of the Securities Act of
1990 (Ontario) (SA’90) provides similar court remedies to those of the CML’03.995

992

Securities Exchange Act 1934 (US) § 21(d)(1) provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to engage in
acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this title, the rules or regulations
thereunder, the rules of a national securities exchange or registered securities association …. it
may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, or the United States courts of any territory or
other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States … to enjoin such acts or practices, and
upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted
without bond. The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such
acts or practices as may constitute a violation of any provision of this title or the rules or
regulations thereunder to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary
criminal proceedings under this title.
993
The terms ‘sanction’ and remedy’ will be interchangeably used to indicate the court’s potential
decisions as specified under art 59 of the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia).
994
Ibid art 59(b).
995
Section 128(1) of the Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) provides: ‘The Commission may apply to the
Superior Court of Justice for a declaration that a person or company has not complied with or is not
complying with Ontario securities law’. Thus, the court is empowered to impose variety of remedies
against the violator. See also s 128(3), which authorises the court, at the request of the Commission to
‘make any order that the court considers appropriate against the person or company’.

321

Chapter 8: Judicial Enforcement

However, under art 59 of the CML’03, it can be clearly seen that the CRSD has the
power to enforce the securities laws by way of a variety of statutory remedies against
wrongdoers. Moreover, art 59 encompasses both types of remedies: legal and equitable
which are discussed in the next section. The CMA has the power to take action to the
court to seek an order for appropriate sanctions against the violators. The above article
is to be applied to any contraventions within the provisions of the CML’03 and the
regulation and rules of the CMA and the SSE.
8.6.1

An Outline of the Current Securities Court’s Remedial Powers Provisions

The CRSD can make orders on the following: compensation, monetary fine, injunction,
specific performance/rectification, account of profit, trading suspension, barring the
violator from acting as a broker, seizing property, imposing a travel ban and barring the
broker from working with companies whose securities are traded on the Exchange.
Under art 59 of the CML’03, remedial powers of the court are available. The court has
the jurisdiction to deal with the civil suits brought by the securities regulators on behalf
of investors. The following section highlights the court remedies against the violators of
the law, rules and regulation of the securities market. In order to do so, the court’s
potential remedies will be divided to two categories; legal remedies and equitable
remedies.
8.6.1.1 The Legal Remedies
The legal remedies available under the CML’03 are the compensation order and
monetary fine.
8.6.1.1.1

A Compensation Order
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Article 59(a)(4) of the CML ‘03 allows the court to order the violator to ‘[i]ndemnify
the persons who have suffered damages as a consequence of a violation that has
occurred’. This remedy aims to recover investors’ losses and damages resulting from a
violation of the securities laws and regulations. Therefore, this provision can be applied
in instances of contraventions of the disclosure regime. The compensation is ordered by
the CRSD after being initially requested by the CMA. The CRSD can subsequently
impose a compensation order on the wrongdoer.
However, it has not been customary for such cases to be brought by the CMA on behalf
of the investors who have sustained loss or damage due to violation of disclosure
requirements. Despite the CMA having the power to sue the violator in order to obtain
compensation for aggrieved investors, the use of this power is almost non-existent. The
above provision is unclear regarding the recompense of injured investors. The CMA has
a significant role to play, as the CMA is required to protect the investors, to uncover any
violations of the law and to specify the investors who have been victims. The remedy of
a compensation order needs further interpretation in order to strengthen the civil liability
regime, foster confidence among investors and clarify the role of the CMA powers to
sue wrongdoers.
8.6.1.1.2

A Monetary Fine

In addition to this, in art 59 (b), the CMA can request the imposition of a monetary fine
against liable persons appearing before the CRSD. The CRSD has the power to levy a
fine of between SAR 10,000 and SAR 100,000 (between USD 2,666 and USD 26,660)
against any person liable for knowingly violating the law or any associated rule.
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The CMA may request that the CRSD fine the violators. For instance, in a case brought
by the CMA against a violator who manipulated other investors to buy shares in a
certain company, the CRSD imposed a fine of SAR 100,000.996 The remedy of a
monetary fine is only issued by the CRSD as an additional sanction for those who have
deliberately violated the law of its rules, and imposes it as an extra deterrent for those
who may consider doing such activities. However, many market participants have
recently raised questions regarding the fines issued by the CRSD. 997 While the CRSD
requires the accused person to pay the fines to the CMA’s account, the harmed investors
will receive no compensation.
8.6.1.2 Equitable Remedies
Generally, in common law countries equitable remedies are more frequently granted
than legal remedies.998 According to paras 1–9 of art 59(a) of the CML’03, there are
several equitable remedies available for the court in regard to the violators. They are:
injunction, specific performance, rectification, account of profit, trading suspension,
barring the violator from acting as a broker, seizing property, imposition of a travel ban
and barring the broker from working with companies whose securities are traded on the
SSE.
The first is an injunction.999 The CMA can seek an injunction before the CRSD for
imposition on persons who have violated the CML’03 or the CMA regulations and
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CRSD Decision No 9/L/D1/2006 of 1426 H Issued 1 January 2006. In addition, the CRSD barred him
from trading in the securities market for three years.
997
Mohammed Alhilali, 'Analysts: Capital Market Authority Is in Need of Reforms', Aleqtisadiah
(online), 3 December 2011 <http://www.aleqt.com/2011/12/03/article_603590.html> [Arabic].
998
David Wright, Remedies, above n 684, 3.
999
Commonly injunctions are defined as a court order (exercising the equitable jurisdiction), which
restrains the defendant from carrying out, or commands the defendant to perform, a specific act. See
Cossins, above n 683, 631.
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rules. The CRSD has the power to warn the person who is the subject of the disclosure
violations. In addition, an injunction can become a court order to prevent the perpetrator
of the violation from continuing the act in question. Despite the Saudi law being direct
here, there are not sufficient details about the injunction criteria.
Although the CML’03 stipulates that the exclusive jurisdiction to grant injunctions is
with the CRSD, the CMA has also exercised this remedy. 1000 This contradiction in the
role of the CMA is considered as a weakness of this remedy. It arises from the principle
that injunctions are always granted at the discretion of the courts.1001
The second court remedy is specific performance.1002 The CRSD has the power to order
a specific performance by persons in order to avoid their committing a violation.1003
Article 59(a)(3) of the CML’03 states that specific performance involves ‘[o]bliging the
person concerned to take the necessary steps to avert the violation’. According to this
provision, the specific performance remedy is an obligation placed on the person in
order to avoid committing a violation. The serious dearth of cases concerning the
remedy of specific performance deserves a further investigation; however, it is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
The third court remedy is rectification. This remedy differs from the specific
performance remedy, the major difference being that a rectification remedy always

1000

The Capital Market Authority (Saudi Arabia) warned Tihama Advertising & Public Relations; this
warning was about breaching art 26 of Listing Rules 2004 (Saudi Arabia). The breach was that it did not
adhere to annual financial statement requirements for fiscal year ended 31 March 2005. For details, see
also Beach, above n 24, 351.
1001
Covell and Lupton, above n 683, 229.
1002
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 59(a)(3). IS IT 58(a)(3) see intro re remedies under 58(a)
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In UK and Australian law, specific performance is a discretionary equitable remedy, by which the
court compels a party to perform its contractual obligations according to the agreed terms. See Yuen-Yee
Cho and Victoria Todd, 'Beware Specific Performance' (2008) 27 International Financial Law Review 36,
37.
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comes after a violation has been committed and addresses the results of a violation.
According to art 59(a)(3) of the CML’03, rectification ‘obliging the person concerned to
take such necessary corrective steps to address the results of the violation’. Conversely,
specific performance remedy comes before the commission of a, perhaps further,
violation, and thus requires certain acts to avoid a violation and the results that might
otherwise attend it.
The fourth court remedial power is the account of profit. This can be brought by the
CMA on behalf of investors.1004 This remedy is found in art 59(a)(4) of the CML’03
where the violator may be obliged ‘to pay the CMA the gains realised as the result the
violation’. Therefore, the account of profit is available against persons who have made a
profit based on a violation of the provisions of CML’03 and the CMA rules and
regulations. This remedy has been imposed by the CRSD in several cases, none of
which concerned defective disclosures in a prospectus, or in continuous disclosure and
periodic disclosures. The available cases are mostly associated with the violations
concerning insider trading, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.1005
The major weakness of this remedy in CML’03 that should be mentioned is that the sole
plaintiff permitted is the CMA. As stated in art 59(a)(4), the CMA alone is allowed to
seek the remedy of ‘account of profit’ before the court. The practice in Saudi Arabia
differs to that in a number of common law countries in this regard, for while an account

1004

It is argued that ‘account of profit’ is quite similar to ‘restitution remedy’. This is because they are
both considered to be monetary remedies. In fact, restitution differs from account of profit remedy. Also
known as a ‘restitutionary damages remedy’, this phrase would be widely used to describe all monetary
remedies including damages. See Peter Birks, Restitution – The Future (Federation Press, 1992) 16–25.
1005
For example, the CRSD required the accused person to pay to the CMA’s account the gains that
resulted from violation acts amounting to SAR. 16,837,224 (USD 4.5 million): See Committee for the
Resolution of Securities Disputes, CSRD Final Decision Case No 15/27, CRSD Decision No
43/L/D1/2006 of 1427 H (issued 03/08/1427 H (01/09/2006 G).Committee for the Resolution of
Securities Disputes, Issued Decisions (11 December 2012) <http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Disputes/2743%20E.pdf>.
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of profit is about taking away the gain, victims must be able to be recompensed for the
loss and damages they suffer as a result of that illegal gain.1006 For that reason, it has
been affirmed in Australia that account of profit is not there available in tort unless
exemplary damages are available.1007 To the contrary, however, Wright claims that the
focus of this remedy is the defendant’s gain, not plaintiff’s loss.1008 Nevertheless,
individuals must have the right to prevent violators from retaining gains made, based on
a breach of the market laws, and the victims of such breaches should have the right to
claim their loss after the gain is paid to the CMA’s account.1009 McGlone and Stickley
confirm that in business transactions, the remedy of account of profit is significantly
useful.1010 The situation in Saudi Arabia, however, requires a clear mechanism to
distribute the gains resulting from the law violations to all investors who sustain loss or
damage as a result of that violation, rather than simply allowing them to accrue in the
accounts of the CMA for its use. Indemnification of injured investors will increase
investor confidence in the securities market by fostering the protection of investors.
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See Michael Tilbury, 'Restitutionary Damages' in Robyn Caroll (ed), Civil Remedies: Issues and
Developments (Federation Press, 1996) 7.
1007
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It can be seen that the law has given the CRSD the option to impose compensation or to
oblige the defendant to return profits resulting from this violation to the CMA. 1011 In
practice, as can be seen from the discussion above, it has failed to impose the former
and instead favours the latter practice. This can be unfair for the victim/plaintiff and
may result in no compensation. The situation in Australia is substantially different under
the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC). The regulator has given
compensation a priority over other remedies in order to remedy plaintiffs’ loss or
damage. It states that ‘preference must be given to compensation for victims’.1012
The fifth court remedy is trading suspension. The CRSD, upon a request from the
CMA,1013 can suspend the trading of a company’s securities on the SEE when it appears
that this company is in violation of the law. Additionally, trading suspension may
extend to any person who violates the law from trading in the securities market.1014
However, this remedy is inadequately presented in Saudi securities law. It lacks details
about the mechanism of this temporary suspension of a security. Moreover, it does not
specify who can be subject to this sanction, nor the period of suspension. 1015 A security
can also be subject to trading suspension, and there is overlapping between the CMA

1011

In order to analyse this remedy, it is important to mention the whole paragraph of art 59 (a)(4) of the
CML’03: ‘compensate persons who suffered damage or loss as a result of the violation committed /or
oblige the violator to pay the CMA the gains realised as a result of the violation’. The use of conjunction
‘or’ indicates that the two (compensation to those who suffered loss or payment of gains realised to the
CMA) are alternatives; and the body that makes the decision as to which to impose is the CMA.
1012
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act Amendment (No 51) 2001 (Cth); see s 12GCA.
The conditions of compensation preference are: If: (a) the Court considers that it is appropriate to impose
a fine under section 12GB in respect of a contravention, or an involvement in a contravention, of this
Division; and (b) it is appropriate to order the defendant to pay compensation to a person who has
suffered loss or damage in respect of the contravention or the involvement; and (c) the defendant does not
have sufficient financial resources to pay both the pecuniary penalty or fine and the compensation; the
Court must give preference to making an order for compensation.
1013
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 59(a)(5).
1014
ACRSC Decision No 147/LS/2009 of 1430H issued 21 June 2009.
1015
For instance, most suspension decisions are a result of insider trading and some violators have been
suspended for five years and others for three years. However, there is no judicial interpretation regarding
suspension period.

328

Chapter 8: Judicial Enforcement

and the CRSD in relation to the power of trading suspension.1016 Article 6(a)(7) of the
CML’03 allows the CMA, when it deems necessary, to prohibit or suspend trading in
any security in the market.1017 On the other hand, art 59(a)(5) of the CML’03 states that
a suspension should be requested by the CMA to the CRSD. Therefore, a clear
articulation is needed for the use of this power.
In most developed and mature securities markets, it is argued that a trading suspension
is an effective method to make companies comply with, for example, disclosure policy
and to ensure that they provide new and material information to the market. 1018 By
contrast, an empirical research carried out by Engelen, Grabowski and Kawinska,
concludes that temporary trading suspension might not be effective in emerging
securities markets.1019 This is due to the fact that during the suspension, investors are
expected to process new information before trading resumes. This will affect the share
prices and therefore weaken the integrity of the market. The Saudi securities market is
still in need of clear and direct provisions concerning this remedy.
Furthermore, there is the sixth court remedy barring the violator from acting in certain
capacities, whereby the court bars ‘the violating person from acting as a broker,
portfolio manager or investment adviser for such period of time as is necessary for the
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The power of the CMA to interfere and suspend trading will be later discussed in detail in Chapter 10
‘Regulator’s Role in Enforcing the Disclosure Regime’.
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For the CMA decision to suspend trading in Bishah Agricultural Development Corporation because of
non-compliance with continuous disclosure requirements, see Capital Market Authority, ‘Announcement
Regarding Bishah Corporation’, above n 922. In addition, this remedy is mostly used to suspend
securities trading of a violating company, that is, one which does not comply with listing rules and
requirement. See, Capital Market Law 2003 art 6)(a)(7) ‘[p]rohibit any Security or suspend the issuance
or trading of any Securities on the Exchange, as the Authority may deem necessary’.
1018
Rezaul Kabir and Peter-Jan Engelen, 'Empirical Evidence on the Role of Trading Suspensions in
Disseminating New Information to the Capital Market' (2006) 33 Journal of Business Finance
Accounting 1142, 1165.
1019
Peter-Jan Engelen, Wojciech Grabowski and Agnieszka Kawinska, 'Trading Suspensions on an
Emerging Market Around Corporate Control Transactions' (Paper presented at the 5th IBR Conference,
Dubai, 26–27 April 2007) 24.
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safety of the market and the protection of investors’.1020 This remedy concerns brokers,
portfolio managers and investment advisors. As per art 59(a)(6), there are two purposes
for this temporary bar against liable persons mentioned in this provision. The first is
investor protection. Therefore, a breach by a broker, portfolio manager or investment
advisor is subject to a temporary bar on that person acting in their professional capacity.
The second is the important purpose of maintaining the stability and integrity of the
market overall.
Because of the important role played by market professionals, brokers and dealers in
securities markets, it is not surprising that the securities laws apply sanctions against
these professionals.1021 Nevertheless, it may be said that this remedy is inadequate. The
reason for this is that despite there being other professionals involved in the trading of
the secondary market and having to comply with the securities laws and regulatory
rules, they are not included in this remedy. Those professionals are, for example, credit
rating agencies, accountants, lawyers and experts working for listed companies.1022
Moreover, the CML’03 and the CMA rules and regulations do not indicate if there is a
review committee to determine an appropriate length of suspension or ascertain whether
the temporary bar is ended or not. The absence of a methodology and criteria for a
temporary bar persists in the Saudi securities laws. In fact, despite the regulatory power
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Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 59(a)(6).
Bashar H Malkawi and Haitham A Haloush, 'Reflections on the Securities Law of Jordan' (2008) 23
American University International Law Review 763, 787.
1022
Market professionals owe duties to their clients. Specifically, market professionals should act with
‘loyalty and dedication to maximize their clients’ interests’. See art 57 of the Securities Law 2002
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given to the CML, there have been no efforts to establish an independent committee to
assess the suspension period.1023
Establishing a mechanism for temporary suspension of trading is imperative to protect
the investors. A temporary suspension is also known as a ‘break’ in securities markets.
A ‘break’ means a suspension of trading in the given share, a period during which no
bids or offers can be made for them.1024 In order to avoid ill-effects on the well-being of
investors or the operation of the stock market, regulation is needed to establish a proper
mechanism and a separate body to assess the trading suspension in the SSE. However,
in addition to the above, remedial courts powers extend to include seizing property,
imposition of a travel ban and barring companies whose securities are traded on the
SSE. These remedies require further investigation in regard to whether they are
effective in protecting investors and deter wrongdoers.
8.6.2

General Weaknesses Concerning the Remedial Courts Powers

Despite the fact that the regulator has broad powers (under art 59 of the CML’03) to
institute civil suits on behalf of investors, these powers are unclear. The ambiguity of art
59 is confirmed by Beach who argues that ‘it is ambiguous on the issue, stating that
only the CMA may come before the CRSD to seek an order for the appropriate
sanction’.1025 This makes the investor’s right to sue unclear. Compared with the US,
although art 59 is presented in a concise and direct format, Saudi law presents the

1023

See Capital Market Law 2003 art 21(a)(8), ‘a. The Board of Directors of the Exchange shall propose
the necessary regulations, rules and instructions for the operation of the Exchange including the following
matters: 8. ‘Any other rules and instructions that the Exchange deems necessary for the protection of
investors through ensuring fairness, efficiency and transparency in all of the Exchange’s related affairs’.
1024
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powers of the CMA with less specificity. It is too general and broad.1026 In addition, art
59 does not specify the type of contravention that is going to be a subject of the above
sanctions.
From a practical point of view, several reasons have contributed to the fact that the
majority of aggrieved investors are unaware that they have been victims as a result of
violation of disclosure requirements. Additionally, other investors do not have the desire
to bring an action to the court, even though they have known that they were victims of
such violation. The prime reason for this is the weak role of the CMA in protecting the
investors which undermines the investor confidence in the securities courts.1027 These
courts and their members are also inefficient, as demonstrated earlier in terms of
specialist knowledge, expertise, training, availability and access; and, perhaps more
pertinent here, they appear to have little function in practice in gaining compensation for
victims.
Arguably, there are further reasons which have contributed to the lack of investor
recourse to the courts for remedial action. These reasons are: the absence of the legal
knowledge amongst investors, the possibly small amount of their loss, the cost of
litigation, and the delay in delivering the judgments. Questions remain, therefore, as to
how the general investors initially can know that their loss was not normal but rather
resulted from a breach of the law,1028 and how such general investors can prove their
right to compensation.
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Ibid.
The role of the CMA will be discussed in depth in the next chapter which is about the administrative
enforcement of the securities laws in Saudi Arabia.
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By tracking cases brought by the CMA against some violators of the securities
regulations, it appears that the CMA has recovered SAR 295 million (USD 78.6
million) which constituted illegal gains unjustly obtained from investors.1029 It could be
argued, particularly by investors who have sustained losses, that legislation should
provide that fines could be levied to help fund the courts, it would appear more ‘just’ if
such amounts contributed to compensation for aggrieved investors who sustained loss or
damage because of the violations of the law. Such a change would obviously require
legislative change. The fact, however, that the aggrieved investors currently receive no
compensation but rather only a sense of satisfaction that court proceedings were
successful, they are likely to remain reticent to attempt to bring the matter to court due
to the stress, and time and effort it will take, unless it is a particularly large loss or they
observe the company continuing to take advantage of other investors through poor
disclosure or other practice.
Nevertheless, once a guilty verdict is decided, aggrieved investors can then take action
to sue the wrongdoers.
In the early days of the CMA, the body failed to announce that they had recovered
significant amounts of money from the violators, so no investor knew that these
amounts were effectively ‘stolen’ from them. This is because the CMA either did not
announce the name of the company or they did not declare it at the time of the
violations. Hence, how during that period could those injured investors know of any
violation and realise that the damages they had sustained were actually due to a

<http://www.alriyadh.com/2010/02/13/article498208.html> [Arabic]. Later the weak role of the CMA in
investor education will be demonstrated.
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company failing to fulfil its obligations, rather than just the natural fall of the market or
due to a legitimate cause, and — in order to gain compensation — prove it as well?
However, the CMA recently announced that every investor can sue those violators who
are proved to be guilty. Thus, once aggrieved investors prove they are victims of market
violations they can claim their loss or damages in a maximum period of five years from
the date of violations. Article 57 of the CML’03 provides any person who buys and sells
security the price of which has been ‘significantly and adversely’ affected by such
manipulation can sue for the amount their purchase or sale price was so affected.
Indeed, the presence of law firms experienced in compensation cases in the securities
market is essential for the investor private right for compensation. Having such law
firms will facilitate private enforcement and assist the securities courts in civil
litigations. This of course will strengthen judicial enforcement and therefore investor
protection.
Consequently, it can be said that, despite the fact that there are a variety of legal and
equitable remedies available to deal with breaches of disclosure provisions,
implementing these remedies against violators needs to be ensured. The position of
investors is further weakened by the fact that securities class-action lawsuits are not
expressly permitted under Saudi securities laws, as is discussed in Chapter 6.1030 The
absence of class actions will weaken the protection of investors.1031

1030

See section 6.6.2.
Recent studies by the EU Commission have concluded that an EU-wide securities class action
remedy is needed to provide victimised shareholders with a realistic legal remedy. See Luke Green,
'German Securities Class Actions: Status Quo Prevails' (Risk Matrics Group, 2010)
<http://blog.riskmetrics.com/slw/2010/11/german-securities-class-actions-survive.html>.
1031
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In general, it can be observed that judicial enforcement is impeded by the weakness of
the CMA in its role and exercise of its authority to protect the public and bring actions
against the violators of the disclosure regime. For that reason, the current situation is
that wrongdoers go unpunished and victims remain uncompensated. Hence, public
confidence in it will be impaired and, in turn, the financial market will be harmed, as
investments will flow in directions other than the securities market. Consequently, it can
be said that the present remedies are ineffective to compensate victims nor to create
deterrence in regard to disclosure contraventions.

8. 7 Summary and Conclusions
Protection of investors is unachievable without the reinforcement of their legal
rights.1032 The adjudication of business disputes requires an effective and independent
judiciary that ensures the rule of law.1033 The enforcement of laws by courts is seen to
play an effective role to protect investors and thus encourage investment in securities
markets.1034
In Saudi Arabia, it has been found that although the enforcement of the legal rights of
investors is of vital importance, the enforcement figures are poor. Moreover, despite the
CML’03 establishing specialised securities courts with jurisdiction over disputes arising
from the securities market, shortcomings continue to prevail. In general, several reasons
have been found for the ineffective judicial enforcement of securities laws and, in
particular, civil liability provisions. These are: the inadequate number of securities
courts; the lack of experienced and efficient judges and lawyers; poor performance of

1032

Johnson, above n 668, 11.
Samuel L Bufford, 'International Rule of Law and the Market Economy - An Outline' (2006) 12(2)
Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 303, 310.
1034
La Porta et al, ‘Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, Reform’, above n 479, 32.
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the CRSD due to its weakness; the ineffective role played by the CMA in bringing civil
suits on behalf of investors; and the drawbacks associated with the remedial powers of
the securities court in Saudi Arabia.
It has been argued that the protection of investors has been weakened by the inefficient
enforcement of securities laws. Thus, it is noted that improvements are required in order
to achieve an effective judicial enforcement of securities laws.
In view of the present situation, members of the securities courts lack accountability.
There are no specific standards or requirements for the evaluation of the performance of
the securities courts. As described earlier, the CRSD can issue civil, administrative and
penal decisions, including imprisonment. Leaving its members without accountability
may lead to undermining their performance.
In brief, it is suggested that reforms of the judiciary are required to effectively deal with
cases arising from the securities market. In addition, amendments are required to be
made to art 25 of the CML’03. This is because this article governs the formation and the
criteria of the selection of members for the CRSD and ACRSD. The law is required to
be properly enforced; for this it requires more courts and judges provided and greater
assurance of judicial independence. Equally important, it is necessary for a statutory
securities class action to be available to the general investor to provide better protection
to investors. The interpretation of the sanctions and remedies of art 59, especially with
the enforcement of civil liability provisions is also necessary, as argued earlier.
The role of the CMA as the regulator of the market has to be more effective. Issuing
rules and regulations to foster the confidence in the market should be a fundamental task
of the CMA. This would lead to better functioning of judicial enforcement. Thus, it is
336

Chapter 8: Judicial Enforcement

agreed that an appropriate legal framework encourages the objective enforcement of
laws and the related regulatory framework.1035
The quality and effectiveness of the judiciary is significant for successful enforcement
of securities laws.1036 A recent study comments that ‘[a] well-developed modern court
system to apply the law and dispense justice is an important component of a modern
legal system based on the rule of law. Saudi Arabia lacks such a system’. 1037 Thus, it
has been suggested that there is a real need for securities law schools, experts and more
research in order to enrich the knowledge of securities literature amongst judges and
lawyers.
Strong legal frameworks and efficient courts deter illegal practices, increase benefits to
market participants, and thereby prevent debacles in securities markets. A recent study
on the recent global financial crisis suggests that a proper enforcement of corporate law
by efficient legal institutions may prevent future financial crises.1038 In other words,
‘weak legal institutions can contribute to economic crises’.1039 In Saudi Arabia, lack of
confidence in the judiciary precludes investors from going to law courts for judicial
remedies. Investors are either reluctant or incapable of going to court for judicial
remedies. Recently, SSE financial analysts deduced that laws and regulations of the
SSE require reforms associated with fair trial and the need for transparency in
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Ali Adnan Ibrahim, 'Developing Capital Markets in Muslim Countries: Strategies and Policies for
Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance' in Salman Syed Ali (ed), Islamic Capital Markets:
Products, Regulations & Development (Islamic Research & Training Institution, 2008) 321, 324.
1036
Ana Carvajal and Jennifer A Elliott, 'The Challenge of Enforcement in Securities Markets: Mission
Impossible?' (Working Paper No 09/168, International Monetary Fund, 2009) 28.
1037
Esmaeili, above n 324, 34.
1038
Franklin A Gevurtz, 'The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a Financial Crisis: Reflections on In re
Citigroup Inc Shareholder Derivative Litigation' (2010) 23 Pacific McGeorge Global Business and
Development Law Journal 113, 114–15.
1039
Johnson, above n 668, 13.
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dealings.1040 The current judicial enforcement of disclosure regime has proved to be
ineffective in protecting investors in the securities market in Saudi Arabia. In addition
to judicial enforcement, the administrative enforcement of securities laws is a crucial
mechanism to the entire enforcement regime. The following chapter will discuss the
issues of administrative enforcement.

1040

Alhilali, above n 997.
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CHAPTER 9:
THE SECURITIES REGULATOR’S ROLE IN
ENFORCING THE DISCLOSURE REGIME IN SAUDI
ARABIA
9. 1 Introduction
Successful investor protection requires strong laws and enforcement. Investor protection
in securities markets relies on having an effective regulator that can implement the laws
and act on behalf of the public interest. There is a close relationship between credible
enforcement rule that particularly protects minority shareholders and the development
of the securities market.1041 The power of the regulator to enforce securities laws is
generally ‘conceived of as comprising the investigation of possible violations of the law
and the taking of appropriate action either administrative, civil or criminal to restrain or
to punish those responsible for any violations found to exist’.1042
In this chapter, the term ‘administrative enforcement’ refers to the enforcement of
securities laws by the administrative or regulatory authorities. The significance of
administrative enforcement of the disclosure regime in Saudi Arabia is derived from the
fact that the judicial enforcement is weak, as discussed in the previous chapter. When
judicial enforcement is inadequate in protecting investors, an efficient regulator can
provide this protection.1043 Moreover, having effective administrative enforcement is
essential to maintain and improve the capital market. Consequently, the role of the
regulatory body is significant in terms of the investor protection and market growth.
Nevertheless, since the inception of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2004, there
have been numerous allegations made against the regulatory body of the securities
1041

Franco Modigliani and Enrico Perotti, 'Protection of Minority Interest and the Development of
Security Markets' (1997) 18 Managerial and Decision Economics 519, 525.
1042
Philip A Loomis, 'Enforcement Problems under the Federal Securities Laws' (1959) 14 Business
Lawyer 665, 665.
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market in regard to its functioning. As the Saudi stock market has grown rapidly over
the past decade, the potential for corporate malfeasance is very high. The CMA is
responsible for restoring confidence to the stock market by enforcing laws and
regulations that pertain to companies and financial intermediaries. Over the past few
years, the CMA has been unsuccessful in restoring investor confidence in the capital
market. This is because of the lack of success in protecting investors — the securities
market still suffers from disclosure violations,1044 wrongdoers are going unpunished and
aggrieved investors are sustaining loss or damage. Thus, issues of administrative
enforcement of the disclosure regime need to be addressed with the objective of
discovering the underlying shortcomings of the current management of the disclosure
regime and drawing up recommendations to make the regulatory body effective.
Moreover, this chapter highlights a number of weaknesses. These weaknesses hamper
investor protection which is the core objective of securities regulation. Further, reforms
are needed to be made by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) to produce a transparent,
developed and fair market.
To this end, the discussion in this chapter begins with an introduction in section 1.
Section 2 describes the current function and mechanism of the securities regulator in
Saudi Arabia. Section 3 investigates the current drawbacks associated with the
administrative enforcement of the disclosure regime. Section 4 discusses the drawbacks
of the current securities regulatory body in regard to the disclosure regime in Saudi
Arabia. Section 5 focuses on the important role played by the regulator in enforcing
securities laws. Section 6 discusses the essentials of the regulatory function in enforcing

1044

Ibrahim Saleh Aldossary, 'Capital Market Authority: The Admiration and the Wonder', Aleqtisadiah
(online), 11 December 2011 <http://www.aleqt.com/2011/12/11/article_605916.html> [Arabic].
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the disclosure regime. Section 7 draws conclusions which will demonstrate that the
present administration has been ineffective in providing protections to the investors.

9. 2 Present Administration of the Disclosure Regime in Saudi Arabia
Currently, the CMA is responsible for the administration of the securities market in
Saudi Arabia. As is evident from the description in Chapter 4, the CMA is the sole
regulator for the securities market regulation. The disclosure requirements are, in
particular, provided in the Capital Market Law 2003 (CML’03). The CMA issues
additional regulations rules and rules regarding the disclosure requirements. According
to art 5(a) of the CML’03, ‘The Authority shall be the agency responsible for issuing
regulations, rules and instructions, and for applying the provisions of this Law’.
Article 6 of the CML’03 gives the CMA the power to issue the associated regulations
and instructions, and to prescribe procedures necessary for regulating and monitoring
the disclosure process. Moreover, the CMA alone is responsible for the administration
of the disclosure regime. Article 5(a)(6) of the CML’03 states that the CMA is entitled
to:
regulate and monitor the full disclosure of information regarding Securities and
their issuers, the dealings of informed persons and major shareholders and
investors, and define and make available information which the participants in the
market should provide and disclose to shareholders and the public.

341

Chapter 9: Securities Regulator’s Enforcement

9.2.1

Regulatory Enforcement Tools

The CML’03 gives the CMA broad authorities and powers so that it can carry out its
function efficiently.1045 In respect of enforcement against breaches of the disclosure
requirements, the CML’03 empowers the CMA with a number of enforcement tools that
can be used in regard to contraventions of the securities regulations. These tools are
stated below:
(i) The members of the CMA and its employees designated by the Board of the
CMA (BCMA) are empowered to subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and
require the production of any books, papers, or other documents which the
Authority deems relevant or material to its investigation.1046
(ii) The CMA shall have the power to carry out inspections of the records or any
other materials, whoever the holder may be, to determine whether the person
concerned has violated, or is about to violate any provision of this Law, the
Implementing Regulations or the rules issued by the CMA.1047
(iii) The CMA can suspend the activities of the stock exchange for a period of not
more than one day; and in cases where the Authority or the Minister of Finance
deems it necessary to suspend the Exchange’s activity for more than one day, the
approval of this decision must be issued by the Minister of Finance.1048
(iv) The CMA can approve, cancel or suspend the listing of any security issued by
Saudi company and traded on any stock exchange outside the Kingdom. 1049

1045

See details in Chapter 3 ‘Legal and Regulatory Framework of Securities Market in Saudi Arabia’.
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 5(c).
1047
Ibid.
1048
Ibid art 6(a)(5).
1049
Ibid art 6(a)(6).
1046
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(v) Prohibit any security or suspend the issuance or trading of any securities on the
Exchange, as the Authority may deem necessary.1050
Moreover, in addition to the CMA’s power to seek orders before the courts as discussed
in the previous chapter,1051 the CML’03 provides the CMA with the power to impose
monetary fines on the violators of the securities laws and regulations. Article 59(b) of
the CML’03 provides that:
The Authority may, in addition to taking the actions provided for under paragraph
(a) of this Article, request the Committee to impose a financial fine upon the
persons responsible for an intentional violation of the provisions of this Law, its
Implementing Regulations, the rules of the Authority and the regulations of the
Exchange. As an alternative to the foregoing the Board may impose a financial fine
upon any person responsible for the violation of this Law, its Implementing
Regulations, the rules of the Authority and the regulations of the Exchange. The
fine that the Committee or the Board can impose shall not be less than SAR 10,000
(USD 2,666) and shall not exceed SAR 100,000 (USD 26,665) for each violation
committed by the defendant.1052

Thus, it appears that the CMA may impose such a fine on anyone liable for the violation
of the CML’03 or its regulations, but, unlike where the CRSD is the relevant body,
there is no requirement to establish that such violation was ‘intentional’. The CMA can
impose the same fine on anyone liable for the violation, apparently even if such
violation was ‘unintentional’. In order to ascertain / illustrate the application of the
enforcement provisions, recent reports of CMA administrative actions will be presented
and then the current enforcement machinery will be examined.

1050

Ibid art 6(a)(7).
With such court orders comprising: ‘warning the person concerned; obliging [him] to cease or refrain
from the act that is the subject of the suit; obliging the person to take the necessary steps to avert the
violation’ or take the ,necessary steps’ to correct its results; indemnify those who have suffered damage
due to the violation, or obliging the violator to pay into the CMA account any gains realised thereby;
suspension of trading; bar on professional practice (period determined by CMA); seizure and sale of
property; travel ban; ban on working with companies whose shares are traded on the SSE: Capital Market
Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 59(a).
1052
The ‘Board’ refers to the Board of the Capital Market Authority.
1051
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9.2.2

Some Relevant Recent Publicly Reported CMA Administrative Actions

The CMA has undertaken a number of actions in the exercise of its administrative
powers over the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE). A number of those recently reported are
found immediately below.
(i) In December 2011, the CMA imposed a penalty of SAR 100,000 (USD 26,665)
on the Advanced Petrochemical Company because of the violation of periodic
disclosures requirements prescribed in art 45(c) of the CML’03.1053 The news of
the company’s preliminary financial results had been leaked to a website on 5
October 2011, before the CMA and the public were informed.
(ii) In November 2011, the CMA imposed a penalty of SAR 50,000 (USD 13,332)
on the Saudi Fisheries Company because of the violation of the continuous
disclosure requirements prescribed in art 46(a) of the CML’03 and art 25 of the
Listing Rules (LR’04).1054 The company had failed to inform both the CMA and
the public of changes in its senior management when these occurred.
(iii) In October 2011, the CMA imposed a penalty of SAR 50.000 (USD 13,332) on
the National Petrochemical Company (PETROCHEM) because of the violation
of art 46(a) of the CML’03 and art 25 of the LR’04.1055 The company had failed
to inform both the CMA and the public of the capital increase for its affiliate
‘Saudi Polymers Company’.
(iv) In January 2012, the CMA imposed a penalty of SAR 50,000 (USD 13,332) on
Tihama Advertising & Public Relations Co due to its violation of art 46(a) of the
1053

Capital Market Authority, 'Announcement: Imposition of Penalty' (Media Relase, 4 December 2011)
<http://cma.org.sa/en/News/Pages/CMA_N_1062.aspx>.
1054
Capital Market Authority, 'Announcement: Imposition of A Penalty' (Media Release, 20 November
2011) <http://www.cma.org.sa/en/News/Pages/CMA_N_1057.aspx>
1055
Capital Market Authority, 'Announcement: Imposition of Penalty' (Media Release, 23 October 2011)
<http://cma.org.sa/en/News/Pages/CMA_N_1001.aspx>.
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CML’03 and art 25 of the LR’04.1056 The company had failed to inform both the
CMA and the public of its participation in establishing the Gulf System
Development Company (Gulf Tech) with the Dar AL-Mustored Group and
Zakha Trading Institute.1057

In situations where the CMA could seek an action before the Committee for the
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD), the law is clear that the
CMA’s decision to fine is an alternative to the CRSD fine, but in addition to other
CRSD orders that have been applied for to the CRSD by the CMA. Hence, art 59(a) of
the CML’03 does not clearly state whether the CMA must wait for the CRSD to act in
regard to those orders (or issue a decision in relation to any fine to be imposed) prior to
the BCMA itself imposing a fine. Even if such a conclusion is reached, the CMA will
need to issue guidance on the conditions precedent to any action taken by the CMA
earlier than any decision being reached by the CRSD.
It should be noted that since the CMA began its operation in 2004, the CMA’s
enforcement and market supervision functions have improved rapidly. One of the most
important powers given to the regulatory body for securities regulation is the power to
make an appropriate order in the public interest. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the CMA can bring civil suits before the court on behalf of the aggrieved investors.

1056

Capital Market Authority, 'Announcement: Imposition of A Penalty' (Media Release, 15 January
2012) <http://cma.org.sa/En/News/Pages/CMA_N_1075.aspx>.
1057
Tihama Advertising & Public Relations Co was the subject of multiple fines for multiple violations
(with some offences dating back to 2006–2007) and convictions as recently as March 2012. See Capital
Market
Authority,
Tihama
Advertising
(12
December
2012)
<http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Search/Results.aspx?k=TIHAMA%20ADVERTISING>. Offences included
material leaked to a website on 28 November 2011 (announced on 3 December 2011) – SAR 100,000
penalty; failure to inform CMA and public of capital increase resolution on 30 November 2010
(announced 6 July 2011) – SAR 50,000 penalty; ACRSC (Appeal Committee for the Resolution of
Securities Conflicts) decision confirming conviction and upholding (SAR 100,000) fine and 5 year ban on
a broker as to his professional practice as a broker and ability to trade (for violations perpetrated 2
October 2006 to 27 December 2007).
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9.2.3

Present Enforcement Machinery

The CMA declares that its main mission in enforcement is to protect investors from
unfair and unsound trading, detect and ensure prosecution in relation to disclosure
violations, and ensure that securities business is undertaken with transparency in
securities transactions.1058 The CMA’s enforcement powers are exercised by four
departments as follows:
Investigation Department: The role of this Department is to oversee all investigations

i.

processes, gather evidence, carry out interrogations and interviews of suspects, and
recommend appropriate actions to the BCMA. Its main functions are: investigating
violations referred by different sources; investigating electronic violations;
requesting data and records from internal and external sources that support the
investigation;

and

subpoenaing

suspects

and

witness

for

interview

and

interrogation.1059
Prosecution Department: Its role is to prosecute criminal violations and unfair or

ii.

offensive exploitation in the capital market before the CRSD and the Appeal
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts (ACRSC). Its main functions
are: preparing and constructing prosecution memoranda for cases received from the
investigation department and, subject to the approval of the BCMA, prosecuting
cases before the CRSD by attending the hearing of cases put forward by the CMA
and responding to the answers provided by the accused; and appealing CRSD
decisions before the ACRSC.1060

1058

Capital Market Authority, About Capital Market Authority, CMA Departments, Enforcement (20
December 2012) <http://cma.org.sa/En/AboutCMA/CMA_Department/Pages/Enforcement.aspx>.
1059
Ibid.
1060
Ibid.
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iii.

The Enforcement Follow-up Department: This Department is responsible for
implementing decisions issued by the BCMA, the CRSD and the ACRSC. These
decisions consist of the freezing of assets (including bank and investment accounts of
offenders); imposition of travel bans, financial penalties, trading bans, and
imprisonment. Its main functions are: coordinating continuously with the CMA
departments concerned and other agencies related to the implementation of
decisions; issuing letters notifying violators of decisions to be implemented; and
following up with violating firms and persons in regard to their implementation of
those decisions.1061
Investors’ Complaints Department: Its objective is to protect investors by receiving

iv.

and reviewing complaints, and by undertaking settlement processes between
disputing parties. If settlement is ‘not reached within 90 days from the filing [of] the
complaint, a formal notification will be given to the complainant for filing the case
with the CRSD’.1062 The main functions of this department are: receiving and
scrutinising investors’ complaints; gathering and analysing relevant data and
documents from disputing parties; conducting settlement processes with disputing
parties; issuing notices and letters of notification in cases where there no settlement
is reached and the parties wish to follow up on the complaint in front of the
CRSD.1063
The above description of the current regulatory body shows that the CMA is the sole
regulator and enjoys broad statutory powers and functions. The CMA is empowered to
protect the investors, supervise and regulate the securities market.

1061

Ibid.
Ibid.
1063
Ibid.
1062
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The most recent comparison between the stock markets in the Arab and Gulf countries
found that the Saudi Arabian securities market is the most structurally independent
market in the performance of its functions.1064 Moreover, the CMA enforcement
decisions provided above show that the regulator is working toward better
implementation of the law. The CMA’s enforcement decisions aim to deter potential
offenders and to ensure full compliance with the disclosure regime. Investor loss or
damage due to defective disclosures could thereby be decreased. In addition, the
monetary fines imposed by the CMA on the offending companies endeavour to restore
public confidence in the securities market. It attempts to show the public that the
regulator has effective law enforcement and appropriate sanctions against those who do
not comply with the CMA’03 and CMA rules and regulations in general. Nevertheless,
compliance with the disclosure regime requires additional attention by the
administration of the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE). It is argued that despite the
significant developments achieved by the CMA in the past few years, shortcomings still
exist in the CMA’s role in protecting investors from violations of the disclosure regime.
With this in mind, the following section will endeavour to identify the existing
drawbacks of the current administrative enforcement of disclosure regime in Saudi
Arabia. Then, these drawbacks will be discussed and evaluated in order to demonstrate
that the current administrative enforcement is insufficient. In order to do that, there will
be discussion of the importance of the regulator and the fundamentals of regulatory
function regarding administration of the disclosure regime.

1064

Saud Alfadhli, 'Independency of the Capital Market Authority Is A Red Line, Statutorily and
Constitutionally', Alqabas (online), 28 September 2011 <http://www.alqabas.com.kw/node/16747>
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9. 3 Existing Drawbacks of the Current Administrative Enforcement
Machinery
Generally, the major goal of the enforcement of the securities laws is to provide
protection for the participants in the market, especially the investors. Any failure in
providing such protection will draw attention to administrative enforcement and to
whether it is effective or not. Failure in this regard will indicate that shortcomings exist
and need to be solved. An empirical study was carried out in 2006, which found that the
failure of the regulator to use many of the CMA’s strategies in the regulation of the SSE
created a significant weakness in the CMA’s role in protecting investors.1065
Over the past few years, the CMA’s enforcement and market supervision functions have
become more prominent. Nevertheless, weaknesses of the regulatory enforcement of the
disclosure regime continue to exist. The weak enforcement machinery can be clearly
seen through several issues. These issues, amongst others, are: a lack of transparency in
operation; inadequacy of monetary fines; weak intervention by the CMA; and lack of
uniformity in the exercise of the regulator’s powers.
9.3.1

Lack of Transparency

In fact, there have been widespread allegations concerning the ineffectiveness of the
current administration of the disclosure regime. As a result of the notable market
debacle in 2006, the Saudi stock market suffered from a loss of investor confidence,
which still desperately needs to be restored.1066 The CMA has failed to restore public
confidence in the securities market. Two legal advisors claim that the CMA requires

1065

Abdulmalik Mohammed Alkhulaifi, The Mechanisms of the CMA and Its Role in the Stability of
Market Stocks and Returns: A Field Study in the Saudi Stock Market (LLM Thesis, University of Science
and Technology, 2007) <http://www.yemen-nic.info/contents/studies/detail.php?ID=17676> Abstract
<http://www.yemen-nic.info/contents/studies/detail.php?ID=17676> [Arabic].
1066
Al-Nwaisir, ‘Saudi Stock Market Needs to be Reformed’, above n 14.

349

Chapter 9: Securities Regulator’s Enforcement

reform in respect of the laws and regulations, levels of disclosure and transparency in
dealings.1067 They maintain that the significantly weak performance of the CMA led to
the collapse of 2006 and the subsequent loss of shareholders’ investments.1068 The noncompliance with the disclosure regime by listed companies is due to the absence of
precise monitoring of these companies. Many claim that investors are not protected and
that many violations occur without being discovered by the CMA.1069 This will raise the
question of whether the CMA has an efficient system to detect violations of the
disclosure regime.
Furthermore, the ineffective enforcement by the CMA has been responsible for the noncompliance with continuous disclosure requirements. There have been examples of
delays in announcing major developments and news of a company, which have affected
the security’s price and therefore caused loss or damage for other investors. The CMA
and listed companies suffer serious problems in determining whether information is
material or not. Certainly, the regulator is responsible for the administration of
continuous disclosure and for monitoring compliance by companies.
So far, there have been no studies carried out by the CMA to assess transparency in the
market, and public satisfaction and confidence in the market. Thus, the issue of market
regulation becomes difficult, especially given the serious lack of extensive legal
research on the aspects of the administrative enforcement of securities laws in Saudi
Arabia.

1067

Alhilali, above n 997.
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9.3.2

Inadequacy of Monetary Fines

Although there have been fines imposed on some listed companies for breach of the
disclosure regime, there are still many companies which are not complying with
disclosure requirements in the secondary market.1070 Monetary fine refers to an
administrative action imposed by the CMA not by court, as one of several regulatory
enforcement actions.
Considering the enormous financial ability of firms, the amount of the monetary penalty
does not create deterrence. For that reason, it is argued that the imposition of a
maximum fine of SAR 100,000 (USD 26,665) for each violation committed is too
lenient.1071 A recent commentator declares that listed companies do not fear of the
CMA’s monetary fines because these fines are simple (and low) compared with the
serious nature of the disclosure violations committed.1072
In contrast, in the UK, the ability of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to sanction
breaches of the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR) involves a potentially
indefinite amount of penalty, payable to the agency, as provided for in s 91 of the

1070

For example, the CMA in 2008 imposed monetary fines on a number of listed companies that had
failed to disclose their results for the year 2007 within the period specified in art 26 of the Listing Rules
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Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000). Davies describes the unlimited
monetary fine as ‘the primary weapon in the hands of the FSA’.1073
In a recent case, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed a USD 1
million administrative penalty against Pipeline Trading Systems LLC for misleading
investors and providing defective disclosure in connection with the sale of securities.1074
This case shows that the amount of the fine is significant where such a fine aims to
create deterrence and consequently compliance with the disclosure requirements. In
respect of effective enforcement and deterrent fine, Coffee affirms that ‘[e]nforcement
can be measured either in terms of the number of enforcement actions brought or the
aggregate financial sanctions levied’.1075
In general, the objective of the monetary fines is to create a level of deterrence that will
lead to compliance. The current situation in Saudi Arabia is that not only is the number
of administrative fines issued fewer than might be expected given the size of the market,
but the amount of each administrative fine is low and hence deterrence is not created.
The level of the administrative penalty has to be in line with the severity of the breach
that caused loss or damage for the market and investors. However, punishing the
company may have a subsequent effect on the investors of the company. Therefore, as
the companies’ directors are responsible for the management and function of the
company, they should be also liable for the company’s behaviour. In the Saudi
securities industry, increasing the level of the monetary sanctions is essential for the
stability of the market. However, it is recommended that the regulator establish rules for
the monetary fines and be given the authority to measure the breach and then impose a
1073
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suitable fine on the company in question. Moreover, regulator must not misuse this
power and there should be an independent bench to monitor the regulator’s
enforcement.
In Saudi Arabia, breaches of the disclosure regime continue to impair the efficiency of
the SSE. According to the CMA 2011 annual report, the cases of disclosure violations
formed the highest percentage of violations during the years 2010 and 2011. There were
130 cases of disclosure violations of the total of 541 investigation cases into suspected
violations.1076 Enforcement that fails to create deterrence is ineffective. The deterrence
approach to enforcement aims to use penalties and prosecutions to deter breaches of the
law. A study on the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)
enforcement of disclosure regime argued that the adoption of an approach of deterrence
is ‘effective in creating healthy corporate culture and improve standards of
behaviour’.1077
9.3.3 Weak Intervention
The lack of protection for investors is evident in the inability of the CMA to detect
violations of the market regime. The relative lack of intervention by the CMA in regard
to disclosure violations could harm public confidence, as the wrongdoers go
unpunished. It could be due to the regulator’s inability to supervise the market, as well
as its weak detection and investigation activities. On the other hand, the CMA is entitled
to issue rules and regulations that can create more protection for investors.
Additional protection in respect of disclosures in the initial public offerings (IPOs)
market is imperative. In reality, the role of the CMA is unclear in respect of protecting
1076
1077
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investors from breaches of the disclosure requirements in a prospectus. For example,
there is absent from the statutory powers of the regulator the power to issue a stop order
against an IPO where it (the IPO) turns out to be defective.1078 In contrast, ASIC can
issue a stop order on a prospectus that lacks clarity in its information content. Section
739(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) clearly provides ASIC with the power to
issue stop orders regarding defective prospectuses.1079 For instance, ASIC issued a stop
order on a prospectus due to concerns that investors and their professional advisers
would not be able to make an informed assessment of the company’s prospects based on
the information contained in the prospectus.1080
Although the CMA has enforcement tools accorded it by the CML’03 and possesses
enforcement machinery through its departments to oversee (detect and prosecute)
violations and carry out enforcement, the detection and investigation departments in the
CMA may require reform. Unlike the CMA, general investors do not have the ability or
the technology to detect disclosure violations in the market. Thus, if the CMA fails to
detect and conduct an adequate investigation, investors will certainly be unable to
discover these violations that cause loss and damage to their investments. This will
allow wrongdoers to go unpunished and victims remain without compensation. As a
result, public confidence in the securities market has been significantly weakened.

1078

See section 9.6.1.2.1 which discusses the power of the stop order.
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s739 states the stop order power can be ordered by ASIC if :
i.
Information in a disclosure document lodged with ASIC is not worded and presented in a clear,
concise and effective manner
ii.
An offer of securities under a disclosure document lodged with ASIC would contravene s 728; or
iii.
An advertisement or publication of a kind referred to in subsection 734(5) or (6) that relates to
securities is defective.
1080
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 'ASIC Places Interim Stop Order on Paridian
Property Development Fund Prospectus' (Media Release, 01/455, 20 December 2012)
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/01%2F455+ASIC+places+interim+stop+order+on+Pari
dian+Property+Development+Fund+prospectus?openDocument#>.
1079

354

Chapter 9: Securities Regulator’s Enforcement

9.3.4

Lack of Uniformity in the Exercise of the Regulator’s Powers

The exercise of power by the CMA needs to be balanced. In a number of instances (as
outlined above), the exercise of the regulator’s power has been described as lenient in
regard to the level of investigation and also in the subsequent imposition of sanctions
for wrongdoing related to matters of disclosure. Hence, it can also be argued that the
CMA is, like other institutions, affected by a tendency to ‘underestimate the likelihood
of fraud [or other illegal activities] during booms and overestimate it following busts’,
and thus following a ‘crash’ might be expected to be overly harsh or disproportionate in
its actions against companies. The wide and strong powers, given to the CMA by the
CML’03, provide it with the ability (at least on paper) to severely sanction offenders or
offending entities and, it can be argued, this may in some jurisdictions have led to a
misuse of power, which has in turn may have had a negative impact on investors. As
Aviram notes, a ‘significant increases in enforcement actions when the market index
declines and decreases in enforcement actions when the market index rises
significantly’.1081 It is unlikely to be said generally of the CMA, however, due to its
weak use of the available powers (as outlined earlier).
Some investors have left the market because of the regulator’s failure to use the powers
available or due to the overuse of these powers. The CMA’s use of its power at times is
lenient or at other times too harsh, reflecting an ignorance regarding issues in regard to
the proper control of the market.1082 A recent report released by the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency (SAMA) shows that the Saudi investors have moved from domestic
to foreign markets, which is illustrated by the extent to which total investment flows
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flowed out of the Saudi securities market from the beginning of 2006 to the end of the
fourth quarter of 2011. These funds have reached more than SAR 278.8 billion (USD
74.4 billion).1083
The CMA is supposed to be responsible for making stringent regulations to control
speculation in the market. Instead, the CMA has — through the media — asked
investors to stop their speculative activities voluntarily in order to maintain and support
the growth in the market.1084 In fact, the CMA is required to perform its role as a
regulatory organisation whose task it is to oversee the market. Hence, the CMA is
entitled to issue rules that provide the market with stability and provide conditions for
success. Black suggests that ‘[t]he core regulatory role is enforcing standards of conduct
against issuers and reputational intermediaries who flagrantly violate the disclosure
rules, not tweaking the rules at the margin’.1085 Effective administrative enforcement
requires efficient regulations and rules by the securities market regulator. Thus, it is
imperative that practical steps be taken towards regulation and prevention of unfair
practices in the market in order to provide better protection for investors and thereby
attract investment to benefit the market by large.
Furthermore, one study blames the CMA for contributing to the market collapses of
2006 and 2008.1086 It claims that the CMA’s performance was weak with regard to
preventing illegal practices in the market prior to the collapses.1087 In addition, the
CMA’s release of news and announcements once the collapse had begun significantly
1083
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contributed to the market’s downfall. According to Abdulsalam, the CMA
announcements were not professionally executed in a timely and considered manner
during the boom and during the market collapse, which led to the weakening of public
confidence in the market.1088 Another recent study found that investor loss can also be
due to the negative response of the market to a regulatory enforcement
announcement.1089 This is because the regulatory enforcement announcement will affect
the company value in the market. For example, a US court1090 found that there were no
grounds for the second SEC enforcement action against Siebel based on a failure to
maintain adequate disclosure controls, yet the company lost 4.52 per cent of market,
model-adjusted value on the day of the SEC news.1091 This indicates the significance of
the news released by the market regulator and therefore this news needs to be carefully
assessed prior to its release.
As an added point, it can be said that despite the CMA having the power to suspend
trading in securities or take other appropriate action, there is no suspension period
specified under the CML’03 and the CMA regulations. Article 6(a)(7) of the CML’03
states that the CMA shall have the power to ‘[p]rohibit any security or suspend the
issuance or trading of any Securities on the Exchange, as the Authority may deem
necessary’. In contrast, § 12(k) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 (US) (SEA’34)
allows the SEC ‘to suspend trading in any security (other than an exempted security) for
a period not exceeding 10 business days’.
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Moreover, a stock exchange generally is required to have a positive duty to provide all
reasonable assistance to the regulator. In Australia, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
(CA’01) gives the ASX the right to institute proceedings for violations of the
continuous disclosure rules.1092 In Saudi Arabia, the role of the SSE in the
administrative enforcement of disclosure violations in the secondary market is absent.
The SSE has only the power to recommend or propose rules to the CMA. According to
art 23(a) of the CML’03, the board of directors of the SSE shall propose the necessary
regulations, rules and instructions for the operation of the SSE. However, art 23(b)
states that any regulations, rules and instructions proposed by the SSE have to be
submitted to the CMA for the approval by the BCMA.
On the basis of the above discussion, it can be consequently said that the need for
reforms regarding the administrative enforcement of securities laws in Saudi Arabia is
imperative in order to restore public confidence in the capital market. The CMA lags
behind when compared with other developed markets. However, in order to demonstrate
that the current disclosure regime is weak in protecting investors, it is important to
investigate the above weaknesses and hurdles in the current securities regulator in Saudi
Arabia. Thus, with the intention of recommending measures to make the regulation
effective, the following section of this chapter will discuss the importance of adequate
administrative enforcement of disclosure regime in relation to the protection of
investors.
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9. 4 Drawbacks of the Current Securities Regulatory Body in Regard
to the Disclosure Regime in Saudi Arabia
Securities regulation comprises the regulation of public issuers of securities, secondary
markets, asset management products and market intermediaries. The securities market
regulator is responsible for issuing rules and regulations and ensuring that all market
participants are complying with these regulations. In Saudi Arabia, there have been
widespread allegations of inefficiency against the CMA in regard to its role in providing
an investor friendly securities market. For instance, De Boer and Turner have criticised
the role of the capital market adminstrator in Saudi Arabia by pointing out that:
In a country like Saudi Arabia, which is flooded with excess cash, weak capital
market and banks prevent adequate funds from reaching small and midsize
business, which in most economies are the engine of growth, innovation, and
employment. The financial system in Saudi Arabia instead channels funds to large
1093
government-owned enterprises and to elite businesses, while starving others.

The above shows that the CMA is required to develop the market and make it attractive
to investors. However, the flaws that exist in the securities regulatory body appear to
have significant negative impact on the stock market in the country. For the
development of market administration, the following section will discuss the inefficient
regulatory role of the CMA in terms of information intermediation and self-regulatory
power.
9.4.1 Insufficiency in the Regulatory Role of the CMA in Regard to Information
Intermediation
Ongoing development of market related laws is essential for legislative support of the
financial market. Despite the legal duty that the CMA has to regulate and develop the
market, its regulatory role remains unsatisfactory. This is because the market is in need

1093

Kito De Boer and John M Turner, 'Beyond Oil: Reappraising the Gulf States' [2007](1) McKinsey
Quarterly 112, 115.

359

Chapter 9: Securities Regulator’s Enforcement

of more by-law regulations to reduce unlawful practices and increase the efficiency in
the market. Comprehensive and effective regulations regarding information
intermediation are central to the role of the regulatory body. Leyens says that
‘[i]nformation intermediation serves to increase the credibility of issuer disclosure and
overcome investor uncertainty’.1094 Providing credible information will lead to
transparent market with a safe investment environment.
Hence, there have been unregulated activities that continue to undermine the reliability
of corporate disclosure. In particular, activities of auditors, financial analysts and rating
agencies are yet to be regulated. It has been stated that
The most important information intermediaries in capital markets are auditors,
financial analysts and rating agencies. Each of these intermediaries acts within a
multi-layered system of legal duties towards issuers, investors and other market
1095
participants’.

The following will discuss the regulatory role in regard to auditors, financial analysts
and rating agencies in Saudi Arabia. All of them stand in a relationship to the market
and have duties of disclosure and transparency.
9.4.1.1 Auditors and their Role in the Disclosure Process
Auditors have an important role in the disclosure process. The auditor’s job is to verify
the financial statements of a company and provide investors with an independent
assurance that the company’s financial statements conform to the accounting standards.
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At this point, the importance of auditors derives from the fact that stock prices respond
to earning announcements and investors rely on accounting information.1096
The accounting profession only started to be effectively regulated in the early 1990s.
The issuance of the Certified Public Accountants’ Regulations in 1991 and the creation
of Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) in 1992 laid the
foundation for the accounting profession in Saudi Arabia.1097
In the securities market, the CML’03 empowers the CMA with a supervisory
responsibility over the auditing standards and conditions required for auditors who audit
the prospectuses and periodic financial statements in the Saudi stock market.1098 The
CMA delegates this power to the SOCPA.
In regard to the prospectus, the issuer must have published audited accounts covering at
least the last three financial years, prepared in accordance with the accounting standards
issued by the SOCPA.1099
Respecting periodic financial disclosures, the issuer must provide the CMA its interim
and annual accounts after having them prepared and reviewed in accordance with the
standards set out by the SOCPA.
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Auditors must be independent as stated by art 31(c) of LR’03:
Each issuer must ensure that the accounting firm that audits its financial statements
and any partner in such accounting firm comply with the SOCPA rules and
regulations in relation to the ownership of shares or securities of the issuer or any
of its affiliates in order to ensure the accounting firm’s independence and
independence of any partner or employee of that firm.

The accounting firm must abide by the independency requirement that set out by the
LR’04. Therefore, the accountants’ report must be prepared by an independent
accountant who is a current member certified by SOCPA.
Because of the important role played by auditors in the prospectus and other financial
reports issue by a company, auditors should be well trained and experienced. AlTwaijry et al found that the role of auditors is undermined by the lack necessary
financial expertise.1100
However, even where standards are adhered to, the standards do not conform to
international standards. Saudi Arabia has established its own accounting standards. A
limited number of accounting standards have been issued by SOCPA. It has been
suggested that Saudi Arabia adopt the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) standards in order to enhance the market. The reasons for this are: first, many
countries in the world already use IASB standards and as a result foreign investments
would be facilitated; and the cost of set up and production of separate and different
national accounting standards would be eliminated.1101 Recently, SOCPA admitted that
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the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) should be adopted for
those issues not covered by the Saudi’s accounting regulations.1102
Having well-trained auditors and capable standards for the accounting profession will
result in better disclosures by corporations in the Saudi stock markets. The CMA, as
part of its supervisory power, is required to issue rules for auditing standards used by
auditing firms registered with SOCPA.
9.4.1.2 Financial Analysts and Their Role in the Disclosure Process
Financial analysts have been the focus of a number of studies regarding the value of
intermediaries and their role in the disclosure process. According to Healy and Palepu,
the role of financial analysts is to gather information from public and private sources,
evaluate the current performance of the firms that they follow, make forecasts about
their future prospects, and recommend that investors buy, hold or sell the stock.1103
Leyens also says that financial analysts ‘provide a buy, hold or sell recommendation
based on their estimate as to prospective stock prices of the issuer and the development
of the market in whole’.1104 Financial analysts are ‘outsiders’ who generally have less
access to a firm’s operations and internal documentation than ‘insiders’, such as
company personnel.
Financial analysts have an important role in the disclosure process. It is admitted that
having financial analysts will help reduce the level of information asymmetry by
providing earnings forecasts that the assist investors to better assess a firm.1105 The role
of the analyst in forecasting activity tends to ‘accelerate both industry and firm-specific
1102
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earnings information’.1106 The disclosures made by financial analysts affect the stock
price as well as investor investment decisions, similarly to auditors’ reports.
An empirical study found that investors in Saudi Arabia security markets have limited
access to professional financial analysts.1107 Although the Saudi securities market has
the highest level of trading on private information, the lack of sophisticated financial
analysts in the Saudi market is considered as a weakness of the market.1108 What is
more, the professional analysts’ community is almost entirely absent. Additionally, the
rules and enforcement of illegal trading are almost absent and the penalty for breaching
such rules is insignificant.
The role of the CMA in regard to the financial analysts as market intermediaries is
completely absent. So without regulations governing the activities of financial analysts,
the integrity of their work may be questioned. Currently, the CMA has realised the
important role played by financial analysts in the securities market. This is combined
with many recent calls to regulate and establish a national authority for the profession of
financial analysts.1109 For this reason, the Saudi Bureau of Experts at the Council of
Ministers has proposed a draft to regulate financial analysts’ activities. It would be
hoped that if financial analysts are regulated then they would attract greater confidence
and grow in number, thus displacing to some extent the dependence on ‘private
information’.
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9.4.1.3 Rating Agencies
The Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) perform an important intermediary function in the
global financial markets, including the Saudi stock market.1110 Although CRAs do not
operate in Saudi Arabia, they have an influence on the stock market. Investors across
the world look to credit ratings agencies to judge where to ‘place their bets’ in the
market. An organisation is needed to provide investors with an independent analysis of
credit worthiness, the ability to pay off loans or investments of companies, countries
and financial products.
The function of credit rating agencies is to ‘rate’ investment and credit instruments to
make it easier for non-specialist investors to determine the risk inherent to particular
investments.1111 The rating agency performs a preliminary analysis of the issuer’s public
financial information, including a registration statement, a prospectus, the most recent
annual or quarterly report, annual reports from the past five years, and subsequent
quarterly financial statements.1112
IOSCO emphasises the importance of regulating market intermediaries. Principle 29 of
the IOSCO Objectives and Principles states that ‘[r]egulation should provide for
minimum entry standards for market intermediaries’.1113 Additionally, Principle 32
provides responsibility for market intermediaries by affirming that ‘[t]here should be
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procedures for dealing with the failure of a market intermediary in order to minimize
damage and loss to investors and to contain systemic risk’.1114
IOSCO stated four principles regarding the activities of the CRAs so that they can to be
a useful tool for securities regulators. The four principles are: quality and integrity in the
rating process; independence and conflicts of interest; transparency and timeliness of
ratings disclosure; and confidential information.1115 Additionally, it was established that
the regulator should strive to achieve these principles in order to improve investor
protection and the fairness, efficiency and transparency of securities markets and to
reduce systemic risk.1116
Although the CMA has the power to regulate rating companies, regulation for credit
rating agencies is absent so far (as to December 2012). Article 6(15) of the CML’03
states that the CMA shall have the power to ‘prepare the regulations and rules for the
surveillance and supervision of entities subject to the provisions of this Law’. In
addition, art 6(18) gives the CMA the power to ‘grant the necessary licenses to be
issued in accordance with the provisions of this Law and its Implementing Regulations,
including the licensing of rating companies and agencies and the conditions thereof’. It
may be the case that the absence of regulations to govern CRAs has a negative effect on
the Saudi securities market. Hence, it can be stated that issuing regulations for the rating
agencies will come as a step toward supporting legislative requirements to strengthen
financial market in Saudi Arabia.
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In fact, developed countries have taken practical steps toward regulating the activities of
CRAs. For instance, by 2003, the need for regulation of credit rating agencies in the US
had become imperative after the famous collapses of a number of giant financial
institutions, such as Enron. Hence, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
realised the importance of having an adequate regulation of the credit rating activities.
In 2005, the SEC recognised CRAs as Nationally Recognised Statistical Ratings
Organisations (NRSROs).1117 The largest users of credit ratings generally accept the
NRSRO in the financial markets as an issuer of credible and reliable ratings.1118
Moreover, in 2004, the European Commission (EC) realised the need for legislation to
deal with the regulation and conduct of CRAs. The EC was required to remain in close
contact with other securities regulators and IOSCO to ensure that developments in
credit rating services are globally consistent. 1119 In Australia, the Corporation Act 2001
(Cth) recognises credit rating as a ‘financial product advice’ under s 766B(1). In
addition, ss 911A and 912A provide requirements for financial product licensing (and
exemptions). However, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)
is entitled to monitor the credit rating businesses to see whether they adhere to the
IOSCO code.1120
The Saudi market crash of 2006 and the international stock market failure of 2008 have
underlined the importance of the regulation of financial markets intermediaries. It is
submitted that the role of the CMA is weak in respect of regulations regulating
1117
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intermediaries. The above discussion regarding the absence of regulations governing the
activities of the CRAs demonstrates the need for such regulation. Effective regulations
that reduce risk and protect investors are vital to restore investor confidence in stock
market investment.
Consequently, an effective regulatory role will provide the underpinning for market
integrity and transparency and thus reduce the risks associated with financial
information. As a result, the regulator will achieve the goal of having strong and
effective protection for the investors.
9.4.2

Inefficient Regulatory Role of the CMA in Regard to Self-Regulatory
Power

‘Self-Regulatory Organisation’ (SRO) is a general term that refers to ‘the devolution of
authority from a first-level regulator to a second-level regulator, essentially relying on
industry expertise’.1121 Self-regulation is an important part of the regulatory structure of
securities markets in many developing, as well as developed, economies.1122 According
to Principle 9 of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles:
Where the regulatory system makes use of Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs)
that exercise some direct oversight responsibility for their respective areas of
competence, such SROs should be subject to the oversight of the Regulator and
should observe standards of fairness and confidentiality when exercising powers
and delegated responsibilities.1123

Carson affirms that the use of self-regulation and of SROs can:1124
i.

improve the effectiveness of securities regulation and market integrity;
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ii.

lead to more efficient capital markets, thus enabling businesses to tap public
equity and debt markets for capital at a reasonable cost, which supports business
expansion and economic development.

In Saudi Arabia, there are no SROs, as the SSE does not exercise regulatory powers,
although it is responsible for operationally running the market and the Depository. As
mentioned earlier, the SSE can propose rules and standards in order to carry out trading
in securities in Saudi Arabia. These proposals are to be submitted to the CMA for
approval.1125 Moreover, an SRO has not been defined in Saudi Arabia. By contrast in
Canada, for example, an SRO is specifically defined as ‘an entity that is organised for
the purpose of regulating the operations and the standards of practice and business
conduct of its members and their representatives with a view to promoting the
protection of investors and the public interest’.1126 Carson observes that ‘[m]any
countries, however, do not formally define a self-regulatory organisation in law, usually
because the law covers approval of an exchange, which is the only form of SROs in
most countries’.1127
On the other hand, developed countries have more than one form of SRO. For example,
greater consolidation of the SRO system has been achieved in Canada. There the term
SRO applies to organisations such as the Investment Industry Regulatory Organisation
of Canada (IIROC).1128
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The UK provides a good example of self-regulation in the field of regulating takeover
bids. The UK Panel on Takeovers and Merger is an independent, private sector body
that sets the UK’s Takeover Code and regulates takeover bids by applying the code.
SROs usually have responsibilities to investors, issuers, and the public imposed on them
by law or regulation, and they are accountable to their supervising regulator. SROs are
broadly accountable to the investors in the capital markets, not just to their members or
shareholders. Those responsibilities require the SRO to: ensure compliance with its
rules and, in some cases, securities regulations; protect market integrity and investors by
imposing rules on business conduct; and maintain a fair, efficient, and reputable public
market.1129
Consequently, implementing SROs is imperative in order to regulate the market in line
with the government regulator (the SSE) as the SROs cannot perform a listings role and
have some responsibility for listed company disclosure or corporate governance. It is
believed that ‘[a] legal framework should clearly establish the scope of an SRO’s
responsibilities and the division of responsibilities between the SRO and its supervising
regulator’.1130 In most developed jurisdictions, self-regulatory organisations, such as
exchanges and industry associations, carry out part of the regulatory function in the
jurisdiction. In many cases, SROs take on a significant role.1131

firms and their registered employees, and enforcing market integrity rules regarding trading activity on
Canadian equity marketplaces. See Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada, About
IIROC (20 March 2012) <http://www.iiroc.ca/English/About/Pages/default.aspx>.
1129
Carson, above n 328, 40.
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1131
Carvajal and Elliott, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses in Securities Market Regulation’, above n 236, 7.
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9.4.3

Need for Reforms in the Regulatory Role of the CMA in Regard to the
Disclosure Regime

In the Saudi securities market, a ‘disclosure regime’ remains a nascent concept.
Although, as described above, there have been disclosure requirements put in place, the
market still suffers from weak transparency and a lack of proper disclosure practice by
listed companies. The regulatory role of the CMA in relation to the disclosure regime is
insufficient. Hence, updating rules and regulations has become a priority in order to
restore investor confidence in the market and foster investor protection. It is argued that
the recent developments in corporate law governing disclosure are not effective in
respect of the protection of investors. This argument may be true due to the continuous
need for issuing more disclosure rules, as well as updating the current rules and
regulations.
It is recognised that accurate information is the lifeblood of the securities market, and
the main mission of the regulator is to safeguard the market’s ‘blood supply’.1132 The
regulatory framework should ensure that the regulator has sufficient power and
resources to effectively regulate and supervise the market participants. Certainly,
disclosure rules and requirements are very important to the integrity of the share market.
Eastbrook and Fischel found that the broad disclosure rules are very effective in
reducing risk in exchange for minor alterations of firms’ disclosures.1133 Moreover,
Principle 4 of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles states that ‘the Regulator should
adopt clear and consistent regulatory processes’. Thus, the regulator is required to have
a defined and effective policy regarding the disclosure regime. In the US, it was agreed
that the effective use of regulatory power by the SEC creates many forms of disclosure
1132
1133

See Condon, Anand and Sarra, above n 237, 202.
Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 559.
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appropriate to the size of the firms and the industries in which they operate.1134
Conversely, there have been widespread allegations against the securities regulator in
Saudi Arabia, claiming that the CMA has not been effective in its role in regard to the
disclosure regime. In particular, there is a need for reviewing and updating the current
rules and regulations of the disclosure regime.
In fact, the CML’03 has granted the CMA a wide range of powers, including the power
to issue and amend the rules and regulations of the market. In addition, the CMA has a
statutory power to regulate and monitor the full disclosure of information. 1135 However,
the use of this legal power has not been effective. For example, the crash of the Saudi
stock market in 2006 was widely blamed on the lack of investor protection and
regulation became a major political issue.1136 Moreover, a recent assessment of the
Saudi stock market conducted in 2008 found that the disclosure regime governing the
review, approval, and disclosure of related party transactions is underdeveloped.1137 As
a consequence, the report presented two suggestions, namely: the CMA should review
and update its rules and regulations; and strengthen cooperation with the stock market
participants, such as companies, shareholders and outside experts.1138 Another study
found that greater transparency and better protection for investors, as well as
enforcement of sound corporate governance standards, would help reduce speculation
and free investors to base their actions on market fundamentals.1139
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A significant issue is that the administrative enforcement of the disclosure regime has
been ineffective. This situation will have negative effects on the civil liability for
defective corporate disclosure and it militates against the protection of investors at
large.
Based on the above, it can be said that a weak regulatory framework will contribute to
hindering the protection of investors in securities markets. Thus, the need to improve
the disclosure rules and regulations is fundamental for the stronger protection of
investors in Saudi Arabia. Schooner and Taylor state that ‘[r]egulatory modernisation is
the process of reforming the organisation and practices of financial regulation to mirror
the economic realities of today’s financial services sector’.1140 The regulatory systems
should be in conformity with regulatory objectives so the protection of investors, as the
ultimate objective of the securities regulations, can be achieved.

9. 5

Importance of the Regulator’s Role in Enforcing Securities Laws

In order to discuss the importance of the regulatory body acting in the interest of
investors, there is a need to understand that the regulator’s role is significant. For that
reason, the following will discuss the theory of public enforcement, the need for
effective administration for the disclosure regime, and qualifications of members of the
CMA.
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9.5.1

Theory of Public Enforcement of Securities Laws

Public enforcement of law refers to the use of government agents to detect and to
impose appropriate sanctions on those who violate legal rules.1141 The administrative
enforcement in securities laws derives from the theory of the administrative process.
The theory states that there are three important aspects of administrative law
enforcement: the investigative power; the adjudicatory power; and the administrative
sanctioning power.1142 The power to make orders and impose sanctions on market
participants has become a major component in the enforcement arsenal of securities
regulators.1143 In addition, in the US and Canada, monetary fines have become an
increasingly high-profile component of the regulatory landscape.1144 Civil liabilities are
found to be useful for protecting investors’ rights.1145
In order to exercise the public enforcement function, the regulator’s power to bring civil
suits on behalf of investors is an effective administrative enforcement tool. In this
respect, the US court in Securities & Exchange Commission v Rind held that civil
enforcement claims are brought by the SEC to protect the public interest by ensuring the
integrity and fairness of the capital markets.1146 In Australia, the High Court upheld the
ASIC verdict, which had been decided by New South Wales Supreme Court in favour
of ASIC’s civil penalty claim in regard to the defective disclosures by the non-executive
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directors and general counsel/company secretary who breached their duty of care and
diligence requirements.1147 Generally, ASIC uses this power only where private
remedies are not practically open to those who suffered the loss. Thus, it is clear that
regulatory enforcement has a larger role in respect of protecting the public from the
unfair and illegal practices arising from the market than is currently the case in Saudi
Arabia.
Furthermore, another role of public enforcement is to prevent the violations, not to
penalise the violator. Nicholls claims that there is a theoretical distinction between the
regulator’s sanctions, based on its powers to protect the public interest, and fines and
other penalties levied by a court. The securities commission’s public interest powers
derive from its role as a market regulator and may only be used for remedial, not
punitive, purposes.1148
Arguably, it is often said that what can be the best for investors’ interest is that the
regulator uses its power to sue on behalf of investors, or where the investors are able to
take action by themselves. A newspaper report of a barrister lodging written
submissions in relation to a well-known accounting company involved in a number of
disputes with ASIC (and retained by that company) noted that ‘[t]here was not
necessarily any correlation between any amount recovered by ASIC and the amount the
company would have recovered if it had conducted the case itself’, and indeed had
challenged the constitutionality of the regulator’s ability to take particular actions in
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relation to the case ‘without just terms’.1149 According to the report, ASIC’s decisions
while running the case could leave the company worse off and, according to the
company’s barrister, ‘no terms — just or otherwise — are provided for such
loss.…’.1150 In the same vein, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer have undertaken
an empirical analysis, making a critical but somewhat provocative proposition that
‘securities laws “facilitating” private enforcement, rather than providing for public
enforcement, benefit the securities market’.1151 In the same article, they claim that
private litigation is a more effective regulatory tool in securities markets than public
enforcement.1152
On the other hand, the fact that public enforcement has a significant role in providing
protection to investors and stabilising the financial market cannot be denied. Hence,
despite a number of securities scholars putting forward the proposition that private
enforcement outperforms public enforcement in encouraging the growth of securities
markets,1153 the latest evidence nevertheless shows that ‘public enforcement typically
dominates private enforcement’.1154
Furthermore, public enforcement has a higher contribution to facilitating private
enforcement after the regulator takes action against a wrongdoer. In this respect, the
situation in Saudi Arabia requires reform. There is a call to publish decisions of cases

1149

Elisabeth Sexton, 'ASIC in the Dock over its Power to Sue: KPMG Feels It's More Than the Vibe',
The Age (online), 27 January 2011 <http://www.theage.com.au/business/asic-in-the-dock-over-its-powerto-sue-20110126-1a5d0.html>.
1150
Ibid. It was to say the least ‘an unusual response’ (as the article also notes) on behalf of the
accounting firm whose actions in relation to the company in question had given rise to the prosecutions.
The case to which reference appears to be made is the Westpoint Case.
1151
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, above n 4, 28.
1152
Ibid.
1153
Rafael La Porta et al, ‘Law and Finance’ above n 779, 1151.
1154
Jackson and Roe, above n 675.

376

Chapter 9: Securities Regulator’s Enforcement

that have been brought before the court by the CMA.1155 It is generally believed that the
publication of the public enforcement of cases would facilitate private enforcement
because aggrieved investors would then recognise the offenders and sue them for the
loss or damage that they have sustained. Hence, investors could claim civil liability
based on public action taken by the CMA against offenders who have been convicted by
the CRSD of a criminal breach of the CML’03 and rules and regulation of the market.
Cox et al believe that private lawsuits are more effective after regulatory authorities
have acted.1156 Hence, private lawsuits are more likely to succeed given that the initial
prosecution has been state funded and wrongdoing demonstrated – and the private
prosecution then has an easier and therefore less costly case to run overall to the
aggrieved investors.
9.5.2

Need for an Efficient Regulatory Body for the Securities Market in Saudi
Arabia by the CMA

As shown above, weaknesses in the current regulatory body impede the goals of
enforcement of the disclosure regime. Although the CMA is functionally independent
from political interference, it lacks expertise in its operational area. It is argued that a
regulator who lacks expertise cannot adequately enforce the securities law, whereas the
efficient enforcement of law is vital for the reliability of securities markets.1157 The
International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) recommends that
‘Securities Commissions must be technical, specified entities specialising in their own
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scope, that is, the securities market’.1158 Black asserts the need for a specialised
securities regulator to pursue complex securities disclosure cases.1159
Baamir declares that the weak intervention by the CMA to control the market shows its
lack of regulatory experience in enforcing the law.1160 He believes that the late
intervention by the CMA has been considered a significant impediment for protecting
investors from corporate debacles. Before the 2006 collapse, the CMA failed to
effectively intervene to control the mass speculation that had led to massive volatility in
the capital market and caused losses to the general investor. For example, before the
market collapsed in 2006, it was noted that the prices of shares traded by 70 companies
of the 81 listed firms traded in the SSE were overpriced and the value of some losing
companies’ shares went up by 200 per cent in a month — clearly unsustainable and
unrelated to the actual performance of the companies in question.1161 Hence, it can be
said that the judicious use of a trading halt by the regulator is imperative to protect
shareholders. A number of studies have found that market volatility is significantly
lower in the reopening period than before the trading halt, suggesting that the
imposition of a trading halt has been successful.1162 A recent IOSCO report concludes
that a trading halt is a useful tool to be used by the regulator in order to protect investors
in the emerging markets.1163 In another study, it has been found that the imposition of
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trading halts helps the dissemination of information across the market, thus enhancing
the price discovery process.1164
In respect of the CMA, although the CML’03 grants the CMA the power to halt trading
in the market when it is necessary to protect investors,1165 halting trading has never been
used to stop the market’s extreme volatility. Thus, it can be said that the massive
collapse of 2006 and the market recession in 2008 were mainly due to the CMA’s lack
of experience in enforcing the securities laws. A Saudi economist criticises the CMA’s
lack of experience in supervising the market by stating that:
…inexplicably, the governmental authorities remained passive and stood by,
watching this painful economic catastrophe without attempting to intervene and
halt the collapse in an effort to save the country and its citizens from its destructive
consequences.1166

The importance of an effective enforcement of securities laws is stressed by IOSCO in
its recent evaluation report of the global financial crisis of 2008, especially, in emerging
markets.1167 The report asserted that ‘prompt and consistent enforcement action is
undoubtedly one of the key criteria for building fair, efficient and transparent
markets’.1168 This is not only true of emerging markets. In the US, it is believed that the
serious lack of regulatory enforcement played a key role in the period preceding the
recent financial crisis.1169 Furthermore, whilst there is no doubt that the securities
regulation in Australia is more robust than that in Saudi Arabia, Tomasic notes that
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regulatory actions have to ‘become more creative and broadly based so as to draw more
effectively upon the strength of the regulated as well as the regulator’.1170
It has been observed that the success of the financial markets in the UK is due to strong
tradition of law enforcement.1171 The effective enforcement of corporate laws will
‘support the broader objectives of market confidence and stability’.1172 The current
situation in Saudi Arabia is that the regulator must be effective in order to have a
successful enforcement program. It can therefore be said that despite having efficient
regulations, the lack of the CML’s experience in supervising the market may undermine
the enforcement of securities regulations in general. Thus the administrative
enforcement of a disclosure regime will be also weakened as long as the entire
enforcement by the regulator is ineffective in protecting the general investors from
illegal practices in the primary and secondary share market. Hence, it can be confidently
said that effective enforcement machinery is important, for without enforcement no
regulatory system achieves its goals. Therefore, in order to restore investor confidence
in the securities market, the regulator is required to provide adequate protection to
investors. The CMA should endeavour to not only issue rules and regulations but also to
effectively implement these laws ‘on the ground’. The Canadian Securities
Administrators (CSA) suggests that ‘[a]n effective regulatory enforcement regime is
rooted in strategies that focus on investor protection and the prevention of harm’.1173
In reality, having a successful administrative enforcement program will not only
improve investor protection, but also benefit the overall capital market. As shown
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above, the effective enforcement of securities laws is vital to restore public confidence
in the capital market and make investment in shares desirable. As a result, effective
enforcement will lead to the investing of more funds into the capital market and,
positively, the performance of the listed companies will be enhanced. Making funds
available to companies will assist them to carry out their projects properly and to have
better and more profitable outcomes. A recent empirical study on EU countries shows
that countries with stricter implementation and enforcement experience significantly
larger ‘capital market’ effect.1174
9.5.2.1 Need for Reforms
Although the CMA is the sole regulator of the stock market in Saudi Arabia and has
been since it inception in 2004, its lack of experience in regulating the market continues
to affect its activities. It can be said that cooperation with other public and private
agencies, such as the Ministry of Justice, banking sector and investment sector, is
imperative for it to achieve stronger protection for the investors in the Saudi securities
market. IOSCO emphasises that effective enforcement requires the regulator to have
close cooperation between domestic agencies, including banking and other financial
sectors.1175
Furthermore, effective market regulation requires proper investigation to be conducted
by the regulator. Investigation is a vital stage in the administrative enforcement
mechanism. Thus, the regulator must have sufficient legal authority to investigate and to
bring actions. With this in mind, regulator cooperation with governmental institutions
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and agencies to obtain information in the investigation stage is essential for successful
enforcement. A recent study has stressed that:
[T]he regulator should have mechanisms to obtain such information either directly
or through other authorities, subject, of course, to due-process protections. In the
latter case, it is particularly important that there be mechanisms in place (such as
memoranda of understanding) to ensure effective and efficient cooperation from
the other authority (for example, the securities regulator commonly needs
cooperation of the banking regulator). There should also be mechanisms to enforce
such power, including sanctions for noncompliance and for providing false
information.1176

The current situation in Saudi Arabia is that the CMA is weak in terms of cooperation
with other regulated agencies. Baamir states that ‘the CMA should coordinate with the
Ministry of Justice to enforce its disciplinary actions against market abusers’. 1177 He
also points out that cooperation with the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) as
the banking regulator is essential to enable the CMA to access bank records.1178
It has been noted that the fines or administrative penalties imposed for breach of the
disclosure regime may not create sufficient deterrence. It may be the case that the
existence of only low monetary fines, as opposed to the high capital resources of listed
companies, does not serve to prevent them from violating the disclosure regime. In
contrast, in the UK, the FSA is authorised to levy unlimited fines on wrongdoers, so
there is no maximum stipulated for fines imposed by the regulator. Davies encourages
the regulator to increase the financial penalties. He explains that the reason for this is
that ‘to achieve credible deterrence, wrongdoers must not only realise that they face a
real and tangible risk of being held to account, but must also expect a significant
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penalty’.1179 Considering the high value of the listed companies and the considerable
profit they gain from failing to adhere to the disclosure regime and other requirements,
the value of fines imposed must to be increased in order to create stronger deterrence
and therefore increase the likelihood of companies complying with the disclosure
requirement. It is vital that strong administrative penalties be introduced to provide
more protection for investors and so induce them to invest in the capital market.
Arguably, it may be said that a tougher civil liability regime will discourage companies
from going public. However, evidence counter to this argument has been found in the
US. It is believed that the US has the toughest administrative enforcement of securities
laws in the world. Because of that, many foreign companies claim that the US
enforcement system is the most important reason for their not wanting to be listed in the
US market. Langevoort, however, believes that the SEC is a highly successful
administrative agency;1180 and refers to its success in focusing on investor protection
and views it as a positive.1181 Consequently, it can be seen that, on balance, investor
protection must be the purpose of any reforms that would be made to administrative
enforcement in Saudi Arabia.
9.5.3

Qualifications of Members of the Capital Market Authority

In today’s worldwide competitive securities markets, only orderly markets can sustain
developments and attract domestic and foreign investors. The effectiveness of
regulation relies on the competence of the persons entrusted with regulatory
responsibilities. Principle 3 of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities
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Regulation provides that ‘[t]he regulator should have adequate powers, proper resources
and the capacity to perform its functions and exercise its powers’.1182 In the
interpretation of this principle, IOSCO stresses that regulator is required to have
‘experienced staff who have skills that are valuable to the private sector’. 1183 In
addition, IOSCO stipulates that ‘[t]he regulator must ensure that its staff receive
ongoing training as required’. Based on the IOSCO Principles, sufficient training and
adequate experience are very important requisites to be acquired by securities regulators
for them to be effective in dealing with issues related to securities.
9.5.3.1 Professional Experience
The existence of highly qualified expert administrators is significant in respect of
securities regulation. The regulator is required to have expertise in the field of the
private sector and especially the securities markets. Securities regulators are charged
with market supervision. Therefore, it can be said that regulatory body members with
poor experience in the private sector will negatively affect the regulation of the market.
For instance, a lack of accounting expertise among commissioners weakened the US
regulator.1184
As was mentioned earlier, the SEC is believed to be one of the most successful
securities regulators in the world. The fundamental philosophy underpinning
appointments to the SEC is that the appointee should have practical knowledge of the
complicated issues involved in the securities markets. Speaking in the context of the
desirability of a single equity market, a former SEC commissioner observed that a
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‘flexible regulator that could deal directly with the markets and financial intermediaries
could provide more appropriate and better oversight’;1185 many, however, are convinced
that such flexibility is only able to be constructed and maintained by those with
experience in the industries that their respective regulatory bodies are bound to regulate.
Bosch, an experienced securities regulator, is convinced that ‘regulation of business is
something that should be done for business and as much as possible by business’.1186
Members with wide experience in business and practical experience of the market are
reasonably expected to play an active role in improving the securities regulations.
In spite of the statutory requirement in Saudi Arabia, which states that the BCMA be
comprised of five members who shall be ‘professionally qualified’,1187 the members of
the Board are lacking significant practical experience in the private sector. Since the
inception of the CMA in 2004, there has never been a member of the CMA from the
professionals in the private sector. Rather, the composition of the members of the CMA
is comprised of bureaucrats, academics and former government agency members.
Therefore, market administration has been hampered by such a lack of experience and
expertise and it could be said that this has contributed to its lack of success in
addressing the market problems and restoring public confidence. Mann claims that a
successful regulator is aware of and maintains the balance between ‘the bureaucrat’s
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inclination to regulate everything and the financier’s preference for minimal
governmental intervention’.1188
In regard to the situation in Saudi Arabia, the first chairperson of the CMA was a
bureaucrat who lacked practical knowledge and experience in securities matters as well
as in the private sector. He had held different positions in a number of government
agencies. He was widely criticised by the public during the major market collapse in
February 2006, although he himself blamed wealthy speculators who dominated the
SSE. He was discharged him from the CMA’s top position in May 2006.1189
In many countries, it has been a requirement for members of the regulatory body to have
professional experience from the private sector. The appointment of private sector
professionals is evident in Australia. Prior to joining ASIC, Mr Greg Medcraft, the
current chairman, spent nearly 30 years in private sector.1190 A recent report released by
the ASIC report declares that:
The Treasurer may nominate as Commissioners only people who are qualified
by knowledge of, or experience in, business administration of companies,
financial markets, financial products, and financial services, law, economics
or accounting.1191

In Canada, those charged with appointing a new member of the Ontario Securities
Commission (OSC) must consider specialised knowledge and private sector

1188

Michael D Mann, 'What Constitutes a Successful Securities Regulatory Regime?' (1993) 3 Australian
Journal for Corporate Law 178, 179.
1189
'Saudi Replaces Stock Market Regulator after Crash', Daily Times (online), 14 May 2006
<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C05%5C14%5Cstory_14-5-2006_pg5_25>.
1190
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 'Annual Report 2010-11' (Report, ASIC, October
2011)
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/annual-report-201011.pdf/$file/annual-report-2010-11.pdf> 7.
1191
Ibid 68.
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experience.1192 At present, 9 members of the 13 members of the OSC have extensive
experience in the private sector.1193 Consequently, it can be said that adequate
knowledge and experience in the private sector, business and securities trading, are vital
in order to broaden capital market efficiency. Hence, the professional experience of
potential members of the CMA needs to be considered in order to bring such expertise
to the regulator and there have it utilised.
9.5.3.2 Legal Education
Considering the complex nature of the securities laws, legal knowledge is crucial for a
capable securities regulator. Hence, qualified persons with law degrees need to be taken
into consideration in the appointment of the members of any securities regulator. The
administration of the securities market requires members who have knowledge and
practical experience in the legal profession. As a result, legal expertise will improve the
performance of the securities watchdog in terms of the regulatory and adjudicative
roles.
To demonstrate the above, the regulatory body in developed countries realised the need
for members who have law degrees. In the US, all members of the SEC, including the

1192

Ontario Securities Commission, '2011 Annual Report' (Report, OSC, 2011)
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/static/_/AnnualReports/2011/pdf/OSC_AR2011_Full_ENG.pdf> 3.
1193
For example,
- Ms Margot C Howard, chartered financial analyst, foundation and pension fund portfolio manager;
- Ms Sarah B Kavanagh, investment banker and had also held senior finance positions at several
Canadian corporations;
- Ms Paulette L Kennedy, financial reporting, senior management positions at Ford Motor Company
(Canada) as well as a major insurer and other companies;
- Ms Judith N Robertson, international financial services (both buy and sell) and former CEO of
company that is a provider of integrated trading technology and brokerage services.
See Ontario Securities Commission, Members of the Commission (11 December 2012)
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/About_members_index.htm> There are also among the current OSC: three
QCs, a former judge, auditors, directors with extensive experience and experienced corporate lawyers,
corporate officers, and so on, amongst the 9–15 (currently 13) member OSC.
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chairman, have a law degree as at December 2012.1194 The New Zealand Securities
Commission requires that ‘at least one member must be a barrister or solicitor of not
less than seven years’ practice’.1195 In the UK, amongst the members of the FSA before
its recent restructure was a member who spent 20 years in private practice, specialising
in commercial litigation with emphasis on financial services.1196 Another member has a
Juris Doctor degree and had had extensive legal knowledge and experience.1197
In Canada, 8 of the 13 members of the Ontario Securities Commission, including the
chairman, have law degrees and sufficient legal experience as in 2012. 1198 In Australia,
the deputy chair of the ASIC has law degrees and extensive knowledge of corporate and
securities law.1199
In Saudi Arabia, despite the regulatory role of the CMA, the chairman and members of
the CMA lack legal education.1200 Since the inception of the CMA in 2004, no person
with legal qualifications has been appointed as a member of the CMA (to the best of
this writer’s knowledge, as at December 2012). The first chairman, who received
enormous criticism, lacked a law degree and had no experience in dealing with capital

1194

The Securities and Exchange Commission, Current SEC Commissioners (27 August 2012)
<http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner.shtml>. This is also often combined with economics, maths or
other degrees and long-term business and /or academic and other experience. The SEC has five members.
1195
New Zealand Financial Markets Authority, 'Annual Report 2012' (Report, FMA, 2012)
<http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/8D1DB5A5-E851-4B4C-995A36964475FE92/254410/DBHOH_PAP_23952_FinancialMarketsAuthorityTeManaTat.pdf> 10. The
Commission can have from five to ten members.
1196
Margaret Cole is a Board Member of the Financial Service Authority. She is a graduate in law from
Cambridge and is a solicitor. See Financial Service Authority, Margaret Cole (8 February 2012)
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who/board/cole.shtml>. Although she left the position that month when the
body was restructured, she is largely accredited with ‘cracking down on insider trading’ and launching the
first criminal prosecutions: Jill Treanor, ‘FSA’s Margaret Cole to Step Down’ Guardian (UK) 15
February 2012 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/feb/15/fsa-margaret-cole-steps-down>.
1197
Peter Fisher, JD (Harvard Law School: Financial Services Authority, Peter Fisher (8 February 2012)
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who/board/fisher.shtml>.
1198
Ontario Securities Commission, ‘Members of the Commission’, above n 1164.
1199
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC Senior Executive (8 February 2012)
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/ASIC+senior+executives#commissioner>.
1200
See arts 5 and 6 of the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia).
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market legislation.1201 Similarly, his successor and incumbent chairman of the CMA has
no law degree or previous experience in securities markets or the private sector.1202
Currently, there is no any statutory requirement for a special knowledge of law as a
requisite qualification for a member of the CMA. Due to the nature of the regulatory
role of the CMA, it is essential that legal education become a prerequisite for (or be
acquired by) the members of the CMA. In Australia, knowledge in the field of law is
mentioned as one of the basic qualifications to be taken into consideration when
appointing members of ASIC.1203 Having regard to the law and practice of the
developed nations mentioned above, the significance of members being familiar with
legal knowledge cannot be ignored. At present, even two of the five members of the
Jordan Securities Commission have a law degree and practical experience in the legal
field.1204 This is the case despite there being no statutory requirement for legal
education.
Based on the above, it can be recommended that Saudi securities laws be amended to
include legal education/experience as a requisite qualification for at least the chairman
of the CMA as well as for at least one other member of the CMA.

1201

Mr Jammaz bin Abdullah Al-Suhaimi, from 2004 to 2006. He has a Bachelor and Masters degree in
the field of electrical engineering.
1202
Dr Abdulrahman Al-Tuwaijri, is the current chairman of the Capital Market Authority of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, from 2006 to present. He holds a Bachelor’s degree and PhD degree in
Economics.
1203
‘The Minister is to nominate a person as a member only if the Minister is satisfied that the person is
qualified for appointment by virtue of his or her knowledge of, or experience in, one or more of the
following fields, namely: (a) business; (b) administration of companies; (c) financial markets; (d)
financial products and financial services; (e) law; (f) economics; (g) accounting’: s 9(4) of the Australian
Securities and Investments Act 2001 (Cth).
1204
Deputy Chair Mansour Haddadin holds Bachelor and Masters degrees in Law as well having
extensive practical experience in Law. See Jordan Securities Commission, About JSC, Board of
Commissioners
(11
December
2012)
<http://www.jsc.gov.jo/Public/English.aspx?Site_ID=1&Page_ID=2333>. Mrs Muna AlMufti (appointed
February 2012) is also an experienced qualified lawyer.
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9.5.3.3 Representatives of Market Participants
Another issue is the absence of representatives of the market participants in the
composition of the CMA. In fact, experience in the corporate management is different
from other experience in the private sector. ‘Representatives of market participants’ are
members who have been in charge of running companies such as senior executives and
board directors, whilst ‘private sector members’ are those who have practical experience
in finance and economics.
Currently, there is no provision for the appointment of market participants to the
regulatory body. The appointment of representatives of market participants is infrequent
and not statutorily required, so of the five permanent members of the CMA, there is
only one member who has been involved in corporate management.1205
In addition to having higher legal education, members of the securities regulators in the
US, UK, Australia and Canada demonstrate their extensive experience in dealing with
corporate management before becoming members of their respective regulatory
body.1206
9.5.3.4 Structure of the Board of the Capital Market Authority
Considering the weaknesses discussed above, specific criteria for appointment to the
CMA are recommended. As outlined above, professional experience as well as higher
education and practical experience in law should be the basis on which to appoint new
members to the regulatory body. Thus, the members of the CMA (currently five
1205

Mr Mohamed Al-Shumrani is a member of the BCMA and has participated in the management of
various companies. Capital Market Authority, ‘Annual Report of 2010’, above n 750, 9.
1206
In Canada, for example, see Ontario Securities Commission, ‘Members of the Commission’, above n
1193. See the bibliographies of the SEC chairman and commissioners: Securities and Exchange
Commission, ‘Current SEC Commissioners’, above n 1194. For ASIC, see Australian Securities and
Investments Commission, ‘Annual Report 2010-11’, above n 1190.
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members including the chairman) may be divided into four categories. These categories
are: legal scholars specialising in securities law, private sector professionals, market
participants and finally, a member who has had practical experience as solicitor in
commercial litigation and capital markets issues. Sufficient background and experience
in finance and economics are essential for the private sector members. Most
importantly, the chairperson must be always chosen from those who have higher law
degrees. At all times, when nominating a member, the importance of investor protection
and capital market growth should be paramount.
9.5.4

Accountability of the Securities Regulator

In order to provide effective regulation to the market, the CMA should be completely
independent from any external interference. Any member of the CMA must be a fulltime member; he or she must have financial independence as well as the security of
his/her membership term. Members of the CMA should not be accountable to the
executive government for their decisions. In the US, once the SEC commissioners are
appointed, they are not directly answerable to either the executive or the Congress for
their decisions.1207
However, it is believed that a person who is entrusted with the regulatory role should
act fairly, and with highest efficiency and honesty. Therefore, a system of accountability
should be put in place to ensure that the regulatory body performs its function
impartially and effectively. Scholz suggests that credible accountability mechanisms for
the public enforcement agency will result in effective functioning.1208

1207

Mann, above n 1188, 181.
John Scholz, 'Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The Changing Perspective of
Deterrence Theory' (1997) 60 Law and Contemporary Problems 253, 266.
1208

391

Chapter 9: Securities Regulator’s Enforcement

Principle 2 of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles relates not only to the operational
independence of the regulator but also to it being accountable in the exercise of its
functions and powers. IOSCO states that the accountability implies: a regulator that
operates independently of sectoral interests; a system of public accountability of the
regulator; and a system permitting judicial review of decisions by the regulator.1209
Since the establishment of the CMA in 2004, there has been no judicial inquiry
conducted into any member of the CMA. This is perhaps because of an absence of a
statutory accountability mechanism in regard to regulatory misconduct or malpractice in
Saudi Arabia.
Members of the CMA should be immune from political and commercial interference in
their functions and decisions. Thus, the government executives cannot make an inquiry
regarding their functions as a member of the CMA. Nevertheless as it is important to
hold accountable members of the CMA, the persons entrusted with the responsibility of
enforcing regulation, and discipline them if the need arose, some mechanism must be
made available.
Consequently, it is suggested that a degree of judicial oversight be implemented to
permit the investigation of any allegations raised against CMA members in relation to
the performance of their duties. Hence, a legal action in the general court of law could
be brought against the member in question by the public prosecutor. If a member is
found to be guilty of misconduct, he or she may be dismissed, based on the judiciary’s
decision rather than government intervention. Indeed, for a better delivery of justice,
any allegations against the members of the CMA have to be dealt with by a general

1209

IOSCO, 'Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation-2010', above n 18, 4.
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court that is independent of CMA. Having an accountability mechanism for regulatory
misconduct is imperative for the maintenance of public confidence in the market. The
issue of the accountability of the CMA will be further discussed in this chapter under
section 5.3.

9. 6 Functions of the Regulator in Protecting Investors from Defective
Disclosures
The aim of the administrative enforcement of securities laws is to foster efficiency in
the market and to protect general investors from corporate misconduct. An effective
enforcement mechanism has a major role in assisting aggrieved investors seek redress
under civil liability provisions for breaches of the disclosure regime. In Saudi Arabia,
however, as seen earlier, the regulatory body (CMA) is not strong or efficient enough to
enforce investors’ rights of redress. As such, the CMA’s performance is not satisfactory.
In this respect, two methods may be adopted to ensure better protection of the investors,
namely indirect protection (pre-violation) and direct protection (post-violation).1210
9.6.1

Indirect Protection

Indirect protection aims to prevent the violation from occurring. It is said that the
regulator should give more attention to prevention of infringements of the securities
law. The following discussion will investigate the measures used by the CMA to
prevent violations. Indirect protection can be implemented through education of
investors and regulatory intervention before the release of the disclosure document.

1210

Also see the discussions of the role of securities regulators in protecting investors in Solaiman,
'Investor Protection by Securities Regulators in the Primary Share Markets’, above n 358, 313.
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9.6.1.1 Investor Education
It is believed that investment knowledge allows investors to protect themselves from the
wrongdoings committed by the market participants. The ability of an investor to make a
responsible investment decision is considered the cornerstone of investment in
securities. Investor education empowers investors to protect themselves. Reyes observes
that ‘[i]nvestors with investment education could adequately protect themselves’.1211
Reyes also maintains that investor education can often be the last line of defence against
corporate malpractices rather than the first.1212 Fanto concludes that educated investors
can easily read disclosure documents.1213 Studies suggest that educating investors is
important for those who may not even be able to understand the importance of some
simpler investment decisions, such as in regard to their own pensions.1214
More importantly, investor education plays a key role in any risk disclosure regime.1215
A report released by the IOSCO Technical Committee considers investor education to
be a significant factor in achieving the goal of investor protection.1216 Indeed, the
potential benefits of investor education for emerging market economies are

1211

E Richie Reyes, 'Can America Escape the Cloud of Corporate Corruption with the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002? A Proposal to Restore Efficiency and Integrity into the Capital Markets by Mandating
Corporate Disclosures of Real-Time Information and Encouraging Investor Education' (2002) 24 Hamline
Journal of Public Law and Policy 147, 156.
1212
Ibid.
1213
James A Fanto, 'Investor Education, Securities Disclosure, and the Creation and Enforcement of
Corporate Governance and Firm Norms' (1998) 48 Catholic University Law Review 15, 39.
1214
Annamaria Lausardi and Olivia S Mitchell, 'Financial Literacy and Retirement Preparedness:
Evidence and Implications for Financial Education Programs' (Working Paper No WA 2006-144,
Michigan Retirement Center, December 2006) 3.
1215
Michael K H Law, 'Behavioural Risk Disclosure and Retail Investor Protection: Reflections on the
Lehman Brothers Minibonds Crisis' (2010) 40(1) Hong Kong Law Journal 15, 39.
1216
International Organisation of Securities Commissions, 'Discussion Paper on the Role of Investor
Education in the Effective Regulation of CIS and CIS Operators' (Report of the Technical Committee of
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, March 2001) 3.

394

Chapter 9: Securities Regulator’s Enforcement

considerable.1217 The former chairman of the IOSCO Emerging Markets Committee
argued that the difficulties facing the developing markets could be defeated through
investor education programs and training seminars, as these deliver positive results for
emerging markets.1218
In some countries, the regulator uses the statutory authority to address investor
education. In the UK, the regulator has an express statutory obligation to undertake
investor education efforts.1219 In Mexico, a separate government institution is
responsible for providing investor education.1220 In Hong Kong, the establishment of an
independent council has recently been proposed, as such a council is important in being
responsible for ‘educating the public in financial literacy’.1221
In Canada, it has been recommended that greater efforts should be made by the
securities regulator to educate investors about market risks and losses, and the
appropriate bearing of responsibility when an investment has negative returns.1222 The
recommendation also emphasised the importance of having sufficient recourse for
investor education, such as ‘providing a financial advisor to clarify the risk associated
with particular investment’.1223

1217

International Organisation of Securities Commissions, 'Investor Education' (Report from the
Emerging Markets Committee of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, October
2002) 21.
1218
Mr Dogan Cansizlar was the chairman of the EMC in 2005. See Final Communique of the XXXth
Annual Conference of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), above n 52.
1219
IOSCO, ‘Discussion Paper on the Role of Investor Education in the Effective Regulation’, above n
1216, 6.
1220
Ibid.
1221
Law, above n 1215, 26.
1222
Mary Condon and Poonam Puri, 'The Role of Compliance in Securities Regulatory Enforcement'
(Research Study, Commissioned by the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 2006)
25.
1223
Ibid.
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Investor education in Saudi Arabia needs to be more recognised by the regulatory body.
Before the market’s major collapse in 2006, there was a complete absence of any form
of investor education by the CMA. For that reason, it is strongly believed that the lack
of investment knowledge by investors was one of the main factors that led to the Saudi
market crash in 2006.1224 Recently, the CMA has engaged in investor education
activities, having realised the importance of the knowledge of investment to the
development of the market, as well as to help the CMA to achieve its goal of the
protection of investors.1225
In addition to its ongoing investor education program, the CMA is required to allocate
more resources to educate the investors about the behavioural risks that they confront in
the capital market. The positive outcomes of this kind of education will not only be a
better understanding of investment, but also greater investor sophistication.1226 The
CMA needs to design a comprehensive investor education program covering all aspects
of the IPOs and to go beyond that to educate investors about trading in the secondary
market.
It should be noted here that weak representation of institutional investors in the Saudi
securities market was one of the most important factors that led to the collapse of the
Saudi stock market in 2006. The percentage of individual investors trading directly in
the Saudi securities market is the highest globally and up to 92 per cent of the market
comprising direct trading transactions.1227 As a result of the individual investors who
lack investment education and experience in stock trading, the market and investor may

1224

Baamir, ‘Issues of Transparency and Disclosure in the Saudi Stock Market', above n 23, 78.
For more details regarding the CMA investor education program, see Capital Market Authority,
‘Annual Report of 2010’, above n 750, 124.
1226
Law, above n 1215, 39.
1227
Albalawi, above n 193.
1225
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be harmfully affected by selling or buying decisions which are not based on experience.
Most recently, the Majlis Ash-Shura (the Consultative Council)1228 has criticised the
CMA for not adopting an effective mechanism to raise awareness amongst investors of
the risks of individuals direct trading and to encourage them to make a shift to
institutional trading.1229
Based on the above, it can be clearly seen that investor education can play a very
significant role. Educating investors must be a statutory duty that is imposed on the
regulator. Proper investor education will benefit investors, the market, and the regulator.
It will help the market administration to achieve better protection of the market
participants, which will significantly restore public confidence and contribute to market
growth. Indeed, it has been found that ‘[i]nvestment education can help stimulate
investor confidence and help restore integrity into the capital market’.1230 In fact,
educated investors will be capable of avoiding investments in financially weak
companies that may be likely to collapse at any time and result in losses to investors. As
mentioned earlier, despite the fact that the CMA has a key role to provide investors with
a proper education programs, sadly, this role has not yet been taken seriously as a means
of strengthening investor protection in the stock market.
However, it should be mentioned that recently there have been a number of initiatives
by the CMA to educate the investors. The Investor Awareness Centre, which is found
on the CMA’s website, now provides brochures, definitions and media releases within

1228

Majlis Ash-Shura is a legislative body that advises the King on issues that are important to the State.
See Hamdallah, above n 58.
1229
Albalawi, above n 193.
1230
Reyes, above n 1211, 170.
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awareness programs targeting general investors, potential investors and school
students.1231
9.6.1.2 Regulator’s Intervention Prior to the Release of the Disclosure Documents
The role of the regulator in respect of disclosure in the market is crucial. Doty
comments that disclosure has always been at the heart of securities regulation.1232 Fair
and full disclosure by corporations is crucial for the protection of investors. In fact, the
ability of general investors to protect themselves requires sufficient knowledge of
investment or proper advice from professional advisors. Neither of these two
requirements is satisfactory in the Saudi Arabian market. Considering the recent
establishment of the CMA, its role is not only to be a regulatory body but also to
contribute to the development of the capital market.
Due to the fact that general investors are not familiar with the issue of fair disclosure,
the CMA should deal seriously with it. Until the investors to have sufficient knowledge
and the services of financial advisors are readily available, the CMA must pursue a
strong system of verifying disclosure documents before they are released to the public.
It is the regulator’s role to verify the disclosure documents for a new issue of securities
and documents regarding periodic and continuous disclosures. This role is derived from
the major responsibility of the regulator to protect the investors from market malpractice

1231

Capital
Market
Authority,
Investor
Awareness
Centre
(3
December
2012)
<http://www.cma.org.sa/IA/books-en/default-en.html>. See also CMA’s new ‘Smart Investor Centre’
http://www.smart-investor.net/>.
1232
James R Doty, 'The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an Internationalized
Marketplace' (1992) 60(6) Fordham Law Review S77, S86.
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or misconduct. It is a statutory duty of the CMA to monitor the full disclosure of
information regarding securities and their issuers.1233
9.6.1.2.1

Primary Market

In respect of the prospectus, the role of the regulator is to verify the adequacy of the
prospectus content and to ensure that it satisfies the listing requirements. In Saudi
Arabia, the CMA has a statutory duty to verify the prospectus before the approval.1234
Although the CMA has recently approved prospectuses for the new issuers in the
market, a lack of analysis of these new prospectuses continues to persist. Considering
that the Saudi market is an emerging one, the role of the CMA needs to go beyond the
verification to include active investigation into whether the information contained is
accurate.
In view of the objective of investor protection, the regulator should take practical steps
to prevent misleading statements and omissions in the prospectus. For that reason, it is
important to establish a specialised due diligence committee (DDC) to carry out
comprehensive verification of every new prospectus in the IPO market in Saudi Arabia.
To have precise disclosure in prospectus, the CMA may stipulate that issuers need to
verify their prospectuses using a specialised committee (the DDC), the composition of
which is specified by the regulator. The issuer will be responsible for forming a
committee to be comprised of representatives from company and advisors, which will
report to the company’s board. Such a committee should consist of those potentially
liable for a defective prospectus or a representative of each.

1233

Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 5(a)(6).
Ibid art 43(a). It states that ‘after its review of the prospectus, the Authority shall announce its
approval or rejection of the prospectus.’
1234
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After the DDC approves the prospectus and it has been submitted to and approved by
the company board, but prior to the release of the prospectus, the regulator must also
conduct a final verification. If the prospectus is found to be defective after it is made
available to the public, the committee can be held liable, along with other persons who
participated in the preparation of the prospectus.
In Australia, the DDC is an alternative source to ensure that the prospectus complies
with the disclosure and content requirements under the Act.1235 The verified prospectus
is signed off by the company-appointed DDC and recommended to the directors of the
issuer, who approve it for lodgement with ASIC.1236
9.6.1.2.1.1 Stop Order

As noted earlier, securities law in Saudi Arabia lacks a statutory power to issue stop
orders to errant issuers. In order to wield an effective enforcement power, however, it is
important that the CMA be authorised to issue a stop order to prevent funds being raised
from the public by a defective prospectus that has been issued and its defect discovered
only after its issue.
The stop order is effective in deterring violations in prospectuses. In Australia, a ‘stop
order’ is described as an effective tool for ASIC to utilise among its enforcement
strategies.1237 Golding supports its use as a deterrent for potential defective disclosures
in a prospectus. He asserts that ‘ASIC perceives that the use of stop orders is its

1235

A full disclosure document or prospectus that complies with the provisions of Chapter 6D of the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
1236
The Committee may include solicitors, investigating accountants, a broker and/or underwriter. See
John Diddams, 'The IPO Due Diligence Process', Company Director (May 2002) 34
<http://www.jfdcpa.com.au/static/G/b/200c6f39b80dda8e7bb5d36c6c5b3e49.pdf>.
1237
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 739 states ‘where ASIC is satisfied that an offer may contravene the
prohibition on prospectus misstatement, it may order that no securities issue or sale can be made while the
order is in force.’

400

Chapter 9: Securities Regulator’s Enforcement

principal means of dealing with inadequate disclosure’, and adds that such a power is
but ‘one aspect of the regulatory armoury to achieve an appropriate level of
deterrence’.1238 For instance, ASIC issued a stop order on the prospectus of a company
involved in a biotech float, following a hearing that found that its prospectus was
misleading and deceptive in several respects.1239 It also lacked adequate information.
Inadequate information being supplied prompts stop orders as this inadequacy makes it
impossible for investors to make informed decisions.1240 Such an order means that
trading stops immediately upon its issue.1241 Such a power is necessary in the Australian
context because, as then ASIC director Richard Cockburn stated in 2002, unlike the
Saudi regulator:
Contrary to some public perceptions, we don’t review fundraising documents
before they become publicly available, nor do we pronounce judgment on the
merits of a particular business enterprise. Instead, we aim to ensure that the
prospectus has adequate information so that investors themselves can decide on the
merits of investing in the company.1242

In Australia, only ‘a number of selected prospectuses’ are routinely examined in
practice ‘to ensure the disclosure is adequate’ and these ‘are selected using risk criteria

1238

Golding, above n 275, 202.
The stop order was issued to prevent any offers, issues, sales or transactions being made under the
prospectus dated 27 April 2001. For details, see Australian Securities and Investments Commission,
'ASIC Issues Final Stop Order on Biotech Float' (Media Release, 01/219, 22 June 2001)
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/01%2F219+ASIC+issues+final+stop+order+on+biotech
+float?opendocument>.
1240
See, eg, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Lack of Information Leads to Stop
Orders
Media
Release,
02/175,
17
May
2002
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/02%2F175+Lack+of+information+leads+to+stop+order
s?openDocument>. Here in the case of a Queensland-based property development company prospectus
and that of a Perth-based oil and gas company.
1241
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 739.
1242
Richard Cockburn, 'Avoiding Stop Orders on Your Prospectus', Australian Institute of Company
Directors
Journal,
July
2002
<http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-ResourceCentre/Publications/Company-Director-magazine/Back-editions-2000-2009/2002/July/Avoiding-stoporders-on-your-prospectus-ASIC>. Cockburn was then director, Corporate Finance, Policy and Markets
Regulation, ASIC.
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developed from [ASIC’s] experiences in this area.’1243 whilst in Saudi Arabia, at least
theoretically, all prospectuses are examined prior to their release. However, as noted
earlier, despite this power, defects have been found in prospectuses or in the process of
their issue after they have been issued.1244 (as has also occurred in relation to
subsequent disclosures then made under continuous disclosure requirements — see
further below).
In the US, § 8(d) of the Securities Act 1933 (SA’33) provides the stop order power to
the SEC when it appears that a registration statement1245 includes any untrue statement
of a material fact or omits to include any material facts required to be stated. In contrast,
because the CML’03 does not stipulate the power of a stop order, the CMA has no right
to suspend the issue of a prospectus, should any error be detected post-issue. Therefore,
it is suggested that a provision similar to the above US provision be inserted in the
CML’03 in order to broaden the scope of the regulator’s role in protecting investors
from defective prospectuses.
9.6.1.2.2

Secondary Market

Listed companies have to provide the CMA with quarterly and annual reports before
disclosing them to the public.1246 According to art 45(b)(4) of the CML’03, the CMA
has the power to apply additional rules and request extra information from the company

1243

Ibid.
See, eg, Abdullah Albsalei, 'Integrated Telecom Company: Pressure Forced the Founders to Deposit
Amounts', Aleqtisadiah (online), 13 June 2012 <http://www.aleqt.com/2012/06/13/article_666406.pda>
[Arabic]. In this example, despite the significant defects in the prospectus of the Integrated Telecom
Company (ITC), the CMA approved it in April 2011. In addition, the ITC annual financial report for 2011
was defective, which made the CMA suspend trading in ITC in April 2012.
1245
The ‘Registration Statement’ is a set of documents, including a prospectus, which is filed with the
SEC prior to the initial public offering.
1246
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 45(a)–(c).
1244
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to assist investors and their advisors to make informed investment decisions.1247
Nevertheless, the role of the CMA may be considered inadequate in regard to
confirming the accuracy of periodic reports to be published for the public.
It has been claimed that disclosures in periodic financial reports are inadequate.1248 For
instance, companies’ periodic financial reports may have a shortfall in the information
regarding the company’s plans and strategies for the future.1249 Thus, investors will not
be able to make an informed investment decision and observe future company
performance in terms of whether it is in accordance with the proposed plans. Criticism
has extended to the role of the CMA in protecting investors from defective periodic
disclosures.1250 It is a statutory duty of the CMA to require companies to disclose their
reports adequately to it and to impose further instructions before the publication of these
reports if required.1251
Furthermore, the role the CMA becomes very significant in respect of continuing
disclosures. Listed companies are obliged to inform the CMA of any material
information changes, which may affect the price of the security. Assessing continuous
disclosures by listed companies falls within the authority of the statutory function of the
CMA.1252 But in practice, companies persist in releasing inadequate material
information, which is not helpful to a prospective investor trying to make an informed

1247

In addition to the requirement to issue periodic reports, the CMA has the right to apply additional
rules and require extra information from the listed company.
1248
Alhilali, above n 997.
1249
Most of the published financial statements concern with the past information which are not important
to the investor as the ‘future information’ or future plans and predictions.
1250
Alhilali, above n 997.
1251
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 45(b)(4).
1252
Ibid art 46.
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investment decision.1253 This is despite the statutory power given to the CMA in art
6(a)(10) to ‘[d]etermine the contents of annual and periodical financial statements,
reports and documents that should be submitted by issuers offering securities for public
subscription or the issuers whose Securities are listed on the Exchange’. Coffee
emphasises that the failure of continuous disclosure is relevant to the actual regulation
and the effectiveness of its enforcement.1254
Thus, it can be clearly said that the role and law of the CMA in verifying disclosure
documents are inadequate. For the sake of investor protection, there is a considerable
need for an effective disclosure verification mechanism to be adopted by the CMA in
regard to the prospectuses, periodic reports and continuing disclosures of companies.
The CMA should seriously consider adopting, in addition to its existing duties, a
preventive policy (as discussed above), such as educating investors in order to enable
them to assess the financial documents, and effective regulatory verification before the
issuance of the disclosure documents. This would increase their own powers of
detection of failures and their ability to evaluate such documents. Nevertheless, this
proposal would not be workable in Saudi Arabia unless consideration was also given to
educating intermediaries. In addition, the regulator should undertake a merit review to
some extent on behalf of the investors. This could further complement the protection
already afforded by the CMA.
Figures from a comparatively recent US study also demonstrate what is possible when
investors and others in the market are themselves able to recognise problems within
documents and report them to the regulator. In that study the vast majority of detections
1253

Mohammed Alomran, 'When a Disclosure Is Inadequate', alphabeta (online), 2 September 2009
<http://alphabeta.argaam.com/?p=4358> [Arabic].
1254
Coffey, above n 562, 302–3.
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were initially detected by persons other than the regulator, not only revealing the
shortcomings of that regulator but also the advantage of an educated market.1255
Consequently, it is believed that ‘[a]n effective regulatory enforcement regime is rooted
in strategies that focus on investor protection and the prevention of harm’.1256 This
necessarily involves, however, preventive indirect strategies and more direct protection.
In order to establish an effective role for the regulator in the protection of investors,
effective enforcement in the period of post-violation is equally as important as
protection prior to the violation. Thus, direct protection by the regulator is important to
allow aggrieved investors (as a result of a defective disclosure) to seek remedies against
the wrongdoers.
9.6.2 Direct Protection
The CMA has been mandated by the CML’03 to implement the rules and regulations
relating to the market. To achieve this purpose, the CMA is empowered to penalise the
violators of the disclosure regime. Direct protection aims to remedy the violation and
enable injured investors to seek compensation. The regulator can also impose a fine on
persons held liable for disclosure violations.1257 In order to impose financial penalties on
the above persons, a claim of a breach requires the CMA to carry out an investigation.

1255

Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse and Luigi Zingales, 'Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?'
(2010) 65(6) Journal of Finance 2213, 2214.
1256
Canadian Securities Administrators, ‘2010 Enforcement Report’, above n 1173.
1257
Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) art 59(b): ‘the CMA may impose a financial fine upon any
person responsible for the violation of this Law. The fine that the Committee or the Board can impose
shall not be less than SAR 10,000 and shall not exceed SAR 100,000 for each violation committed by the
defendant’.
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9.6.2.1 Investigative Powers of the Capital Market Authority
The concept of due process of law is to balance the rights of individuals and the
authority of the law. Hence, due process of law must be observed in every dispute. This
process starts with an investigation. Investigation into a securities market violation has
three functions: gathering information to initiate the dispute; initiating the prosecution
process and thus facilitating the conviction of the offender; and restoring public
confidence regarding the effectiveness of the regulation concerned.1258
Securities markets are vulnerable to violations. Investors in the securities market expect
strong and rigorous enforcement of securities laws. As a matter of necessity, the
regulator should have adequate regulatory powers encompassing investigation, as well
as the mechanisms in place to execute those functions.
According to IOSCO, a principle of enforcement of securities regulation is that the
regulator ‘should have comprehensive inspection, investigation and surveillance
powers’,1259 and ensure their ‘effective and credible use’ and the ‘implementation of an
effective compliance program’.1260 Investigative powers have a crucial role in
administrative enforcement. They play a central role in the enforcement, which raises
the question of whether the investigative powers of the CMA are sufficient or not.
In Saudi Arabia, the CMA is required to conduct investigations in order to oversee the
market and determine if a person ‘has violated or is about to violate’ the CML03 or any

1258

Kris Arjunan and Chee Keong Low, 'Powers of Investigation under Companies and Securities
Legislation: A Hong Kong Perspective' (1996) 6 Australian Journal for Corporate Law 161, 165.
1259
Principle 10: IOSCO, 'Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation-2010', above n 18, 6.
1260
Principle 12: Ibid.
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of its rules and regulations.1261 The CMA has the power to issue subpoenas, take
evidence and inspect any record as it sees fit.1262
Although the CML’03 empowers the CMA to undertake an investigation, it does not
give details of the procedure for carrying out this investigation. The general provision of
investigation powers to the CMA is lacking in detail concerning the criminal procedures
for manipulative conduct.1263 This shortcoming may complicate the right of investors to
seek compensation upon a criminal conviction being recorded. Those injured by any
manipulative conduct and who have not asked for compensation for damages through a
criminal procedure may benefit from the conviction decision obtained to seek
compensation through a civil procedure. This is because a civil suit does not have the
level of burden of proof that exists in criminal suits.
Moreover, there are no clear regulatory structures for the period prior to the
investigation. A similar observation has been made in relation to the SEC in the 1970s
when Lowenfels noted that, ‘In the pre-investigatory stage, the Commission should
issue some sort of informal guidelines to the staff with respect to recommending the
initiation of investigations which would make the entire process more even-handed and

1261

Article 5(c) of the CML’03 provides the CMA with instigative function and powers. It states that:
For the purpose of conducting all investigations which, in the opinion of the Board, are necessary
for the enforcement of the provisions of this Law and other regulations and rules issued pursuant
to this Law, the members of the Authority and its employees designated by the Board are
empowered to subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers,
or other documents which the Authority deems relevant or material to its investigation. The
Authority shall have the power to carry out inspections of the records or any other materials,
whoever the holder may be, to determine whether the person concerned has violated, or is about to
violate any provision of this Law, the Implementing Regulations or the rules issued by the
Authority.
Similar to the above provision, see s 21(a)(b)(c) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and s 11 of the
Ontario Securities Act 1990.
1262
Earlier in this chapter, details of the role of CMA’s Department of Enforcement have been provided.
1263
The Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) does not provide the legal proceedings in criminal
matters.
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predictable’.1264 Thus, to achieve an effective investigation mechanism, the CMA must
conduct the investigation process having adequate powers to do so effectively and using
such powers that are provided effectively.
9.6.2.2 Need for an Effective Investigation for the Allegations of Disclosure
Violations
Although the CMA has been given broad investigative tools by the CML’03, as
identified earlier, the regulator is required to carry out efficient investigation of the
violations that lead to market loss.1265 Investigation and prosecution of market
manipulation should continue to be imperative to ensure that businesses and small
investors alike are adequately protected.1266
This requires that staff of the securities regulator should have sufficient knowledge and
experience concerning the process of investigation, such as people with, ‘keen
mathematical minds trained in finance who can keep up with new products and financial
engineering models… [and] people with technological expertise’.1267 Practical
knowledge is also an important requirement for regulator staff. In Australia, according
to ASIC, its Market Surveillance team is made up of a number of former ASX
surveillance staff and ASIC staff with extensive market experience so as to be able to
effectively identify market misconduct issues.1268
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Lewis D Lowenfels, 'Securities and Exchange Commission Investigations: The Need for Reform'
(1971) 45(4) St. John's Law Review 575, 581.
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Al-Nwaisir, ‘Saudi Stock Market Needs to be Reformed’, above n 14.
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in Australia' (2011) 8 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 54, 81.
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Jayne W Barnard, 'Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission' (2010) 71
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 403, 419.
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Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 'Report 227: ASIC Supervision of Markets and
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to
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2010'
(ASIC,
January
2011)
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rep227.pdf/$file/rep227.pdf> 8.
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The CMA should also be granted stronger powers to impose sanctions and fines in its
administrative and quasi-judicial capacity in the same way as the American Securities
Exchange Act 1934 (SEA’34) and Investment Advisers Act 1940 (IAA’40) authorise the
SEC’s Division of Enforcement to institute administrative proceedings and impose
sanctions against persons associated with broker-dealers, municipal securities dealers,
investment advisers, or investment companies.1269
However, empowering CMA alone will not help. Non-regulatory bodies/persons should
also take part in process as is done in the US. For instance, in the US, a study over 216
cases of violations in the market over the period 1996 to 2004 found that only seven per
cent of these cases were discovered by the SEC.1270 In the same study, it was found that
most of these cases were uncovered by market analysts, auditors and investors.1271 This
study shows that even in developed countries such the US, the discovery of violations
requires additional resources and developed mechanisms to effectively track new
violations throughout the market.
In fact, the need for ongoing development of investigative powers persists. For instance,
in order to improve ASIC’s ability to police the markets and combat stock market
manipulation in Australia, recent regulatory amendments1272 make additional resources

1269

For more details, see Rose Arce, 'The SEC and the Extent of Its Power to Sanction: An Analysis of
Teicher v. Securities and Exchange Commission - Did the Court Correctly Apply Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council to a Matter of Agency Interpretation?' (2000) 30 Golden Gate University Law
Review 593, 601.
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Dyck, Morse and Zingales, above n 1255.
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Ibid.
1272
The Corporations Amendment (Financial Markets Supervision) Act 2010 (Cth). ASIC is now
responsible for the real-time monitoring of ASX’s markets and for administering and enforcing
compliance with the new ASIC Market Integrity Rules (ASX Market) 2010.
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available to ASIC and enhance its investigative powers.1273 Constable comments that
the deterrent effect of such a development would be considerable.1274
9.6.3 Review of the Administrative Enforcement Decisions
Remedies against the decisions of the CMA are available in Saudi Arabia.1275 The
CRSD is empowered to hear cases brought against the CMA, and to order any form of
remedy necessary to redress the rights of the aggrieved person. 1276 The decisions and
sanctions issued by the CMA can be only reviewed by the CRSD. The aggrieved person
can submit a grievance against decisions issued by the CMA. The implication here is
that there is only one remedy against the decision of the CMA namely, a grievance
against such decision.1277
Although a claim against the CMA’s decisions is available in art 25(c) of the CML’03,
it is unclear in respect to whether a person can submit a grievance directly to the CRSD
or whether it has to initially be placed in the hands of the CMA itself. In both situations,
however, a review of the particular decision can be done by the CRSD, which — some
may say — may be to a great extent under the power and influence of the CMA, whose
Board appoints the members of the CRSD.1278 In this case, a question may arise: how
effectively can the appointee take an action against the appointer? It is a conflict-of-

1273

Constable, above n 1266, 108.
Ibid 56.
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Article 25(c) of the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) provides that:
The Committee’s jurisdiction shall include claims against decisions and actions taken by the
Authority or the Exchange and the Committee shall have the right to issue a decision awarding
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Article 25(b) of the Capital Market Law 2003 (Saudi Arabia) states that ‘the members of the
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interest situation where justice may suffer. Therefore, it may be the case that ‘[w]ho will
guard the guards themselves?’.1279
In Australia, a person aggrieved by an ASIC decision has the right to seek a review of
the decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). 1280 The AAT is an
independent body that can review ASIC’s decisions which are made under s 244(2) of
the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASICA’01).1281
The AAT can, among other things: confirm, vary, or set the ASIC decision aside and
replace it with its own decision. Moreover, persons affected by the decision of ASIC
can challenge the right of the regulator to begin a proceeding on behalf of the public
interest. For example, the recent case of the accounting firm KPMG against the ASIC’s
enforcement powers. In the High Court of Australia, KPMG challenged the
constitutional validity of s 50 of the ASICA’01 on ground that ‘ASIC’s use of section
50 turned a company’s private right into an exercise of public power’. 1282 Any person
who has been affected by a decision or order of ASIC can lodge a further appeal with
the High Court to question the law arising out of such a decision.
In the UK, the Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber (the Tribunal) is
empowered to review decisions of the FSA.1283 The Tribunal is an independent body
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and part of the administrative justice system of the UK. The Tribunal may uphold, vary
or cancel the FSA’s decision. In addition, any person aggrieved by a decision of the
FSA can commence judicial proceedings to challenge the FSA decision. For instance,
the Swift Trade Case against the FSA, among others, shows that the decision of the
corporate regulator could be subject to a review by an independent judiciary.1284
In Canada, under sub-s 9(6) or s 144 of the Securities Act 1990 (Ontario) (SA’90), a
person or company affected by a decision by the OSC can apply for a judicial review
with the Divisional Court of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. These provisions
allow a person or company to apply for a further decision or for a variation to or
revocation of the OSC decision.1285
Based on the above, provisions in developed countries clearly reveal the Saudi
provision regarding remedies against the regulator’s decisions as inadequate. Further, it
may seem to be contradictory to Principle 4 of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles
regarding regulators having ‘clear and consistent … processes’, given the absence of a
judicial review power. Additionally, Principle 2 of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles
holds that regulators should be ‘accountable in the exercise’ of their functions and
powers. Therefore, the CMA decisions should be made available for judicial scrutiny
without weakening the significance of having an effective administrative enforcement.
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There were 17 grievance resolutions sought by persons in 2009–2010. This is in terms
of 210 decisions/resolutions issued by the CMA in that period. 1286 In addition, Table 9.9
(below) shows that there were eight decisions reviewed by the ACRSC and no such
appeals have been finalised in the period, whereas 4 grievances have been resolved
during the period.1287 Unlike the provisions of developed countries, those of Saudi
Arabia do not currently allow the affected person to seek judicial review in an
independent and higher court other than the CRSD. The close association between the
CMA and CRSD has led to accusations that the latter is under the influence of the
CMA, and therefore the affected person may be disadvantaged by a lack of alternative
judicial scrutiny. This perception exists because the CRSD was established by the CMA
which also appoints the members of the CRSD.1288 Hence, it has been said that
allegations against the CMA — such that, the regulator misuses its statutory powers —
may appear to be true.1289
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Capital Market Authority, ‘Annual Report of 2010’, above n 750, 101.
These are not necessarily the same matters as a matter carried over from the previous year may be
resolved during this period, while others initiated during 2009–10 are carried forward.
1288
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Table 9.9: Grievances against Decisions and Orders of the CMA in 2009 and 2010
(There were 210 Decisions issued by CMA during 2009 and 2010)
Case Type

Filed in 2009 and 2010

Finalised in 2009 and
2010

Number

Number

Grievances against the
CMA Board
Resolutions/Decisions
before the CRSD

17

4

Appealed before the
ACRSC

8

0

Source: the Capital Market Authority Annual Report of 2010.1290
It is consequently suggested that in addition to the presently available right to lodge a
grievance in regard to BCMA resolutions or decisions, CMA decisions should be made
open to judicial scrutiny. It is believed that such a suggestion will enhance credibility
and accountability in the administrative enforcement of securities laws.

9. 7 Summary and Conclusions
It has been submitted that enforcement of law is much more important than the quality
of the law ‘on the books’.1291 Hence, effective law enforcement is a major concern for
any legal system. For that reason, a securities watchdog body is required to be properly
equipped with balanced powers and corresponding accountability in order to achieve the
basic objectives of securities regulations. These objectives, as stated by IOSCO, are:
protecting investors; ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and
reducing systemic risk.1292 Investor protection is a prime aim of the administrative
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enforcement program. Good regulatory practice has been well summarised by Fiona
Haines and David Gurney who declare that it ‘focuses on the outcomes of regulatory
aims, not obsessive concern about compliance with prescriptive rules’. 1293 La Porta et al
and DeFond and Hung argue that law enforcement institutions, such as market
regulators, play a vital role in protecting the interests of investors and re-establishing
confidence in the stock market.1294
An increased power for the regulator is encouraged by Xu and Pistor. 1295 They describe
the court as ‘reactive’ because it enforces law only after others have brought an action.
On the other hand, they describe enforcement by the regulator as a ‘proactive’, which
may be better for preventing harm.1296 Langevoort is convinced that ‘strong
enforcement and dispute resolution are the most crucial elements of global securities
regulation’.1297 In this respect, Principle 11 of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles
demands ‘comprehensive enforcement powers’ for regulators.1298
Although there has been improvement in the CMA structure and performance in the
administration of the market, shortcomings have persisted in relation to the
effectiveness of administrative enforcement. As evident in the discussion, the current
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situation of CMA is not satisfactory for investors who sustain loss or damage due to
disclosure violations.
In addition to the inefficient judicial enforcement of the securities laws as discussed in
the preceding chapter, weak administrative enforcement will significantly undermine
the civil liability regime for defective disclosures in Saudi Arabia. It has been found that
the Saudi provisions of administrative enforcement are inefficient in contrast to their
equivalent in developed countries provisions. Moreover, it has been seen that the CMA
has not fulfilled the objectives and principles of IOSCO. In reality, the efficiency of the
CMA has been questioned on several occasions by market observers who blamed the
regulator’s functioning (or lack thereof) for the massive loss of investors who were
understandably cautious in the wake of the 2006 market collapse. The lack of local
investors also served as further incentive to open the market more to overseas
investment in order for the local market to recover. As a result, the Saudi Arabia stock
market, after the 2006 crash, started to open the market for non-residents to trade in
local stocks through Saudi intermediaries.1299
This adds further impetus to the need to bring the regulatory structures into the 21st
century with appropriate powers and finely-tuned investor protections able to better
handle new and existing challenges and so engender greater confidence in the market.
In this chapter, it has been found that the existing CMA’s role in enforcing the
disclosure regime is inadequate. Drawbacks hindering the role of the CMA are: lack of
transparency; weak interference by the CMA; weak detection and investigation;
inadequate monetary fines; and lack of uniformity in the exercise of the CMA’s powers.
1299

See Rod Ringrow, 'Everything to Play for', Global Investor Magazine [February 2009]
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It has been found that these drawbacks resulted from the weak functions of the CMA as
the sole regulator of the securities market in Saudi Arabia. In reality, the members of the
CMA lack experience in the private sector, appropriate legal education and experience
in dealing with corporate management.
In terms of disciplining members of the CMA, it is important to hold those persons
entrusted with making regulation accountable. It has been discovered that no judicial
inquiry has been conducted since the establishment of the CMA, which is perhaps due
to an absence of a statutory accountability mechanism against regulatory misconduct or
malpractice in Saudi Arabia.
It has been seen that the role of the CMA in controlling market malpractice is not
satisfactory. This finding is an outcome of measuring the CMA’s role in protecting
investors in both pre-violation and post-violation phases. In the pre-violation stage,
investor education is lacking the resources necessary to educate investors about the
behavioural risks, IPOs and secondary markets. Likewise, the CMA’s intervention prior
the release of the disclosure document is weak. There is: an absence of clear verification
process for prospectuses before they are released to the public; no clear verification of
material information in the periodic and continuous disclosures; and the absence of a
stop order provision under the CML’03. Moreover, it has been found that the role of the
CMA in the post-violation is also inadequate. The investigation power of the CMA is
inefficient regarding the procedures and prosecution of market manipulation.
Based on the above and following the path of the developed countries, a number of
recommendations can be made to allow the CMA to have a more effective role in
enforcing the disclosure regime. As noted earlier, the members of the CMA need to be
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required to have relevant qualifications to perform their regulatory role. The current
composition of the members of the CMA is inadequate in terms of legal education,
professional experience and market representation. In addition, a system of
accountability should be put in place to ensure the CMA performs its role impartially
and effectively. Hence, a degree of judicial intervention is suggested in order to
investigate into any allegations raised against the members of the CMA.
To provide a comprehensive protection for investors in the IPO and secondary market,
proper investor education is needed to benefit the investors, the market, and the
regulator. The CMA needs to design a comprehensive investor education program
covering all aspects of IPOs and to go beyond that to educate investors about trading in
the secondary market. It is highly recommended that a specialised due diligence
committee (DDC) be established by companies to carry out comprehensive verification
of new prospectuses. This DDC is to be composed of company persons and advisors.
Rules and Composition of the DDC is to be set out by the CMA.
These recommendations extend to having an effective investigation power for the CMA
joined with the appointment of experienced and trained staff. It has been submitted that
it is important for the CMA to have clear procedures to conduct an investigation into
any allegations of disclosure violations.
Following the path of developed countries, provisions may be inserted in the CML’03
in relation to appeals against the decisions of the CMA. Appeals may be allowed to be
heard by a bench of the judiciary independent of the influence of the CMA.
Furthermore, it is suggested that establishing an independent committee to observe the
regulator is highly recommended in order to have an effective enforcement program.
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For instance, in the US there is a call to establish a new advisory committee to conduct
an independent review of the Commission’s enforcement program from multiple,
diverse perspectives, and for it to recommend to the Commission, if warranted, any
necessary changes. Atkins and Bradley are confident that the outcome of such a
committee ‘will be an enforcement program that is more transparent, better embodies
principles of due process, and more effectively combats violations of the federal
securities laws’.1300
To this end, effective regulator enforcement of securities laws is crucial for the
protection of investors. In view of the disclosure requirements, it is strongly suggested
that reforms are needed in order to have an effective enforcer in both the IPO and
secondary markets.
To enable investors to make informed investment decisions and restrain companies
from issuing defective disclosures, reforms in the regulatory regime should be brought
into conformity with the proposals made in the discussions in this chapter. It is to be
always remembered that securities regulators have a clearly defined mission, which is to
protect investors.1301
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CHAPTER 10:

MAJOR FINDINGS AND GENERAL
CONCLUSIONS

10. 1 Introduction
A well-functioning stock market plays a significant role in the development process in
an economy. The importance of the stock markets is derived from two important
factors: transforming people’s savings to be invested in a stock market and allowing for
a more efficient allocation of resources.1302 The securities market in Saudi Arabia is the
biggest market in the Middle Eastern region and the fastest growing amongst the
developing markets in the world. However, the main prerequisite for an efficient and
developed market is to have adequate laws and appropriate regulations that are well
enforced.
Most of the literature reviewed throughout the thesis show that stronger securities
regulation can bring about significant economic benefits. The sustainable development
of stock markets requires adequate protection of investors, and a lack of such protection
keeps the investing public out of the market. Hence, an adequate civil liability regime is
essential to provide protection for investors in the securities market. However, from
beginning to end, it has been agreed that ‘good legal rules’ are of vital importance in all
robust securities markets.1303 However, the Saudi securities market is yet to be
considered a robust market. Hence, developing securities regulation for investor
protection is a useful philosophy for the integrity of the securities market in Saudi
Arabia.
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It should be noted that this study appreciates the current strength of the market in three
ways. The first is that the government has become more responsible in realising the
great role played by the stock market in the national economy. The second is the
enactment of the Capital Market Law 2003 (CML’03) which is considered the first and
only national securities law to govern all securities market activities and participants in
Saudi Arabia. The CML’03 establishes an independent securities regulator, the Capital
Market Authority (CMA), with the objective of protecting investor interests, ensuring
orderly and equitable dealings in securities, and promoting and developing the capital
markets.1304 The third is that sincere efforts are made by the CMA to enhance the
market and protect investors by issuing rules and regulations. However, there are
thousands of potential investors who are looking for a more transparent and strong
securities market.
While vibrant stock markets can bring growth for both the local economy and investors,
the creation of such markets relies on strong regulation. It is asserted that strong
regulation is crucial for the establishment of a strong securities market.1305 The Saudi
securities laws suffer from weak legal provisions and enforcement machinery. The
cumulative effect of these shortcomings results in unstable securities markets.
This concluding chapter brings together the various strands of arguments and findings
found in the previous chapters in respect of the abovementioned issues. In addition, it
comes up with a number of specific suggestions and recommendations for improving
the civil liability for defective disclosures in Saudi Arabia and consequently the investor
protection.
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10. 2 Findings in the Introductory Chapters
Chapter 1 presents the general introduction of the study. Primarily, the lack of investor
protection is considered as the major obstacle for the development of the securities
market in Saudi Arabia. Weaknesses in legal provisions and enforcement machinery
contribute to the weak protection of investors. The consequence of these shortcomings
results in a fragile market. The chapter aims to justify the need for this study as an
attempt to improve the market, and brings out its potential significance and expected
contribution. It provides the research questions, and states the scope and limitations of
the study. The research methodology adopted in this study gives details of the way in
which the data is collected and treated.
It has been emphasised that the protection of investors in the Saudi stock market will be
the hub of all discussions carried out in order to address the above three central
questions. Providing such protection is crucial to restore and maintain investor
confidence in the stock market.
Chapter 2 has discussed the key research question of the present thesis: ‘What is the
importance of investor protection in the Saudi securities market?’. In addition, this
chapter introduces the importance of Saudi Arabia as an independent country with the
most traditionalist Islamic legal system in the world today. It shows that the Saudi
Arabian economy is the largest amongst the Middle Eastern and Arab countries.
Additionally, the importance of Saudi Arabia derives from its location as the heartland
of Islam and the site of the two holy mosques and the focus of Islamic devotion and
prayer. Moreover, this chapter identifies the main terms and concepts which have been
the concern of the current study. It has been seen that investor protection is the
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cornerstone of any securities regulation. In addition, optimal disclosure and
transparency rules are of vital importance for the protection of investors in securities
markets.
The significance of having a vibrant securities market to the economy of Saudi Arabia is
discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter illustrates the history of the development of the
securities market in Saudi Arabia since its inception in 1935 through to 2012. It also
presents the infrequent attempts made by the authorities concerned to reform the market
and increase market growth. The chapter shows the position of the Saudi securities
market in comparison with its regional and international counterparts. After the major
market collapse in 2006, the integrity of the market was subject to massive criticism
from investors who called for governmental intervention and better control of market
dynamics. This chapter identifies further drawbacks, which significantly delay the
desired development and require legal intervention. These drawbacks are, namely: the
small number of listed companies in comparison with scale of the economy; instability
of the market caused by the unprecedented market collapse in 2006 and the correlation
between the oil prices and the stock market; and the absence of foreign portfolio
investment. As individual investors who lack experience in stock market do the majority
of securities trading, it is highly recommended that they be encouraged to adopt trading
through institutional investors as an effective solution as they will thereby be able to
avail themselves of the expertise of experienced and knowledgeable personnel in those
institutions, especially when such institutional investors work within a strong legislative
framework with sufficient regulatory oversight together with adequate enforcement (as
will be further outlined below) . It is agreed that the growth of institutional investors
and their use by individuals for their investments will be useful for the investor
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protection, the market and the economy as long as the institutions have a good
‘watchdog’ or supervisory regulations and enforcement.
Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates that weak transparency and poor disclosure
practices by listed companies is a major impediment to the sustainable development of
the securities market in Saudi Arabia. Most importantly, this chapter shows that the
poor civil liabilities for defective disclosures have a considerable negative impact on
market development. It has been seen that a strong civil liability regime will restore
investor confidence and attract them to invest in the securities market. For that reason,
this chapter concludes by exploring the meaning of civil liability which is a central term
of the present study. However, it has been demonstrated that the need for information
disclosure and transparency is crucial for market efficiency and, most importantly, for
investor protection.
In Chapter 3, a survey of the legal the regulatory framework of the securities market in
Saudi Arabia finds that the promulgation of the CML’03 was fundamental to the market
in Saudi Arabia. It presents an account of the development of the regulatory framework.
The CML’03 replaced the vague legal and regulatory framework of the market before
2003. This chapter shows that the CML’03 is the law that governs securities market
activities and participants in Saudi Arabia. The CML’03 is an ‘enabling law’ — it
enables the CMA to be the regulator of the securities market and issue rules and
regulations by law in order to oversee the market.
Whilst the introduction of CML’03 represented a great step forward, this chapter
nevertheless detects some flaws in the current legal and regulatory framework of
securities markets in Saudi Arabia. In reviewing the role of the regulator in relation to
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the market disclosure, the chapter demonstrates that the regulatory role of the CMA in
regard to the disclosure regime is insufficient. It has been agreed that providing credible
information will lead to greater market transparency and thereby a safer investment
environment.
In addition to the above, discussions throughout the thesis prove that the current legal
and regulatory framework for securities market in Saudi is ineffective in terms of the
disclosure regime, civil liability and enforcement. Problems regarding civil liability and
the regulatory weaknesses have been identified in the introductory chapters. In Saudi
Arabia, investors who sustain loss or damage as a result of a violation of the disclosure
regime remain uncompensated and wrongdoers go unpunished. The main findings of
this thesis will demonstrate the need for reforms in the current legal provisions of
disclosure regime and civil liability in order to facilitate the claim for compensation by
aggrieved investors. Likewise, the weak regulatory enforcement mechanism makes the
issue difficult.

10. 3 Major Findings in the Thesis
In analysing the civil liability for defective disclosures in Saudi Arabia, the major
findings can be divided into three main sections: disclosure requirements; civil liability
provisions for the breaches of these requirements: and the enforcement machinery of the
civil liability provisions. In the pursuit of the major findings, relevant provisions from
the US, the UK, Australia and Canada have been discussed in line with their equivalent
provisions in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, objectives and principles of the securities
regulations stated by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
have been used to measure investor protection in Saudi securities markets. The major
425

Chapter 10: Findings and Conclusions

findings included in the following sections demonstrate that the current level of investor
protection is weak in the Saudi securities market.
10.3.1 Major Findings in Relation to the Disclosure Requirements
The following findings answer the key research question: ‘Are the present requirements
adequate to ensure full, fair and timely disclosure of material information by
corporations in Saudi Arabia?’.
The requirement to disclose information is necessarily connected with liability for
misstatements made in the course of that disclosure. Hence, it has earlier been submitted
that an analysis of civil liability for defective disclosures begins with the requirement of
disclosure. Saudi securities regulations have provided for prospectuses, continuous
disclosures and periodic disclosures documents and granted the regulatory role to one
body — in this instance the CMA — to govern, supervise and enhance disclosure
requirements. A major development has been that the CMA has recently (2010) become
a member of the IOSCO,1306 which requires more efficient and transparent disclosures
in the secondary market. However, the CMA has been unsuccessful in strengthening
investor protection in the IPO market in conformity with the IOSCO Objectives and
Principles.
In reviewing the requirements for disclosure in the CML’03 and the CMA rules and
regulations, the study finds that these requirements require improvement to ensure
integrity and accuracy in the information disclosure. Generally, the study finds that
unlike in the selected developed countries, in Saudi Arabia the matters of issuing new
rules for, or improving or amending disclosure requirements have not been prioritised.
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In reality, no new rule, or improvement to or amendment of requirements in respect of
the disclosure regime has been made since the CML’03 and the CMA rules and
regulations came into existence.
In analysing the disclosure requirements for prospectuses and periodic disclosures and
continuous disclosures, the study finds that the current Saudi laws and regulations do
not include sufficient requirements for the concept of materiality.1307 Discussion shows
that the requirement for materiality under the CML’03 is somewhat obscure. A clear
standard to determine what should be considered material under the Saudi prospectus
provisions is absent. This can be done by the adoption of a materiality test, which can
be a significant element in examining misstatements even though the law does not
generally require it.
In addition to the materiality test for information provided in all types of disclosures, the
study finds that there is no verification test for prospectuses to be carried out by the
CMA, while a mechanism to test the information in the prospectus has been adopted by
most developed countries. Although the Saudi requirement under art 55 of the CML’05
for ‘all information’ equates with developed countries’ requirement, there is no further
practical steps to test information materiality. The test is known, for example, in
Australia as the ‘reasonable investor’ test. Therefore, the study suggests that the CMA
to adopt a verification test in relation to prospectus contents. A requirement for
verification of a prospectus, which involves checking each material statement of fact or
opinion, is important to:
i.

1307

ensure that prospectus is accurate and complete;

See section 4.4.2.
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ii.

assist investors to make an informed investment decision;

iii.

afford the persons involved in the prospectus preparation with a defence in
relation to their potential liability for a defective prospectus; and

iv.

strengthen disclosure in the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) market.

Furthermore, the study finds that, under the current CML’03 and CMA rules, the
issuing companies are not required to undertake a due diligence process during the
preparation of prospectus.1308 A requirement should be introduced for the issuers to
verify their prospectuses with a specialised committee before submitting the prospectus
to the CMA. This is essential. This requirement has a twofold objective: to ensure that
the prospectus complies with disclosure requirements; and to identify the due diligence
committee as a liable person along with other persons who participated in the
preparation of the defective prospectus. Therefore, in Saudi securities regulations, it is
suggested that a robust due diligence process should maximise the likelihood that all
material information is disclosed to the market and minimise the possibility of liability
arising from defective disclosure. Moreover, the CMA has to perform a greater role to
monitor disclosure in prospectuses and ensure that issuers are complying with the
CML’03 and the rules and regulations set out by the CMA. Principle 16, regarding
issuers, states that ‘there should be full, accurate and timely disclosure of financial
results, risk and other information which is material to investors’ decisions’.1309
As in developed countries, the Saudi disclosure regime has recognised the continuous
disclosure obligations.1310 In relation to the function and meaning of continuous
disclosure, it has been found that the Saudi regulator has identified the need for
1308
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continuous disclosure and required listed companies to comply with such a requirement.
However, it has also been found that art 7 of the Market Conduct Regulations 2004
(MCR’04) is insufficient in regard to who is responsible for continuous disclosure. It
states the broad term of ‘person’ as being responsible for making disclosures without
specifications or definition as natural and corporate person, which demonstrates a
degree of ambiguity.
In respect of the periodic disclosure requirement under securities laws in Saudi Arabia,
the preceding description of legislation and associated regulations in selected countries
shows that Saudi Arabia has adopted the same approach in most regards, one that
requires companies to disclose their financial reports quarterly and annually.1311
However, the study finds that only annual reports are required to be audited whereas in
other developed jurisdictions every periodic report has to be audited to ensure the
adequacy of the information released to the public.
Thus, the Saudi securities regulator needs to insert a legal requirement that stipulates
that listed companies should audit their quarterly financial report before it is disclosed
to the public. It is believed that the auditing of quarterly reports will lead to:
i.

accurate advice given by financial analysts, who rely on information contained
in the quarterly reports;

ii.

reduced risk in regard to investment decisions and investments in the market that
are made in accordance with those quarterly financial reports; and

iii.

increased reliability of reporting which contributes to the overall degree of
investor confidence.
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All of the above will strengthen the fairness of the market and thus increase the
protection of investors. However, the study finds that although the CMA is a member of
IOSCO, it does not completely satisfy that organisation’s principles in respect of
periodic disclosure.
10.3.2 Major Findings Concerning the Civil Liability Provisions for Breaches of
the Disclosure Requirements
Civil liability provisions have been discussed throughout Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. In this
regard, the following key research questions were discussed: ‘What is the scope of
contravention of these requirements which would attract civil liability?’; ‘Who can be
held liable for a disclosure containing untrue and misleading information under Saudi
law?’; ‘What are the strengths and weaknesses of the civil liability regime for corporate
disclosures in Saudi Arabia in order to protect investors?’.
In analysing the civil liability provisions for defective disclosures under the Saudi
securities laws, the study finds that these provisions are inadequate in terms of the
articulation of liabilities, remedies, defences and evidence. The study ascertains that the
civil liability provisions for defective disclosure in Saudi Arabia are weaker than their
equivalents in the US, the UK, Australia and Canada.
In regard to prospectus liability, the study shows that both Saudi Arabia and developed
countries impose civil liability for a defective prospectus.1312 It shows that the issuers,
directors, underwriters and experts are liable in these jurisdictions for defective
prospectuses. Unlike Saudi law, the laws of these selected developed jurisdictions
clearly impose civil liability on parties other than those stated in art 55 of the CML’03.
Nevertheless, it is found there are other persons who are involved in the preparation of
1312
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the prospectus and do not fall within the ambit of this liability. Those persons are,
namely: promoters, lawyers and issue managers. The discussion on the roles of
promoters, issue managers and lawyers demonstrates the important role played by
promoters and issue managers in providing separate certification to the fact that they
have examined a prospectus. In addition, the discussion proves that lawyers play a
significant role in corporate fundraising. Discussion of the roles of promoters, issue
managers and lawyers and the rationale for their liability for a defective prospectus
demonstrate the need to improve the civil liability provisions to include all persons
participating in the preparation of a prospectus.
Furthermore, unlike the law in the selected developed jurisdictions, it can be found that
the Saudi law includes the vague expression, ‘any person who has been mentioned in
the prospectus and has certified any part of the prospectus will be exclusively liable for
the part he/she certified’.1313 This urges a clear specification for who can be held liable
for the untrue statement or omission from in the prospectus documents. The lack of
clarity regarding civil liability of those persons who are not specifically mentioned in
the prospectus civil liability provisions would generate uncertainty in relation to the law
concerned.
Chapter 6 has discussed the two key research questions of the present thesis. These
questions are ‘What remedies are available for breaches of civil liability provisions for
defective disclosures?’ and ‘Are the present remedies adequate to compensate victims
and to create deterrence against contraventions?’. The study shows that investors in the
Saudi securities market have two causes of action under the CML’03. The first cause of
action is that of the existence of defects in prospectuses. The second is that the cause of
1313
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action is based on defects in any disclosure documents in connection with sale or
purchase of a security. The analysis of the available remedies reveals that investor
remedies for breaches of the disclosure regime are inadequate under the current civil
liability provisions for defective disclosures.
Although the remedy of damages could be available to compensate the plaintiff’s loss
resulting from the breach of the disclosure requirements, it remains the only relief
available to investors. In addition, this chapter demonstrates several drawbacks
associated with the remedy of damages. The discussion shows that the remedy of
damages is unclear. In contrast, aggrieved investors in the developed markets have
statutory remedies other than damages available to recover their losses, such as:
rescission, the right to withdraw and have money returned, and the right to return the
securities and be reimbursed the amount paid for those securities.1314
Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates that the securities class action is an effective
remedy for aggrieved investors as well as a deterrent to potential violators.
Nevertheless, the possibility of a securities class action does not exist in Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, it has been observed that the current limitation period of one year is
inadequate and contrary to investor protection. The twelve-month period during which
the aggrieved investor can bring a legal action seeking compensation for the violation of
the disclosure regime starts from when the investor first realises that he/she has been a
victim,. Thus, a recommendation is made to increase the limitation period to more than
one year as it is in some developed jurisdictions.1315
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The study confirms that the weak investor remedies for defective disclosures will
undermine investor protection by:
i.

allowing investors remain uncompensated,

ii.

permitting wrongdoers go unpunished, and

iii.

providing incentives for market participants not to comply with the disclosure
regime.

The key research question ‘What defences are available to escape liability, and how and
when can these defences be relied upon?’ has been answered in Chapter 7 which deals
with defences available for defendants to avoid civil liability for defective disclosure.
Hence, in investigating the provisions of defences to civil liability for defective
disclosures under the Saudi securities laws, Chapter 7 demonstrates that these defences
remain ambiguous and unclear. This chapter finds that the due diligence, lack of
causation, purchaser’s actual knowledge of the alleged breach and lack of authorisation
are the defences which are available for defendants in contravention of prospectus
requirements in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, defendants can avoid civil liability for
defective disclosures in the secondary market by proving a lack of causation or lack of
authorisation.
However, the articulation of the due diligence defence is inadequate under the current
Saudi civil liability regime for defective disclosures. 1316 There is a significant lack of
interpretation regarding the ‘reasonableness’ standard, that is, of what constitutes
reasonable investigation and reasonable grounds. This is coupled with missing criteria,
namely what constitutes a reasonable investigation and reasonable grounds in respect of
1316
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the defence of due diligence. A clear standard regarding reasonableness in the due
diligence defence is needed. The law is required to clarify the difference between the
executive directors and non-executive directors in respect of the due diligence
defence.1317 This is because, equally with the executive directors, the non-executive
directors should carry the burden of knowing the truth of the information provided in
the prospectus.
As regards the evidence in securities litigation, it has been argued that although the
current laws dealing with the evidence under the CML’03 have procedural rules, they
lack the substantive rules that are significant for the law of evidence and the concept of
fair trial. Besides, the absence of a comprehensive written code of evidence under the
Saudi legal system makes the issue more difficult.
10.3.3 Major Findings Regarding the Enforcement of the Civil Liability Provisions
This section summarises the major findings which are related to the two key research
questions: ‘What are the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial enforcement of the
disclosure requirements currently in place in Saudi Arabia?’ and ‘What are the strengths
and weaknesses of the administrative enforcement of these requirements and how
effective is the role of the market regulator in protecting securities investors in Saudi
Arabia?’.
Without an efficient enforcement mechanism alongside the liability regime, any law
will be worthless. Effective enforcement is essential to help establish the rule of law.
The enforcement mechanism of the securities laws in Saudi Arabia has been carefully
investigated. Chapter 8 recognises flaws that persist in the judicial enforcement
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mechanism. Central to the main findings is that the inadequacy of the current securities
courts is causing difficulties for the issue of securities laws enforcement in Saudi
Arabia. It has been demonstrated that the having just one bench of three members to
deal with all securities allegations arising from the market is not an effective approach
to dispensing justice in an efficient manner. This situation has led to slow processing
which in turn leads to victims being reluctant to lodge a claim. In addition, they may not
be able to claim for their loss or damages. Hence, the number of judges must be
consistent with the number of cases, especially, given the fact that the CML’03 does not
place any restrictions on the number of members of the Committee for the Resolution of
the Securities Disputes (CRSD) as well as for members of the CRSD.1318 In order to
deal with the large number of cases pending in the CRSD, it is imperative that the
number of courts and their members be increased so as to restore public confidence in
the judicial enforcement of securities laws.
Moreover, this study finds that the judicial independence of the securities courts is
weak. Members of the securities courts are not independent in their administration of
justice. They are engaging in other paid employment and activities in both the
government and private sector. In addition, there is no statutory protection for the
members of these courts. Under the Saudi securities laws, there is no mention of judicial
accountability for the members of the securities courts in Saudi Arabia (namely the
CRSD and the ACRSC).1319 Judicial accountability has a considerable impact on the
balance between judicial independence and impartial justice.
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According to the provisions of the CML’03, a member of the securities court in Saudi
Arabia is empowered to fine and impose a term of imprisonment of up to five years. It
is suggested that the Law of Judiciary 2007 (Saudi Arabia) (LJ’07) to be applied to the
members of the CRSD and the Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities
Conflicts (ACRSC). This is because the LJ’07 provides judges with independence,
protection and accountability.
It has been shown that the bench dealing with securities cases in Saudi Arabia lacks
sufficient training and experience in relevant law and practice. The main causes for such
inadequacy in terms of experienced and well-trained judges are: lack of legal education;
lack of prior legal practice; and lack of practical experience in dealing with cases
involving disclosure allegations. For example, holding a formal legal qualification is not
compulsory for a person willing to be appointed as a member of the higher securities
court (the ACRSC) which has the power to impose imprisonment for up to five years.
Hence, a suggestion that legal background as well as practical experience should be
required on any person appointed as a member of the ACRSC.
Furthermore, it has been found that the lack of skilled lawyers dealing with securities
litigation hampers the judicial enforcement of securities law in Saudi Arabia. The main
reasons for such a scarcity are the non-availability of courses on securities law in the
law schools and the serious lack of securities case law. Generally, the number of
lawyers is insufficient when compared with fast growing population of Saudi Arabia as
well as the rapid growth of the securities market. There are only 1611 lawyers
registered, which is relatively low compared to the country’s population of over 27
million (as of 2011). The lack of lawyers, together with the absence of an independent
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bar council, may have a negative impact on the legal profession in Saudi Arabia. 1320
Hence, it is suggested that providing courses on securities laws in the universities will
make a positive contribution to the legal interface1321 with securities cases in the long
term.
It has been provided that the CMA is entitled to bring suits before the CRSD on behalf
of the investor. In this regard, according to art 59 of the CML’03, the court has to
determine a range of remedies. The discussion finds that although the courts remedial
powers are presented in a direct format, they are broad and have little specificity. The
CMA appears to have little function in practice in gaining compensation for victims.
Hence, the judicial enforcement is impeded by the weak role of the CMA in exercising
its role to protect the public and bring actions against the violators of the disclosure
regime.
Weaknesses in the judicial enforcement result in ineffective performance of the
securities courts. It has been shown that there is a low number of resolved cases
compared with the number of cases lodged. It is suggested that rules, criteria and
methodology for ascertaining the quality and performance of judges could play a
significant role in improving the judiciary in whole. Besides, the absence of an
organisation to monitor the judiciary weakens the enforcement of laws in Saudi Arabia.
A recent empirical study suggests several benefits of having specialised organisations to
evaluate the judicial performance and quality, based on courts’ productivity. 1322 Some
of the most important of these benefits are the enhancement of the judicial performance
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and the support of legal research.1323 The need for a single body, which can put in place
guidelines and standards to oversee productivity and conduct, is imperative for
enhancing the quality of the judiciary. In this respect, it is believed that such guidelines
will provide an excellent list of standards to determine whether a judge meets the
requirements of his or her office and demonstrates appropriate accountability. 1324 This is
of course in addition to having sufficient, independent, well-trained judges and lawyers
as emphasised earlier.
Chapter 9 discusses issues relating to the effectiveness of the administrative
enforcement of the securities laws in Saudi Arabia and the role played by the CMA.
Despite the recent trend to increase the powers of the regulator, this study attempts to
balance the regulator’s powers. Accordingly, it is essential that the regulator can
implement the laws and act on behalf of the public interest. The reality is that the CMA
has been desperate to restore investor confidence in the securities market. This study
finds that the role of the CMA in enforcing the disclosure regime is ineffective. Flaws
centred on a lack of transparency in the securities market. The CMA needs an efficient
system to discover and detect violations of the disclosure regime. It has been found that
the absence of precise monitoring of all corporate disclosures is a significant cause for
disclosure violations. As many violations occur without being discovered by the CMA,
investors remain without protection. What makes the issue difficult is that there have
been no studies carried out by the CMA to assess transparency in the market, and public
satisfaction and confidence in the market.
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It has been shown that the current administrative fines are negligible and not creating
deterrence for potential violators. Evidence is provided by some jurisdictions that the
availability and imposition of significantly high-value administrative fines creates
deterrence and consequently compliance with the disclosure requirements. Moreover,
this study demonstrates that weak intervention by the CMA to control the market shows
its lack of regulatory experience in enforcing the law.1325 Although the CMA has
enforcement tools given by the CML’03 and enforcement machinery through its
departments to oversee violations and carry out enforcement, the detection and
investigation departments in the CMA may require reform. Unlike the CMA, general
investors do not have the ability or the technology to detect disclosure violations in the
market. In contrast with developed jurisdictions, the CMA also lacks the power to
impose a stop order. It is suggested that the CMA be armed with the power to issue a
stop order on a prospectus when it detects matters that give rise to concern that investors
and their professional advisers would not be able to make an informed investment
decision.
It has been found that some investors have left the market because of the regulator’s
failure to use the powers available or for the overuse of these powers. Hence, this study
calls to strike a balance between the two extreme approaches.1326
This chapter has revealed an insufficiency in the regulatory role regarding information
intermediation. This has been done by showing the weak role played by the CMA in
regard to auditors, financial analysts and rating agencies and their role in the disclosure
regime.

1325
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Baamir, ‘Issues of Transparency and Disclosure in the Saudi Stock Market', above n 23, 80.
See section 9.3.4.
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The discussion on auditors concludes that having well-trained auditors and high
standards for accounting professionals will result in better disclosures by corporations in
the Saudi stock markets. A recommendation is made that the CMA issue rules for the
auditing standards performed by auditing firms registered with the Saudi Organisation
for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA).
It has been found that there is a serious lack of sophisticated financial analysts in the
Saudi stock market. In addition, the role of the CMA in regard to financial analysts as
market intermediaries is completely absent. A suggestion has been made to issue
regulation governing the qualifications and activities of the financial analysts in the
stock market.
Moreover, this chapter finds that the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE) is not exercising its
role as a ‘Self-Regulatory Organisation’ (SRO). The enabling nature of the CML’03
only allows the SSE to propose rules and standards for the operation of the market.
These proposals require approval from the CMA to be effective. Examples from
different selected developed jurisdictions show that their market exchange operators can
issue rules, instructions and directives to ensure that a transparent trading system is in
place. This chapter shows that the transparency in Saudi securities market is suffering
from not having reliable credit rating agencies (CRAs) in the country as well as the
absence of laws to govern their activities. The relation between having regulations to
regulate the CRAs and the protection of investors has been shown to be significant. This
chapter concludes by revealing the need for reforms in the regulatory function of the
CMA in regard to the disclosure regime.
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Evidence is provided that the weak performance of the CMA in releasing news and
information regarding the market was one of the main reasons for the inadequacy of the
market. Therefore, the CMA announcements should be professionally executed in a
timely and considered manner, especially, during the market boom and fall. In addition,
news to be released by the market regulator needs to be carefully assessed prior to its
release.
Furthermore, a regulatory reform needs to consider the role of the SSE, as an SRO,
which should be expanded to institute proceedings for violations of the continuous
disclosure rules. Evidence is presented that the stock exchange in some developed
jurisdictions has the right to carry out actions against the breaches of the disclosure
requirements during the listing period of the company. This is believed to be effective in
regard to creating deterrence and hence better compliance with the disclosure
requirements.
The effectiveness of regulation relies on the qualifications of the persons entrusted with
regulatory responsibilities. It is submitted that the CMA is to be comprised of members
with sufficient experience in the private sector and corporate management, adequate
legal education and practice. Members of the CMA are required to have expertise in the
field of the private sector and especially the securities markets. This will help the
regulator in addressing the market problems and restoring public confidence. Moreover,
considering the complex nature of the securities laws, legal knowledge is crucial for a
capable securities regulator. Under the Saudi securities laws, there is no statutory
requirement for a special knowledge of law as a requisite qualification for a member of
the CMA. Therefore, it can be recommended that Saudi securities laws be amended to
include legal education/experience as a requisite qualification for at least the chairman
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of the CMA as well as for at least one other member. It is submitted that persons with
law degrees need to be taken into consideration in the appointment of the members of
the CMA. In addition, having representatives of the market participants in the
composition of the CMA is important because they have experience in the corporate
management. Unfortunately, there is currently no provision for the appointment of
market participants in the regulatory body.
As the current CMA consists of five members including the chairman, a suggestion is
made to have a member from the following categories. These are: legal scholars
specialising in securities law, private sector professionals, market participants and
finally, a member who has had practical experience as solicitor in commercial litigation
and capital markets issues. Evidence is provided that the majority of members of the
securities regulators in developed countries are chosen from those who have practised
law. In all cases, the chairperson must be always chosen from those who have higher
law degrees.
However, having an accountability mechanism for regulatory misconduct or malpractice
is imperative for the maintenance of public confidence in the market. For that reason, it
is important to hold the persons entrusted with market regulation accountable, and be
able to discipline them if the need arises. It is suggested that a degree of judicial
oversight be implemented to permit the investigation of any allegations raised against
CMA members in relation to the performance of their duties.
The review of the administrative enforcement decisions is available in Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether a person can submit a claim directly to the CRSD or
whether it has to initially be placed in the hand of the CMA. In both situations,
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however, a review of the particular decision is done by the CRSD. The main concern
here is that the CRSD was established by the CMA which also appoints the members of
the CRSD. This close association has led to accusations that the latter is under the
power and influence of the CMA, and therefore the affected person may be
disadvantaged by a lack of alternative judicial scrutiny. Likewise, an allegation against a
member of the CMA should be heard before a general court of law rather the securities
court which can be seen to be under the influence of the members of CMA.
To provide stronger investor protection, market malpractice can be controlled by two
different methods; these can be termed as ‘indirect protection’ (pre-violation) and
‘direct protection’ (post-violation).
Indirect protection aims to prevent the violation from occurring and can be implemented
in two ways: firstly, investor education; and secondly, regulatory intervention prior to
the release of the disclosure document. In regard to investor education, ongoing investor
education programs are highly recommended. Evidence is provided from different
jurisdictions that shows that securities regulators there have a statutory obligation for
educating investors. A recommendation is also made that emphasises the importance of
having a separate government institution responsible for educating and training market
investors. The positive outcomes of this kind of education will not only be a better
understanding of investment, but also greater investor sophistication.1327 Proper investor
education will reduce the investment risk and therefore provide stronger protection for
investors.

1327

Law, above n 1215, 39.
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For the purpose of the regulator’s intervention prior to the release of the disclosure
document, the CMA must pursue a strong system of verifying disclosure documents
before they are released to the public. The CMA must have a specialised department to
accurately verify the drafts of prospectuses, continuous and periodic disclosures
documents before they become available to the public. The objective of such
department is to prevent the violation of the disclosure regime in particular and
securities laws in general. Hence, until the investors have sufficient knowledge and the
services of financial advisors are readily available in Saudi Arabia, the necessity of an
effective verifying body is evident.1328
Direct protection aims to remedy the violation and enable injured investors to seek
compensation. In this regard, the CMA must conduct the investigation process having
adequate powers to do so effectively and using such powers that are provided
effectively. The study finds some flaws in regard to the investigative powers of the
CMA. There are no clear regulatory structures for the period prior to the investigation.
Although the CML’03 empowers the CMA to undertake an investigation, it does not
give details of the procedure for carrying out this investigation. The general provision of
investigation powers to the CMA is lacking in detail concerning the criminal procedures
for manipulative conduct. The CML’03 does not provide the legal proceedings in
criminal matters.1329
Effective investigative powers require additional resources and well-developed
mechanisms that must be provided for the CMA to effectively track new violations
throughout the market as they occur. To effectively identify market malpractice, it is

1328
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See section 9.6.1.
The availability of criminal prosecution as a deterrence is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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recommended that the investigation department of the CMA be composed of people
with high technological expertise, extensive market experience, and keen mathematical
minds trained in finance.
The CMA needs to observe the IOSCO Objectives and Principles in order to improve
investor protection in Saudi Arabia so that it is on par with its equivalents in developed
countries.

10. 4 Final Thoughts and Way Forward
Investor protection is the cornerstone of securities regulation. Similarly, the
development of the securities market requires efficient regulation. This study
demonstrates that the current civil liability regime for corporate disclosures in Saudi
Arabia is inadequate from the perspective of investor protection. It is believed that this
drawback in the legal provisions produces weaker protection of investors in the
disclosure regime in Saudi Arabia. However, the following provides the answer for the
key research question, namely: ‘How can the Saudi corporate disclosure regime be
further improved to protect investors?’.
In order to improve the investor protection in the securities market, Saudi securities
laws should follow the path of the selected developed countries. This is because
selected developed countries have a long history of dealing with securities cases and of
judicial interpretation of securities law. Moreover, the CMA is required in practice to
apply the IOSCO Objectives and Principles for Securities Regulation.
The CMA should strictly maintain investor protection and therefore adhere to the
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation set out by the IOSCO. The objectives
for the regulator in this IOSCO policy framework include: protecting investors;
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ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and reducing systemic risk.1330
In addition, the CMA is required to adopt clear and consistent regulatory processes as
stated in Principle 4 in the IOSCO Objective and Principles. Principle 7 requires the
regulator to contribute to a process to review the ‘perimeter of regulation’ regularly.
Certainly, improvements to the current disclosure regime are needed to provide an
efficient and transparent market comparable to that of the selected developed markets.
As an empirical study of 2009 reveals that ‘corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is
characterised by a lack of accountability, a weak legal framework and poor protection of
shareholders’.1331
Securities regulations need to be responsive to financial crises. Securities regulatory
bodies have a duty to correct and review their laws in order to have a better market with
strong investor protection. A recent study shows that it is essential for the protection of
investors that an effective action be taken by securities regulators after a financial
crisis.1332 Securities regulators need to consider useful disclosure requirements as part of
their response. For example, after the meltdown of Enron in late 2001, the US enacted
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, which aims to increase the protection of investors in the
securities market.1333 The need for effective regulation for the secondary market is
essential for the protection of investors in the SSE, especially after the market collapse
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IOSCO, 'Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation-2010', above n 18.
Falgi, above n 36.
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Mark K Brewer, Orla Gough and Neeta S Shah, 'Reconsidering Disclosure and Liability in the
Transatlantic Capital Markets' (2011) 9 DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal 257, 291. See
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in 2006. Consequently, the role of the CMA as the supervisory and regulatory body of
the securities market needs to continue to develop and embrace further refinement of its
rules and regulations, especially regarding secondary market disclosure.1334
It has been seen that that the Saudi civil liability provisions for defective disclosure are,
principally, a direct translation of the equivalent provisions of the US Securities Act
1933.1335 It is clear that the US provisions have witnessed a historical development
since they came into existence. In order for this importation to suit Saudi securities
market conditions, a greater role is required by the government, the CMA and for court
interpretations of these provisions. Thus, it is strongly suggested that the regulator of the
Saudi securities market utilise and benefit from the US developments.
Arguably, there is a need to take into account further causes that have contributed to the
lack of investor recourse to the courts for remedial action. These reasons are: the
absence of the legal knowledge amongst investors, the likely small amount of loss so
investors do not care to pursue the matter, in the face of the cost of litigation, and the
delay in delivering the judgments. Questions remain, therefore, as to how general
investors initially can know that their loss was not normal and resulted from a breach of
the law,1336 and how such general investors can prove their right to compensation.
A significant point is that the combination of the serious lack of case law and absence of
interpretation by courts has considerably contributed to the ambiguity of civil liability
regarding the defective prospectus.

1334

For example, Fanto illustrates the SEC’s traditional mission as disclosure-related to securities
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So far, there have been no studies carried out by the CMA to assess transparency in the
market, and public satisfaction and confidence in the market. Thus, the issue of market
regulation becomes difficult, especially with the serious dearth of extensive legal
research on the aspects of the administrative enforcement of securities laws in Saudi
Arabia.
Equally important, the need for ongoing research and studies is significant in relation to
the regulator’s role in protecting investors. Tomasic suggests that academic researchers
have an important role to support regulators in order to implement effective
enforcement strategies.1337 Therefore, there is a need for cooperation between the CMA
and scholars in the field of securities laws in order to enhance the effectiveness of the
securities laws.
Indeed, the law interferes in the securities market to provide protection for investors
from unfair practices. Sufficient and adequate investor remedies against breaches of the
disclosure regime together with effective enforcement machinery will create strong
incentives for market participants to comply with disclosure requirements and therefore
lead to improved investor protection.
Consequently, the author believes that strengthening the civil liability for the breaches
of disclosure regime can promote better protection for investors in both IPOs market
and the secondary market in Saudi Arabia. This protection will help restore investor
confidence in the market and therefore attract greater investment.
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Tomasic, ‘Governance and the Evaluation of Corporate Law and Regulation in Australia’, above n
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On the basis that the interests of investors impose on market participants a duty of
disclosure and thus transparency, this thesis attempts to determine what will serve to
foster a fair, efficient and competitive capital market environment. If such a worthy
objective is to be achieved, it is important that the law relating to continuous as well as
periodic disclosure is robustly enforced.
Throughout this thesis, it has been seen that the focus is civil liability for defective
disclosures as an effective means of providing protection for investors in the securities
market in Saudi Arabia. However, when it comes to the absence of a viable disclosure
regime, surely it is not due just to the lack of transparency, but also the lack of certain
prerequisites. These prerequisites have to do with investors’ ability to make prudent
investment decisions in the use of disclosure in the prospectus, strong legal regulatory
and enforcement framework for investor protection, dominance of institutional investors
and, finally, the availability of an investment advisory service (and education) and retail
research to throw more light on the nature of the disclosure of issuers. Laws dealing
with these issues may be a suitable field for profound examination in order to provide
comprehensive protection for investors in the Saudi stock market. Such examination
may be the subject of further research.
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